PLOWRIGHT v. MIAMI DADE COUNTY III MDPD (2023)

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Miami–Dade County's (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (ECF No. 54) Plaintiff Sylvan Plowright's (“Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint” or “SAC”) (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 58), and Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 61). The Motion is now ripe for review. The Court assumes the Parties’ familiarity with the background in this Case.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) “is to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citation and alterations omitted). The court takes the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must contain enough facts to plausibly allege the required elements. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2007). A pleading that offers “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on two grounds. First, Defendant argues the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claim for negligence based on failure to state a claim. Mot. at 5–8. Then, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for negligent training based on sovereign immunity. Id. at 8–10. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

A. Negligence

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's claim for negligence should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff failed to state a claim; (2) Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty; and (3) the underlying conduct—the shooting and tasing—was intentional and cannot support a claim for negligence. See Mot. at 5–8. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for negligence it does not discuss Defendant's other arguments.

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that the negligence action is “based upon the negligence of the county in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.” SAC ¶ 39. Other than this conclusory statement, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts suggesting that the County was negligent. Plaintiff states that officers responded to his call for assistance and, when they approached his home, they shot and killed his barking dog. Id. ¶¶ 38–48. Plaintiff does not specify how Defendant acted negligently, or how Defendant breached a duty of care it owed to Plaintiff.

In the Court's prior Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's negligence claim as a shotgun pleading. See ECF No. 49. After being given the opportunity to amend his complaint, Plaintiff himself concedes that in his second amended complaint, “[a]rguably Plowright's negligence claim is not the clearest.” Resp. at 2. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligence and, accordingly, his negligence claim is dismissed.

B. Negligent Training

Defendant next moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for negligent training because Defendant is immune under the discretionary function exception. See Mot at 8–10. Plaintiff argues that the challenged actions were operational—not discretionary—and therefore not barred by sovereign immunity. Resp. at 4.

Under the discretionary function exception, the Government is not liable for

[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). “The discretionary function exception ‘marks the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.’ ” Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660, (1984)). “When the discretionary function exception applies to a claim, the federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Illinois Metro. Inv. Fund v. United States, 773 F. App'x 540, 542 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Swafford v. United States, 839 F.3d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 2016)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is liable for negligent training because “[t]he defendant inadequately trained its officers due to the fact that no real policy or curricula were developed” regarding interactions between police officers and dogs. SAC ¶ 53. Plaintiff further states that “defendant knew or should have known that the failure to have a policy and train would result in pets needlessly killed.” Id. ¶ 54. Without any factual support, Plaintiff makes the conclusory statement that “[t]he defendant's policy of allowing these shootings without training or curricula established a deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens when it knows of the widespread pattern of wantonly, willfully, and maliciously shooting pets so dear to their owners.” Id. ¶ 57.

In determining whether the discretionary function exception bars Plaintiff's claim for negligent training, the Court finds instructive the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2001). In Lewis the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for negligent training and held that:

[Plaintiff] does not challenge the implementation or operation of the City's police training program as it relates to the officers involved in the shooting, but rather [Plaintiff] challenges the City's policy decisions regarding what to include in the training of its police officers. A city's decision regarding how to train its officers and what subject matter to include in the training is clearly an exercise of governmental discretion regarding fundamental questions of policy and planning. Because [Plaintiff] challenges the reasonableness of basic policy decisions made by the City, the ‘discretionary’ function exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity applies and her claim is barred.

260 F.3d at 1267.

Similarly, this claim falls squarely within the discretionary function exception because it concerns Defendant's decision regarding how to train its officers and what subject matter to include in the training. Id.; see also Echevarria-de-Pena v. United States, No. 12-cv-22248, 2013 WL 616932, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2013) (“Plaintiff's claim based upon the alleged negligent training of employees also falls within the ambit of the discretionary function exception.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for negligent training is dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 54) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.¹ The Clerk of Court is instructed to CLOSE this case. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 9th day of January, 2023.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A district court's discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend is restricted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), which directs that leave to amend shall freely be given when justice so requires; but where, as here, there has been a repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, the district court does not have to allow the party to amend the pleading. Barrett v. Scutieri, 281 F. App'x 952, 954 (11th Cir. 2008).

K. MICHAEL MOORE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE