Scott Walker, Plaintiff, v. Mattress Firm, Inc., Defendant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 1

This is an employment dispute. Defendant Mattress Firm, Inc. filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the case. Dkt. 19. After carefully considering the motion, Plaintiff Scott Walker's response, Dkt. 21, Mattress Firm's reply, Dkt. 23, the record, and the applicable law, the Court grants Mattress Firm's motion (Dkt. 19) and denies Walker's motion for leave to amend his complaint, Dkt. 18.

Background

The following facts are taken as true. Walker was employed by Mattress Firm as a sales professional from October 2021 until August 2025. Dkt. 5 at 1. During that time, Walker was “repeatedly denied advancement opportunities.” Id. at 2. He began performing interim managerial duties but was not promoted and did not receive additional compensation. Id. at 3. Walker filed an EEOC charge on August 14, 2025. Id. at 4. He was terminated ten days later. Id.

On April 8, 2026 Walker sued Mattress Firm under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for discrimination and retaliation. Dkt. 1 at 3-4. He amended his complaint the next day. Dkt. 5. Mattress Firm filed an answer to Walker's amended complaint. Dkt. 10. Walker moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. 18. Mattress Firm then filed a motion to compel arbitration. Dkt. 19. Both motions are ripe for resolution.

Legal Standard

Courts conduct a two-step inquiry when resolving a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). First, a court decides whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute. See OPE Int'l LP v. Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 258 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). That inquiry asks both “(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement.” Id.

At the second step, courts determine “whether legal constraints external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims.” Id. at 446 (quotation omitted). That determination takes account the FAA's requirement that courts “enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).

Analysis

Mattress Firm seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA that covers Walker's employment claims. Dkt. 19. Walker does not dispute the validity of the agreement or its application to his claims. See Dkt. 21. Indeed, the agreement that Walker signed requires him to arbitrate all claims “arising out of or relating” to his employment, Dkt. 19-1 at 3, 5, which plainly covers his Title VII claims. Rather, Walker asserts that Mattress Firm waived its right to arbitrate by filing an answer and litigating this case for over a month before moving to compel arbitration. See Dkt. 21. Walker bears the burden of proving waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. See Garcia v. Fuentes Rest. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 141 F.4th 671, 677 n.6 (5th Cir. 2025). He has not met that burden.

“The right to arbitrate a dispute, like all contract rights, is subject to waiver.” Nicholas v. KBR, Inc., 565 F.3d 904, 907 (5th Cir. 2009). Waiver “is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 417 (2022) (quotation omitted). Adapted to the arbitration context, Morgan held that a party has waived its right to arbitrate only if it “knowingly relinquish[ed] the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right.” Id. at 412, 419.

The Fifth Circuit has revised its standard for waiving arbitration in light of Morgan. See Garcia, 141 F.4th at 675-76. The pre-Morgan waiver test asked if a party “substantially invoke[d] the judicial process ․ to the detriment or prejudice of the other party.” See id. at 675. But as the Fifth Circuit observed, Morgan rejected that “special, arbitration-preferring procedural rule[ ].” Id. at 676 (quoting Morgan, 596 U.S. at 418). Now, “substantial invocation of the judicial process is merely one way of demonstrating that a party waived its right; after all, substantial invocation of the judicial process is an intentional abandonment of a known right.” Id. “Thus, when the moving party is a defendant, the court must assess whether the defendant, during the course of the litigation, has acted in such a manner that the law deems the defendant to have acquiesced to having the claims at issue adjudicated by means of court litigation rather than arbitration.” Glob. Advantech Res. Ltd. v. Brown, 2026 WL 1483966, at *8 (5th Cir. May 27, 2026). The analysis depends on the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Walker argues that Mattress Firm acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate by filing an answer that asserts affirmative defenses and seeks “affirmative relief from this Court.” See Dkt. 21 at 2; Dkt. 10 at 10 (answer). But “[a]nswering a complaint does not typically suggest that a party has substantially invoked the judicial process. After all, answers are the most basic form of responsive litigation, with failure to answer resulting in a default judgment.” Garcia, 141 F.4th at 679. More beyond filing an answer is needed to show that the party has intentionally relinquished its right to arbitrate the dispute. Compare e.g., id. (finding waiver where defendant not only filed an answer but also litigated the case for almost five months, participated in discovery, attended mediation, and represented to the court that it did not intend to pursue arbitration), with Bradley v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 2026 WL 1630442, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2026) (no waiver where defendant filed an answer and engaged in Rule 26(f) conference); Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2026 WL 682669, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2026) (same), adopted by 2026 WL 691398 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026).

Nor does Mattress Firm's less than two-month delay in filing its motion to compel constitute waiver. Compare Dkt. 1 (suit filed April 8, 2026), with Dkt. 19 (May 27, 2026 motion). Far longer delays have been deemed permissible. See Bradley, 2026 WL 1630442, at *5 (five months of litigation activity insufficient to constitute waiver); Hendrix v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2026 WL 942672, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2026) (no waiver despite seven months' delay), adopted by 2026 WL 940295 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2026); cf. GHA Capstone, LLC v. Tang, 2025 WL 4475635, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (noting decisions finding waiver based on 10-18 months' delay).

Walker has not shown by the preponderance of the evidence that Mattress Firm intentionally relinquished or abandoned its right to arbitrate. His waiver argument fails, as a matter of law. And because his claims fall within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement, Walker's claims must be arbitrated, and his request for leave to amend is therefore denied. The Court further stays this case pending arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475-76 (2024) (stay of proceedings is mandatory).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Mattress Firm's motion to compel arbitration and stay the case (Dkt. 19) be GRANTED. This dispute must be submitted to arbitration. These proceedings are hereby STAYED and administratively closed pending arbitration. The parties must file a joint status report within 14 days of receiving a final arbitration award.

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Scott Walker's motion for leave to amend his complaint (Dkt. 18) be DENIED.

Signed on July 16, 2026, at Houston, Texas.

Yvonne Y. Ho United States Magistrate Judge