PLOWRIGHT v. MIAMI DADE COUNTY III MDPD (2022)

OMNIBUS ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon two (2) motions to dismiss. First, Defendant Miami–Dade County (the “County”) and Defendant Miami-Dade Police Department Director Alfredo Ramirez, III (“Ramirez”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (“County Mot.”) (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff Sylvan Plowright (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition, (“Resp. to County”) (ECF No. 14), and Defendants filed a reply (“County Reply”) (ECF No. 32). Then, Defendant Officer Leonardis Rondon (“Rondon”) and Defendant Officer Sergio Cordova (“Cordova”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Off. Mot.”) (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (“Resp. to Off.”) (ECF No. 25), and the Officer Defendants filed a reply (“Off. Reply”) (ECF No. 30). The Motions are now ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND 1

On October 6, 2020, Plaintiff called 911 to report suspicious activity at his neighbor's residence. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14. Shortly thereafter, two police officers, Rondon and Cordova, arrived at Plaintiff's residence. Id. ¶ 15. When Plaintiff opened the door for the officers, “they immediately began shouting ‘show me your hands’ while their weapons were drawn.” Id. ¶ 19.

The officers then demanded that Plaintiff “get his dog,” who was barking. Id. ¶ 20. The officers were referring to Plaintiff's dog, Niles, an American Bulldog who weighed less than forty pounds. Id. ¶ 16. While “screaming commands at Plaintiff,” Rondon pointed and shot his taser at Niles, sending the dog into shock. Id. ¶ 24. Then, Cordova fired “at least two shots from his gun” and killed Niles. Id. ¶ 27.

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 17, 2022, asserting claims for: (1) excessive force pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cordova; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress against Rondon and Cordova; (3) negligence and negligent training against the County; and (4) negligent supervision against Ramirez. See id.

Plaintiff attached to the Complaint a news article detailing several incidents where police officers in Miami-Dade County shot household dogs. See Exhibit A. The article also quotes Miami-Dade Police Major Carlos Gonzalez where he stated that he “wanted to bring in experts, so we can develop a curriculum” regarding interactions between police and family pets. Id. at 2. The Complaint also states that Miami-Dade County's Mayor “recently reacted that the [C]ounty must do something about the unnecessary shooting of dogs by police.” Compl. ¶ 109.

Now, the Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint. See generally Mots. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Officers includes reference to, and bases its arguments on, an attached flash drive containing body camera footage capturing the Underlying Incident.²

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) “is to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citation and alterations omitted). The court takes the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must contain enough facts to plausibly allege the required elements. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2007). A pleading that offers “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on several grounds. First, Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claim for excessive force against Cordova based on qualified immunity. See Off. Mot. at 4–10. Second, Defendants assert the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Cordova, Rondon, and Ramirez based on statutory immunity. Id. at 15; County Mot. at 14. Lastly, Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the County because Plaintiff failed to state a claim. See County Mot. The Court addresses each of these arguments, as well as Plaintiff's responses, in turn.

A. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that Cordova is entitled to qualified immunity because the law pertaining to pet owner's rights vis-à-vis law enforcement is not clearly established in this Circuit. Off. Mot. at 9–10. In response, Plaintiff argues that Cordova is entitled to qualified immunity because Cordova intentionally violated Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. Resp. to Off. at 8. Plaintiff also asserts that the issue of qualified immunity should be decided at the summary judgment stage, not at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 7.

The United States Supreme Court has urged courts to apply qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of litigation because the defense is immunity from the burdens of defending a lawsuit, not just immunity from damages or liability. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). As such, “[a]lthough ‘the defense of qualified immunity is typically addressed at the summary judgment stage of a case, it may be raised and considered on a motion to dismiss.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “Generally speaking, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. Thus, “[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

“Qualified immunity provides complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities where their conduct ‘does not violate clearly establish statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App'x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). “An officer is entitled to qualified immunity where his actions would be objectively reasonable to a reasonable officer in the same situation.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). To assert a qualified immunity defense, an officer must have been acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Id.

Once the government official establishes that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that (1) the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). This Court may consider the two prongs in any order, but “an official is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish either.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty, 923 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019).

Defendants state, and Plaintiff does not contest, that it is “undisputed that Off. Cordova was within his discretionary authority when he interacted with Plaintiff.” County Mot. at 6. The Court agrees and accordingly turns to whether Plaintiff has met his burden to establish that Cordova violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the incident. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808.

