KARIN SANDQUIST DANIELLE BUONOMO v. THE TJX COMPANIES INC MARMAXX OPERATING CORP MAXX MARSHALLS (2026)

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants’ TJX Companies, Inc. and Marmaxx Operating Corp. (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Karin Sandquist and Danielle Buonomo's (“Plaintiffs”) Amended Class Action Complaint (“Motion”), ECF No. [19]. Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [34]. Defendants filed a Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [39]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

In their Class Action Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants systematically charged and collected Florida sales tax on purchases of tax-exempt baby and toddler products in their T.J. Maxx and Marshalls stores. ECF No. [16]. The plaintiff class (“Class”) consists of customers that Defendants overcharged under the guise of sales tax, from the period beginning July 1, 2023, to the present (“Class Period”). Id. at ¶ 1.

Defendants collectively have over 2,500 stores nationwide, including approximately 102 T.J. Maxx stores and 111 Marshalls stores across the state of Florida, where they sell a variety of baby and toddler products. Id. at ¶ 12-13. Defendants continue to charge sales tax on baby and toddler products despite Florida's explicit tax exemption for these products. Id. at ¶ 14. When Plaintiffs purchased articles of toddler clothing at Defendants’ stores, Defendants collected a 7% charge labeled as Florida sales tax, despite the exemption on these products. Id. at ¶ 15-16.

The Florida Department of Revenue provided public notice of the sales tax exemption to Defendants on July 1, 2022, after the sales tax exemption had passed the Florida Legislature and was signed by Governor Ron Desantis. Id. at ¶ 22. The Department of Revenue provided notice once again to Defendants on June 9, 2023, via a Tax Information Publication that a permanent sales tax exemption on baby and toddler products would be effective starting July 1, 2023. Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiffs filed this action to prevent Defendants from collecting sales tax on baby and toddler products that are explicitly subject to a tax exemption under Florida Statutes, § 212.08. Id. at ¶ 24-25.

Plaintiffs, in this putative class action, allege eight causes of action: fraudulent misrepresentation (Count I), unjust enrichment (Count I1), breach of contract (Count III), unconscionability (Count IV), conversion (Count V), a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) (Count VI), negligent misrepresentation (Count VII), and negligence (Count VIII). Id. at ¶ 63-149. Plaintiffs seek an order certifying the Class, appointing Plaintiffs and their legal counsel to represent the Class, awarding repayment, with interest, of the wrongfully charged sums purported to be sales tax on baby and toddler products, compensatory and statutory damages, statutory penalties, and punitive damages, and such injunctive or equitable relief necessary to prevent further misconduct. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiffs seeks an order requiring Defendants to implement safeguards, policies and procedures to ensure that the point of sale system used complies worth applicable tax laws, and that employees are trained to use the point-of-sale system and ready to take the steps necessary to prevent the application of sales tax on tax-exempt items. Id.

In the Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of all Counts for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and alternatively for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants contend that Florida Statutes, § 215.26, provides that an application to the Department of Revenue is the exclusive procedure and remedy for obtaining a refund on collected taxes where none was due. ECF No. [19] at 6. As such, since Plaintiffs have not pursued or exhausted those administrative remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. Plaintiffs respond that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction and the Amended Complaint states viable claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F. 3d 964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005). It should do so “at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F. 3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Once a federal court determines that it is without subject-matter jurisdiction, “the court is powerless to continue.” Bochese, 405 F. 3d at 974-75; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action”).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “ ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When a defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all possible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Am. Marine Tech, Inc. v. World Grp. Yachting, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1079 (S.D. Fla. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ class action claims. ECF No. [19] at 9. Specifically, Defendants argue that Florida Statutes, § 215.26 serves as a jurisdictional bar for Plaintiffs who failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in seeking a refund of improperly collected taxes with the Florida Department of Revenue. Id.

Florida Statutes, § 215.26 provides, in relevant part:

(1) The Chief Financial Officer may refund to the person who paid same, or his or her heirs, personal representatives, or assigns, any moneys paid into the State Treasury which constitute:

(a) An overpayment of any tax, license, or account due;

(b) A payment where no tax, license, or account is due; and

(c) Any payment made into the State Treasury in error;

․

(2) Application for refunds as provided by this section must be filed with the Chief Financial Officer, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, within 3 years after the right to the refund has accrued or else the right is barred.

․

(4) This section is the exclusive procedure and remedy for refund claims between individual funds and accounts in the State Treasury.

․

(6) A taxpayer may contest a denial of refund of tax, interest, or penalty paid under a section or chapter specified in s. 72.011(1) pursuant to the provisions of s. 72.011. Fla. Stat. § 215.26.

Defendants rely on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fox v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 977 F. 3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2020), to demonstrate that a failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Florida Statutes, § 215.26, acts as a jurisdictional bar for filing suit on claims for a tax refund. In Fox, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a hotel guest's tax refund claim because the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. Id. at 1051. The plaintiff represented hotel guests who were charged hidden automatic gratuities and sales taxes on food and beverage purchases, and alleged violations of the FDUTPA and state tax law. Id. at 1043. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the Florida legislature established a procedure for acquiring a tax refund where no tax was due, and Florida Statutes, § 215.26 “provides the mechanism” by which such refund is obtained. Id. at 1049. (quoting Sarnoff v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 825 So. 2d 351, 355 (Fla. 2002)); see also State Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Rendon, 957 So. 2d 647, 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because, similar to the plaintiffs in Fox, Plaintiffs did not allege compliance with the administrative process for obtaining a tax refund. ECF No. [19] at 10.

Defendants also rely on the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Bugliaro, 273 So. 3d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), and argue that a taxpayer must attempt to obtain a refund from the State before filing suit. In BJ's, the plaintiff filed a class action seeking relief under FDUTPA alleging that BJ's Wholesale Club improperly collected sales tax from customer on the full price of products purchased with a discount, instead of collecting sales tax after the application of the discount. Id. at 1120. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Id. at 1121. In reversing the order, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant plaintiff's motion because, as part of the class's declaration for relief, plaintiffs sought a tax refund, triggering the requirements of Florida Statutes, § 215.26 to pursue administrative remedies with the Department of Revenue prior to filing suit. Id. Defendants argue that, similar to the plaintiffs in BJ's, Plaintiffs cannot seek relief under FDUTPA before exhausting their administrative remedies with the Department of Revenue. ECF No. [19] at 10.

Defendants further argue that even if Plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies and this Court had jurisdiction, Defendants are the wrong party to this action. Id. at 11. Defendants rely on Florida Statutes, § 213.756(1) to show that taxes “are state funds from the moment of collection.” Fla. Stat. § 213.756(1) (2025). Because Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants failed to remit those funds to the State, Defendants argue that if Plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies, the correct Defendant would be the State of Florida. ECF No. [19] at 11.

Defendants alternatively argue that each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action, including fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, unconscionability, conversion, a violation of FDUTPA, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence, fail to state a claim for relief and are barred by the Independent Tort Doctrine. Id. at 11-21.

Plaintiffs respond that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), because they have met the numerosity, diversity, and amount-in-controversy requirements. ECF No. [34] at 8.

Plaintiffs also challenge Defendants’ argument that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional bar as Plaintiffs do not have a direct refund remedy through the Department of Revenue. ECF No. [34] at 6. Plaintiffs rely on Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.014, which states that a consumer who paid a tax when no tax was due is entitled to seek a refund directly from the dealer, not from the Department of Revenue. Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs maintain that Florida's regulatory framework places the responsibility on the dealer to refund the taxpayer, not the Department of Revenue. Id.

Plaintiffs rely on two cases where the court applied Rule 12A-1.014 and found that plaintiffs have a right to seek a tax refund directly from a dealer who collected an illegal tax. see Schojan v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1208 (M.D. Fla. 2014); Minniti v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 2015 WL 5037164 at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2015).

In each case, plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that a pizza company charged and collected sales tax on delivery fees in violation of Florida law. Schojan, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 1208; Minniti, 2015 WL 5037164 at 1. In denying the motions to dismiss, the courts found that Florida Statutes, § 215.26 did not serve as a jurisdictional bar to the plaintiffs’ tax refund claims, the presence of administrative remedies was not a basis for dismissal, and individuals have a right under Rule 12A-1.014 to seek a refund directly from the dealer. Schojan, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 1212; see also Minniti, 2015 WL 5037164 at 3.

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants’ reliance on Fox and BJ's is misplaced. BJ's does not apply because, unlike the plaintiffs in BJ's, Plaintiffs do not seek a tax refund under their claim of violation of FDUTPA, and therefore the Court should not dismiss their claim. ECF No. [34] at 12. Moreover, Fox is inapplicable because the charges brought against Ritz-Carlton were not the same as those raised here. Id.

A. Plaintiffs Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Because Plaintiffs filed a claim for a tax refund under state law, Florida's substantive law applies in this diversity action according to Erie principles. Fox, 977 F. 3d at 1049 (citing Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, L.L.C., 746 F. 3d 1008, 1020 (11th Cir. 2014)). Therefore, precedent from the Supreme Court of Florida, or the intermediate appellate courts when the State's highest court is silent, will govern. Id. (citing Winn-Dixie, 746 F. 3d at 1021)

The Court finds two Florida decisions guide the result here. In Sarnoff, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of a class action that challenged a Florida statute requiring vehicle owners to have their vehicles inspected annually for emissions and pay an inspection fee. 852 So. 2d at 351. In its decision, the court held that Florida Statutes, § 215.26 “provides the mechanism for receiving a refund from the State,” and individuals are “required to request a refund under this statute before proceeding to circuit court.” Id. at 355.Similarly, in Rendon, the Third District Court of Appeals barred monetary relief to a class of disabled motorists who challenged a fee placed on the issuance and renewal of handicapped parking permits. 957 So. 2d at 654. In reversing the trial court's award of monetary relief, the court held that, under Florida Statutes, § 215.26, “a taxpayer can obtain a refund of a fee paid where no fee was owed,” and can only bring suit if the refund request is denied. Id. at 653-54.

