GALINDO v. UNITED STATES (2025)

ORDER DISMISSING MOTIONS TO VACATE AND CLOSING CASE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Movant, Luis Fernando Galindo's pro se [Amended] Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (“Amended Motion”), [ECF No. 5], and his [Supplemental] Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (“Supplemental Motion”), [ECF No. 6]. Movant challenges the constitutionality of his federal conviction and sentence in Case No. 24-CR-20236-RAR. For the following reasons, both Motions are DISMISSED as facially deficient—and without leave to amend.

Rule 2(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Cases requires a movant to, among other things, “specify all the grounds for relief available” and “state the facts supporting each ground[.]” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 649, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005); see also R. Governing § 2255 Cases 2(b). In comparison to other civil actions, § 2255 is subject to “heightened pleading requirement[s]” which require the movant to use “ ‘fact pleading’ as opposed to ‘notice pleading,’ as authorized under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).” Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 810 (11th Cir. 2011). Put another way, a § 2255 motion must contain “enough specific facts that, if they were true, would warrant relief[.]” Chavez v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). And it is well settled that “[f]ederal district courts must ‘dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.’ ” Orr v. United States, 800 F. App'x 705, 707 (11th Cir. 2020) (alteration adopted; other alteration added; quoting Borden, 646 F.3d at 810).

On July 2, 2025, the Court dismissed Movant's initial § 2255 Motion (“Initial Motion”) as facially deficient, explaining that Movant's “rudimentary allegations hardly trigger[ed] either ․ prongs for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.” Order to Amend, [ECF No. 3] at 3 (citation omitted). Granting Movant an opportunity to amend, the Court stated that “[h]is Amended Motion must specify all the grounds available and provide enough specific facts for each ground to show that [he] is entitled to relief.” Id. “Conclusory allegations will not suffice,” the Court added, and “no further chances to amend will be provided.” Id. (citation omitted).

In his Amended Motion, Movant does nothing other than describe the standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Movant's “supporting facts” are as follows:

Petitioner Mr. Galindo moves alleging that [he] was deprived of his constitutional right to effective legal representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In support of this motion, petitioner invokes the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) which requires a showing of two elements:

Deficient Performance of Counsel

Defense counsel failed to act within a reasonable professional standard. Examples include:

- Failure to adequately investigate the facts of the case.

- Failure to communicate a favorable plea offer to the defendant.

- Failure to present key witnesses or exculpatory evidence.

- Failure to object to illegally obtained evidence or improper statements by the prosecutor.

Prejudice to Petitioner.

[T]he allegations are based on the fact that I was ill-advised by counsel to accept facts that gave rise to the crime for [ ] As a result of the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome in obtaining my sentence would have been different.

Am. Mot. at 4 (cleaned up).

Completely absent from his Amended Motion are any particularized facts from Movant's pretrial proceedings satisfying one of his listed generic “examples” of deficient performance. Id. Further Movant does not provide details of his counsel's purportedly defective advice, or what facts Movant improperly accepted, or how his resulting sentence “would have been different.” Id. Once again, Movant has failed to sufficiently plead “how his ‘counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness[,]’ ․ [or] ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Order to Amend at 3 (first quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); then quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).

Movant's Supplemental Motion fares no better. After similarly invoking the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance, Movant's only factual allegations are that, “[i]n this particular case, [c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to consult with [Movant] about his wishes to file a direct appeal.” Supp. Mot. at 3. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000), the Supreme Court “reject[ed] a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.” Id. at 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court went on to say:

We instead hold that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. In making this determination, courts must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known[.] Only by considering all relevant factors in a given case can a court properly determine whether a rational defendant would have desired an appeal or that the particular defendant sufficiently demonstrated to counsel an interest in an appeal.

Id.

Thus, whether Movant's counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with him is a fact-bound inquiry. But Movant neither affirmatively alleges that he actually informed his counsel of his desire to appeal, nor does he give the Court any factual basis to determine that a rational defendant in his position would have wanted to appeal. See generally Supp. Mot. Without more, Movant cannot establish deficient performance. See Tanzi v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 772 F.3d 644, 652 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The burden is on the habeas petitioner to ‘identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.’ ” (emphasis added; quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052)).

In short, because Movant has failed to plead facts that, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief, both his Amended Motion and Supplemental Motion must be dismissed. See Paez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 653 (11th Cir. 2020) (“If a petition does not set forth a sufficient factual basis for habeas relief, the petition is ‘legally insufficient on its face,’ and the district court must dismiss it.” (quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994))).

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Movant, Luis Fernando Galindo's Amended Motion, [ECF No. 5], and Supplemental Motion, [ECF No. 6], are DISMISSED. All pending motions are DENIED as moot and all deadlines, if any, are TERMINATED. This case shall remain CLOSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 8th day of September, 2025.

RODOLFO A. RUIZ II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE