SIGNET MARITIME CORPORATION v. SHANGHAI MING WAH SHIPPING CO (2026)

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On January 8, 2024, an allision occurred in the Port of Brownsville involving four vessels: a bulk carrier ship owned by the Shanghai Ming Wah Shipping Company, and three tugboats owned by Signet Maritime Corporation. In addition to damaging one of the tugboats, the allision also destroyed a significant portion of a dock that Signet used in its operations and at which the three tugboats were berthed when the allision occurred.

Shanghai Ming accepts liability for the allision, but the parties dispute the damages that Signet can recover.

In July 2025, the Court held a three-day bench trial, after which the parties submitted their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on the trial record and the applicable law, the Court issues its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1

I. Factual Findings

Claimant Shanghai Ming Wah Shipping Company is the registered owner of the motor vessel CHANG HANG HUI HAI, a bulk carrier ship.

Signet Maritime Corporation is an international marine transportation and logistics company that owns several facilities and a fleet of almost forty tugboats. Signet maintains facilities in Brownsville, Texas, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, among other locations. The company's tugboats include the Signet DEFENDER, Signet MAGIC, and Signet RANGER.

In Brownsville, at the time of the incident that forms the basis of this lawsuit, Signet maintained a 5,000 square foot shoreside building for operations and an 80' x 20' rectangular timber dock to moor its tugboats. Signet's ownership of the dock dates back to its acquisition of Gateway Tugs in 1998. After that transaction, Signet repaired and conducted routine maintenance on the structure, which formed part of the company's business operations in the Port of Brownsville.

The initial 20 feet of the dock lay over land, with the remaining 60 feet over water. Twenty-seven wood pilings, arranged in a grid formation of nine rows of three pilings, and all driven deep into the ground, provided support, along with layers of longitudinal wooden frames and transverse wooden beams. Eighty wooden planks formed the decking. And two tubular steel monopiles were placed on each side of the dock for mooring tugboats. Signet provided power to moored tugboats through four electrical breaker boxes and power cables spanning the dock's length.

The dock was originally built in the 1970s. By 2007, it “was old” and “needed some work.”² Late that year or early 2008, Signet completed a “full rebuild” of the structure, contracting with Orion Construction for the work.³ The company replaced the 60-foot portion extending over the water, and left the 20-foot, landside portion intact. As part of the rebuild, Signet replaced 22 of the 27 wooden pilings.

A. The Allision

On January 8, 2024, the CHANG HANG was moored at Dock No. 12 in the Brownsville Ship Channel. Signet's dock lay a relatively-short distance away and three of the company's tugboats were moored there. On the side of the dock closest to the CHANG HANG, the Signet MAGIC and Signet DEFENDER sat alongside each other, port to starboard, with each tugboat's bow facing the shore, and with the Signet DEFENDER closest to the CHANG HANG. The Signet RANGER was moored on the other side of the dock with the same orientation.

Around 12:40 p.m., the forward lines of the CHANG HANG parted and the vessel began to move away from Dock No. 12 and toward Signet's dock and its tugboats. The CHANG HANG released its starboard and port anchors, but to no avail. The CHANG HANG made initial contact with the Signet DEFENDER. The following image shows the vessels at the moment of the allision:

The Signet DEFENDER was pushed into the Signet MAGIC, which in turn allided with the dock. Video from the CHANG HANG depicts most of the dock that protruded over the water buckling and breaking apart, thrust into the Signet RANGER's starboard side. The waters surrounding the dock filled with wood debris. The CHANG HANG continued moving into the tugboats, pushing all three of them and the debris toward the shore.

Signet personnel had learned of the CHANG HANG's movement and arrived at the scene shortly after the allision. The crews of the Signet DEFENDER and Signet MAGIC boarded the tugboats and got them underway. A few minutes later, the Signet RANGER started her motors and began to make her way toward the CHANG HANG, moving through wood debris as she did so. The three tugboats managed to assist the CHANG HANG back to Dock No. 12.

B. Post-Allision Surveys and Reports

The day after the allision, Signet hired Bill Hatfield, a local marine surveyor, to assess the damage to the dock and the three tugboats. M.P. Singh, a representative of Shanghai Ming, accompanied him. After the visit, Hatfield produced four reports, including one for the dock (the “Hatfield Dock Survey”) and one for each tugboat.⁴

Hatfield concluded that Signet should replace the entire 80-foot dock. His report included a list of required materials, including the replacement of all wooden pilings and steel monopiles, as well as the electrical breaker boxes and cable systems on the dock.

As for the Signet DEFENDER and Signet MAGIC, Hatfield identified no damage. However, he assessed damage to the Signet RANGER, including to components on the tugboat's starboard side, such as its watertight door. He also reported that the starboard propeller blades were bent. Hatfield recommended that Signet place the Signet RANGER in drydock for assessment and repairs.

Also on January 9, Signet hired Tex-Dive Commercial Diving Services, an underwater survey company, to assess damage to the dock and tugboats. Tex-Dive scuba divers recorded underwater video of the dock remnants and the tugboats.⁵ Tex-Dive's report also recommended that Signet drydock the Signet RANGER for further inspection and repair.⁶

Two days later, Antonis Panagiotareas, a surveyor hired by Signet, began his assessment. He inspected the dock on two occasions, taking photos and measurements. He observed bent pillars and noted that the video depicted the dock receiving significant torsion forces during the allision. He agreed with the materials list that Hatfield had provided.