Because the statute requires parties to pursue administrative remedies with the Department of Revenue before suing a dealer to obtain a refund, trial courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear cases in which a party did not exhaust their administrative remedies. BJ's, 273 So. 3d at 1121.

Plaintiffs argue that Florida's administrative code directs taxpayers to obtain refunds from the dealer as opposed to the Department of Revenue. Plaintiffs rely on a decision from the Middle District of Florida and a Florida circuit court ruling as case law to support their argument. ECF No [34] at 11. However, their argument has been rejected by the Third District Court of Appeal in BJ's and by the Eleventh Circuit applying Florida law in Fox. 273 So. 3d at 1121; 977 F. 3d at 1051.

Similar to the plaintiffs in BJ's, Plaintiffs here seek an order requiring “repayment, with interest, of the wrongfully charged sums purported to be sales tax on Baby and Toddler products collected from members of the proposed Class․” ECF No. [16] at ¶ 5. Plaintiffs contend they are not seeking a tax refund because there was no tax due in the first place. ECF No. [34] at 9. In contrast, Defendants properly rely on Florida Statutes, § 213.756, which states: “Funds collected from a purchaser under the representation that they are taxes provided for under the state revenue laws are state funds from the moment of collection․” Fla. Stat. § 213.756(1) (2025). Because Plaintiffs did not allege that Defendants failed to remit these funds, the funds are therefore in the possession of the Department of Revenue, and Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their remedies with the State. ECF No. [39] at 7.

Critically, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fox has decided that BJ's controls this tax refund claim as the highest court in Florida to decide this issue. 977 F. 3d at 1049. Like in Fox, Plaintiffs seek damages, including a tax refund. ECF No. [16] at ¶ 5. In applying BJ's, the court found that plaintiffs must comply with the requirements of Florida Statutes, § 215.26 prior to filing suit for a tax refund. Fox, 977 F. 3d at 1050. The court in Fox also stated that “regardless of the nature of the claim, because the plaintiff's remedy was for a ‘tax refund,’ she needed to exhaust the administrative procedures in § 215.26 before going to the courts.” Id. (citing BJ's, 273 So. 3d at 1121). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ argument that they do not have administrative remedies to exhaust under a claim for violation of FDUTPA fails.

B. CAFA Does Not Create Federal Jurisdiction Where State Jurisdiction is Lacking

Plaintiffs’ argument that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action through CAFA is without merit. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a federal court does not have diversity subject-matter jurisdiction on claims where a state court would lack jurisdiction. Fox, 977 F. 3d at 1050, (citing Connolly v. Maryland Casualty Co., 849 F. 2d 525, 528 (11th Cir. 1988)). In Connolly, plaintiffs sued an insurance company in federal court for allegedly mishandling a claim and intentionally mistreating the claimant and his wife. Id. at 525. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was found in the Florida's Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a federal court cannot grant remedies that would “rise above the exclusive remedy provided by the Florida statutes.” Id. at 528. Like Connolly, the Court must dismiss the present action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the same manner that a Florida state trial court would. Florida Statutes, § 215.26(4) explicitly states that this provision “is the exclusive procedure and remedy for refund claims between individual funds and accounts in the State Treasury.” Fla. Stat. § 215.26(4) (2025). The Erie doctrine requires federal courts to apply state law regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Fox, 977 F. 3d at 1050 (citing Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F. 2d 1164, 1168-70 (5th Cir. 1979)). Otherwise, non-resident plaintiffs would be able to file a diversity action in federal court and circumvent the Florida legislature's requirement to exhaust administrative remedies prior to litigation, leading to an inconsistent application of justice. Fox, 977 F. 3d at 1050 (citing Woods, 591 F. 2d at 1170).

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ theory that the Florida Administrative Code governs is contrary to binding precedent. Courts “adjudicate disputes based on the language of Florida law, even where it may be in conflict with a promulgated rule.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 397 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the Florida Administrative Code, regulations drafted by appointed officials to assist executive agencies, overrides a statute passed by the Florida legislature. However, “it is axiomatic that an administrative rule cannot enlarge, modify or contravene the provisions of a statute.” State of Florida, Dep't of Bus. Regul., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. Salvation Ltd., Inc., 452 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In the event of a conflict between a statute and an administrative rule, the statute governs. Therefore, Florida Statutes, § 215.26 applies to Plaintiffs’ tax refund claim against Defendants, and filing suit for repayment from the Defendant is the improper remedy.

Without allegations or other evidence that Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the Florida legislature, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. As a result, the Court does not consider Defendant's alternative argument that Plaintiffs lack standing or the Amended Complaint fails to adequately state claims for relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

1. Defendants T.J. MAXX and MARSHALLS Motion, ECF No. [19], is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

3. The Clerk Shall CLOSE the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on July 28, 2026.

BETH BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE