FYFFE v. EVANS FOOD GROUP LTD (2024)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion to sever and motion for partial remand filed by Defendants Evans Food Group, Ltd. and Angel Gibson. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff Mary Fyffe has moved for an extension of time to respond and move for a full remand. (Doc. 7). For the following reason, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion, deny as moot Plaintiff's motion, and remand this action to the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas.

I. Procedural Background

According to the complaint, Fyffe was employed by Evans Food Group beginning in April 2022; in her role, she was under the supervision of Gibson. (Doc. 5, PageID 45). On April 27, 2023, Fyffe was “injured while at work when she tripped over a hose and fractured her arm.” (Id.). She received a full release until June 21, 2023, and filed a claim for workers’ compensation due to her injury. Fyffe submitted her release paperwork to Evans Food Group's human resources department on June 20, 2023, at which point she alleges Defendants told her that “there was nothing else needed and that they would put her on the schedule for her to return to work.” (Id., PageID 46). However, on June 21, 2023, Defendants informed Fyffe over telephone that her employment had been terminated. (Id.).

Fyffe alleges that her age, disability, and workers’ compensation request were motivating factors in Defendants’ decision to terminate her employment.¹ Accordingly, she brought eight claims for relief against Defendants in the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, including claims for employment discrimination and retaliation arising under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 and Section 4123.90. Defendants then timely removed this matter on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, asserting the presence of both complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.²

Immediately upon removal, Defendants moved to sever Count V (Violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.90) and remand that count to state court on the grounds that it is not removable by statute. (Doc. 3, PageID 36). Fyffe did not respond.

II. Standards of Law

Removal of civil actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Defendants carry the burden of showing that removal is proper and that the federal court has original jurisdiction to hear the case. See Village of Oakwood v. State Bank and Trust Co., 539 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2008).

The limits of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded through the improper removal of an action from state court, and “[a] federal court may remand a case sua sponte where the allegations of the complaint which give rise to the federal jurisdictional basis are insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.” Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Civil Service Comm'n v. Overstreet, 115 F. App'x 813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2004); see 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (under which “[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States.”). The removal statute is to be strictly construed and courts are to favor remand to state court when jurisdiction is in doubt. Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534 (6th Cir. 1999).

As relevant here, “[t]he question of whether a court should remand an entire action or just a workers’ compensation claim was ‘resolved by Congress's [2011] revision to the removal statutes.’ ” Kaylor v. Multi-Color Corp., 488 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (quoting Miley v. Hous. Auth., 926 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (D. Conn. 2013)). “The statute as written now ‘mandates that the Court must sever and remand only the non-removable workers’ compensation claim.’ ” Id. Notably, however, federal district courts do not possess “authority to sever and remove a single claim made nonremovable by statute if the remaining claims arise under state law only and the defendant removed the case on diversity grounds.” Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, 925 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2013); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).

III. Analysis

As a threshold matter, the Court holds that severance and a partial remand would be improper in this case. Although severance and partial remand are specifically authorized in some instances by § 1441(c), that provision applies only to cases in which removal is based upon federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c); see Kaylor, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 645. Here, Fyffe's claims all arise under the Ohio Revised Code, and Defendants have made clear that their removal of the action was based upon diversity jurisdiction. (See Doc. 1, PageID 2).

For their part, Defendants look to two published district court cases—one from the Northern District of Florida and one from the Northern District of Alabama—in support of their position. However, the first of those cases involved mixed claims under state employment law and the Family and Medical Leave Act, see Shaw v. Ring Power Corp., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1222 (N.D. Fla. 2013), and the second dealt primarily with the joinder of workers’ compensation claims against a former employer with product-liability claims against an unrelated defendant, see Formosa v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1183-84 (N.D. Ala. 2011). Neither case appears to be instructive for these purposes, and Defendants fail completely to address the critical facts that (1) Fyffe's claims all arise under Ohio law; and (2) they removed this matter on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

Resolving all jurisdictional doubts in favor of remand, Brierly, 184 F.3d at 534, the Court must conclude that removal was improper and that it therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to sever and for partial remand is DENIED, Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time is DENIED as moot, and this matter is hereby REMANDED in its entirety to the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the complaint:Because Ms. Fyffe's claims under R.C. 4123.90 and its public policy have a one-hundred-and-eighty-day statute of limitations, and because her claims under R.C. Chapter 4112 arise out of the same set of facts as alternative theories of relief, Ms. Fyffe is required to file this Complaint alleging all her wrongful termination claims before exhausting her administrative remedies under R.C. Chapter 4112. However, R.C. 4112(B)(2)(a) allows Ms. Fyffe to immediately sue on her claims under R.C. Chapter 4112 before administrative exhaustion if she seeks only injunctive relief on them, which is the case here. Then, R.C. 4112(B)(3) allows Ms. Fyffe to amend the Complaint to request damages on her claims under R.C. Chapter 4112 once she receives her right-to-sue letter from the OCRC and/or EEOC, which is what she intends to do in this case.(Doc. 5, PageID 47 n.1).

2.   Although Defendants concede that Gibson is a non-diverse party, they contend that Gibson was fraudulently joined, thereby providing for complete diversity of citizenship. (Doc. 1, PageID 3-5). Fyffe counters that Gibson was “responsible for, and/or ․ participated in, the adverse employment action.” (Doc. 5, PageID 45). Regardless, the Court declines to reach the question at this juncture.

Michael R. Barrett, United States District Judge