At Panagiotareas' request, S.R. Trident in January 2025 presented a proposal to rebuild the dock. In preparing the proposal, S.R. Trident representatives did not visit the dock, but instead relied upon the materials list in the Hatfield Dock Survey to produce its estimate. S.R. Trident's proposal included a complete rebuild of the dock, as the company would not warranty a construction built over existing materials. The proposal totaled $1,625,375, which included a construction contingency, but no “soft costs.”⁷

Panagiotareas also obtained a parts estimate from Jacobs Engineering, which relied on the materials list within the Hatfield Dock Survey. Jacobs provided an “Opinion of Probable Cost,” but not an official bid for the rebuild project.⁸ Excluding “soft costs” or a construction contingency, the Jacobs Estimate totaled $1,581,691.45.

At trial, Shanghai Ming offered the testimony of Patrick Darjon, a civil engineer who specializes in maritime infrastructure. He did not visit the dock, but completed a “desktop” review and analyzed the Hatfield Dock Report, the Jacobs Estimate, Panagiotareas's report, and various videos and photographs taken after the allision. He concluded that Signet needed to replace only 75% of the dock, as the initial 25% of the dock did not show signs of displacement, cracking, or fracturing.

C. Post-Allision Operations

In the aftermath of the allision, Signet continued its operations in the Port of Brownsville. While initially attempting to do so without the dock, the effort proved untenable and unsafe, and Signet constructed a temporary dock using a spacer barge, a gangway, and nine-foot staircase, all of which it sourced from its own inventory.

The Signet RANGER maintained normal operations in the Port of Brownsville for three weeks after the allision, during which time its crew did not report any problems with the tugboat. Signet decided to drydock the tugboat to assess the extent of the damaged and conduct repairs, but found no available drydocks in south Texas. In late January 2024, Signet transported the Signet RANGER to its Pascagoula, Mississippi drydock facility, where it evaluated the tugboat, itemized needed repairs, and performed them. The Signet RANGER remained in drydock for 60 days, although Signet acknowledges that its personnel spent 15 days to complete repairs and work unrelated to the allision.

After sending the Signet RANGER to dry dock, Signet brought the Signet COLUMBIA from Ingleside, Texas to the Port of Brownsville to perform some of the work that the Signet RANGER would have completed. Signet operated in the Port of Brownsville under a tariff agreement, which established hourly rates for various services. The agreement placed restrictions on Signet from performing outside work and required the company to maintain a certain number of vessels or horsepower capability within the port. Signet re-assigned the Signet COLUMBIA to the Port of Brownsville to comply with its tariff obligations.

Signet encountered difficulty supplying power to its tugboats berthed at the temporary dock. The company initially used a portable diesel generator, but found the solution inadequate and unsafe. Signet resolved the issue by using the generator aboard the Signet RANGER, although this required an employee to monitor the generator during overnight use, per Signet's internal policies. Signet had to pay the monitoring employee, an expense that the company would otherwise have avoided. During the day, Signet tugboats at the temporary dock used their onboard generators for power, consuming additional fuel in doing so.

II. Analysis

Shanghai Ming concedes to liability in this case. The dispute between the parties concerns the damages, if any, that Signet may recover.

At trial, Signet bore the burden to establish recoverable damages by a preponderance of the evidence. See Gaines Towing & Transp., Inc. v. Atlantia Tanker Corp., 191 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A] defendant cannot be held liable for damages that he has not been shown to have caused[.]”); 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 1 ADMIRALTY & MAR. L. § 5:5 (6th ed. 2022). Signet seeks damages in six categories: (1) Repairs to the dock; (2) Cost for the temporary dock; (3) Repairs to the Signet RANGER; (4) Loss of use of the Signet RANGER; (5) Loss of Use of the Signet COLUMBIA; and (6) Miscellaneous damages, such as the emergency tow of the CHANG HANG. The company also requests pre-and post-judgment interest. The Court will address each category in turn.

Federal law provides the rules of decision regarding the recovery and measure of damages in admiralty. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. S/S Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 302 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976). In turn, federal admiralty law is an “amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.” E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864–65, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). Courts sitting in admiralty rely substantially upon common-law rules from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., Pizani v. M/V Cotton Blossom, 669 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1982) (referencing Restatement (Second) of Torts to support basis of compensatory damages in maritime tort suit); Freeport Sulphur Co., 526 F.2d at 304 (same); E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986) (recognizing the Restatement (Second) of Torts as part of the “general maritime law” in products liability suits).

The purpose of compensatory damages is to place the injured party in the same position had the tort not occurred. Pizani, 669 F.2d at 1088; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903. As a result, a tortfeasor cannot be held liable for damages the tortfeasor did not cause. Pizani, 669 F.2d at 1088. This includes repairs that enhance property beyond its condition prior to the tort. Id.

A court may “deny to the negligent victim damages ‘for so much of the losses as are shown to have resulted from failure on his part to use reasonable efforts to avoid or prevent them.’ ” Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co. v. M/V Delta, 598 F.2d 930, 932 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts). While some courts have referred to a “so-called duty to mitigate damage,” no such duty exists, because “there is no correlative right upon its violation.” Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co., 598 F.2d at 932 (citing Southport Transit Co. v. Avondale Marine Ways, 234 F.2d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 1956)). Instead, courts “apportion[ ] damages between the parties where the injured party has, subsequent to infliction of the harm, failed to exercise that degree of care society demands of the reasonable person.” Southport Transit Co., 234 F.2d at 952. The tortious party bears the burden of showing that the tort victim failed to minimize damages. Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co., 598 F.2d at 933. To satisfy this burden, the tortious party “must demonstrate (1) that the conduct was unreasonable, and (2) that it had the consequence of aggravating the harm.” Id.

A. The Dock

1. Ownership

As a threshold matter, Shanghai Ming argues that Signet failed to prove ownership of the dock and, as a result, cannot recover any damages that the allision inflicted on the structure. The Court finds the argument unpersuasive.

A tort victim may recover damage to physical property in which it has a proprietary interest. See, e.g., Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Exp., Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1473 (5th Cir. 1991). A party has a proprietary interest in physical property that the party owns. State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 728 F.2d 748, 749 (5th Cir. 1984).

Signet acquired a proprietary interest in the dock in 1998 when it purchased Gateway Tugs, the dock's previous owner. In the following years, Signet made repairs to the dock, conducted routine maintenance upon it, and used the dock as part of its business operations in the Port of Brownsville. And in late 2007 or early 2008, Signet completed a “full rebuild” of the dock, contracting with Orion Construction to complete the construction.

Shanghai Ming correctly notes that the trial record does not contain a document confirming Signet's ownership of the dock. Based on the absence of such a document, Shanghai Ming argued at trial that the statute of frauds serves as a defense to Signet's recovery. In its pleadings, however, Shanghai Ming did not advance this argument, which represents an affirmative defense that a party must plead. See Automated Med. Lab'ys, Inc. v. Armour Pharm. Co., 629 F.2d 1118, 1122 (5th Cir. 1980). Its failure to do so constitutes waiver of the defense. See LSREF2 Baron, L.L.C. v. Tauch, 751 F.3d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 2014).

In any event, “a defense under the statute of frauds is personal to the parties to the transaction and cannot be availed of by third parties.” Texeramics v. United States, 239 F.2d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 1957); see also Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co., 294 F. 176, 181 (2d Cir. 1923) (“[T]he defense of the statute of frauds is personal to the contracting parties.”). Here, Shanghai Ming represents a third party as to any transaction involving Signet and previous (or current) owners of the dock. As a result, Shanghai Ming cannot rely on the statute of frauds to preclude Signet's recovery for damages to the dock.

2. Partial or Complete Rebuild

The parties contest whether repairing the dock will require that Signet rebuild the entire structure or only the 60 feet protruding over water.⁹ In essence, Shanghai Ming argues that the allision did not damage the 20 feet of the dock resting over land and, as a result, Signet should not recover a windfall by being able to recover for the replacement of that 25% of the dock.

Recoverable damages in a tort action aim “to place the injured person as nearly as possible in the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred.” Pizani, 669 F.2d at 1088. The amount depends upon whether the damage constitutes a total loss or whether partial damage justifies repair. Gaines Towing & Transp., Inc., 191 F.3d at 635. A party suffers a total loss when the damage is not reparable. Id. A constructive total loss occurs when the damage is repairable, but the cost of repairs is greater than the fair market value immediately before the injury. Id.

The Court concludes that Signet proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the allision rendered the dock a total loss or constructive total loss. The allision visibly shattered about one-half of the dock, with deck timbers thrust into the starboard of the Signet RANGER. Another quarter of the dock visibly shifted, with the videos and images revealing material movement. The 20 feet of the dock largely over land did not appear to have shifted or otherwise moved.

Panagiotareas inspected the damage in the days after the allision and concluded that the dock could not be partially repaired, but would have to be entirely rebuilt. He relied in part on the Hatfield Dock Survey, which reached the same conclusion.¹⁰ Admittedly, neither Panagiotareas nor Hatfield tested the integrity of the remaining wooden pilings that supported the initial 20 feet of the dock. But their reports clarified that doing so would have required pulling the pilings, obviating any potential cost savings if the pilings proved undamaged. The court found Panagiotareas to be knowledgeable and his reliance upon the Hatfield Dock Survey credible.

Based on the record, the Court concludes that a prudent owner would not rebuild only the 75% of the dock visibly damaged, hoping that no damage occurred to the initial 20 feet. In fact, S.R. Trident, a construction company that provided a proposal to rebuild the dock, would not complete a partial rebuild due to liability concerns regarding the remaining portion of the dock. Panagiotareas testified that S.R. Trident “was very, very clear that they will not do the job if it's not full construction.”¹¹ This evidence further supports the conclusion that Signet's only option is to rebuild the entire dock.

Shanghai Ming presented the controverting testimony of Patrick Darjon, but the Court finds his testimony of less weight. He reviewed pictures, videos, and reports of the allision and subsequent damage to the dock, but he did not personally visit the dock. The Court finds the conclusions from Panagiotareas and Hatfield more credible and persuasive than Darjon's, on the issue of whether the allision requires Signet to replace the entire dock or only 75% of it.

The Court concludes that Signet may recover as damages the cost of replacing the entire dock.

3. Life Expectancy of the Dock and Depreciation

The parties dispute the anticipated life expectancy of the dock, which affects the amount that Signet may recover to repair the dock.

When a party incurs damage to its property, “the owner is entitled to its money equivalent, and thereby to be put in as good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been destroyed.” Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. S. Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146, 155, 45 S.Ct. 465, 69 L.Ed. 890 (1925). Courts calculate repair costs to restore a damaged object to its condition immediately before the injury occurred. Gaines Towing & Transp. Inc., 191 F.3d at 636; Petition of M/V Elaine Jones, 480 F.2d 11, 27 (5th Cir. 1973) (“A party suffering injury to his property is entitled to no more than restoration to its condition prior to the wrong.”). When a total loss or constructive total loss occurs, courts depreciate the in-kind replacement value to match the remaining life of the destroyed object. Freeport Sulphur Co., 526 F.2d at 305 (applying a straight-line depreciation). Awarding more than the depreciated value amounts to a prohibited windfall.

Applying these principles in the current matter, the Court must determine the percentage of useful life remaining on the Signet dock at the time of the allision and apply a straight-line depreciation to the cost for its reconstruction. Based on the trial record, the Court finds that the Signet dock had a 30-year life expectancy. Signet's rebuild of the dock in 2007 or 2008 supports the finding. By 2007, about thirty years after the dock was initially built, Signet determined that the structure “was old” and “needed some work.”¹² Signet rebuilt the entire dock, replacing over 80% of the wooden pilings. Snyder testified that while the new dock was different in nature–i.e., the original dock was more like a pier–both structures were wooden and consisted of similar materials.

Signet argues that the dock had a life expectancy of 50 years, but the evidence on which it relies proves unpersuasive. Signet emphasizes a study concluding that wood treated with chromate copper arsenate (CCA) could last 50 years. While the Signet dock used similar material, the study tested CCA-treated wood in a forest environment, rather than a submersed, brackish water environment like the waters in the Port of Brownsville. This material difference renders the study largely irrelevant.¹³

Applying a life expectancy of 30 years for the dock, and using January 2008 as the date of the rebuild, by the time of the January 2024 allision, the dock was 16 years old, representing 53.3% of its life expectancy. As a result, the Court will apply a 53.3% depreciation to any recovery by Signet for an in-kind replacement of the dock.

4. Cost of Replacing Dock

At trial, each party presented the opinions of an expert regarding the cost of replacing the dock.

Signet relied on Panagiotareas, who serves as the CEO of Oceanus Maritime Services, LLC and who holds almost 40 years of experience in the maritime industry. He testified that replacing the dock, including the “soft costs” and a construction contingency, would cost $2,114,566.45. He testified that he regularly provides maritime damages surveys and repair cost estimates, although not in matters concerning docks. He relied on both the Jacobs Estimate of probable costs and the S.R. Trident proposal. Excluding “soft costs” and a construction contingency, the two calculations differed by only about $40,000. Panagiotareas accepted the detailed materials list from the Hatfield Dock Survey, although on cross examination he conceded that the list contained some errors, such as including 8 steel monopiles, when the parties agree that the dock contained only 4.

Shanghai Ming presented the testimony of Darjon, who opined that replacing the dock would cost $1,542,366.63. At trial, he analyzed the line items in the Jacobs Estimate, agreeing with some costs, while disputing the necessity or amount of other categories. As to the line items with which he disagreed, he procured price information from his own experience and from RSMeans, a software tool that estimates costs. He also criticized the Jacobs Estimate on the grounds that the company never visited the dock. For some of the disputed line items, Darjon testified that the expense was unnecessary and recommended that the cost be removed.

The Court generally found Darjon's cost analysis more robust and credible. He analyzed the line items in the Jacobs Estimate and adequately explained why he reduced certain costs and removed others altogether in his own calculation. The Court found most of his reductions appropriate, such as accounting for 27 wooden pillars rather than 28. In addition, based on Darjon's testimony, the Court finds that Signet did not prove the need to conduct an environmental study or land survey in connection with the replacement of the dock, rendering those amounts not recoverable. The Court also does not award costs for a new gangway, as Signet did not prove that the allision damaged the gangway.

Based on the trial record, the Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the cost of replacing the entire dock totals $1,765,319.90, which includes a 15% contingency fee. After applying the 53.3% depreciation, the Court awards $824,404.39.

B. Temporary Dock

In maritime cases, the doctrine of restitutio in integrum applies, allowing for damages measured by the “cost of necessary repairs and the loss of earnings while they are being made.” Delta Marine Drilling Co. v. M/V Baroid RANGER, 454 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1972). Such damages may include the cost of constructing a temporary replacement for a damaged structure. See, e.g., United States v. State Rd. Dep't of Fla., 189 F.2d 591, 595–96 (5th Cir. 1951).

Although a maritime tort victim bears no duty to mitigate damages, its failure to do so can reduce its damages. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Robin Hood Shifting & Fleeting Serv., Inc., 899 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co., 598 F.2d at 932 (explaining that while no formal “duty” to mitigate damages exists, the failure to mitigate will decrease the apportionment of damages to the injured party). The use of substitute equipment to replace damaged equipment is a form of mitigation of damages. See Delta S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 747 F.2d 995, 1007 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying this rule to vessels). When a maritime tort victim avoids lost profits by temporarily substituting equipment from its inventory pending repair or replacement of the damaged equipment or structure, courts may award the profits that the repurposed equipment would have generated. Id. But if the substitute equipment was idle, then the maritime tort victim has lost no profits from repurposing the equipment. See id.

Applying these principles to the present case leads to the following findings and conclusions. The evidence demonstrates that Signet required a dock to maintain normal tugboat operations in the Port of Brownsville. Absent a dock, Signet would have lost revenue and profits by having to decrease or altogether cease tugboat services in the port. As a result, Signet is entitled to the cost of constructing and maintaining the temporary dock that it has utilized since the allision. But Signet may only recover out-of-pocket costs related to the construction and maintenance of the temporary dock. To the extent that Signet avoided out-of-pocket costs by utilizing its own equipment to construct a temporary dock, Signet acted reasonably. But as using its own equipment avoided out-of-pocket costs, Signet cannot recover the value of the utilized equipment, unless the trial record demonstrated that Signet repurposed the equipment and, in doing so, lost profits that the equipment would have otherwise generated.

In constructing the temporary dock, Signet used a barge, gangway, and staircase, each of which it already owned. Signet seeks as damages the rental value of these items, for the 425 days that Signet used the temporary dock through the start of trial.

The Court concludes that Signet may recover a portion of its requested damages for the use of its barge as a temporary dock. Signet offered some evidence that before the allision, it leased the barge to customers and generated revenue. Stephanie McMichael, Signet's Vice President of Accounting, testified that the company “regularly” leased the barge for an average of $550 per day.¹⁴ Captain Macklin testified that Signet used the barge and the Signet COLUMBIA for its launch service in Ingleside, generating about $100,000 in revenue from August to December 2023. This evidence, however, does not establish with any precision how many lease days Signet lost by using the barge as a temporary dock, or the profits that such leasing would have generated. Still, even Shanghai Ming acknowledges that some loss occurred.¹⁵ Based on the trial record, the Court finds that Signet would probably have leased the barge for at least 60 days during the relevant time period, resulting in losses of $33,000.¹⁶ Awarding any additional damages would rest on mere speculation.

As to the gangway, Signet may recover the value of the equipment. Some evidence indicated that Signet leased the gangway on occasion at $450 per day. Signet seeks damages of $191,250, representing 425 days at the daily lease rate. Signet would normally be entitled to recover the lost profits occasioned by its inability to lease the gangway to third parties, but other evidence indicated that the gangway cost about $25,000. A reasonable owner would purchase another gangway for $25,000 to use with the temporary dock, rather than continue to lose profits by repurposing a gangway from its inventory. Thus, the Court concludes that Signet may recover only $25,000 in connection with the use of the gangway for the temporary dock, as the company could have avoided lost profits above that amount by purchasing another gangway.

The same principle caps Signet's recover for the use of the staircase to $570. Although Signet requests damages for lost lease revenue at $450 per day, the record indicates that Signet could have purchased an additional staircase for $570. A prudent maritime tort victim would buy the additional staircase rather than incur lost rental income. Signet may recover only the cost of buying that staircase.

Signet also requests recovery of the delivery costs for transporting the barge, gangway, and staircase, which Signet maintained at its Ingleside facility, to the Port of Brownsville. The Signet COLUMBIA transported these items over three days. The record demonstrates that the Signet COLUMBIA maintained daily tugboat work, meaning that absent the allision, Signet would have assigned the Signet COLUMBIA to profit-generating work, rather than the transport of the Signet equipment. Thus, Signet is entitled to the day rate cost of the Signet COLUMBIA, which the record reflects was $5,900, multiplied by three days, for a total of $17,700.¹⁷

Finally, Signet may also recover as damages the post-allision costs for powering its tugboats when stationed at the temporary dock. Before the allision, shore lines powered the docked tugboats. The allision rendered that power source unavailable. For the temporary dock, Signet initially leased a portable generator, using this power source for 229 days (June 1, 2024, to January 15, 2025). But as Signet did not provide data regarding the cost of the portable generator, it may not recover any amount for this power source. Starting on January 15, 2025, Signet began using the Signet RANGER's onboard generator to supply power overnight, and a crewmember remained onboard while the generator ran. Signet paid the unlicensed engineer $405 per day for 187 days, through the first day of trial. This pay represented an incremental cost of $75,735 to Signet. During the day, tugboats moored at the dock used their onboard generators for power, occasioning additional consumption of fuel. During the relevant time period, Signet incurred additional fuel expense of $32,986 to operate the generators. Signet may recover both of these incremental costs.

In total, Signet may recover $184,991 as damages related to the construction and use of the temporary dock.¹⁸

C. Repair of the Signet RANGER

Signet seeks recovery of the losses occasioned by the alleged damages to the Signet RANGER from the allision.

When a damaged vessel in a maritime accident is not a total loss, the owner is entitled to recover “the reasonable cost of repairs necessary to restore it to its pre-casualty condition and actual profits lost during the detention necessary to make repairs.” Gaines Towing and Transp., Inc.., 191 F.3d at 636–37 (citing The Tug June S v. Bordagain Shipping Co., 418 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1969)). The claimant must establish the amount of repair costs “with reasonable certainty that the damages claimed were actually or may be reasonably inferred to have been incurred as a result of the collision.” Mitsui O. S. K. Lines, K. K. v. Horton & Horton, Inc., 480 F.2d 1104, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973).

In the present matter, the Court finds that the allision damaged the Signet RANGER's starboard propeller, as well as the starboard watertight door, side running gear, bulwark, and skeg. Signet is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of repairing these items.

Shanghai Ming argues that the evidence did not prove that the allision damaged the starboard propeller. In particular, Singh testified that the pictures of the starboard propeller did not reveal recent damage, and that Tex-Dive's underwater survey shortly after the allision reported only “nicks” and “dings” to the propeller, but no bending of the blades. The Court has considered this testimony, but concludes that the record as a whole demonstrates that the allision damaged the starboard propeller, either during the initial impact or when the Signet RANGER moved out of the debris-filled water. The Hatfield Dock Survey, Tex-Dive underwater survey, Mr. Panagiotareas's testimony, and the photos of the propeller support this conclusion.

The Court also finds that Signet acted as a prudent vessel owner by drydocking the Signet RANGER and inspecting the tugboat. Given the nature of the allision, and the post-allision inspections reporting damage to the starboard propeller and other areas of the tugboat, Signet had reasonable concerns that the Signet RANGER had suffered damage below the water line. Signet's engineers and the outside surveyors recommended that Signet drydock the tugboat to conduct a thorough inspection. Signet acted reasonably by doing so.

Signet requests $152,549 in damages for the repair of the Signet RANGER. This amount includes costs for a broad inspection of the tugboat, an inspection that in some instances revealed no damage. Shanghai Ming contests some of the alleged damages, and in particular challenges the necessity of various tasks that Signet performed, on the grounds that no evidence showed outward damage to these areas. These items include, as examples, the emptying, cleaning, and inspection of the fuel tanks and ballast tanks, or the removal of the shaft. Shanghai Ming's witness, Singh, testified that Signet had no need to inspect items not visibly damaged and for which no evidence suggested any damage. On this issue, the Court finds credible the testimony by Signet witnesses who testified that even if the exterior of these items did not demonstrate obvious damage from the allision, a prudent vessel owner would inspect the items. The allision not only thrust a significant portion of the destroyed dock directly into the Signet RANGER's starboard, but also left the tugboat afloat amidst debris, some of which would undoubtedly be underwater. The nature of the allision and the ensuing sea of debris rendered it reasonable for Signet to conduct a thorough inspection of the tugboat, to determine the full extent of the damages from both the initial impact and the Signet RANGER moving through the debris after the allision. In some instances, an adequate inspection required the emptying of tanks or the removal of the item, such as the shaft. Even though Signet did not identify damage to these parts of the tugboat, the company acted reasonably by inspecting the tugboat for such damages.

Thus, the Court concludes that Signet is entitled to the repair costs that it seeks, with the following exceptions. First, the Court finds that the evidence does not demonstrate that the allision damaged the Signet RANGER's transducer (also referred to as the depth finder). Signet operated the tugboat for three weeks after the allision with no reports of the transducer malfunctioning. Any malfunction should have been apparent from the use of the equipment. Signet first identified damage to the transducer when it drydocked the tugboat, but it provided no evidence indicating that the nature of the damage was consistent with the allision and would have been undetectable immediately after the allision. As Signet has not demonstrated that the allision damaged the transducer, the company may not recover the costs of repairing or replacing the equipment. Second, Singh identified an apparent duplicate charge for labor in connection with Items 305 and 305.1 in Signet's damage chart.¹⁹ The Court agrees with this testimony, resulting in a reduction of $5,834.78.

As for the location of the drydock, the Court finds that Signet acted as a prudent vessel owner by sending the Signet RANGER to Mississippi for inspection and repairs. Signet sought access to a drydock in Corpus Christi, but that facility proved unavailable. Given the unavailability of suitable local drydocks, Signet made the reasonable decision to use its facility in Pascagoula so as to avoid further delays. The travel to Pascagoula took only three days. The record contains no evidence that a drydock facility existed in south Texas that Signet could have used more quickly than the three days necessary to transport the Signet RANGER to Mississippi.

Given that Signet acted reasonably by using its Mississippi drydock for the repairs, the company may recover the necessary and related travel expenses, both for the tugboat and for its crew. The crew members are stationed in Brownsville, requiring Signet to pay them a $25 per diem and to cover their travel costs when assigned to work outside of south Texas. Signet may recover $45,143.35 for the travel costs of its crewmembers. Also, Signet may recover the $35,814.48 in fuel cost for transporting the Signet RANGER to Pascagoula, as absent the allision, Signet would have avoided this expense. And Signet may recover the $18,907.35 expended to perform welding work on the Signet RANGER so that it could undertake the trip to Pascagoula.

The Court also finds that the repairs reasonably required 45 days, a finding supported by evidence such as Panagiotareas's testimony on the length of the drydock. Singh testified that the repairs should have required no more than 9 days, but he arrived at this conclusion based largely on his opinion that Signet engaged in unnecessary inspections. The Court has found those inspections reasonable. Given that the Court finds that Signet required the 45 days to evaluate and repair its tugboat, the Court rejects Shanghai Ming's challenges to certain costs related to the repairs that rely on the number of days required for the work. These costs include, as examples, the expenses for warehouse support and consumables, the wet and dry berthing of the tugboat, and the daily cost of a safety manager for the drydocking.

Based on these findings, Signet may recover $231,819.65 for the inspection and repair of the Signet RANGER.

D. Loss of Use or Lost Profits

Signet contends that it is entitled to recover the consequential damages stemming from the loss of the use of the Signet RANGER when it remained in drydock, and of the substitute vessel, the Signet COLUMBIA, which Signet reassigned to the Port of Brownsville during the drydock period.

1. Signet RANGER

As the repairs from the allision and the related transit required 48 days, Signet seeks $160,623.90 in loss of use damages. In support of this request, Signet cites to Continental Oil Co. v. S.S. Electra, 431 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1970) and Delta Marine Drilling Co. v. M/V Baroid Ranger, 454 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1972). In response, Shanghai Ming argues that Signet may recover only its lost profits occasioned by having to repair the Signet RANGER. Based on the applicable law, the Court agrees that lost profits represents the appropriate damage model.

Lost profits is a traditional item of damages in admiralty. Skou v. United States, 478 F.2d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 1973); Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1001. The vessel owner bears the burden of proving lost profits with reasonable certainty. The CONQUEROR, 166 U.S. 110, 125, 17 S.Ct. 510, 41 L.Ed. 937 (1897); Skou, 478 F.2d at 348. As the Fifth Circuit explained in one of the cases that Signet cites, “in no event can more than the net profits be recovered by way of damages; and the burden is upon the libellant to prove the extent of the damages actually sustained by him.” Cont'l Oil Co., 431 F.2d at 392.

To recover lost profits, the vessel owner must prove “actual loss.” The CONQUEROR, 166 U.S. at 127, 17 S.Ct. 510. The claimed loss “must not be merely speculative, and something else must be shown than the simple fact that the vessel was laid up for repairs.” Id. A commercial vessel owner may prove actual loss when the vessel “has been engaged, or was capable of being engaged in a profitable commerce.” Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1001 (quoting The CONQUEROR, 166 U.S. at 133, 17 S.Ct. 510). Evidence demonstrating that the vessel was operating profitably at the time of damage, and would have continued operating profitably but for the damage, typically satisfies the “actual loss” requirement. See, e.g., id. at 1001–1002; In re M/V NICOLE TRAHAN, 10 F.3d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Maritrans Operating Partners, LP v. Port of Pascagoula, 73 F. App'x 733, 734 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (per curiam).

Upon a showing of actual loss, a court must then calculate a vessel owner's lost profits during the vessel's period of detention. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1001–1002. To accomplish this, a court first seeks to estimate the vessel's average daily profit rate, then multiplies this rate by the number of days the vessel is detained. See, e.g., id.; Moore-McCormack Lines v. THE ESSO CAMDEN, 244 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1957). To determine the average daily profit rate, courts typically look to the vessel's total profit on voyages immediately before and after the vessel was damaged, then divide the total profit on those voyages by the total length of the voyages. Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149, 1155–56 (5th Cir. 1990). No fixed time period applies for the average daily profit rate. Id. Historically, courts have applied the “three voyage” rule to determine the rate, utilizing data from the voyage immediately before the casualty voyage, the casualty voyage itself, and data from the voyage immediately after the casualty voyage. Id. But the Fifth Circuit has approved of varying time periods. Id. (citing Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1000–1001) (deriving an average daily profits from six voyages, three prior to and three after the casualty voyage); Moore-McCormack Lines, 244 F.2d at 201 (deriving a daily average profit figure from three voyages totaling 241 days).

In the present matter, the Signet RANGER generated an average daily profit of $1,783.73. As the allision caused the Signet RANGER to remain drydocked and in transit for 48 days, the lost profits occasioned by the allision total $85,619.04. Shanghai Ming agrees that Signet incurred $1,783.73 in daily lost profits, but contends that the Court should award only nine days' worth of such damages. As the Court has determined that Signet is entitled to recover for the 48 days that the Signet RANGER remained in drydock (including the three days of transit), the Court concludes that Signet is entitled to the $85,619.04 in loss profits.

2. Signet COLUMBIA

Signet also may recover the lost profits caused by having to reassign the Signet COLUMBIA to the Port of Brownsville. Signet acted as a prudent vessel owner by reassigning the Signet COLUMBIA to the Port of Brownsville, as the governing tariff in the port required Signet to maintain a certain capacity of tugboats and horsepower. The Signet COLUMBIA did not have the requisite characteristics to complete all of the Signet RANGER's tasks, but covered some.

The trial record demonstrates that in both Ingleside and the Port of Brownsville, the Signet COLUMBIA operated at a loss. But the tugboat's operating losses were greater while operating in Brownsville. And demand existed for the Signet COLUMBIA in Ingleside, leading the Court to conclude that absent the allision, Signet would have avoided the incremental losses caused by having to reassign the Signet COLUMBIA.

In 2023, the Signet COLUMBIA's net daily profit was -$593.96 in Ingleside. During the tugboat's operations in the Port of Brownsville, it operated at a net daily profit of -$1,188.22, or $594.26 per day in incremental losses to Signet. Over the course of 48 days, the incremental losses total $28,524.48, an amount that Signet may recover.

E. Emergency Rescue Services

Immediately after the allision, the three Signet tugboats involved in the incident provided rescue services to move the CHANG HANG back to its dock. Signet billed Shanghai Ming for this service at the standard tariff rate, totaling $79,488.64 and which included a 35% dead-ship surcharge.

Shanghai Ming challenges the application of the surcharge, arguing that the CHANG HANG does not meet the definition of a dead ship. The Court agrees.

In maritime law, a vessel is deemed a dead ship if it has been “withdrawn from navigation and maritime commerce.” Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 568 U.S. 115, 133, 133 S.Ct. 735, 184 L.Ed.2d 604 (2013) (quoting Amoco Oil v. M/V Montclair, 766 F.2d 473, 477 (11th Cir. 1985)). “Whether a vessel has been withdrawn from navigation is a question of the physical characteristics of and modifications to the structure.” Id. (citing SCHOENBAUM, 1 ADMIRALTY & MAR. L., § 3:6 (“Only if a ship is so changed in function that it has no further navigation function will it be considered to have lost vessel status.”)). “[A] limitation on what a vessel can do does not necessarily render it a dead ship.” In re S. Recycling, L.L.C., 982 F.3d 374, 385 (5th Cir. 2020).

Here, no evidence indicates that Shanghai Ming had withdrawn the CHANG HANG from navigation or maritime commerce. As a result, the vessel does not satisfy the definition of a dead ship, and Signet cannot apply the 35% surcharge applicable for work involving such vessels. But Signet may recover the adjusted amount of $58,800.47 for the emergency assist of the CHANG HANG.

Signet also requests contractual interest related to the unpaid invoice from Signet to Shanghai Ming. Under a contract with the Port of Brownsville, Signet imposes a 1.5% monthly interest surcharge on unpaid invoices. Signet sent its invoice to Shanghai Ming on December 31, 2024, and began to apply the monthly interest charge after nonpayment of the invoice on January 31, 2025. Signet claims that the total amount now owed is $107,874. The record leaves unclear how Signet applies the contractual interest to calculate that amount. And as discussed in the next section, the Court awards prejudgment interest. Under these circumstances, and to avoid a double recovery, the Court declines to apply the contractual interest on the unpaid invoice.

F. Interest

1. Prejudgment Interest

Under maritime law, an award for prejudgment interest “is the rule rather than the exception; prejudgment interest must be awarded unless unusual circumstances make an award inequitable.” Ryan Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. James Marine Servs., Inc., 792 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1986). Courts award prejudgment interest not to penalize the party at fault, but to compensate the prevailing party for the loss of use of funds between the time of the injury and the date of judgment. Jauch v. Nautical Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 2006); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d 401, 415 (5th Cir. 1982). Although courts do not automatically award prejudgment interest in admiralty collision cases, they deny such an award only in exceptional circumstances, such as the prevailing party's undue delay in prosecuting the lawsuit or its bad faith conduct. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 196, 199, 115 S.Ct. 2091, 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995); Jauch, 470 F.3d at 215. “[N]either a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case.” City of Milwaukee, 515 U.S. at 196, 115 S.Ct. 2091.

In the present matter, the Court finds the award of prejudgment interest appropriate to compensate Signet for the loss of use of the funds represented by the recoverable damages. The Court awards prejudgment interest at a rate of 4%, applied on the following schedule:²⁰

2. Postjudgment Interest

Under federal law, “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The statute applies in maritime actions and also establishes the applicable interest rate. See, e.g., Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 173 (5th Cir. 2010) (vacating the district court's denial of postjudgment interest in a maritime action because an award of postjudgment interest pursuant to the Section 1961 rate “is not discretionary”). In the present matter, the Court will award Signet postjudgment interest at the rate applicable at the time of entry of the Final Judgment.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons explained in this Order and Opinion, the Court awards the following amounts as damages to Signet:

The Court will enter an Amended Final Judgment in accordance with these Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Any finding of fact which should more appropriately be characterized as a conclusion of law shall be considered as such, and any conclusion of law which should more appropriately be characterized as a finding of fact shall be considered as such.

2.   Macklin, Day 1 Tr. 240:24–241:4 (Doc. 59).

3.   Snyder, Day 1 Tr. 37:10–19, 43:11–22 (Doc. 59).

4.   Hatfield Dock Rpt., PX15 (Doc. 56–8); Hatfield DEFENDER Rpt., PX16 (Doc. 56–9); Hatfield MAGIC Rpt. PX17 (Doc. 56–10); Hatfield RANGER Rpt., PX18 (Doc. 56–11).

5.   Tex-Dive Videos, PX24–26 (Docs. 56:15–17).

6.   Tex-Dive Rpt., PX23 (Doc. 56–14).

7.   S.R. Trident Proposal, PX43 (Doc. 56–38).

8.   Jacobs Estimate, PX27 (D0c. 56–18, 14).

9.   The Court notes that at the time of trial, Signet had not rebuilt the dock, but had continued to use the temporary dock.

10.   Witnesses from both parties confirmed that Hatfield enjoys a good reputation as a marine surveyor.

11.   Panagiotareas, Day 2 Tr., 45:20–46:13 (Doc. 60); see also S.R. Trident Proposal, PX43 (Doc. 56–38, 3).

12.   Macklin, Day 1 Tr. 34:11–17, 37:7–16 (Doc. 59).

13.   In addition, while Snyder testified at trial that Signet anticipated the dock would last 50 years, Shanghai Ming impeached his statements through his deposition testimony in which he expressed that the dock would last 20 to 30 years. Snyder, Day 1 Tr. 89:9–90:2 (Doc. 59).

14.   McMichael, Day 1 Tr. 149:12–150:6 (Doc. 59).

15.   See Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Doc. 65, ¶ 67).

16.   The Court accepts the evidence that Signet leased its barge at $550 per day.

17.   Signet may not recover the fuel costs that it requests, as had the Signet COLUMBIA conducted normal service during those three days, it would have presumably consumed about the same amount of fuel. Signet offers no evidence that the Signet COLUMBIA consumed more fuel during those three days than it would have during normal operations.

18.   After trial, Signet informed the Court that the Port of Brownsville had communicated that Signet could not continue using a temporary dock, and that this development could occasion additional damages. (Notice of Potential Additional Damages, Doc. 68) But as Signet did not quantify those damages or provide the legal authority establishing its entitlement to such damages, the Court does not address whether the alleged communication from the Port of Brownsville increased Signet's damages.

19.   See Signet's Damages Spreadsheet, PX27 (Doc. 56–18, 2).

20.   Cf. United States District & Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Texas, Post-Judgment Interest Rates - 2026 (Jan. 2, 2025), https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/post-judgment-interest-rates-2026.

Fernando Rodriguez, Jr., United States District Judge