To demonstrate that a constitutional right is “clearly established,” the party opposing qualified immunity must identify “a controlling case or robust consensus of cases” finding a constitutional violation “under similar circumstances.” Id. at 591 (citation omitted). The ultimate inquiry is “whether the state of the law gave the defendants fair warning that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.” Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The line between law and unlawful is often vague. Harlow’s ‘clearly established’ standard demands that a bright line be crossed. The line is not to be found in abstractions–to act reasonably, to act with probable cause, and so forth–but in studying how these abstractions have been applied in concrete circumstances.” Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1194 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, “a constitutional right is clearly established if controlling precedent has recognized the right in a ‘concrete and factually defined context.’ A plaintiff cannot avoid the qualified immunity defense ‘by referring to general rules and to violations of abstract ‘rights.’ ” Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2001). “[I]f case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff cites to no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit authority holding that an officer shooting a dog amounts to a constitutional violation. See generally Resp. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that “[w]here a seizure is made without a warrant, it is presumptively unreasonable,” and that “[i]t should be obvious to the citizens that their pets are secure from unreasonable seizure by government.” Id. at 8. This is a mere reference to “general rules and to violations of abstract ‘rights’ ” that is insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff's burden. Chesser, 248 F.3d at 1122. Plaintiff failed to identify “a controlling case or robust consensus of cases” finding a constitutional violation “under similar circumstances.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808. Accordingly, Officer Cordova is entitled to qualified immunity regarding the alleged constitutional violations.

B. Statutory Immunity

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's remaining claims against Ramirez, Cordova, and Rondon must be dismissed because the Defendants are entitled to statutory immunity. County Mot at 16; Off. Mot. at 15. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. See Resp. to County; Resp. to Off.

Florida law provides that:

[a]n officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions may not be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). “[W]hether an act was committed with malicious purpose, bad faith, or with wanton and willful disregard is not a question that must be submitted to a jury, but rather, can be decided by the Court depending on the facts.” Blue v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 10-23599-CIV, 2011 WL 2447699, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2011) (citing Prieto v. Malgor, 361 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Plaintiff brings a tort claim against Ramirez personally but fails to allege any facts suggesting that Ramirez “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Plaintiff also brings claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cordova and Rondon. Compl. ¶¶ 54–76. Although Plaintiff makes the conclusory statement that the Officers acted “in bad faith, and with malicious purpose with a willful and wanton disregard for human safety and property,” id. ¶¶ 57, 70, Plaintiff provides no facts suggesting Cordova and Rondon acted “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Plaintiff failed to establish the requisite malice and Defendants Cordoza, Rondon, and Ramirez are statutorily immune from Plaintiff's tort allegations.

C. Remaining Counts Against the County

The Court now turns to Plaintiff's remaining claims against the County: (1) negligence; and (2) negligent training and supervision. See Compl. ¶¶ 77–104.

Defendants argue the Court should dismiss the negligence claim because it “confusingly describes County police officers’ interactions with dogs as somehow involving ‘excessive force in violation of the 4th amendment,’ ” and Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to Plaintiff's dog. County Mot. at 7–8. Plaintiff responds that “the complaint is clear that the killing of the family pet is a seizure of [Plaintiff's] property in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Resp. to County at 5. Defendants then argue that the Complaint alleges a Fourth Amendment violation based on excessive force—not based on a deprivation of property—and that Plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his Complaint. County Reply at 5.

Then, Defendants argue the Court should dismiss the negligent training and supervision claim because Plaintiff does not specify whether he brings the claim pursuant to state or federal law. County Mot. at 9. Defendants also state that the “unfocused nature of the allegations makes it difficult for Defendants to respond. Id.

The Court agrees with Defendants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim” showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thereunder, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (cleaned up).

“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’ ” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). One type of shotgun pleading complaint is one that is “guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at 1322. The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests. Id. Such a shotgun pleading makes it “virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore, “shotgun pleadings are routinely condemned by the Eleventh Circuit.” Real Est. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Cadrecha, No. 8:11-cv-474, 2011 WL 2881928, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2011) (citing Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991)).

The causes of action for negligence and negligent training and supervision here are quintessential shotgun pleadings in violation of Rule 8(a)(2). This is precisely the kind of shotgun pleading the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly condemned, as “[t]he result [ ] that [all] count[s] [other than the first] [are] replete with factual allegations [and legal conclusions] that could not possibly be material to th[ose] specific count[s].” Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (alterations added). The Court is “unwilling to address and decide serious [ ] issues on the basis of this [C]omplaint.” Id. (alterations added).

IV. CONCLUSION

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. The Officer Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff's claims against Officers Cordova and Rondon are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The County Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED.

4. Plaintiff's claims against Ramirez are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

5. Plaintiff's claims against the County for Negligence and Negligent Training are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has until December 12, 2022, to submit an amended complaint addressing the foregoing deficiencies. The submission of another shotgun pleading will result in the entry of an order of dismissal.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 5th day of December 2022.

FOOTNOTES

2.   A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim merely tests the sufficiency of the complaint; it does not decide the merits of the case. Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 1984). “The court has discretion as to whether to accept material beyond the pleading that is offered in conjunction with a 12(b)(6) motion. Once the court decides to accept matters outside the pleading, it must convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Property Management & Investments, Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 604 (11th Cir. 1985). However, if a district court provides an alternative basis for dismissal that does not rely on extrinsic evidence, the court need not convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Christy v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., 288 F. App'x 658, 664 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, the Court declines to consider the body camera footage attached to the Motion to Dismiss and relies on an alternative basis of dismissal.

K. MICHAEL MOORE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE