LILIAN ROXANA VALLEJO v. DIRECTOR DHS ICE ERO (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 16]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner, Lilian Roxana Vallejo's, Status Report and Motion to Enforce (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 16], filed on January 26, 2026. Respondents filed a Response in Opposition [ECF No. 18], and Petitioner filed a Reply [ECF No. 19].

THE COURT has reviewed the Motion [ECF No. 16], the Response and Reply thereto, the applicable law, and the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging her continued immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) without a bond hearing. [ECF No. 1. After reviewing the Petition and the parties’ submissions, this Court granted the Petition in part and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond determination hearing forthwith and no later than January 23, 2026. [ECF No. 15] (“Habeas Order”).

On January 16, 2026, Petitioner appeared before Immigration Judge Stuart A. Siegel for a custody redetermination hearing. Following the hearing, the Immigration Judge ordered that Petitioner be released from custody upon posting a $10,000 bond. The Immigration Judge's order also included the notation, “No further arrests.” [ECF No. 16-1].

Petitioner subsequently posted the required bond and was released from immigration detention. There is no dispute that Respondents provided the bond hearing ordered by this Court or that Petitioner was released after satisfying the bond condition.

On January 26, 2026, Petitioner filed a Status Report and Motion to Enforce. [ECF No. 16]. In the Motion, Petitioner represents that, following her release, Respondents required her to participate in the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”) and wear an electronic ankle monitor. Petitioner further represents that she was required to report to ISAP, provide certain documentation to immigration officials, and submit to home visits by ICE officers. According to Petitioner, these requirements were imposed despite the Immigration Judge's release order and constitute an unauthorized continuation of her custody. Petitioner therefore requests that this Court enforce the Immigration Judge's order and direct Respondents to remove her from ISAP and electronic monitoring. Id.

Following the filing of the Motion, this Court directed Respondents to respond. [ECF No. 17]. Respondents filed their Response on February 13, 2026. [ECF No. 18]. Respondents contend that they fully complied with this Court's Habeas Order by providing Petitioner with a bond hearing before the Court-imposed deadline and subsequently releasing her after bond was posted. Respondents further maintain that federal immigration statutes and regulations independently authorize DHS and ICE to impose conditions of release, including electronic monitoring and participation in ISAP, and therefore no violation of either this Court's order or the Immigration Judge's custody determination occurred. Id.

The Motion is now ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Courts have the inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders[.]” Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 1991); see Davis v. Post Univ., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (Rosenberg, J.) (“It is well settled that federal courts possess inherent authority to enforce their own orders and to police their own proceedings.”).

With respect to bond determinations under Section 1226, Congress has expressly stripped the courts of jurisdiction to review such orders. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “§ 1226(e) precludes an alien from challenging a ‘discretionary judgment’ by the Attorney General or a ‘decision’ that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003)); see also United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court cannot review or overturn an IJ's bond order pending the conclusion of immigration proceedings).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that Respondents violated both this Court's Habeas Order and the Immigration Judge's custody redetermination order by requiring her, after release on bond, to participate in the ISAP and wear an electronic ankle monitor. Petitioner therefore requests that the Court “enforce” its prior Order by directing Respondents to remove those conditions.

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Respondents complied with this Court's January 13, 2026 Habeas Order. In granting the Petition in part, this Court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing no later than January 23, 2026. Respondents secured a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge on January 16, 2026, well before the Court-imposed deadline. Following that hearing, the Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner released upon posting a $10,000 bond, which she subsequently posted. Petitioner was thereafter released from immigration detention. Accordingly, Respondents complied with this Court's Habeas Order.

Petitioner nevertheless argues that Respondents acted ultra vires by imposing ISAP participation and electronic monitoring because those conditions were not included in the Immigration Judge's custody redetermination order. The governing statutory and regulatory framework does not support that contention.

Congress has authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to arrest and detain an alien pending a decision on removal and, in the Secretary's discretion, either continue detention or release the alien subject to bond and other conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). The implementing regulations similarly authorize release subject to conditions prescribed by immigration officials. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). While an Immigration Judge possesses authority to review custody determinations and set bond, the regulations also contemplate that conditions imposed by DHS may be reviewed administratively. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1); Matter of Garcia-Garcia, 25 I. & N. Dec. 93, 98 (B.I.A. 2009).

Thus, the Immigration Judge's decision to release Petitioner on bond did not extinguish DHS's independent statutory authority to impose conditions of release. Compliance with the Immigration Judge's Order is not a matter for this Court to enforce, and Petitioner cites no authority for why it would be. This Court also notes that Petitioner cites no binding authority for her claim that the “No further arrests” notation in the Immigration Judge's order prohibitted DHS from requiring supervision measures.

The district court decisions relied on by Petitioner in which courts characterize electronic monitoring and ISAP participation as continuing restraints on liberty are not persuasive. Even assuming they were, they do not establish that DHS lacks statutory authority to impose such conditions. Rather, most address whether individuals subject to those conditions remain “in custody” for habeas jurisdiction purposes. That issue is distinct from the question presented here—whether DHS may lawfully impose supervision conditions following an Immigration Judge's bond determination.

On the other hand, the court's reasoning in Hernandez v. Udzinski, No. 2:25-cv-373, 2025 WL 4093557, at *3–5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2025), which involved materially similar facts, is instructive. There, after obtaining habeas relief and a bond hearing, the petitioner was released on bond and subsequently required to participate in ISAP and wear an ankle monitor. The district court rejected the petitioner's motion to enforce, concluding that 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) expressly authorizes DHS to impose those release conditions notwithstanding the Immigration Judge's bond order. Id. at 3–5. This Court agrees with the court's analysis and conclusion by in Hernandez.

Additionally, the regulations provide Petitioner with an administrative mechanism to challenge the conditions of her release. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). Petitioner does not indicate that she sought review of those conditions before the Immigration Judge or requested amelioration through the procedures established by those regulations. While this Court need not decide whether exhaustion is required under these circumstances, the availability of that administrative process further counsels against granting the extraordinary relief Petitioner seeks.

Ultimately, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Respondents violated this Court's Habeas Order, violated the Immigration Judge's custody redetermination order, or acted outside the scope of their statutory authority. Because Respondents provided the bond hearing ordered by this Court and thereafter exercised authority expressly conferred by Congress and implementing regulations, there is nothing for this Court to enforce.

Therefore, Petitioner's Motion to Enforce is due to be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner Lilian Roxana Vallejo's Status Report and Motion to Enforce [ECF No. 16] is DENIED.

This case shall remain CLOSED. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and any scheduled hearings are CANCELED. No further relief is warranted.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 17th day of June, 2026.

MELISSA DAMIAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE