UNITED STATES v. GUMBS (2025)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Jeleel Eion Gumbs’ Motion to Suppress (DE 41) (“Motion”). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion (DE 41) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND 1

In October 2022, federal law enforcement in Doral, Florida seized an air tank carrying firearms with obliterated serial numbers. Following some preliminary investigation, Defendant Jeleel Eion Gumbs’ (“Mr. Gumbs”) fingerprints were found inside the air tank. As a result, Special Agent Erik Honig (“Agent Honig”) from Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) placed a “Look Out”² to be notified of any international travel by Mr. Gumbs. For roughly seventeen months, no further investigation was conducted into Mr. Gumbs’ alleged connection to the air tank and firearms. No witnesses were interviewed; no records were subpoenaed; neither Mr. Gumbs nor Mr. Dante Donaldson (Mr. Gumbs’ co-defendant in this case) were surveilled, nor were their houses or businesses searched.

On March 6, 2024,³ Agent Honig received a notification that Mr. Gumbs had booked an international flight. Agent Honig then contacted the HSI duty agent at the Atlanta airport to “coordinate” a “border search” of Mr. Gumbs when he attempted to leave the country. Between October 2022, when Agent Honig first became aware of Mr. Gumbs’ potential involvement with the air tank, and March 6, 2024, when Agent Honig received the Look Out notification, Agent Honig never sought a search warrant for any of Mr. Gumbs’ electronic devices. At the hearing, Agent Honig testified that he never had any evidence, prior to the seizure, to indicate that Mr. Gumbs used any electronic devices in connection with the alleged crime.

On March 9, 2024, as Mr. Gumbs was boarding his flight to Saint Martin, law enforcement stopped him and requested his phone. Eventually, Mr. Gumbs gave the federal agents the three cell phones he was carrying and was permitted to leave. Law enforcement officials in Atlanta did not conduct a manual search of the devices. Instead, the phones were shipped to Agent Honig in Miami. Over two weeks later, between March 26, 2024, and March 29, 2024, Agent Honig conducted a forensic search of the phones.

On April 26, 2024, the Government filed a three-count indictment against Mr. Gumbs and Mr. Donaldson. (DE 1.) On October 29, 2024, Mr. Gumbs filed the instant Motion. (DE 41.) In the Motion, he seeks to suppress all evidence as fruit of the allegedly illegal search of his cell phones, which were seized on March 9, 2024, in the Northern District of Georgia and searched on March 26, 2024, in the Southern District of Florida. (Id. at 1.) The Government filed a Response in Opposition (DE 43) (“Response”), and Mr. Gumbs filed a Reply (DE 46) (“Reply”). Mr. Gumbs also filed two notices of supplemental authority (DE 67; DE 70), which the Court has reviewed. On May 13, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the Motion and permitted supplemental briefing on the Motion following oral argument. (DE 73.) Both Parties filed supplemental briefs. (DE 74; DE 75.)

II. DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court has made clear that “searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border[.]” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977) (emphasis added). “Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside.” Id. at 619, 97 S.Ct. 1972 (emphasis added). But, separate from the “border search exception,” the Supreme Court has held that “a warrant is generally required before [a search of a cell phone], even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). This holding was based on the recognition that “when privacy-related concerns are weighty enough a search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.” Id. at 392, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (internal quotations omitted). Although the Supreme Court thus far has not issued a decision regarding the intersection of privacy-related concerns in cell phones and the border search exception, several circuit courts have. See infra at p. ––––.

The Eleventh Circuit has not adopted Riley’s application to border searches. See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). In Vergara, the court stated that “[b]order searches never require probable cause or a warrant.” 884 F.3d at 1312. The court went on to state that it would “require reasonable suspicion at the border only for highly intrusive searches of a person's body such as a strip search or an x-ray examination.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). While the Eleventh Circuit has used this broad language when approving suspicionless border searches, it developed this framework in the context of searches identifying contraband to be confiscated prior to entry into the United States. The specific focus of the court in those cases was the interdiction of child pornography. Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1311 (emphasis added); Touset, 890 F.3d at 1230. The court relied on the fact that “child pornography, no less than drugs or other kinds of contraband, is prohibited from ‘entering the country’,” and “the government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.’ ” (first quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620, 97 S.Ct. 1972; then quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004)). However, those interests are not implicated where an individual is exiting the country, and the Government wishes to search her property solely for the purpose of finding non-contraband evidence relevant to a dormant criminal investigation.

The only question before the Court is whether the search of Mr. Gumbs’ phones was an appropriate, legitimate border search, as that concept has been defined. For three reasons, the seizure and search of Mr. Gumbs’ phone exceeds the bounds of the border search doctrine: 1) Mr. Gumbs was an outgoing traveler from within the United States, not entering from abroad; 2) the seizure did not take place at the border or the functional equivalent of the border; and 3) the search does not advance any of the justifications underlying the border search exception.

First, every Eleventh Circuit case regarding border searches has been based upon individuals entering the country from the outside. In United States v. Touset, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the search of an electronic device without a warrant when an individual entered the country. 890 F.3d 1227. In doing so, the Touset court noted that “[t]he First Congress—the same one that proposed the Fourth Amendment—empowered customs officials to stop and search without a warrant any vessel or cargo suspected of illegally entering our nation.” Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit found that the forensic search of an individual's phone at the border did not require a warrant or probable cause because “searches at the border, ‘from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside.’ ” 884 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619, 97 S.Ct. 1972 (1977)) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728 (11th Cir. 2010) (search of crew member's living quarters on a foreign cargo vessel that was entering the country) (“Because of the United States’ strong interest in national self-protection, ‘[r]outine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)) (emphasis added); Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1339–40 (11th Cir. 2009) (discussing search of individual when she arrived at Fort Lauderdale airport from abroad) (“Entrants, therefore, are subject to search even in the absence of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant ․ As a whole, the law provides that when Customs Officers first encounter an individual seeking entry into the United States the officer has discretion to stop the person and conduct a preliminary border search without fear of running afoul of the Constitution ․ Because an individual's expectation of privacy is at its lowermost at border entry points, the officer need not possess any level of suspicion.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982) (search of a plane that entered the United States) (“The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country.”) (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620, 97 S.Ct. 1972) (emphasis added).

When given the opportunity to expand the border search doctrine to those exiting the country, the Eleventh Circuit refrained from doing so. In United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, the Eleventh Circuit narrowly held that “[a]lthough we need not decide here whether the border exception applies equally in all respects to incoming and outgoing searches at the border, we conclude that Congress may, consistent with the [F]ourth [A]mendment, authorize Customs officers to conduct warrantless searches of persons and property departing the United States on the basis of reasonable suspicion that a currency reporting violation is occurring.” 813 F.2d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). It should be noted that this conclusion is premised on the explicit statutory authority Congress gave officials in conducting searches regarding currency violations of travelers. See id. at 1133; 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (explaining that to prevent currency violations, “a customs officer may stop and search, at the border and without a search warrant, any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other conveyance, any envelope or other container, and any person entering or departing from the United States.”)

Notably, every Supreme Court case regarding the border search exception has also involved entrants to this country—not those exiting. The Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Ramsey is instructive here. In Ramsey, the Supreme Court held that “[b]order searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside.” 431 U.S. at 619, 97 S.Ct. 1972. The Supreme Court's intentional use of the term “single fact” clearly supports the proposition that a border search would not automatically be deemed reasonable if the person or item had not entered into the country from outside.

Second, it is undisputed that Mr. Gumbs was not at an actual physical border when his devices were seized. Nonetheless, “[a] border search may be conducted at any place which constitutes the functional equivalent of the border.” United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Garcia, 672 F.2d at 1363–64). Three conditions are required for a search to have “occurred at the functional equivalent of the border: (1) reasonable certainty that the border was crossed, (2) lack of time or opportunity for the object to have changed materially since the time of crossing, and (3) performance of the search at the earliest practical point after the border is crossed.” Id. Therefore, although an airport may be the functional equivalent of a border in many circumstances, see United States v. Ogueri, 798 F.2d 452, 452 (11th Cir. 1986) (search twenty feet from customs enclosure was the functional equivalent of the border because “the evidence was conclusive” that the defendant had just crossed the border), it is not always so. Here, Mr. Gumbs was in the interior of the country at all relevant times. See Santiago, 837 F.2d at 1548 (“It is certain that the border was crossed because the flight originated in the Bahamas and ended in the United States.”). See e.g., United States v. Hill, 939 F.2d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Our understanding of our precedents is that the Garcia test dominates and provides the proper analysis for a functional equivalent border issue[.]”). But because the Government has failed to demonstrate how the facts of this case comport with the “certainty” standard set forth in Santiago,⁴ and without the express authorization afforded by 31 U.S.C. § 5317, the Court finds that the warrantless search—which occurred two weeks after the Government seized Mr. Gumbs’ phones—was not at the functional equivalent of a border as caselaw has developed the term. Here, the Government acknowledges that the sole reason for taking Mr. Gumbs’ phones before he left the United States was to further an investigation that had stagnated for roughly seventeen months.

There are many justifications for the border search exception: “border integrity, stopping contraband or individuals from entering the country, exigency, [and] national security.” United States v. Fox, 23-CR-227 (NGG), 2024 WL 3520767, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2024); see also Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021) (the border search exception's purpose is “to bar entry to those ‘who may bring anything harmful into this country.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)) (emphasis in original). By arguing that the search in this case should come within the border search exception, the Government asks the Court to broaden that exception to those who may be planning to but have not crossed any United States border, and who are planning to leave the country, not enter. It further argues for this expansion to sanction a search done solely for investigative purposes, after a year and a half of no investigative activity in the subject case.⁵ When the Court asked the Government to articulate a limiting principle for their expanded border search doctrine, the Government responded by acknowledging that there were “outer limits” but that “we are not there yet.”

Other circuits have rejected such an “anything goes” approach to border searches of electronic devices. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit constrains such searches both based on the intrusiveness of the search, see id. at 1016 (“we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion), and the search's purpose. Id. at 1018–19 (“[W]e hold that the border search exception authorizes warrantless searches of a cell phone only to determine whether the phone contains contraband. A broader search cannot be justified by the particular purposes served by the exception.”) (internal quotations omitted). The Fourth Circuit does as well. United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 721–22 (4th Cir. 2019) (requiring at least reasonable suspicion of a crime that “bears some nexus to the purposes of the border search exception” before a warrantless forensic search of electronic devices at the border is allowed); see also United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018) (“After Riley, we think it is clear that a forensic search of a digital phone must be treated as a nonroutine border search, requiring some form of individualized suspicion.”) (citations omitted).

Even those circuits that have not had occasion to rule definitively on the scope of the border search exception for searches of electronics have nonetheless recognized the need for guardrails. See United States v. Castillo, 70 F.4th 894, 897–98 (5th Cir. 2023) (acknowledging that “government searches of [modern cell phones] have the potential to be uniquely intrusive,” distinguishing them from property traditionally subject to the border search exception, but not reaching the question of whether forensic searches require reasonable suspicion); United States v. Xiang, 67 F.4th 895, 900–01 (8th Cir. 2023) (expressing agreement with other circuits’ conclusions that “a forensic or “advanced” search ․ becomes a non-routine border search[ ] requiring some level of reasonable, individualized suspicion ․ given the heightened personal privacy interest in electronic devices recognized in Riley”); United States v. Mendez, 103 F. 4th 1303, 1310–11 (7th Cir. 2024) (noting that a “non-routine” search require[s] reasonable suspicion,” but declining to decide whether “intrusive, forensic electronic device searches” fall into that category).

Indeed, adopting an unconstrained view for what is meant to be an exception to constitutional protections risks turning the border search doctrine into an invitation for abuse. Any law enforcement agency could place a Look Out on a person for any reason, including personal animus or disagreement with protected speech, and wait until the person shows an intent to leave the country. Under this unlimited view of the border search exception, law enforcement could then gain full access to the person's electronic devices and review the entire scope of their personal and professional history, without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or ever having to justify the search to a neutral magistrate. This allowance would conflict with the protections of the Fourth Amendment, “a provision of the Constitution which sought to guard against an abuse that more than any one single factor gave rise to American independence.” Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). To allow such a search under the specific circumstances of the case before the Court would endanger core Fourth Amendment Principles by “untether[ing]” the exception “from the justifications underlying it,” Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 595, 138 S.Ct. 1663, 201 L.Ed.2d 9 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). In fact, the “implication of the Government's broad view of the border-search exception is that the cellphone of any individual arriving home from a trip abroad ⁶ is subject to search without even reasonable suspicion ․ But one does not forfeit his or her privacy rights in a device that keeps a digital record of nearly every aspect of one's life whenever they cross the border after a vacation or business trip.” Fox, 2024 WL 3520767, at *10 (emphasis added). To hold otherwise would allow law enforcement to review the “most intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private emails.” Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145 (internal quotations omitted). The Court will not encourage “this abandonment of the right of privacy[.]” Harris, 331 U.S. at 194, 67 S.Ct. 1098.

Finally, the Court finds that the good-faith exception does not warrant permitting the evidence seized from Mr. Gumbs’ devices to be presented at trial. In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to searches conducted based “in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent.” 564 U.S. 229, 239, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). However, as discussed supra, there is not a single decision issued by the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court that has extended the border search exception to departing passengers.⁷ Moreover, the Government's search was conducted, not to protect the border or for any of the other original justifications underlying the border search exception, but to advance a domestic investigation outside the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court finds that the good-faith exception is inapplicable here.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Jeleel Eion Gumbs’ Motion to Suppress (DE 41) is GRANTED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, on this 8th day of August, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

2.   A Look Out is a law enforcement tool through which an agent can enter the information of an individual to be monitored so that the law enforcement officer will receive a notification if the individual books an international flight.

3.   The Court notes that Agent Honig testified that he received the notification on March 6, 2023, and declined to have his recollection refreshed. However, the Department of Homeland Security Report (DE 41-1) (“Report”) contradicts this testimony. Therefore, the Court relies on the March 6, 2024 date recorded in the Report.

4.   The Court need not address the other two elements of the Santiago test, as the seizure of Mr. Gumbs’ phone fails at step one. However, it is also unclear whether either of the two remaining criteria are met, given that no search was conducted of Mr. Gumbs’ phone until two weeks after the seizure, and the phone changed hands multiple times beforehand. See (DE 43 at 3–4 (detailing the transfer of Mr. Gumbs’ devices between Atlanta and Miami and between at least three federal agents before the forensic search was conducted).)

5.   The Government contends that it had “reasonable suspicion to conduct a border search of [Mr. Gumbs’] cell phones in light of [Mr. Gumbs’] involvement in the illegal exportation of firearms.” (DE 75.) This argument is not convincing. Mr. Gumbs’ potential association with an illegal firearms exportation scheme was discovered roughly a year and a half before the Government searched his phones. The Government's “reasonable suspicion” to search Mr. Gumbs on his way to St. Martin, therefore, stemmed from their analysis of his alleged prior criminal conduct. However, “evidence of prior criminal conduct alone is not sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Kim, 103 F.Supp.3d 32, 45 (D.D.C. 2015). Lacking any investigative findings to premise their search, the Government could not conclude, for example, that Mr. Gumbs was not traveling for leisure, medical reasons, or to visit family. Indeed, there was “no objective manifestation” that Mr. Gumbs “was or was ‘about to be, engaged in criminal activity.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). This might have been a different matter had the Government diligently investigated Mr. Gumbs and uncovered facts linking his travel to the illegal exportation of firearms. But a moribund investigation yields no such facts, and the Court will not conjure such premises for the Government's benefit.

6.   Indeed, as in this instance, anyone holding a ticket to depart the country, who has not yet left the airport, may be subject to a search under the Government's view of the border search exception.

7.   As noted supra, the border search exception applies to departing passengers only for the purpose of preventing currency violations pursuant to the express authority of 31 U.S.C. § 5317, which provides that both inbound and outbound passengers may be subject to search.

KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE