MAGEE ON BEHALF OF v. COLUMBIA POLICE DEPARTMENT (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On a night in October 2023, Latasha Magee allowed her sixteen-year-old son S.G. to drive without a license. S.G. then unlawfully parked the car in front of a private driveway. Officer Daniel English pulled up behind the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. Officer English quickly learned from Magee that S.G. did not have a driver's license or learner's permit. The events escalated from there, and the entire interaction was captured on body camera video.

Throughout the stop, Magee hindered Officer English's investigation into the various violations. She repeatedly interjected as Officer English attempted to question S.G. She interrupted Officer English when he attempted to speak to her directly. And, she continued to talk on speakerphone and hold her phone to her face despite Officer English's repeated requests that she put the phone down so he could have a discussion with her in furtherance of his investigation. After numerous refusals to comply, Officer English arrested Magee for disorderly conduct, detaining her in handcuffs for approximately fifteen minutes before releasing her. While Officer English was handcuffing Magee, S.G. (a high school football player) physically intervened and attempted to pull Officer English away from Magee. Around this time, Magee's wig was removed from her head. Nevertheless, despite the presence of probable cause for a number of criminal violations by S.G. and Magee, neither Magee nor S.G. were taken to the police station for booking or detained in a police vehicle. The entire encounter lasted less than thirty minutes.

Magee alleges numerous constitutional violations arising from the stop. The Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In sum, Magee's claims fail. While in hindsight, Officer English could have potentially been even more patient with Magee before detaining her for disorderly conduct, there was no constitutional violation. And beyond that, there certainly is no clearly established case law that Magee has presented. Officer English therefore maintains the shield of qualified immunity. Magee's claims against both Defendants are dismissed with prejudice, and summary judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of October 29, 2023, in Columbia, Mississippi, Officer Daniel English initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle that was illegally parked in front of a private driveway. Officer English recorded the interaction on his body camera. [32-1]. As Officer English exited his patrol car to approach the vehicle, Latasha Magee stepped out of the passenger side of the stopped vehicle. Officer English asked Magee, “Hey, what's going on?” Id. at 00:00:37. Magee responded, “I'm coming to my uncle's house to give him a plate ․ What did we do wrong?” Id. at 00:00:39-45. Officer English then walked towards the driver's side of the vehicle. Id. at 00:00:45-47.

When Officer English reached the driver's side, he found S.G., Magee's sixteen-year-old son, in the driver's seat. Id. at 00:00:50. Also in the car was a small child in the back seat, later confirmed to be Magee's godson. Id. S.G. opened the door when Officer English approached. Id. at 00:00:54. Officer English asked S.G., “Was that you that I saw over there on Nathan [Street] a few minutes ago?” Id. at 00:01:14-17. But before S.G. could respond, Magee interjected and denied driving on that street, stating that they had just left her mother's house. Id. at 00:01:19-20. Magee remained on the passenger side of the vehicle while Officer English questioned S.G. A second officer then arrived at the scene. Id. at 00:02:24.

Continuing with the investigation, Officer English asked for S.G.’s driver's license. Id. at 00:01:41. Magee offered hers instead, explaining that S.G. did not have a driver's license. Id. at 00:01:45. Officer English asked Magee to stand-by as he questioned S.G. Id. at 00:01:53. Officer English again asked S.G. if he had a driver's license, learner's permit, or state-issued ID, and S.G. confirmed that he did not. Id. at 00:02:02. Magee continued to interrupt Officer English's questioning. Id. at 00:02:04. She said that S.G. did not have a license and that she would “take the ticket” because S.G. was “underaged” and she was “his mother.” Id. at 00:02:04-12. Officer English responded, “Ma'am, he's driving the car. Hold off, I'll talk to you in a minute.” Id. at 00:02:12. Because S.G. did not have a driver's license, Officer English asked S.G. to step out of the car. Id. at 00:02:17. At this point, Magee then made a phone call where she loudly expressed frustration with the stop, and yelled questions at Officer Purvis. Id. at 00:02:19-37. Officer Purvis stood by his patrol car and told Magee to “hang tight” and that Officer English “would talk to [her] in a just a second.” Id. at 00:02:37-50. Officer English then ran an identity check on S.G. based on his name and birthday. Id. at 00:02:20-04:14.

Officer English then walked around the car to talk with Magee, but Magee continued to talk on the phone on speaker. She yelled into the phone, “He's a kid! He's 16!” Id. at 00:04:27-31. Officer English told Magee, “Ma'am, your son is operating a vehicle right now—” Id. But before Officer English could finish his sentence, Magee interrupted him as she held her phone close to her face. She exclaimed, “That's not what you pulled him over for. You asked him was he on Nathan Street. He passed you. Then you asked me did I pass you coming down and I said, ‘No, I just left my mother's house.’ ” Id. at 00:04:32-40. Officer English said, “Ma'am,” but Magee cut him off again and said, “No. I tried to talk to you nice a while ago and you wouldn't talk to me.” Id. at 00:04:40-43. At that point, Officer English warned Magee “At a traffic stop, I'm telling you this, I told you to be quiet, and I will talk to you in a minute.” Id. at 00:04:43-45. Magee again responded with frustration, saying, “No, you can ask me to be quiet. You can ask me. Ask me nicely.” Id. at 00:04:46-49.

In response, Officer English warned Magee that she would be arrested for disorderly conduct if she did not calm down. Id. at 00:04:50. Magee ignored Officer English and returned to her phone conversation. She said into the phone, “Do you hear him, Anna? Anna, he's in my face. Anna, he's in my face” Id. at 00:04:54-5:01. Officer English instructed Magee to calm down, but she continued to talk loudly on the phone. Id. at 00:04:56-05:03. Officer English again warned, “Put the phone down ․ I will take you in for disorderly if you fail to comply. Put the phone down.” Id. at 00:05:01-08. Magee continued to talk into the phone. Id. at 00:05:07-09. In response, Officer English led Magee to her car and asked for her driver's license. Id. at 00:05:11-15. Magee continued to talk on the phone as she retrieved her driver's license from her car. Id. at 00:05:16-40. Once Magee provided Officer English with her driver's license, Officer English called in her information to dispatch. Id. at 00:05:40-52. Officer English again asked Magee why she would allow S.G. to drive without a driver's license, but Magee only responded, “Because we just left my—he asked me to drive home. I told him, ‘Okay’ ․ Because I told him, ‘Yes, he could.’ ” Id. at 00:06:00-32.

After questioning Magee, Officer English walked back to the driver's side of the vehicle to talk to S.G. Id. at 00:06:37. Officer English explained to S.G. that he could not be driving without a driver's license or learner's permit. Id. at 00:06:48-07:30. Officer English nevertheless assured S.G. that he would not issue him a ticket for the violation. Id.

After speaking with S.G., Officer English returned to the passenger side of the vehicle to continue questioning Magee. At this point, Magee still had her phone held up to her face. Id. at 00:07:38. Officer English told her, “So here's the deal. I already told you to put the phone down.” Id. at 00:07:38-41. Magee still did not comply, asking why she had to put her phone down. Id. at 00:07:42. Officer English again warned Magee, “You're this close to going in for disorderly. I've told you that already.” Id. at 00:07:44-46. Magee continued to ignore Officer English's commands to put her phone away. Id. at 00:07:46-50. Officer English then reached for Magee's phone and initiated the arrest. Id. at 00:07:50-53.

At that moment, S.G. exclaimed, “Hey, hey, hey!” as he ran over to the passenger side of the vehicle. Id. at 00:07:51-53; see also [32-5], 00:07:25. S.G. grabbed Officer English and attempted to pull him away from Magee. [32-5], 00:07:29. Officer Purvis then intervened, trying to pull S.G. off Officer English. Id. at 00:07:32-37. Magee screamed, “Stop it! You pulled my wig off! Stop it!” Id. Officer Purvis and Magee repeatedly instructed S.G. to let go and back away, but S.G. held onto Officer English for a minute and a half as Officer English handcuffed Magee and made the arrest. Id. at 00:07:32-09:09. As Officer English handcuffed Magee, her wig was removed and appeared to be tangled in the handcuffs. [32-1], 00:09:07-10:26. Despite the allegations in her Complaint, the video makes clear that Magee did not fall to her knees during the arrest, nor was she hit, kicked, or otherwise subjected to physical injury other than the removal of her wig.¹

Following the arrest, Officer English led Magee to the outside of his patrol car and untangled her wig from the handcuffs. Id. at 00:10:42-12:38. Officer English continued to warn Magee about the danger of allowing S.G. to drive without a license. Id. at 00:13:00-08. He further clarified the basis for the disorderly conduct arrest, telling Magee, “What you definitely cannot do is disobey the commands on a legal stop.” Id. at 00:13:11. Magee interjected, saying, “I can disobey [unintelligible] you.” Id. at 00:13:13. Officer English warned Magee to stop interrupting and explained, “When I'm on a legal stop, you can't just go about doing what you like. And if I tell you to do something, you gotta do it. If you're causing more of a scene and making more of a problem out there, that's an issue.” Id. at 00:13:29-38.

Magee then questioned Officer English about the reason for her arrest. She asked, “Is it against the law for me to record you?”² Id. at 00:14:30. Officer English confirmed that it was not unlawful for Magee to record the interaction. Id. at 00:14:32. He explained to Magee, “As far as you coming at me and when you're talking to me, you're trying to talk and I'm trying to talk with the driver. When I'm telling you I'll talk to you in a minute, I'll talk to you in a minute. But when I'm dealing with the driver—” Id. at 00:14:37-45. Magee told Officer English, “You had an issue with me recording you.” Id. at 00:15:18. But Officer English emphasized:

It's not an issue with you recording me. Because here's the deal, people are legally allowed to record me. They do it all the time. And I re— I told you to put the phone down twice ․ You can leave it on record, but you have to put it down ․ Based on the traffic stop, when I'm trying to talk to the driver of the vehicle. I told you to be quiet, second time I told you I'll talk to you in a minute because you wanna converse, right, about your kid. And later on, I told you to put the phone down when I was going to be dealing with you. What I'm charging you with is disorderly conduct.

Id. at 00:15:22-16:05. After more back and forth, Officer English then wrote Magee a citation for disorderly conduct, explained the charge, noted what he would not be citing her or S.G. for, and released Magee from her handcuffs. Id. at 00:17:26-25:26. The entire encounter lasted just short of thirty minutes and neither Magee nor S.G. were removed from the scene or even detained in a police vehicle.

One year after the stop, Magee brought several constitutional claims against Officer English and the Columbia Police Department, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Discovery ensued, with Defendants taking the deposition of both Magee and S.G. It does not appear that Plaintiffs took a single deposition.

In her Complaint, Magee alleged that her and S.G.’s Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated on grounds of unreasonable seizure, failure to be informed of charges, substantive due process, and equal protection. Additionally, Magee now clarifies in her Response that she was subjected to excessive force during her arrest. The Columbia Police Department and Officer English have filed their Motion for Summary Judgment [32], asserting that the Columbia Police Department is the incorrect defendant, that Officer English is shielded by qualified immunity, and that the City of Columbia cannot be liable under the requirements of municipal liability.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It is the burden of the nonmovant to “go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supporting motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)).

“A genuine dispute of material fact means that ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Royal v. CCC Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). “ ‘If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,’ summary judgment is appropriate.” Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). When deciding whether a genuine fact issue exists, “the court must view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). But “[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

“Where video evidence is available, there is an ‘exception to the materiality/genuineness rule cited above.’ ” Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667, 675 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656, 663 (5th Cir. 2015)). It requires the Court to “view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. (quoting Boyd v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662, 665 (5th Cir. 2023)). “[W]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Bailey, 125 F.4th at 675 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007)). Thus, “we assign greater weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to the facts evident from video recordings taken at the scene.” Bailey, 125 F.4th at 675 (quoting Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011)).

Further, a “good-faith qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof.” Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2020). In fact, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available. Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2010)). The plaintiff “must rebut the defense by establishing that the officer's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Wolfe v. Meziere, 566 F. App'x 353, 354 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005)). “To negate a defense of qualified immunity and avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff need not present ‘absolute proof,’ but must offer more than ‘mere allegations.’ ” Ontiveros v. City of Rosenburg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1991)). But when evaluating a qualified immunity defense, “all inferences are still drawn in the plaintiff's favor” at the summary judgment stage. Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 2021).

III. DISCUSSION

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Magee “must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) must demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000)). The statute does not create any substantive rights; it simply provides a remedy for the applicable rights. Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997). “Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983.” Id. (quoting Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 868 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989)). Magee brings claims against Officer Daniel English and the Columbia Police Department, alleging a litany of constitutional violations, including unreasonable search and seizure, failure to be informed of the charges against her, substantive due process, equal protection, and excessive force.

A. Motion for Summary Judgment as to Officer Daniel English

Magee brings claims against Officer English in his individual capacity. Magee brings her constitutional claims through the vehicle of Section 1983. In response, Officer English asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). As a result, qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from ․ liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

Determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-prong analysis. “[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of negating [qualified immunity] by showing that (1) the [officer] violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’ ” Bailey, 125 F.4th at 674-75 (citation omitted) (quoting Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 255 (5th Cir. 2018)). The Court can analyze the prongs in either order or resolve the case on a single prong. See Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019).

a. Constitutional Violations

As to the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, Magee asserts a myriad of constitutional violations by Officer English. The Court addresses each in turn below.

1. Unlawful seizure

Magee first argues that her and S.G.’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated at various points throughout the encounter, including the initial stop, being ordered out of the vehicle, unreasonably prolonging the stop, and the arrest for disorderly conduct, including her allegation of excessive force. Pursuant to the analysis below, the Court disagrees.

A. Traffic stop

In her Response, Magee first takes issue with Officer English initiating the traffic stop. [40], p. 5. Notably, Magee seemingly failed to allege any unconstitutional action as to Officer English's initiation of the stop in her Complaint. Only in her Response to the present motion does she “contend that the initial encounter constituted a seizure without probable cause.” [40], p. 5. It is impermissible to raise new claims at the summary judgment stage that are absent from the complaint. Jackson v. Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2021) (“It is well settled in our circuit that ‘[a] claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, this argument is waived. But even if Magee had properly pled this issue, as discussed below, her argument would fail on the merits.

Traffic stops can be initiated based on either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. A traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Such a stop must be “justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985)). On the other hand, a police officer may also “stop a vehicle if he has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Cole, 444 F.3d 688, 689 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996)). The probable cause determination is “an objective test based on the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop, not on the motivations of the officer making the stop.” United States v. Escalante, 239 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2001). But “if it is clear that what the police observed did not constitute a violation of the cited traffic law, there is no ‘objective basis’ for the stop, and the stop is illegal.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998)).

“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Accordingly, “probable cause to make a traffic stop exists ․ when a [person] commits a traffic violation and a law-enforcement officer observes the violation.” United States v. Gebrezghi, No. 3:24-CR-152-SA, 2026 WL 244316, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 2026) (quoting United States v. Rosales-Giron, 592 F. App'x 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2014)). And Supreme Court precedent “allows officers to justify a stop by the occurrence of a traffic violation even though this is not the real reason for the stop.”³ Cole, 444 F.3d at 689 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 806). Still, the legal justification for the traffic stop must be “objectively grounded.” Cole, 444 F.3d at 689.

The video evidence and the deposition testimony show that Officer English had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. See Bailey, 125 F.4th at 675. S.G. violated Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-901 when he parked the vehicle in front of a private driveway. This provision of Mississippi traffic law commands that “No person shall stop, stand, or park a vehicle ․ [i]n front of a public or private driveway.” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-901(1)(b). The video evidence shows the vehicle parked in front of the private driveway. [32-1], 00:00:33-35.⁴ Further, both S.G. and Magee testified that the vehicle was parked in front of the driveway at the time that Officer English initiated the stop.⁵ Moreover, Officer English observed the traffic violation firsthand.⁶ Thus, Magee fails to present any genuine issue of material fact as to whether a traffic violation occurred or whether Officer English observed the traffic violation and therefore, her Fourth Amendment claim as to the initiation of the traffic stop fails.

Even if Officer English initiated the stop for a different reason other than the undisputed traffic infraction of parking in front of a driveway, there would still be no constitutional violation. It is true that the incident report prepared by Officer English lists the reason for the stop as “failing to signal a left turn.” [32-4], p. 3. Additionally, Officer English's bodycam footage shows that he first asked Plaintiffs whether he saw them on another nearby street. [32-1], 00:01:15.⁷ Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit instructs that“[s]o long as a traffic law infraction that would have objectively justified the stop had taken place, the fact that a police officer may have made the stop for a reason other than the occurrence of the traffic infraction is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 173 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 806 (concluding that a pretextual stop for a minor traffic infraction was constitutional).

Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed “after-the-fact justification[s]” for probable cause. See Sam v. Richard, 887 F.3d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Officer English “may justify the arrest by showing probable cause for any crime.” Voss v. Goode, 954 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 2020). It need not be a “reason[ ] given at the scene.” Id. (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly explained” that “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813). Because S.G. parked in front of a private driveway in violation of Mississippi law, which is uncontradicted by both video evidence and deposition testimony, the stop would be justified even if Officer English initiated the stop for a reason other than the one plainly seen on the video. The initial stop did not violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

B. Ordered to get out of vehicle

In support of her unlawful seizure claim, Magee next argues that Officer English, “without any warrant or probable cause, ordered [S.G.] to get out of the vehicle.” [1-1], p. 3. But “[t]he Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers who have lawfully detained a motor vehicle to order the driver or any passengers to step out, and neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion is required.” United States v. Meredith, 480 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the “Supreme Court has blessed this practice as not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, because concerns for officer safety outweigh the minimal intrusion on the privacy of drivers and passengers.” Id.; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (“Rather than conversing while standing exposed to moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer to ask the driver of the vehicle to step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both.”). The Court has already determined that the stop was lawful. Officer English's command for S.G. to get out of the vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

C. Unreasonably prolonged stop

In the third allegation under her unreasonable seizure claim, Magee argues—for the first time in her Response—that the stop was “prolonged unreasonably as English warned [her] about her phone use and arrested her for ‘disorderly conduct’ after she asked questions.” [40], p. 3.

It is true that “[o]nce the purpose of a valid traffic stop has been completed and an officer's initial suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts.” United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006). Indeed, “a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the detention extends beyond the valid reason for the stop.” Santiago, 310 F.3d at 341. But a stop may be extended “if additional reasonable suspicion arises in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled.” United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Lopez–Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005)). In those cases, “the detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed.” Id. In making reasonable suspicion determinations, a court “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 692, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)). The detaining officer must be able to “point to specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.” Estrada, 459 F.3d at 631.

As articulated above, the Court finds that the stop was justified at its inception due to the traffic violation of parking in front of a driveway. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-901. And while investigating a valid traffic stop, “an officer may request a driver's license.” Estrada, 459 F.3d at 631. The video evidence shows that Officer English approached the driver's side of the vehicle and requested S.G.’s driver's license, just one minute and twenty seconds after Officer English initiated the stop. [32-1], 00:00:45, 00:01:42-45. When Officer English asked for S.G.’s driver's license, Magee—who had already exited the vehicle—responded that S.G. did not have one. And then S.G. confirmed himself that he did not have a driver's license, learner's permit, or state-issued identification. Id. at 00:01:57-02:05.

Mississippi law requires that “[n]o person shall drive or operate a vehicle ․ upon the highways ⁸ of the State of Mississippi without first securing an operator's license to drive on the highways of the state.” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-5(1)(a). Additionally, “[n]o person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by [her] or under [her] control to be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized under the provisions of this article[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-63.⁹

At the time Officer English discovered these additional violations, he then had probable cause ¹⁰ to prolong the stop based on S.G.’s violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-5 and Magee's violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-63. And the discovery of these violations occurred in the course and scope of the investigation into the initial traffic violation. Indeed, the initial purpose of the stop had not yet been fulfilled when Officer English asked for S.G's license. And asking for S.G's license was a necessary part of that initial investigation.

Further, Magee then created additional probable cause to prolong the stop when she repeatedly ignored Officer English's directives. As explained in the pages below, Officer English had probable cause to believe that Magee had engaged in disorderly conduct in violation of Mississippi law. Magee had already exited the vehicle when Officer English pulled up behind her and S.G.’s vehicle. As Officer English continued to inform Magee of the unlawfulness of allowing S.G. to drive without a license, he instructed her to calm down and put her phone down on more than one occasion so that he could speak with her directly and without interruption. See [32-1], 00:04:52, 00:05:01, 00:05:06, 00:07:39, 00:07:48. Magee failed to comply with any of these commands. Id. As a result, Officer English had further reason to prolong the stop to investigate and issue a citation for Magee's disorderly conduct. And as Officer English informed Magee of the basis for her disorderly conduct citation, he continued to question Magee as to why she would allow S.G. to drive without a license and cautioned against that behavior. Id. at 00:13:00-18:30. Moreover, as he continued to question Magee, Officer English was also trying to decide whether he should charge Magee with contributing to the delinquency of a minor since she allowed a minor to drive without a license. Id. at 00:16:00-13.

For these reasons, the Court does not find that the stop was unreasonably prolonged. Indeed, the entirety of the stop was an investigation of various violations of Mississippi law. The stop was initially prolonged when Officer English discovered that S.G. did not have a license. The stop was then further prolonged when Magee admitted that she allowed S.G. to drive without a license. And finally, the stop was prolonged again when Officer English had probable cause to believe Magee engaged in disorderly conduct and Officer English accordingly detained her while continuing to investigate her actions. While it is true that the stop was prolonged beyond the initial investigation of the traffic violation, it was not unreasonable. Indeed, the stop lasted less than thirty minutes despite probable cause for at least four violations of law. In sum, the Court finds no Fourth Amendment violation on grounds of a prolonged stop.

D. Arrest for disorderly conduct

Magee's fourth unlawful seizure claim is based on her arrest for disorderly conduct. Magee asserts that her arrest “was unsupported by probable cause” and that her “verbal interruptions were acts of parental protection.” [40], p. 6.

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Because arrests are ‘seizures’ of ‘persons,’ they must be reasonable under the circumstances.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56, 138 S. Ct. 577, 198 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018). A warrantless arrest is reasonable if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime in the officer's presence. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001).¹¹

To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, courts “examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonably police officer, amount to probable cause.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57 (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But probable cause is “a fluid concept” that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). Even still, probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 188 L. Ed. 46 (2014).

Under Mississippi law, a person engages in disorderly conduct when, “with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under such circumstances as may lead to a breach of the peace, or which may cause or occasion a breach of the peace, fails or refuses to promptly comply with or obey a request, command, or order of a law enforcement officer ․ to act or do or refrain from acting or doing as ordered.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-7(1)(i). “In Mississippi, the elements of the crime of disorderly conduct are (1) breach of the peace ¹² and (2) failure to obey the lawful command of a law enforcement officer.” Crosby v. Bell, Civ. Action No. 5:14-cv-49-DCB-MTP, 2015 WL 4496489, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 23, 2015). What may seem innocuous to some can still result in disorderly conduct under Mississippi law.¹⁴

The Court begins its analysis of Magee's disorderly conduct with the first element, specifically “a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to believe that a breach of the peace was being threatened or a crime was about to be committed.” Bradford, 337 So. 3d at 282 (quoting Odem v. State, 881 So. 2d 940, 946 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating this factor, courts may look to not just spoken words, but “consideration of [her] conduct, behavior, and demeanor.” Odem, 881 So. 2d at 946. Not only was Magee “agitated” and “loud,” but her “behavior indicated that [s]he was intent on creating a scene so that [the officer] would not enforce the procedures.” Id. As with the broader offense of disorderly conduct, a breach of the peace can encompass a wide variety of situations. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 326 So. 3d 1019, 1026 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (finding sufficient evidence that an officer made a reasonable inference of a defendant's breach of the peace—and therefore, a conviction for disorderly conduct—by defendant's refusal to stand up and enter a holding cell). As evidenced by the video footage, Magee is the first and seemingly only person to raise her voice. Indeed, she is immediately verbally combative and begins shouting at both Officers English and Purvis early on. She responds to most of Officer English's questions with questions of her own. Further, she either ignores or refuses Officer English's repeated orders to calm down and put her phone down so he can speak with her directly. Not only was Magee holding her phone throughout the interaction, but she was also carrying on a phone conversation with “Anna” while Officer English was attempting to question her. Finally, Magee repeatedly interrupted Officer English as he tried to speak to both her and S.G. separately while conducting his investigation. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that Officer English had probable cause to believe the first element of disorderly conduct was met.

As to the second element of disorderly conduct, the Court first notes that Officer English's commands to Magee to calm down, to put her phone down, and to stop interrupting were lawful ones because they were made in furtherance of his investigation into the stop. Officer English had pulled over an unlicensed teenager at night with his licensed mother in the passenger seat. It was imperative for Officer English to evaluate the situation and address possible safety concerns as to whether Magee could safely drive home and other potential issues. To do that, he needed to speak directly and uninterrupted with both Magee and S.G. Additionally, the lack of compliance with Officer English's command is plain from the body cam footage. Indeed, it confirms that Officer English made several requests for Magee to calm down and put her phone down so he could speak with her directly, but Magee never complied. See [32-1], 00:04:50-52, 00:04:56: 00:05:01, 00:05:06, 00:07:39, 00:07:48.¹⁷ Instead, Magee continued to talk on speakerphone for much of their interaction and continued to hold the phone close to her face. It began as Officer English questioned S.G. as to whether he had a driver's license. Magee can be heard in the background loudly talking on speaker phone. As a result, Officer English approached her shortly after he began questioning S.G.:

Officer English: Ma'am—

Magee: *on the phone* He's a kid!

Officer English: Ma'am—

Magee: He's 16!

Officer English: Your son is operating a vehicle right now.

Magee: That's not what you pulled him over for. You asked him was he on Nathan Street. He passed you. Then you asked me did I pass you coming down. I said, “No, I just left my mother's house.”

Officer English: Ma'am, I—

Magee: No. I tried to talk to you nice a while ago and you wouldn't talk to me.

Officer English: Look. I'm at a traffic stop and I'm telling you this. I'm telling you to be quiet and I'll talk to you in a minute.

Magee: No, you can ask me to be quiet. You can ask me.

Officer English: Okay, at this point—

Magee: Ask me nicely.

Officer English: If you don't calm down—

Magee: For what? For what?

Officer English: If you don't calm down ․ I'm gonna take you in for disorderly.

Magee: *speaking into the phone* Do you hear—do you hear him, Anna?

Officer English: Calm down.

Magee: Anna, he's in my face.

Officer English: Okay.

Magee: Anna, he's in my face.

Officer English: Okay, put the phone down. You're talking to me right now.

Magee: I'm talking to Anna Morris, she's um the um she's the um—

Officer English: I will take you in for disorderly if you fail to comply. Put the phone down.

Magee: *speaking into the phone*

* Officer English reaches to grab Magee's phone*

Magee: Anna he taking my phone! Anna—

Officer English: *guiding Magee to her car* Come over here. Where's your ID?

Magee: My ID's right here in my purse.

Officer English: Get it.

Magee: *talking to child in the car* Give me my purse. Give me my purse. Record—record this Billy [unintelligible]. Give me my purse baby ․ Nothing, because I know my rights.

Magee: *speaking into the phone: Talking about I'm get—Say what, Anna? Talking about—I'm right here in front of Billy [unintelligible]. He just left the driver's license ․ In front of Billy [unintelligible] house.

*Officer English called in Magee's information to dispatch*

․

Magee: Billy [unintelligible], go in the house. I got this. I got this ․ Never been in no trouble. Don't do nothing. Never.

Officer English: Does your son have a driver's license?

Magee: No, he doesn't.

Officer English: Why is he driving?

Magee: Because we just left my—he asked me to drive home. I told him, ‘Okay.’ We just left the cook-out. Then you hopped behind us, but you asked him was he on Nathan Street. That's not what you pulled us over for.

Officer English: Why is he driving?

Magee: But why'd you ask him what you did a while ago?

Officer English: Can you answer my question?

Magee: I just told you. Because I, he asked to drive—

Officer English: Why did you permit him to drive when he doesn't have a license?

Magee: Because I told him yes.

[32-1], 00:04:28-06:00.

“This conduct alone provided [Officer English] with probable cause to arrest [Magee] for disorderly conduct.” See Morton v. City of Corinth, No. 1:22-CV-65-GHD-DAS, 2025 WL 2524853, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 2, 2025) (finding probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest where Plaintiff admitted to refusing to comply with the officer's request to exit the vehicle). Magee continued to hold her phone and speak to “Anna” despite Officer English's commands to stop and talk with him. And when Officer English attempted to resume his conversation with Magee, he saw that she was still holding her phone close to her face.

Officer English: So here's the deal. I already told you to put the phone down.

Magee: Why I have to put my phone down?

Officer English: You're this close to going in for disorderly. I told you that already.

Magee: Cause I got my phone in my hand?

Officer English: Put the phone down.

Magee: Can I ask you a question? Why do I—

Officer English: Okay. *grabs Magee to initiate the arrest*

Magee: Don't—don't break my phone!

Officer English: Put the phone down.

S.G.: *runs over to English and Magee, grabbing English's arm* Hey, hey, hey!

Magee: Do not break my phone!

[32-1], 00:07:38-55.

While Magee's repeated interruptions and noncompliance with Officer English's commands might have been rooted in parental protection, that is still noncompliance. Her claim of parental protection is not enough to overcome an arrest for disorderly conduct. Again, Magee repeatedly disobeyed Officer English's lawful commands to put her phone down so he could speak to her and investigate the situation. Considering the body cam footage plainly evidences Magee's failure to comply with Officer English's commands on several occasions, the Court is persuaded that Officer English had probable cause to arrest Magee for disorderly conduct.¹⁸ As a result, the Court finds no Fourth Amendment violation in Magee's arrest for disorderly conduct.

Finally, the Court notes that even if Magee's arrest for disorderly conduct had not been based on probable cause, Officer English also had probable cause to arrest her for her violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-63, arising from her permitting S.G. to drive without a license. See Johnson v. City of San Antonio, No. 22-50196, 2023 WL 3019686, at *8 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (“[P]robable cause may be for any crime and is not limited to the crime that the officers subjectively considered at the time they perform an arrest.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Davidson v. City of Stafford, Tex., 848 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 2017))). “An officer may conduct a warrantless arrest based on probable cause that an individual has committed even a minor offense, including misdemeanors.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 165; see also Davidson, 848 F.3d at 391 (“Officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity unless there was no actual probable cause for the arrest and the officers were objectively unreasonable in believing there was probable cause for the arrest.”). During the stop, Magee readily admits that S.G. does not have a license. Accordingly, there can be little dispute that Officer English had probable cause to arrest Magee for Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-63 as well. See Chiles v. Hempstead, 426 F. App'x 310, 311 (5th Cir. 2011) (“An officer has the right to arrest even for a very minor offense if the offense is committed in her presence.”).

E. Excessive Force

Magee's final Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim is based on her allegation that Officer English used excessive force during her arrest.¹⁹ Based on the video footage, to effectuate her arrest, Officer English appears to turn Magee around while grabbing her arms to handcuff her, at which point S.G. (a high school football player)²⁰ physically intervenes and a scuffle ensues. Although not mentioned in her Complaint, Magee stated during her deposition that Officer English used his elbow to push her during the arrest. [32-2], pp. 8-9; see also [40], pp. 3, 7. At some point during the arrest, Magee's wig was removed from her head. [40], p. 7. The Court does not find that Magee suffered more than a de minimis injury or that Officer English's force was excessive considering the circumstances. Notably, it was nighttime, there were people standing around, Magee had already expressed noncompliance from the start, and her son was nearby and ultimately did intervene. Accordingly, it is understandable that Officer English would move quickly to make the arrest. This does not constitute excessive force.

“Excessive force claims are ‘evaluated for objective reasonableness based on the information the officers had when the conduct occurred.’ ” Valderas, 937 F.3d at 389 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)). The reasonableness of an officer's force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. To state a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against excessive force, the plaintiff must allege: “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need, and (3) the use of force that was objectively unreasonable.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 2008). Courts often consider excessiveness and unreasonableness together. See Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2018).

Fundamentally, “the touchstone of [the Court's] inquiry is simply the reasonableness of the force employed.” Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 981 (5th Cir. 2022). And the Court's analysis is guided by the following factors: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [she] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Carter v. Dupuy, 173 F.4th 561, 565 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)).

i. Injury

The first issue is whether Magee suffered an injury recognized under the law. While a showing of a “significant injury” is no longer required in the context of an excessive force claim, courts “require a plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim to have ‘suffered at least some form of injury.’ ” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.)). “The injury must be more than a de minimis injury and must be evaluated in the context in which the force was deployed.” Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314 (emphasis added); see also Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A]lthough a de minimis injury is not cognizable, the extent of injury necessary to satisfy the injury requirement is directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Lynch, 524 F. Appx 69, 79 (5th Cir. 2013))). As a result, “objectively reasonable force will result in de minimis injuries only.” Alexander, 854 F.3d at 309 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Lynch, 524 F. App'x 69, 79 (5th Cir. 2013)).

Magee alleges that she was injured when her “wig [was] ripped from [her] head,²¹ and entanglement caused humiliation and pain from elbow push.” [40], p. 7. Injuries resulting from typical handcuffing are often considered de minimis. See Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007) (“This court has previously held, however, that minor, incidental injuries that occur in connection with the use of handcuffs to effectuate an arrest do not give rise to a constitutional claim for excessive force.”). Officer English used his elbow to effectuate the arrest and handcuff Magee. So any pain Magee experienced due to an “elbow push” was de minimis and occurred in connection with Officer English handcuffing Magee. See [32-2], p. 8-9.

The video evidence may indicate that the wig was removed when it was tangled in the handcuffs, but the video does not conclusively establish that fact.²² Even still, when viewing the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to Magee, her alleged injuries relating to her wig removal do not meet the “some injury test.” Sam, 887 F.3d at 714. Magee does not allege that any of her actual hair was ripped out,²³ nor did she testify to receiving any bruises, lacerations, or cuts during the arrest.²⁴ Cf., Schmidt v. Gray, 399 F. App'x 925, 928 (5th Cir. 2010) (pain, soreness, and bruising resulting from officer slamming a car trunk lid on suspect's finger was a legally cognizable injury). Indeed, Magee does not put forward any evidence of anything beyond her wig being removed from her head. While the Court appreciates that this was likely embarrassing for Magee, that is not enough to allege an excessive force claim.²⁵ Magee's failure to allege any actual injury is fatal to her excessive force claim.

ii. Reasonableness of force

Purely in the alternative, even assuming the removal of Magee's was sufficient to plead an excessive force claim, the claim still fails because Officer English's force was reasonable under the circumstances. Bone, 657 F. App'x at 262 (“Whether [Magee's] injury is cognizable depends on the reasonableness of the force, not just the extent of the injury.”).

“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. In addition to the aforementioned factors such as the severity of the crime, the suspect's safety threat, and whether the suspect is resisting arrest, officers may also “consider a suspect's refusal to comply with instructions ․ in assessing whether physical force is needed to effectuate the suspect's compliance.” Orr, 844 F.3d at 492 (omission in original) (quoting Deville, 567 F.3d at 167). When dealing with an uncooperative suspect, police act within the scope of objective reasonableness when they “react[ ] with measured and ascending responses.” Orr, 844 F.3d at 493 (alteration in original) (quoting Galvan v. City of San Antonio, 435 F. App'x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2010)).

First, the severity of the crime weighs in Magee's favor. Here, the traffic stop was initiated due to a minor traffic violation. Officer English later discovered that S.G. was driving without a license and that Magee was aware of this fact. And Magee was eventually arrested for disorderly conduct due to her failure to put away her phone and comply with Officer English's orders. None of these crimes are severe or violent in nature.

As to the second factor, and based on the video evidence, Magee did not pose an “immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While she was argumentative and disruptive during Officer English's investigation, the body cam footage does not show that Magee was directly a safety threat. However, the video footage also does not evidence significant force by Officer English outside of typical handcuffing, other than the removal of Magee's wig. S.G., however, elevated the safety risk when he intervened in Magee's arrest. In fact, S.G. attempted to push Officer English away from Magee as Officer English initiated the arrest. [32-5], 00:07:29. And Officer Purvis warned S.G. to “let go so [Magee] don't get hurt.” Id. at 00:08:00-08. But S.G. continued to intervene, escalating the danger of the situation. In fact, it appears that Magee's wig was removed during the scuffle with S.G. and both Officers. Id. at 00:09:08-11. In hindsight, it is fortunate that this is the only injury that resulted. By grabbing onto an officer engaged in an active arrest, S.G. created an immediate threat to the safety of Magee, the officers on scene, and himself. Because of S.G.’s interference, this factor weighs in Officer English's favor.

As for the third Graham factor, Magee merely verbally resisted her arrest by continually screaming, “Let me go! Let me go!” See [32-1], 00:08:05-17. But S.G. intervened and physically resisted on her behalf. Specifically, S.G. pushed Officer English and held onto both Magee and Officer English during the arrest. And S.G. repeatedly told Officer English to “let go” of Magee as he physically intervened. Id. at 00:07:45-08:40. In response, Officer Purvis continually commanded S.G. to “let go” of Officer English. [32-5], 00:07:29-09:06. Despite these demands, S.G. continued to hold onto Officer English and Magee. S.G. then told Officer Purvis, “You can get off me, bro ․ You got five seconds to let me go.” Id. at 00:08:45-59. As a result of S.G.’s interference, this factor also weighs in Officer English's favor. Because S.G. physically resisted Magee's arrest and held onto Officer English as he handcuffed Magee, it was necessary for Officer English to use some force to effectuate the arrest.

As to the final factor articulated in Orr, Magee continually disobeyed Officer English's verbal instructions to put her phone down so he could talk with her directly while Magee was talking with “Anna.” 844 F.3d at 492 (quoting Deville, 567 F.3d at 167). He verbally asked Magee to put her phone down on several occasions. He warned her that she would be arrested for disorderly conduct if she failed to do so. But Magee still disobeyed Officer English's commands. Officer English responded by initiating the arrest and handcuffing Magee. See Cadena v. Ray, 728 F. App'x 293, 296-97 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding no excessive force where “[t]he Officers spoke calmly to [the suspect] for several minutes despite [the suspect's] ․ erratic behavior throughout the interaction. Furthermore, [the suspect] ․ had disobeyed their prior order to leave the [hotel] lobby.”). And Officer English's use of force increased, and then only slightly, when S.G. interfered with the arrest. In fact, it is during this time that Magee's wig was removed from her head, even if it appears that the wig was only tangled in the handcuffs. Accordingly, Officer English reacted with “measured and ascending responses” based on Magee's disobeyance of Officer English's commands and S.G.’s intervention. Orr, 844 F.3d at 493 (quoting Galvan, 435 F. App'x at 311). Considering all facts and circumstances before the Court, even if Magee had alleged a sufficient injury, Officer English did not use excessive force to effectuate Magee's arrest. Thus, there was no constitutional violation on grounds of excessive force.

2. Failure to be informed of charges

In addition to her allegations of unlawful seizure, the next constitutional violation Magee asserts is a failure to be informed of the charges against her. Specifically, Magee claims that she was not “informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against [S.G.] and her” in violation of the Sixth Amendment. [1-1], p. 5. Although this allegation is present in her Complaint, Magee concedes in her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment that the Sixth Amendment only applies “post-charges,” and that the “arrest context implicates due process.” [40], p. 6.

The Sixth Amendment reads, in applicable part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. As a result, a criminal “defendant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation brought against her does not exist until the Government is committed to a prosecution.” Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000). “The text of the Sixth Amendment does not afford an arrestee the right to be immediately informed of the ‘nature and cause of the accusation’ against him or her following an arrest.” Hiley v. Skinner, No. 21-4179, 2022 WL 604187, at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 8, 2022) (emphasis in original). So “[w]hile it is assuredly good police practice to inform a person of the reason for [her] arrest at the time [she] is taken into custody, [the Supreme Court] has never held that to be constitutionally required.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 155; see also United States v. McGavic, 337 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir. 1964) (Edwards, J., Concurring) (“[T]here is no federal constitutional requirement that the arresting officer inform the person arrested of the reason for the arrest.”).

Despite the lack of any constitutional requirement to inform an arrestee of their charges at the moment of arrest, Officer English warned Magee about her disorderly conduct on several occasions even before her arrest.

• “If you don't calm down ․ I'm gonna take you in for disorderly.” [32-1], 00:04:52-54.

• “I will take you in for disorderly if you fail to comply. Put the phone down.” Id. at 00:05:04-06.

• “I already told you to put the phone down. You're this close to going in for disorderly. I told you that already.” Id. at 00:07:39-47.

Then, after the arrest, Officer English explicitly told Magee, “What I'm charging you with is disorderly conduct.” [32-1], at 00:16:02. Magee's claim that the “[b]ody cam shows confusion from lack of clarity” holds no weight. [40], p. 6. Officer English's explanation could not be clearer.

Further, only eight minutes elapsed from the time that Officer English initiated the arrest to when Magee was officially informed of the charge underlying her arrest. See Standberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that a thirty-minute delay in informing defendant of the nature of his crime did not constitute impermissible delay); see also Hiley, 2022 WL 604187, at *5 (finding a twenty-minute delay in informing defendant of charges did not implicate or violate the Sixth Amendment). The Court finds no violation here under the Sixth Amendment, due process, or otherwise.

3. Substantive due process violation

Magee next claims that Officer English “infringed upon family integrity” during the traffic stop in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court finds that these claims are not distinct from Magee's Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claims. Rather, the conduct complained of here is fully embraced by the Fourth Amendment. For that reason, this claim cannot succeed. See Eason v. Senatobia, 776 F. Supp. 3d 492, 504 (N.D. Miss. 2025) (where “the Fourth Amendment fully embraces the conduct in question here—an unreasonable seizure[,] [a] Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is likewise unavailing.”). But even if this claim were distinct, it would still fail. To be clear, this Court recognizes the “fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). But Magee does not explain how this interaction implicated those rights, or how Officer English might have infringed on any parent-child relationship in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, as previously described, S.G. was driving a vehicle even though he never had a driver's license, he committed a traffic violation, Magee allowed S.G. to drive without a license, Officer English had probable cause to arrest Magee for disorderly conduct, and then S.G. actively interfered when Magee was arrested. Parental rights are not a license to freely violate the law or allow a minor child to do so. As a result, this claim cannot succeed.

4. Equal protection violation

Magee's equal protection claim fails as well. Magee claims that, though this claim was “not explicitly pled,” she and S.G. were subjected to selective enforcement based on their status “as African Americans in a region with policing disparities.” [40], p. 7. But rather than present evidence of racial disparities, Magee only argues that “inferences from context” can support the theory of selective enforcement. Id. Magee also further puts forward a conclusory “class of one” theory of equal protection, claiming that fact issues exist on discriminatory intent. Id.

First, Magee's unsupported request that this Court rely on mere inferences cannot by itself overcome summary judgment. Accordingly, to the extent that Magee claims selective enforcement, those claims fail as wholly conclusory. See Liendo v. DeWalt Indus. Tool Co., No. 1:24-CV-43, 2025 WL 2605405, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2025) (“While a court construes ‘all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,’ the nonmovant cannot rely on ‘conclusional allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentations of only a scintilla of evidence’ to avoid summary judgment.”) (quoting McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Magee's “class of one” equal protection claim also fails. “[A] plaintiff may state a ‘class of one’ equal protection claim if [she] has been ‘intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’ ” Bynum v. City of Magee, 507 F. Supp. 2d 627, 635 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000)). But Magee does not present any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently, and her conclusory claims of any equal protection violations are insufficient. See Butts v. Martin, 877 F.3d 571, 590 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on equal protection claims where “nowhere in [Butts’] complaint does Butts identify any other individuals or groups that he claims were similarly situated by received superior treatment from Martinez.”). Based on her unsupported allegations, Magee's equal protection claims fail.

b. Clearly Established Law

And finally, even if Magee could demonstrate any constitutional violation despite the analysis articulated above for any of the alleged constitutional violations, she still cannot show that Officer English violated a “clearly established” constitutional right pursuant to the second prong of qualified immunity. A clearly established right is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable officer would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11, 136 S. Ct. 305, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2012)). The Court cannot “define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)). Rather, the constitutional question must be defined with specificity. Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1166 (5th Cir. 2021). “And while plaintiffs need not identify ‘a case directly on point’ to show that a law was clearly established, they must provide ‘authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity’ to put law enforcement officers on notice that such conduct is ‘definitively unlawful.’ Est. of Parker v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Safety, 140 F.4th 226, 242 (5th Cir. 2025) (emphasis in original) (quoting Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015)).

Magee presents mainly conclusory allegations and no clearly established case law—on point or loosely related. Magee's briefing involves “[t]hat high level of generality [that] cannot clearly establish the relevant law.” Garcia, 957 F.3d at 601. Accordingly, Magee has not met her burden of showing that any alleged violated rights were clearly established. See Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016) (Appellants’ entire argument on this second prong of the qualified immunity test is that ‘it is clearly established in the law that citizens are protected against unjustified, excessive police force.’ This general statement is insufficient to meet Appellants’ burden.”). Officer English remains shielded by qualified immunity.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment as to Columbia Police Department

a. Request for substitution

In her Complaint, Magee named the Columbia Police Department as a Defendant. But now, in her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Magee acknowledges that “the Columbia Police Department is not a separate legal entity but an arm of the City of Columbia” and claims that the Court should allow for the substitution of the City of Columbia. [40], p. 4. Magee assures the Court that “this is a curable defect,” relying on the fact that the Magistrate Judge “invited a motion to substitute the City.” Id. at p. 5 (citing [29], p. 4). Magee claims that her current request, at the summary judgment stage, is her acceptance of the Court's previous invitation and a “move to substitute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, as the City had notice through service on the Department and shares the same counsel.” [40], p. 5. Yet Magee neglects to address the tardiness of her request. The Court will not allow for substitution at this late date.

The Court recognizes that, “[u]nder Mississippi law, a municipality's police department is not a legal entity separate and apart from the municipality.” Moore v. Laurel Police Dep't, No. 2:22-CV-1-KS-MTP, 2022 WL 22236294, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 2, 2022). Thus, it does not have a “separate legal existence” that allows it to be sued. Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1979)). These are long-standing principles of which Magee should have been aware at the time of filing her Complaint. Nevertheless, she waited until eight months after the Court's deadline to file motions for amended pleadings to request leave to amend her Complaint.²⁹ Despite the delay, the Magistrate Judge gave Magee an opportunity to remedy her error. See [29], p. 4 n.2 (“Although the instant motion is denied, the Court would entertain a separate motion to substitute party with respect to Plaintiff's request to substitute City of Columbia for the Columbia Police Department.”). But instead of promptly filing a separate motion as instructed, Magee waited over four months to request substitution in her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, which was also filed late but excused by the Court.³⁰ See [40], p. 5 (“Plaintiffs now move to substitute [City of Columbia]”).

Magee fails to set forth any good cause for her late request to amend, in either her earlier Motion for Leave [24] or in her most recent request contained in her Response [40] to the Motion for Summary Judgment. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A] scheduling order ‘shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause’ ․ The good cause standard requires the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’ ” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b))); see also L.U. CIV. R. 7(b)(3)(C) (“Any motion must be an item docketed separately from a response.”). Accordingly, Magee's claims against the Columbia Police Department are dismissed. See Moore, 2022 WL 22236294, at *1 (“By suing only the Laurel Police Department, Plaintiff has failed to sue a proper defendant, and the Complaint will be dismissed.”).

b. Even if substituted, Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Columbia fail

In the alternative, even if Magee had sued the proper defendant, her claims would fail on the merits. To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Magee “must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” James, 535 F.3d at 373 (quoting Moore, 233 F.3d at 874). Indeed, a municipality and other local governments may be sued under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff's alleged deprivation of right stems from the government's unconstitutional or illegal policies. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). In other words, a local government entity may be sued “if it is alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through ‘a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officer's.’ ” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). Accordingly, to successfully plead a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, there must be “proof of 1) a policymaker; 2) an official policy; 3) and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.’ ” Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).

This analysis begins and ends with the third element. For the reasons outlined previously in this opinion, Magee cannot meet that element since there was no underlying violation of any constitutional right. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S. Ct. 1571, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986) (holding that “[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the department regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” (emphasis in original)); see also Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that “every Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.”) (quoting Kitchen v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 759 F.3d 468, 483 (5th Cir. 2014)).

Moreover, even if there were a constitutional violation, Magee's Section 1983 claim would still fail because she does not mention any policymaker pursuant to the first element, nor any official policy to satisfy the second element. The Fifth Circuit has identified three routes to establish an “official policy” for Section 1983 municipal liability. Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi, 170 F.4th 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2026). First, the plaintiff may offer “a policy statement formally announced by an official policymaker.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010). Second, a policy may be established by a “persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Id. (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). And third, a single unconstitutional act by a final policymaker may be considered a policy. Cambric, 170 F.4th at 321. (citing Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169). The Court outlines Magee's failure on each route in turn.

As to the first route, Magee seemingly offers the “City's Discipline Policy” as a policy statement, but she does not explain whether this policy was “formally announced by an official policymaker” as required. Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168. Indeed, Magee fails to identify any policymaker whatsoever. [40], p 8. See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986))).

As to the second route, Magee claims that there has been “[a] policy or practice of insufficient de-escalation training.” [40], p. 8. But she offers no evidence of “sufficiently numerous prior incidents.” Cambric, 170 F.4th at 325 (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A pattern also requires sufficiently numerous prior incidents, as opposed to ‘isolated instances.”)). In fact, Magee does not offer a single instance other than her own arrest. Thus, Magee cannot rely on any pattern or practice to establish an official policy. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 582 (explaining that a plaintiff must demonstrate “a pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single case.”).

That leaves only the third route. Magee claims that the “single incident” of her arrest “may be sufficient” to create a policy. [40], p. 8. But this route fails for the same reason as the first—Magee fails to identify a “final policymaker,” let alone any policymaker. See Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169 (“Alternatively, it may be shown that a final policymaker took a single unconstitutional action.”). Therefore, even if the actions here were found to be unconstitutional, Magee does not allege or show that they were committed by any final policymaker. In sum, Magee has not established a policy under any of the three routes.

1. Failure to train

Finally, to the extent that Magee argues a failure to train as grounds for municipal liability,³¹ a “failure to train can amount to a policy if there is deliberate indifference to an obvious need for training where citizens are likely to lose their constitutional rights on account of novices in law enforcement.” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 849. To establish a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must “prove that (1) the city failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Texas, 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2018)).

To show deliberate indifference under the third prong, a plaintiff normally must allege “a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Id. However, even in the absence of a pattern, a plaintiff may still establish deliberate indifference through the single-incident exception. Id. But this exception is “extremely narrow” Valle, 613 F.3d at 549. Indeed, it is “generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor was provided no training whatsoever.” Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, Texas, 70 F.4th 302, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Peña, 879 F.3d at 624).

As to the first element, Magee provides only conclusory allegations that the City failed to train Officer English in “de-escalation,” and points primarily to a “failure to discipline” which she surmises from Officer English's good standing resignation from the department. [40], p. 8. She presents no evidence regarding the City's training program, nor does she explain how it is inadequate. See Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170 (“To prevail on a ‘failure to train theory,’ a plaintiff must demonstrate ․ that the municipality's training procedures were inadequate[.]”). And as to the second element, Magee offers no causal connection between any alleged failure to train and the arrest at issue. See id. (“To prevail on a ‘failure to train theory,’ a plaintiff must demonstrate ․ that the inadequate training policy directly caused the violations in question.”).

As for the final element of deliberate indifference, Magee again relies only on the single incident of her arrest. [40], p. 8. Indeed, she does not point to any other action by the Columbia Police Department, let alone one that shows a failure to provide de-escalation training. Thus, the events of this case cannot fall into the “extremely narrow” single incident exception. Valle, 613 F.3d at 549. Indeed, Magee does not show that Officer English received “no training whatsoever.” Edwards, 70 F.4th at 313 (quoting Peña, 879 F.3d at 624). She only claims that any training he received was insufficient. As a result, Magee's “allegations lie well beyond the reach of this narrow exception.” Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 386 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is a difference between a complete failure to train ․ and a failure to train in one limited area.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council—President Gov't, 279 F.3d 273, 288 (5th Cir. 2002))). With no avenue for municipal liability against either the currently named Defendant Columbia Police Department or the requested substitute City of Columbia, Magee's claims must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Columbia Police Department and Officer Daniel English's Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is GRANTED. Latasha Magee and minor S.G.’s claims against Columbia Police Department and Officer Daniel English are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 30th day of September, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In her Complaint, Magee says that “Defendant English assaulted the Plaintiff with his hands, ․ and caused her to fall down to her knees at which time he handcuffed her and placed her under arrest.” [1-1], para. 11. She additionally states that Officer English “pulled, shoved, cuffed, and verbally assaulted and abused” her and that he “caused her to have cuts and bruises over her body.” Id. at para. 11. But the video footage shows that Magee remained on her feet and did not fall to her knees during the arrest, nor does it evidence the additional physical or verbal assault allegations. See [32-1]; [32-5]. Magee also testified during her deposition that the removal of her wig was the only physical injury that resulted from the arrest. [32-2], p. 8-10. Additionally, in her Response to the present motion, Magee claims that she suffered “pain from elbow push.” [40], p. 7. But this allegation is absent from the Complaint.

2.   Notably, Magee was not using her phone to record the interaction until later, but rather was primarily engaged in a phone conversation. [32-1], 00:04:55-58.

3.   It appears that Magee tries to make a pretextual stop argument in her Complaint, though she never defines it as such until her Response to the present motion. See [1-1], para. 9 (“Defendant English first approached the vehicle and asked whether [S.G.] had tried to run him over with his vehicle.”); [40], p. 1 (“[A] reasonable jury could find that Officer Daniel English violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights during a pretextual and unlawfully prolonged traffic stop ․”). But the video evidence directly contradicts the Complaint's allegation. Officer English asked, “Is that you that I saw over there on Nathan [Street] a few minutes ago?” See [32-1], at 00:01:15. He did not accuse S.G. or Magee of nearly running him over. And S.G. testified in his deposition that Officer English did not provide a reason for the stop. See [32-3], p. 5 (responding “No, sir” when asked “Do you recall Officer English telling you why he initiated the stop?”). Even still, the Fifth Circuit “usually does not scrutinize the particular questions asked during a stop so long as they tend to relate to the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Alvarado, 989 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (quoting United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2002)). But even if Magee properly made an argument based on a pretextual stop, that too would fail. See Escalante, 239 F.3d at 680-81 (“The traffic stop may have been pretextual. But under Whren v. United States, a traffic stop, even if pretextual, does not violate the Fourth Amendment” if the officer making the stop objectively determines that a traffic violation has occurred) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Based on the video evidence, and for additional reasons outlined in the body of this opinion, Officer English had probable cause, based on an objective traffic violation, to initiate the traffic stop.

4.   Magee argues that there “is a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiffs’ parking actually violated Miss. Code. § 63-3-901(1)(b)” because “the body camera footage does not clearly show any obstruction.” [40], p. 5. But the statute does not require obstruction. It only requires parking a vehicle in front of a driveway. Again, S.G. is parked in front of the driveway in the video, and the Plaintiffs’ own testimony confirms this.

5.   See [32-2], p. 6 (Magee said that S.G. was parked “[r]ight in front of [the] driveway” and confirmed that he “didn't pull into the driveway”); see also [32-3], p. 4-5 (S.G. confirmed that the car was parked in front of the driveway).

6.   The video evidence confirms that Officer English initiated the stop after he observed the vehicle already parked in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-901. [32-1], 00:00:24-37 (Officer English turned on his lights at 00:00:24, Magee's vehicle was parked in front of the driveway when he exited his police car at 00:00:31, and Magee can be seen exiting the passenger side of her car at 00:00:37). And, despite the assertion in Plaintiffs’ Complaint that S.G. pulled the vehicle over in response to Officer English's signal to do so, both S.G. and Magee's testimony confirm that the vehicle was already parked in front of the driveway when Officer English initiated the stop. [32-2], p. 5 (“Q. So I guess what I'm trying to ask is did Officer English pull you over? Like was the vehicle moving, or was it already parked and he came behind a parked vehicle? A. It was already parked. We was already parked.”); [32-3], p. 4 (“Q․ Was the vehicle parked? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. So he pulled behind the -- your parked vehicle? A. Yes, sir. Q. You had already parked? A. Yes, sir.”).

7.   This is the extent of the Court's knowledge of the Officer's intentions in this case as Plaintiffs did not take Officer English's deposition.

8.   The Mississippi Code defines a highway as “the entire width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-125(a).

9.   Magee's Complaint seems to rely on the fact that “[S.G.] is a minor” in support of the proposition that he “was unable to display a driver's license.” [1-1], para. 8. This does little to explain anything.

10.   As noted above, the officer need only have reasonable suspicion of further crimes in order to prolong a stop for reasons other than the initial investigation. The Court finds that Officer English met the higher threshold of probable cause here because S.G. admitted he did not have a driver's license, and Magee admitted that she allowed S.G. to drive without a driver's license. As a result, Officer English had probable cause to prolong the stop for S.G.’s violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-5 and Magee's violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-63.

11.   As Defendants point out, they need not necessarily even prove probable cause to be entitled to qualified immunity, but rather only “arguabl[e]” probable cause. Terrell v. Allgrunn, 114 F.4th 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2001)).

12.   “The disorderly conduct statute does not require that there be an actual ‘breach of the peace’ occurring at the time of the arrest. Instead, it only requires that the individual have the ‘intent to breach the peace’ or that such conduct ‘could lead to a breach of the peace.’ ” Simmons v. Fair, Civ. Action No. 1:19-CV-38-SA-DAS, 2020 WL 1539935, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2020) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-7). “This statute, in effect, equips the officer with a proactive tool to avoid a potential breach of the peace. Meaning the statute as written requires the officer to make a judgment call—based on the information available to him or her at the time—as to whether the suspect's conduct might lead to a breach of the peace.” Simmons, 2020 WL 1539935, at *4. Moreover, “[e]ven if the Officer[ ] w[as] incorrect in assuming that [Magee's] conduct could lead to a breach a peace, [his] assumption was at most a mistaken judgment which is covered by qualified immunity.” Id. at *5.

14.   See S.M.K.S. v. Youth Court of Union Cnty., 155 So. 3d 747, 750 (Miss. 2015) (finding arrest for disorderly conduct was lawful where Plaintiffs failed to comply with an order to place their hands on the car); Sims v. State, 329 So. 3d 528, 535 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (holding defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct for repeatedly refusing to remove his hands from his pockets despite officers’ requests and for cursing at officers and acting “irate”) Bradford v. State, 337 So. 3d 277, 282-83 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (finding arrest for disorderly conduct was based on probable cause where defendant cursed at officers and was agitated, loud, and threatening in response to officers ordering her to leave the store); Bovan v. State, 706 So. 2d 254, 255-57 (Miss. Ct. App. 1997) (evidence was sufficient to support disorderly conduct conviction where defendant refused officer's attempts to search the home pursuant to a felony warrant and lied about another arrestee's presence in the home).

17.   Officer English's body cam footage confirms that the request for Magee to put her phone down was not a request for her to stop recording, despite Magee's claim at the scene. Indeed, Magee was not recording for much of the interaction at issue but is rather seen and heard talking on speakerphone to “Anna.” After the arrest, Officer English explained that he asked Magee to put her phone down because it was disruptive when he was questioning both S.G. and Magee herself. [32-1], 00:15:21-16:02. In fact, he expressly told Magee, “You can leave it on record, but you have to put it down.” Id. at 00:15:41. Moreover, Magee has not challenged her arrest on First Amendment grounds or as to any other violation of any right she had to document the stop or continue talking on the phone.

18.   See Matthews v. City of Madison, 143 So. 3d 579, 584-85 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that there was sufficient evidence to support arrest and conviction for disorderly conduct when officer instructed plaintiff to stop using cell phone and plaintiff testified that he refused to stop using his cell phone); Warren v. Winston Cnty., No. 1:25-CV-075-GHD-DAS, 2026 WL 826081, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 25, 2026). (“The Plaintiff admits he refused to comply with the arrest Officers’ request for him to provide his identification and calm down ․ This conduct alone provided the officers with probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff for disorderly conduct.”); Bradford, 337 So. 3d at 282-83 (finding probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest where arrestee failed to comply and “acted in an agitated, loud, irate, and threatening manner.”).

19.   The Court recognizes that, while Magee did not explicitly bring an excessive force claim in her Complaint, she mentioned that “Defendant English's assault on Plaintiff Magee caused her to have cuts and bruises over her body and caused significant clumps of hair to be ripped out of her head, all of which was the direct and proximate result of forceful nature Defendant English removed the phone from Plaintiff Magee's hands and cuffed her, which resulted in in injuries including bruising to the wrists and arms and post-traumatic stress disorder.” [1-1], p. 4. While the Defendants argue that any mention of excessive force would be a new claim, the Magistrate Judge noted in his Order [29] that any excessive force claim would arguably not be a new claim, but that Magee could re-urge a motion for leave to amend if she was seeking to clarify any of her claims. [29], p. 2. While Magee did not attempt to clarify any claims or file any subsequent motion for leave to amend, the Court will still consider Magee's excessive force claim to the extent that she presents one. See Memon v. Deloitte Consulting, LLP, 779 F. Supp. 2d 619, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (explaining that a plaintiff “ ‘may clarify the theories upon which she relies without expanding or otherwise altering the scope of the action in any meaningful manner,’ even in response to a motion for summary judgment, because doing so does not prejudice the defendant.”) (quoting Est. of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 272 F.R.D. 248, 251-53 (D.D.C. 2011)).

20.   See [32-1], 00:01:52 (Magee telling Officer English that S.G. plays football at Columbia High School).

21.   Despite the numerous allegations in her Complaint relating to her injuries, Magee later testified that the only physical injury she suffered from the arrest was when her wig was removed. [32-2], p. 10.

22.   A bystander asked Magee, “Is [the wig] on the handcuffs?” Magee responded, “Yes.” [32-1], 00:10:23. And Magee's wig can be seen hanging from her handcuffs in the body cam footage. Id. at 00:09:58. Then, Officer English had to untangle the wig from the handcuffs before he took the handcuffs off Magee's wrists. Id. at 00:10:44-12:20. The video does not clearly show, however, whether Officer English removed the wig or whether the wig was simply tangled in the handcuffs.

23.   Although, it appears that “hair” and “wig” were used synonymously at times in the Complaint, during Magee's deposition, and during Plaintiffs’ counsel's argument at the hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the actual evidence presented says that Magee's wig, not any of her actual hair, was removed from her head.

24.   Regarding Magee's physical injuries, there are inconsistencies between Magee's Complaint [1], subsequent Response to the present motion [39], deposition [32-2], and her attorney's statements during the hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. In her Complaint, Magee claims that Officer English “ripped her hair out of her head, and caused her to fall down to her knees,” “caused her to have cuts and bruises over her body and caused significant clumps of hair to be ripped out of her head,” “pulled” and “shoved” her, and caused “bruising to [Magee's] wrists and arms.” [1-1], paras. 11, 13. Finally, Magee claims in the Complaint that she and S.G. “were required to and did obtain expert medical treatment.” Id. at para. 14. But in her Response to the present motion, Magee claims only that her “wig ripped from head, and entanglement caused humiliation and pain from elbow push.” [39], p. 7. Moreover, in her deposition, Magee states that “[Officer English] pulled [her] hair[,] ․ pulled [her] wig,” including the removal of a glue cap or patch, and “tried to push [her] to the ground” with his elbow. [32-2], p. 7-10. But she also confirmed during her deposition that the wig removal was her only physical injury. Id. at 10. Finally, during a hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs’ counsel told the Court that Magee did not actually seek medical attention for any physical injuries. See Buehler, 27 F.4th at 983 (noting plaintiff's failure to seek medical treatment and finding injury to be de minimis). With regard to the wig injury, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the removal of the wig had ripped her scalp and that somehow “hair” was ripped and came off her head.

25.   See e.g., Buehler, 27 F.4th at 983 (finding injury to be de minimis where “lacerations ․ were so minor as to be essentially invisible” and where plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he did not physically suffer anything more than bruising and pain); Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 550 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Westfall's other injuries, including the abrasions and bruises, bloody urine, and high blood pressure and heart rate, which may have been caused by Trevino's actions, are, based on our case law, de minimis.”); Bone v. Dunnaway, 657 F. App'x 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting the possibility that bruising and a swollen cheek could be “could be characterized as de minimis”); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a sore, bruised ear lasting for three days was de minimis).

29.   The Case Management Order [9] set a deadline of February 28, 2025, for motions for joinder of parties or amendment. Magee did not file her Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [24] until October 21, 2025.

30.   The Court permitted Magee to file her Response out of time “due to excusable neglect.” [38], p. 1.

31.   Magee argues in her Response that “[t]he single incident here, combined with the City's inaction, creates a genuine issue as to whether inadequate training or supervision was the moving force behind the violations.” [40] p. 8-9. Again, this allegation is absent from the Complaint.

TAYLOR B. McNEEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE