UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ (2024)

ORDER REDUCING SENTENCE

In 1998, following a jury trial, I sentenced then-21-year-old Gomeo Rodriguez to 610 months imprisonment after he was found guilty by a jury of committing four armed robberies. Mr. Rodriguez has been incarcerated for more than 25 years and now moves for reduction of sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, the First Step Act, and the Sentencing Commission's recent amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. (DE 245). The Government initially contested this Motion, filing a Response in Opposition on November 22, 2023, (DE 253), but has since filed a Notice of Filing Joint Proposed Order, agreeing that Mr. Rodriguez should be resentenced to time served (DE 263). I commend the Government for joining Mr. Rodriguez's motion. Much has transpired since the original sentencing, both in the law and in Mr. Rodriguez's life. As the Parties are in agreement that Mr. Rodriguez should be granted a sentence reduction to time served pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and U.S.S.G. § 1b1.13(b)(5) (2023), I will do so.

I. STATUORY FRAMEWORK AND HISTORY

The Government and Mr. Rodriguez agree that he qualifies for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and U.S.S.G. § 1b1.13(b)(5)(2023)(the “Other Reasons” provision). (DE 263-1). It is clear to me that Mr. Rodriguez presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, however, it is not clear to me that subsection (b)(5) is the most appropriate avenue.

To explain, I will repeat much of the history articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in its 2021 decision, United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 583, 211 L. Ed. 2d 363 (2021). Frustrated by decades of unbridled discretion when sentencing judges were bound only by statutory minimums and maximums and parole boards had further discretion to release prisoners despite serving only factions of their sentences, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) to bring “uniformity and honesty” to sentencing. Id. Congress abolished the parole system and created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, delegating the power to create a comprehensive system of sentencing guidelines.

The SRA had an overarching prohibition against courts “modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it ha[d] been imposed,” with only three narrow exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Courts could only modify terms of imprisonment after motion by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that a specific prisoner qualified for one of the exceptions. The relevant exception here allows a court to reduce a term of imprisonment for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The SRA put specific parameters around this phrase, directing the Commission to define through “general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions,” 28 U.S.C. § 994 (a)(2), “what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” 28 U.S.C. § 994 (t). Congress plainly stated that the Commission would be the controlling source of guidance with respect to extraordinary and compelling reasons. The only boundary placed on the Commission's definition was that “rehabilitation ․ alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” (Id.)

The Sentencing Commission published its first substantive definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in 2007, titled as a “Policy Statement.” That definition listed four reasons as extraordinary and compelling: (i) “a terminal illness”; (ii) a “permanent physical or medical condition” or “deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,” which “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care” in prison; (iii) “death or incapacitation of the defendant's only family member capable of caring for a minor child”; and (iv) “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, ․ an extraordinary and compelling reason, other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (i), (ii), and (iii).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2007).

In 2016, the Commission, after receiving criticism that many inmates who were eligible for release were still not being considered, conducted a review, held a public hearing, and revised its policy statement. It reorganized and expanded the first three categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons. The fourth and catch-all category, referred to as Application Note 1(D), remained the same. The Commission even made a direct plea to the BOP and encouraged it to file further Section 3582(c)(1)(a) motions on behalf of inmates as was Congress's intention.

In 2018, Congress passed, and the President signed, the First Step Act. The First Step Act amended the SRA and added the italicized language: “the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582). Not only did this amendment explicitly expand the availability of relief under the SRA by allowing prisoners to bring their own motions, but the First Step Act went on to require the BOP to notify prisoners when they may be eligible and help them craft and file their motions. Bryant takes us this far.

1. U.S.S.G. § 1b1.13(b)(5) – Other Reasons

Just two months ago, in November 2023, the Sentencing Commission submitted further amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Policy Statement. U.S.S.G. § 1b1.13 (2023). Of importance here, the Sentencing Commission replaced Application Note 1(D) with the Other Reasons provision, which states in full: “The defendant presents any other circumstances or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” § 1b1.13(b)(5)(2023). The reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4) remain the same in type as the former statements and include when the defendant is suffering from or is at risk of a terminal or serious medical condition, the defendant is at least 65 years old and experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health, the defendant's family circumstances require him to be a caregiver, and the defendant suffered abuse in custody.

“Congress made a ‘determined choice,’ United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 1990), that the Commission, not courts, would continue to establish what reasons were extraordinary and compelling for Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motions.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1259. “If Congress had meant to free district courts from following the Commission's guidance for defendant-filed motions, “ ‘we would expect the text ․ to say so.’ ” Id. citing Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 579 U.S. 115, 136 S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 195 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016). I am bound to follow the Commission's guidance in their policy statements.

Having read the Parties’ extensive briefing, none of the reasons set forth in (1) through (4) readily apply to Mr. Rodriguez. While the Other Reasons provision includes the catch-all of “any other circumstances or combination of circumstances,” it limits those circumstances to those “similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” § 1b1.13(b)(5)(2023). Not only does the statutory interpretation cannon of ejusdem generis instruct me to consider the specific terms that precede a general catch-all term, the Other Reasons provision explicitly requires that the circumstances for relief be similar in gravity to those that precede it. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991) (“Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.”).

The circumstances described in paragraphs (1) through (4) necessitate relief because of some external factor or need that requires that the Defendant is released: a terminal illness or serious medical condition, deterioration caused by age, the necessity to be a caretaker to a family member, and victimization while in custody. These are specific circumstances that all pertain to the defendant's physical wellbeing in prison or the wellbeing of a family member as a result of the defendant's incarceration. I understand the “catch-all” language in the Other Reasons provision to provide flexibility for like circumstances. The Parties have not presented any facts about Mr. Rodriguez's physical wellbeing or the wellbeing of his family, nor stated any negative circumstance that his release would alleviate. The reasons stated in Mr. Rodriguez's Motion include his extraordinary rehabilitation, the family support he will now receive, and the unusual harshness of his original sentencing.

2. U.S.S.G. § 1b1.13(b)(6) – Unusually Long Sentence

However, Mr. Rodriguez is undeniably deserving of relief. In its November 2023 Policy Statement, the Sentencing Commission also created a brand new category of extraordinary and compelling reasons deserving relief:

“Unusually Long Sentence. – If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant's individualized circumstances.”

U.S.S.G. § 1b1.13(b)(6)(2023) (the “Unusually Long Sentence” provision). When Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to 610 months in prison, § 924(c) of the criminal code had not yet been amended, and it contained a provision known as the “stacking provision.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). This provision allowed prosecutors to charge defendants with “use of a firearm in furtherance of a violent offense” in the same criminal indictment as the underlying offense. Regardless of the fact that it was Mr. Rodriguez's first criminal conviction, the stacking provision allowed prosecutors to compound Mr. Rodriguez's second use of a firearm and mandate a sentence “to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).

In 2018, after the stacking provision had long received criticism for resulting in disproportionately harsh sentences, Congress amended the relevant language with Section 403(a) of the First Step Act. This change in law created a gross disparity between the sentence Mr. Rodriguez is serving and the sentence likely to be imposed for the same crime now in 2024. When Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced, his low-end guideline range was 610 to 627 months. The stacking provision required a term of imprisonment of 20 years consecutive to any other term of imprisonment imposed. If Mr. Rodriguez were to be charged today for the same crime, he would only be charged with brandishing firearms and not using them. Based on a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history category of 1, the guideline imprisonment range is 70 to 87 months. As to each of the Counts Five, Seven, and Nine, the required term would only have been 5 years consecutive to any other term of imprisonment imposed. In totality the guideline range, therefore, would have been 322 to 339 months – a little over half of the sentence Mr. Rodriguez received in 1998. Mr. Rodriguez has already served between 321 and 327 months imprisoned.

Mr. Rodriguez's sentence is also unusually long in another way. Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced at the same time as his Co-Defendant Tobian Ponder. Mr. Ponder was the more violent of the two and a career offender. Mr. Ponder was charged with several more charges, participated in additional robberies, brandished a firearm at a police officer, and violently beat a store owner. Mr. Ponder's own counsel admitted that “Mr. Ponder deserves a higher sentence than Mr. Rodriguez based upon the facts of this case alone.” (United States v. Tobian Ponder, No. 97-cr-00162, DE 238 at 9). Yet, Mr. Ponder was released from federal custody on November 17, 2022. Due to several unique characteristics of his original sentencing, Mr. Ponder's original § 924(c) conviction was vacated and I resentenced him in January of 2023. At his resentencing hearing, Mr. Ponder was able to take advantage of the new sentencing laws, and it was the judgment of the Court that Mr. Ponder should be committed to the Bureau of Prisons for 168 months imprisonment for Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8 and the three 60-month sentences as to 5, 7, and 9 for a total sentence of 348 months.

At Mr. Ponder's resentencing hearing, the Government pointed to the fact that Mr. Rodriguez could not similarly receive such relief and that reducing Mr. Ponder's sentence would create a sentencing disparity between the codefendants in this very case. Here due to the Sentencing Commission's latest Policy Statement, I can consider this discrepancy between Mr. Ponder and Mr. Rodriguez, and now correct it.

Despite the apparent applicability of this provision to Mr. Rodriguez, the Parties did not agree to Mr. Rodriguez's sentence reduction under the Unusually Long Sentence provision, maintaining that Mr. Rodriguez instead should be granted a sentence reduction pursuant to the Other Reasons provision. While I agree that Mr. Rodriguez is deserving of relief, I believe subsection (6) would be the appropriate mechanism. However, I will grant the Parties’ joint request for sentence reduction as it has been presented to me.

II. DEFENDANT'S CIRCUMSTANCES

I also want to briefly spotlight some of Mr. Rodriguez's individual achievements, without which he would not have extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. On August 24, 1998, I sentenced Mr. Rodriguez to a total of 610 months of imprisonment. Since then, Mr. Rodriguez has undergone, as Mr. Rodriguez's counsel rightly characterized it, an “extraordinary transformation from a troubled teen into a devoted son, student, and community man.” (DE 245 at 22).

I want to commend Mr. Rodriguez for his unique record of rehabilitation. Mr. Rodriguez's file is replete with testimonials and anecdotes that demonstrate that throughout his incarceration he has endeavored to further improve himself, support others, and reckon with his mistakes. Most recently, Mr. Rodriguez saved a prison staff member from severe bodily injury when during his UNICOR Federal Prison Industries shift, Mr. Rodriguez put himself in harm's way to prevent machinery from crushing the staff member's leg. Prior to this one incident, Mr. Rodriguez committed himself to his own education, earning his GED, taking several certification courses, and obtaining his forklift license. Mr. Rodriguez was selected from over 1,200 inmates for a presentation on the benefits of the Non-Residential Drug Abuse Program to Attorney General William Barr, Senators Lindsey Graham, Tim Scott, and other U.S. Officials. Mr. Rodriguez has also dedicated more than 200 hours to mentoring young people as part of the youth Encouragement Program.

Most illustrative of Mr. Rodriguez's character are the letters of support that Mr. Rodriguez has submitted. Senior Officer R. Crews wrote “in my 30+ years of law enforcement experience I have never written a letter of recommendation for anyone that I've arrested or supervised during their incarceration.” Yet for Mr. Rodriguez, Officer Crews wrote that he was a “model inmate” and a “good individual to consider for any positive consideration in sentence reduction.” (DE 245-5). Correctional Officer Specialist B. Thomas wrote that Mr. Rodriguez “is and always has been a man that works hard and efficiently, a man that is courteous and kind, an outstanding mentor to fellow inmates as well as staff, and a true example of what a human being should be, not just an inmate.” (DE 245-4). Safety Specialist R.H. Garcia writes of Mr. Rodriguez, “he is highly motivated, extremely astute, and dedicated to bettering himself and those around him.” (DE 245-6).

Mr. Rodriguez's strength of character is evidenced by the support he is going to receive upon his release and the longevity of his relationships with his family. Due in part to the jobs that Mr. Rodriguez has performed and held throughout his time of incarceration, he has already been offered employment at Pumps Out Unlimited as a sewer and storm manhole repair technician. (DE 245-7). Pumps Out Unlimited is based in Georgia and does work throughout the state of Florida, Georgia, and Texas. (Id.) Mr. Rodriguez will live with his sister in Hinesville, Georgia, as he has maintained a close relationship with his family, speaking with them nearly every day. His cousin Christina Smith writes in support of Mr. Rodriguez that “he has grown up to be a great man and very inspirational” and that “upon his release he will be surrounded by family who love and miss him and will help out here in the real world.” (DE 245-8).

III. CONCLUSION

Finding that Mr. Rodriguez is deserving of relief under the Sentencing Reform Act, the First Step Act, and the Sentencing Commission's recent amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, in no way undermines the seriousness of his crimes. Mr. Rodriguez committed violent acts, for which he has been imprisoned for over 26 years. Not everyone who was sentenced in the manner Mr. Rodriguez was is now eligible for such relief. I believe that Mr. Rodriguez is one of the rare few, who due to his impeccable record in federal incarceration and plan for life upon relief, is the type of individual the Sentencing Commission hoped to address in their latest policy statement, and I commend the Government for recognizing that.

I also want to thank Probation for their expeditious investigation, which assisted this Court in finalizing the terms of Mr. Rodriguez's release to his home in Georgia.

Upon full consideration of the record in this case, applicable law, and the positions of all parties, I find that Mr. Rodriguez is entitled to the relief he requests. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. Gomeo Rodriguez's Motion to Reduce Sentence (DE 245) is GRANTED. The Defendant's sentence is reduced to TIME SERVED. Upon release from imprisonment, he shall be placed on supervised release for a term of THREE (3) YEARS. He shall abide by all mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release along with the following special condition: Permissible Search requirement and Unpaid restitution, fines or special assessment.

2. Probation shall take immediate steps to finalize a release plan to assist Mr. Rodriguez in adjusting to his return to freedom and a lawful, productive life.

DONALD M. MIDDLEBROOKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE