MARC v. HARTWIG (2025)

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion To Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [ECF No. 12] (the “Motion”), filed on September 22, 2025. Plaintiff has responded in opposition [ECF No. 14], and Defendant replied in support of the Motion [ECF No. 20]. The Motion is, therefore, ripe for resolution. After due consideration, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's federal claims which confer subject-matter jurisdiction on this Court. Because Plaintiff fails to state a federal cause of action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law claims.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Thus, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all the plaintiff's allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This purported civil rights action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), arises from a state-court eviction proceeding in which Defendant landlords were awarded possession of Plaintiff tenant's dwelling. [See ECF No. 12-4, Susan H. Collins, et al. v. Sam Marc, No. CONO25015244, Div. 71 (17th Jud. Cir. Broward Cnty., Fla. Apr. 14, 2025)]. After Defendants prevailed in the eviction action, Plaintiff brought suit against them in state court, “seek[ing] to hold Defendants accountable for their breaches of contract [under the lease agreement], violations of the Florida Landlord-Tenant Act, negligence, and unlawful discrimination under state and federal law.” [Compl., ECF No. 1-2 at 1]. Defendants timely removed the case to this Court, invoking federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, over Plaintiff's FHA and ADA claims, and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over Plaintiff's related state-law claims. [See ECF No. 1]. After removal, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on res judicata grounds and for failure to state upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 12]. Because the claims giving rise to the Court's original jurisdiction are the federal claims, the Court focuses its attention on those claims.

III. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

For purposes of the instant Motion, Plaintiffs allegations, taken as true, are as follows: Plaintiff, Sam Marc (“Marc”), is a “permanently disabled individual” whose unspecified disability is one “defined by the [FHA] and the [ADA].” [Compl., ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 5]. Plaintiff's “serious medical conditions ․ require, among other things, the constant availability of electricity to refrigerate vital medications, including Humira;¹ access to hot water for medically necessary therapeutic baths for a skin ailment; and a functioning electrical outlet for his life alert system.” [Id. ¶ 13].

On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff executed a 12-month lease with Defendants’ agent to rent residential property located at 331 Monroe Street, Hollywood, Florida 22019 (the “Premises”). [Id. ¶ 9; see Lease Agreement, ECF No. 1-2 at 19]. Plaintiff contends that Defendants “breached the Lease from its inception.” [Id. ¶ 15]. First, the Premises were not ready for occupancy on Plaintiff's move-in date: “the unit was still under active repair and littered with tools and materials, forcing Plaintiff to incur additional hotel and storage fees.” [Id. ¶ 16]. Then, the condition of the Premises “deteriorated catastrophically beginning in late December 2024.” [Id.]. From late December 2024, through March 17, 2025, the Premises lacked “functional electricity and, for significant periods, [lacked] ․ water.” [Id.].

Because the Premises were uninhabitable, Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to notify Defendants about the “dire conditions and to beg for essential repairs.” [Id. ¶ 17]. Plaintiff's pleas for help (through an online portal, via e-mail, and by telephone) went unheeded. [Id.]. The lack of electricity to the Premises destroyed Plaintiff's Humira medication, which requires refrigeration, and also rendered Plaintiff's life-alert system inoperable. [Id. ¶ 18]. The lack of water to the Premises deprived Plaintiff of “medically necessary hot water treatments for his skin condition, causing [the condition] to worsen.” [Id.]. Ultimately, the stress of living under these uninhabitable conditions caused Plaintiff's health to deteriorate to the point of hospitalization. [Id.].

On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff sent a formal demand letter to Defendants via his attorney, complaining about the uninhabitable conditions. [Id. ¶ 18]. In response, Defendants’ agent, Melina Morris, maintained that because Florida Power and Light confirmed power was being supplied to the building there was no issue on Defendants’ part regarding the lack of electricity to the Premises. [Id. ¶ 20]. Thus, Defendants insisted Plaintiff pay his rent, ignoring “clear evidence of internal wiring failures.” [Id.]. On February 26, 2025, the City of Hollywood, Code Compliance Division, inspected the Premises and cited Defendants for violations of various sections of the City's Minimum Property Standards. [Id. ¶ 21]. The violations included: (1) no working electricity, lighting or electrical units; (2) no operable power for the refrigerator; and (3) damaged, deteriorated, and broken PVC pipe under the kitchen sink. [Id. ¶ 22]. The City issued a separate Notice of Violation for “unpermitted installation of A/C units on the property” and required Defendants to hire a licensed electrician to repair the “electrical for the property.” [Id. ¶¶ 22, 23].

On or about March 4, 2025, Defendants’ agent called Plaintiff to complain that Plaintiff had arranged for an electrician to access the Premises without Plaintiff's being present. [Id. ¶ 25]. The telephone call became heated after Plaintiff asked the agent if his rent would be credited for the time the Premises remained uninhabitable. [Id.]. “During this hostile exchange, Plaintiff explicitly reminded the agent that he was ‘fully disabled,’ that his disability was on file with the company, and that he would ‘invoke my ADA right.’ ” [Id. ¶ 26]. In response, Defendants filed an action for eviction. [Id. ¶ 27]. A final judgment for possession was entered against Plaintiff “due to a technical deficiency in his rent-withholding notice.” [Id. ¶ 28].

On these allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Defendants: (1) breach of contract (Count I); Violation of the Florida Landlord-Tenant Act (Count II); Violation of the Fair Housing Act (Count III); Violation of Title III the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count IV); and Negligence (Count V). [ECF No. 1-2 at 8–15]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for all rent paid during the period of uninhabitability, costs of alternative housing and storage, cost of destroyed medication, moving costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees and costs, as well as damages for economic loss, emotional distress, humiliation, punitive damages. [See id. at 11–12].

IV. DISCUSSION

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). “A federal court not only has the power but also the obligation at any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction does not exist arises.” Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Put differently, it is the Court's responsibility to “zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and [it] should itself raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction arises.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) (alterations added; citation omitted). Federal subject-matter jurisdiction arises in one of three ways: (1) a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The burden for establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction rests with the party bringing the claim. See McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).

Because Plaintiff's FHA and ADA claims invoke the Court's original federal question jurisdiction, the Court examines those claims first to see whether Plaintiff plausibly pleads a cause of action under either statute.

A. Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a Fair Housing Act claim (Count III).

The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any ․ renter because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). The FHA defines “discrimination” to include “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim pursuant to Section 3604(f)(3)(B) of the FHA, a plaintiff “must establish that (1) he is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) such accommodation was necessary to afford him an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation.” Warren v. Delvista Towers Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1085–86 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citing Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 347 F. App'x 464, 467 (11th Cir. 2009)) (quoting Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Viewing the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has not plausibly pleaded a discrimination claim under the FHA. First, Plaintiff has not established he is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the Act. A person is disabled or handicapped under the FHA if he has “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1). In the case at bar, Plaintiff alleges only that (1) he is “permanently disabled”; (2) he has been prescribed Humira; (3) his skin condition requires hot water therapeutic baths; and (4) he owns a life-alert system. [Compl., ECF No. 1-2]. These allegations do not suffice. For starters, Plaintiff does not disclose the nature or extent of his alleged permanent disability. Nor does Plaintiff show how the alleged disability “substantially limits” one or more of Plaintiff's “major life activities.” Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first element.

As for the second element, Plaintiff does not allege he requested a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Instead, Plaintiff alleges he asked Defendants to supply the Premises with water and electricity, without which his medical conditions worsened and his medication spoiled. Such a request is one for basic necessities, not for a reasonable accommodation of a disability. Living in an uninhabitable residence would be a burden on anyone, disabled or not. The FHA was designed to afford disabled persons an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Groteboer v. Eyota Econ. Dev. Auth., 724 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (D. Minn. 2010) (Essling's Homes Plus, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 356 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979 (D. Minn. 2004)) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). In this case, it appears from the allegations that all residents were treated equally poorly. So, Plaintiff fails to have plausibly pleaded the second prong as well.

Finally, Plaintiff's allegations do not satisfy the fourth element either. Once again, allegations that Defendants failed to remedy Plaintiff's water and power outages do not show a refusal to make a “reasonable accommodation.” Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants failed to make a reasonable accommodation in “rules, policies, practices, or services.” Instead, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide basic necessities as contractually required under the Lease; that is not a sufficient pleading for the fourth element of an FHA claim.

In sum, for the reasons stated above Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a discrimination claim under the FHA, and Count III is due to be dismissed.

B. Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead an ADA Title III claim (Count IV).

To survive a motion to dismiss, ADA Title III requires a plaintiff to plead the following elements: (1) the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) the plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of that disability, and (3) the defendant owns, leases, or leases to or operates a place of public accommodation. See Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., No. 0:18-CV-62486-UU, 2020 WL 9762992, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2020), aff'd and remanded sub nom. Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2021).

To satisfy the first element, the plaintiff must allege “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). This is the same test Plaintiff failed under the FHA. Accordingly, for the same reasons given above in connection with the FHA claim, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead the first element of his discrimination claim under Title III of the ADA.

As for the second element, Plaintiff makes absolutely no connection between his alleged disability and Defendants’ alleged discrimination. Nowhere does Plaintiff allege Defendants’ poor (indeed, if true, ghastly) treatment of him had anything to do with his alleged disability. Plaintiff alleges only that he put Defendants on notice of his unspecified disability and then threatened to invoke his ADA rights when Defendants’ agent refused to reduce his rent in March of 2025. [See ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 26]. Without pleading that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because he is disabled, Plaintiff's Title III ADA discrimination claim fails at the second prong.

Third, and most fatally to Plaintiff's ADA claim, residential facilities are not places of public accommodation under Title III. Title III of the ADA prohibits the owner of a place of public accommodation from discriminating “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A public accommodation is a private entity whose operations affect commerce and fall into one of twelve categories, including “an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Private residential facilities are not public accommodations within the purview of Title III of the ADA. Philippeaux v. Miami Apartments Investors, LLC, 21-CV-22981-PCH, 2022 WL 2347089, at *3 (S.D. Fla., Mar. 11, 2022) (citation omitted); See Indep. Housing Servs. of San Francisco v. Fillmore Ctr. Assocs., 840 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 n.14 (N.D. Cal.1993) (“[T]he legislative history of the ADA clarifies that ‘other place of lodging’ does not include residential facilities.”); H.R. Rep. No. 101–485(II), at 100 (1990) (“Only nonresidential facilities are covered by [Title III].”). Several courts have recognized that Title III does not apply to apartment complexes. See, e.g., Indep. Housing Servs., 840 F. Supp. at 1344 (“[A]partments and condominiums do not constitute public accommodations within the meaning of the [ADA].”); Reid v. Zackenbaum, No. 05-CV-1569, 2005 WL 1993394, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) (citing Indep. Housing Servs., 840 F. Supp. 1328) (“A residential facility, such as an apartment, is not a public accommodation under the ADA.”); Lancaster v. Phillips Invs., LLC, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1366–67 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (dismissing Title III claim against apartment complex because residential facilities are not places of public accommodation under the ADA). Because the Premises at issue in this lawsuit is not a “public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA, Plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim fails at the third prong. Accordingly, Count IV is due to be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support the elements of an ADA Title III discrimination claim.

C. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims.

The remaining claims in this case arise under Florida law. [ECF No. 1-2 at 8–11 (Count I: breach of contract); 9–11 (Count II: Florida Landlord-Tenant Act violation); 14–15 (Count V: negligence)]. Where a district court has original jurisdiction over an action, the court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ․ [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “Section 1367(c) gives a court discretion to dismiss a supplemental claim or party when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ” Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original); see also West v. City of Albany, 830 F. App'x 588, 596 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (noting that a “district court's decision to either retain or reject” supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is “purely discretionary” and “not a jurisdictional matter.” (citation omitted)).

The Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when ․ the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). As announced in United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), a district court should consider the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity before doing so. Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130; West, 830 F. App'x at 597 (citations omitted). The Gibbs factors “may, by their presence or absence, influence the court in its decision concerning the exercise of such discretion” to retain or reject supplemental jurisdiction. Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569.

After considering the § 1367(c) and Gibbs factors, which weigh in favor of dismissal, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Concerns of comity weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. This case now consists entirely of state causes of action that would be more appropriately resolved by a Florida state court. Pinkert v. Schwade, No. 11-CIV-23324, 2012 WL 3962386, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2012); see also Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Laboratories, Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 540 (11th Cir. 2015) (“state courts, not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law in our federalist system”) (alteration adopted; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And, given that Plaintiffs and Defendant are residents of Florida, it would not be inconvenient for the parties to litigate in that forum. See Pinkert, 2012 WL 3962386, at *2. Further, this case has only just begun: discovery has not commenced, and only limited motion practice has occurred. Id. (finding judicial economy favored declining to exercise jurisdiction where the case was in early stages as no discovery had commenced and “the parties’ filings in this case have dealt almost entirely with the resolution of [d]efendants’ motions to dismiss”). Moreover, considerations of fairness do not support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction as Plaintiff filed this action in state court, and Defendant removed the case knowing that the federal claims could be dismissed (and even argued for dismissal). See Ameritox, Ltd., 803 F.3d at 539 (“every litigant who brings supplemental claims in [federal] court knowingly risks the dismissal of those claims”) (citations omitted). Finally, Plaintiff can litigate his remaining claims in state court on remand. See Zen Grp., Inc. v. Harris, No. 1:20-CV-23218, 2021 WL 6802922, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2021) (citing Espinoza v. Galardi S. Enterprises, Inc., No. 14-CIV-21244, 2018 WL 1729757, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2018) (“However, the question of whether [p]laintiffs could timely bring its state law claims in state court is a non-issue. This is because § 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations for state claims during the period in which they have been pending in federal court and for 30 days after an order of dismissal.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)).

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's state law claims. See Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (if the district court chooses to dismiss the state law claims, it should do so without prejudice).

V. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 12] is GRANTED IN PART.

2. The Court DISMISSES Count III and Count IV of the Complaint [ECF No. 1-2] for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

3. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The Court DISMISSES Counts I, II and V.

4. If Plaintiff chooses to seek leave to amend the Complaint to cure the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order consistent with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he must file a motion for leave to amend no later than November 21, 2025, and attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion, failing which the federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice and this case will be remanded, without further notice.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on November 7, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Humira is a prescription medication used to treat the following moderate to severe conditions: rheumatoid arthritis, plaque psoriasis, Crohn's Disease, psoriatic arthritis, among other conditions. Plaintiff does not disclose what condition he suffers from, or to what extent. [See Compl., ECF No. 1-2].

DAVID S. LEIBOWITZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE