UNIVERSAL PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY AS SUBROGEE OF MARLENE AND LUIS TORRES v. AMAZON COM SERVICES LLC (2026)

ORDER

THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on the Plaintiff Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company as subrogee of Marlene and Luis Torres (“Plaintiff”)’s Expedited Motion for Pretrial Determination that Fault may not be Apportioned Among Absent Entities in the Same Chain of Distribution for the Same Alleged Defective Product, filed May 8, 2026. [DE 60]. The Court has carefully considered the Expedited Motion, Defendant Amazon.com Services, LLC (“Defendant” or “Amazon”)’s Response [DE 63], Plaintiff's Reply [DE 64], and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

The Court construes the Expedited Motion as a motion in limine to exclude evidence and/or argument in the jury trial in this case that other non-party entities upstream from Defendant Amazon in the chain of distribution, Rattan Electric Bike and Yamee Electric Bike, are liable to Plaintiff for the alleged defect in the lithium-ion replacement battery that allegedly caused the fire and the resulting damages to the Torres home and property at issue in this case. Motions in limine are not designed for a Court to give advisory opinions. Moreover, it is difficult to rule in a vacuum without having the opportunity to see the proffered evidence or testimony in perspective with other evidence in the trial. Rather, motions in limine are best limited to those issues the mere mention of which would be so prejudicial that it would deprive a party of a fair trial. Even if the Court were to grant a limine motion, it would be granted without prejudice to the adverse party's proffering of the evidence outside the presence of the jury. Should the court deny a motion in limine, it is without prejudice to the party renewing its objection at trial after the Court has heard other evidence or perhaps the door has been opened to the evidence. Normally, the Court would rather place the issues raised in a motion in limine in perspective of all the evidence and arguments presented at the trial.

Nonetheless, the Court has examined the arguments and authorities relied upon by both sides and, at this juncture, finds it unlikely that it would allow the jury instructions and verdict form to “apportion fault” to non-party entities upstream from Defendant Amazon in the chain of distribution to reduce Plaintiff's recovery against Defendant Amazon in this strict products liability action.¹ Plaintiff's strict liability claim requires only proof that Defendant Amazon sold the defective battery to the Torreses that caused the fire and damages at issue in this case. “The fundamental purpose underlying the doctrine of strict products liability is to further public safety in the use of consumer goods, by imposing liability without fault upon entities that have the ability to adequately compensate the injured party, distribute the risk of loss, and deter further production of defective products.” Porter v. Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (emphasis added). See also Harrell v. BMS Partners, LLC, 350 So. 3d 361, 367 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (“The West decision [West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976)] and its progeny therefore reflect a clear public policy to protect consumers from injuries caused by unreasonably dangerous products placed on the market by manufacturers and retailers.”); Samuel Friedland Fam. Enters. v. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 1994) (“In adopting strict liability, we recognized that a manufacturer, who places a potentially dangerous product on the market and encourages its use, undertakes a special responsibility toward members of the public who may be injured by the product. Id. at 86. Since West, Florida courts have expanded the doctrine of strict liability to others in the distributive chain including retailers, wholesalers, and distributors.”). The Court therefore disagrees with Defendant's position that, in enacting the 2011 version ² of Fla. Stat. § 768.81, the Florida legislature obliterated West and its progeny to overrule the Florida Supreme Court's adoption of the strict liability doctrine, by permitting comparative fault principles to eliminate or comparatively reduce an injured consumer's recovery based on “apportioning fault” between parties and non-parties who are in the same chain of distribution for the same allegedly defective product. See, e.g., V-8 Choppers, LLC v. McCudden, 177 So.3d 618 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2015) (affirming, per curiam, post-2011 amendment to § 768.81, trial court order granting plaintiffs’ motion to preclude evidence of non-party manufacturer's comparative fault in strict liability claim against seller of defective motorcycle).

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Expedited Motion [DE 60] is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Defendant renewing its arguments, if appropriate, during the context of the trial of this action.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 20th day of May, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the event Defendant Amazon is found liable in this action, it likely may seek reimbursement from non-party entities upstream from Defendant Amazon in the chain of distribution of the allegedly defective product at issue through an indemnification action.

2.   The Court notes that the Florida Legislature's express purpose in enacting the 2011 amendment to section 768.81 was to overrule the Florida Supreme Court's decision in D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001), in which the Court held in an enhanced injury crashworthiness products liability claim, fault could not be allocated to someone causing the initial accident.

WILLIAM P. DIMITROULEAS United States District Judge