ALFONSO LOZANO GLIS ANDRADE SANCHEZ v. TODD BLANCHE (2026)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint and motion in opposition to Plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. Having considered the parties' briefs, the record and the relevant law, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss should be granted and that the motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.

Plaintiff Glis Andrade Sanchez, mother of Plaintiff Alfonso Lozano, is a citizen of Mexico who at one time appears to have had a visa allowing her to legally be in the United States. She overstayed her visa, however, and was eventually placed into removal proceedings, with a final hearing date in Immigration Court scheduled for September 24, 2026.

On February 24, 2026, Lozano, who states he is a United States citizen, filed a form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, on behalf of his mother Andrade Sanchez, as well as on behalf of his father, Alfonso Emmanuel Lozano Ortiz, who resides in Mexico. Lozano appears to have properly filed this form with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for adjudication. Plaintiffs appear to have hoped USCIS would have adjudicated the I-130 in Andrade Sanchez' favor prior to her September 24, 2026, hearing date – such a result, if granted, would likely have given Andrade Sanchez a colorable argument to make to the Immigration Court to allow her to stay in the United States. USCIS has not issued a decision on Andrade Sanchez' I-130 yet, however. Plaintiffs want this Court to order them to do so and have requested relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Mandamus Act – this request is misplaced for a variety of reasons.

Administrative Procedure Act.

The APA allows courts to compel agency action when the action has been “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (“[W]ithin a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.”). However, “ ‘a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency [1] failed to take a discrete action that [2] it is required to take. ’ ” Li v. Jaddou, No. 22-50756, 2023 WL 3431237, at *1 (5th Cir. May 12, 2023) (unpublished) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004)). “A court's authority to compel agency action is limited to instances where an agency ignored ‘a specific, unequivocal command’ in a federal statute or binding regulation.” Fort Bend Cnty. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 59 F.4th 180, 197 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63, 124 S.Ct. 2373).

Plaintiffs face two main hurdles on their APA claim, standing and the “within a reasonable time” for action standard. First, Andrade Sanchez does not appear to have standing to challenge the lack of adjudication of the I-130.

Generally, the beneficiary of an I-130 petition lacks Article III standing to challenge the adjudication of that petition. See Siddhantam v. Sessions, No. 3:17-CV-2001-S, 2018 WL 4053366, at *3–5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2018); Gene's Mack, Inc. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Civ. A. No. V-11-4, 2012 WL 1067557, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2012) (same); Olugbenle v. Heathman, Civ. A. No. H-14-3085, 2015 WL 3546996, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 2015); Opoku-Agyeman v. Perez, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1148 (W.D. Mo. 2012); Li v. Renaud, 709 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Andrade Sanchez does not appear to have standing, and there appears to be no jurisdictional grounds for her claims. See Doe v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 496 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Standing is a jurisdictional requirement and not subject to waiver.”).

Second, USCIS does not appear to have engaged in any type of unreasonable delay in processing the I-130. The petition has been pending slightly over six months, which does not seem on its face to be an unreasonable time period. There is no evidence USCIS has exceeded any statutory or regulatory requirements or guidelines for adjudicating these types of petitions.

The case law also fails to support Plaintiffs' claim that the time USCIS has so far taken to process the I-130 is unreasonable. See, e.g., Ghadami v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-397 (ABJ), 2020 WL 1308376, at *8 (D.D.C. March 19, 2020) (“[M]any courts evaluating similar delays have declined to find a two-year period to be unreasonable as a matter of law.”) (citing cases)); Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2021) (“Even if the Court started the clock when [the plaintiff] filed the petition five years ago, several of this district's courts have noted that delays between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 154 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases concluding that delays of four and a half, five, and ten years were not unreasonable in different immigration contexts). “The agency operates in an environment of limited resources, and how it allocates those resources to address the burden of increasing claims is a calculation that courts should be loathe to second guess.” Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2004). In addition, Plaintiffs' need for adjudication of the matter seems to have been caused in large part by Plaintiff Andrade Sanchez' own actions in overstaying her visa and being placed in removal proceedings.

Here, even though Plaintiff Lozano may be entitled to the relief he seeks in his I-130, there is no requirement that this relief be granted on a particular timeline. In fact, a review process is expressly built into the law. The USCIS is required to investigate the facts underlying I-130 petitions, and petitioners must establish that they and their beneficiaries are entitled to the benefit they seek. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153(a), 1154(b); 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b). USCIS's nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate I-130 petitions only attaches “[a]fter an investigation of the facts of each case.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). The Fifth Circuit recently found that there was “no clear mandate” requiring USCIS “to act within six months, or even within a year,” even though “Congress enacted an aspirational goal of six months, 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (‘180 days’)” to rule on I-485 petitions (for lawful permanent residency). Li, 2023 WL 3431237, at *1. By extension, a similar logic applies to Plaintiff's claim. There is no clear mandate or binding regulation stating USCIS is required to act on I-130 petitions within a particular timeframe. Without a clear mandate, the Court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff's APA claim and must dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(1).

Mandamus Act

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and only available if a plaintiff makes three showings: (1) that the plaintiff has a clear right to the relief, (2) that the defendant has a clear duty to perform the act in question, and (3) that “no other adequate remedy is available.” Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Even where these requirements are met, mandamus is considered an extraordinary remedy, and a district court should only choose to exercise jurisdiction as a matter of “sound judicial discretion.” Mustafa v. Pasquerell, No. SA-05-CA-658-XR, 2006 WL 488399, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2006) (quoting Newsome, 301 F.3d at 231).

Plaintiffs' claims fail on all three criteria above. As discussed previously, Plaintiffs do not have a right to a favorable adjudication on Andrade Sanchez' behalf of the pending I-130 claim, nor is adjudication in general within Plaintiff's requested time period a duty that any of the defendants have. Significantly, there is an “other adequate remedy” available to Plaintiffs, although it may not be ripe yet. Should USCIS deny the I-130 petition for either of Mr. Lozano's parents, he would have additional administrative avenues under the APA to challenge such a decision. Defendants have never claimed or alleged they will not adjudicate Mr. Lozano's I-130 petition on behalf of his parents. Should they do so, however, Mr. Lozana would likely have a stronger case to ask for relief under the Mandamus Act, since it seems undisputed that USCIS has a duty to act on the I-130.

When the APA has been an avenue to compel agency action, courts have dismissed motions for writs of mandamus seeking the same remedy. See Sawan v. Chertoff, 589 F. Supp. 2d 817, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (finding that “the mandamus claim adds nothing to the APA claim and should be dismissed”); see also Ali v. Frazier, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (D. Minn. 2008) (dismissing a mandamus claim finding that “the APA itself provides a remedy for unlawfully delayed agency action, so plaintiffs in immigration-delay cases have a remedy available other than mandamus”); Almakalani v. McAleenan, 527 F. Supp. 3d 205, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Plaintiffs' mandamus claims are duplicative of their APA unreasonable delay claims: in the event that Plaintiffs did have a clear right to an immediate adjudication and Defendants did have a clear duty to adjudicate within a specified time frame, Section 706(1) of the APA would provide Plaintiffs with an adequate remedy.”).

Since in the instant case the APA provides an adequate alternative remedy for Plaintiffs' claims (even if such claims may not be ripe), dismissal of Plaintiffs' mandamus claim against all Defendants is proper pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Request for Preliminary Injunction

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish the following elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not harm the public interest. Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiffs request fails on all of these elements. The Court's findings regarding why Plaintiffs cannot meet first one has been discussed in detail above. Regarding the second and third elements, Plaintiffs also fail since Andrade Sanchez is unlikely to suffer irreparable harm if the I-130 is not resolved in her favor and she is ordered removed from the United States after her upcoming hearing. If that result occurs, she will be removed to her home country of Mexico, but Lozano's I-130 petition on her behalf will continue to be processed, just as it will be for his father. Should the I-130 be adjudicated in her favor at some later date, Lozano and Andrade Sanchez will be free to make arrangements at that time for her to enter the United States legally and reside there with her son. It is not uncommon for foreign relatives that a United States citizen files a Form I-130 on behalf of to reside in their home country while that petition is pending adjudication.

Andrade Sanchez also has no due process right to adjust status in the United States even if the Form I-130 is ultimately approved, and such approval does not immunize her from removal. Lozano also does not have a fundamental liberty interest in his mother being permitted to remain in the United States. See, e.g., Dep't of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 909 (2024).

Finally, Plaintiffs cannot show that granting their requested injunction will not harm the public interest. This Court finds that granting it would not be in the public interest. Granting it would confer a benefit on Plaintiffs – especially Andrade Sanchez – that others with pending I-130 petitions are not given. Granting it would essentially give Andrade Sanchez preferential status regarding her pending immigration hearing and adjudicating her I-130. She is requesting this relief because of her imminent hearing in Immigration Court – a proceeding that only exists because she did not follow the law and overstayed her visa. Granting the requested injunction would reward her behavior and likely place the adjudication of her I-130 ahead of many other people who did not violate the terms of their visas or otherwise violate immigration law. Such a result would not be in the public interest.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED September 11, 2026, in McAllen, Texas.

Arthur R. Jones United States District Judge