UNITED STATES v. JONES (2026)

ORDER

Charles Terry Jones filed a Motion [45] for a reduction in sentence. In October 2020, Jones pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the Court considered Jones' criminal history, which includes prior convictions for harassing and threatening phone calls, resisting arrest, malicious mischief, and conspiracy to possess cocaine. Ultimately, in light of Jones' base offense level of 29, criminal history category of II, and the Section 3553(a) factors, the Court sentenced Jones to a guideline sentence of 120-months imprisonment—the statutory mandatory minimum—followed by five years of supervised release and a fine of $4,500.

Jones asks the Court to reduce his sentence because of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” namely due to the link between methamphetamine purity and culpability at sentencing, and because of his good behavior while incarcerated. The Court finds that Jones' Motion [45] should be denied. First, the Court does not have the authority to reduce Jones' sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum. In the alternative, his claims do not constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a reduction in his sentence. But even if they did, the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh against a sentence reduction.

The distinction between “methamphetamine actual” and “methamphetamine mixture” is not overly significant to Jones because he possessed high purity methamphetamine. And in any event, even if the Court found the purity distinction argument persuasive, reducing Jones' sentence based on this distinction would not reflect the dangers of methamphetamine or the seriousness of the offense.

Further, reducing Jones' 120-month term of imprisonment would be inconsistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In making this determination, the Court considered a number of factors, including the nature and circumstances of his offense, his prior criminal history, the need to deter criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public from future crimes.

For all the reasons discussed fully below, Jones has not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a reduction in his sentence, and the Section 3553(a) factors weigh against a sentence reduction. Jones' Motion [45] is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2020, Charles Terry Jones was named in a two-count indictment and charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) outlines the two specific drug deals, over which Jones sold a total of 109.79 grams of methamphetamine, that support his current conviction. [27]. Jones possessed 55.6 grams of 100% pure “ice”¹ and 54.19 grams of 98% pure “methamphetamine actual.” Id. at p. 8.

With the assistance of counsel, Jones entered into a plea agreement with the Government. Jones agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the Government moving to dismiss Count 2, as well as recommending that Jones be sentenced in the lower 50% of the applicable guideline range. Jones was then sentenced by this Court on December 21, 2021. In calculating the advisory guideline range, the Court considered Jones' total offense level of 29 and his criminal history category of II, which includes prior convictions for harassing and threatening phone calls, possession of marijuana, resisting arrest, malicious mischief, and conspiracy to possess a controlled substance (cocaine).² Id. at pps. 9-10. Upon consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors, this Court sentenced Jones to a guideline sentence of 120-months imprisonment—the statutory mandatory minimum—followed by five years of supervised release and a fine of $4,500. His projected release date is June 14, 2028.³

On August 5, 2022, Jones submitted a Request for Administrative Remedy to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the Yazoo City Medium Federal Correctional Institute. [40], p. 1. In his request, Jones asked the BOP to submit a Motion for Compassionate Release so he could care for his mother and due to the risk of COVID-19 in the prison. Later, on October 25, 2022, and upon exhaustion of administrative remedies, Jones filed a Motion [34] for Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In that Motion [34], Jones sought early release due to his mother's cancer diagnosis, his risk of contracting COVID-19, his rehabilitation efforts, and his good conduct. The Court denied Jones' Motion, finding no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a reduction in sentence. See United States v. Jones, Criminal No. 2:20-cr-43-TBM-MTP, 2023 WL 11160280 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 30, 2023). The Court further noted that, even if there were “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the Section 3553(a) factors weighed against the requested reduction. Id.

Now, Jones has filed a similar Motion [45] for a reduction in sentence under the First Step Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). On May 2, 2024, Jones first filed a request for a reduction of his sentence with the warden of his facility. [45-1]. Jones then filed his Motion [45] with this Court. Jones argues that he is entitled to a reduction in his sentence because he would receive a lesser sentence if he were sentenced today due to the distinction between “methamphetamine actual” and “methamphetamine mixture,” and he “has been a role model inmate ․ [and] has made extraordinary strides of rehabilitation.” [45], p. 2.

II. DISCUSSION

In 2018, the First Step Act amended Title 18 to permit prisoners to bring motions for sentence reductions on their own behalf. United States v. Handlon, 53 F.4th 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2022). Prior to the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, such motions could be presented to a court only upon request by the warden of the defendant's facility. United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2021). But to move for a reduction in sentence “on their own accord,” the defendant must first exhaust his administrative remedies. Id.; see also United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020). To fully exhaust his administrative remedies, Jones must show “a failure of the BOP to bring a motion on [his] behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of [his] facility, whichever is earlier.” United States v. Powell, 834 F. App'x 940, 941 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).

On May 2, 2024, Jones requested that the warden of his facility file a motion for a reduction in sentence on his behalf. [45-1]. Jones argued for a reduction in his sentence on the same grounds presented in his motion to this Court. [45]; [45-1]. The BOP did not bring a motion on Jones' behalf, and more than 30 days have passed since Jones filed a request with the warden of his facility. Id. Jones has fully exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court will now proceed to the merits of Jones' Motion.

A. Statutory mandatory minimum

First, Jones was sentenced to 120-months imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum. District courts have limited authority to sentence defendants below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. James, 468 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 2006). In fact, “[f]ederal law explicitly cabins the district court's discretion in departing downward ․ from a statutory minimum sentence.” United States v. Phillips, 382 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court may impose a sentence below the statutory minimum only if the Government makes a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) asserting the defendant's substantial assistance to the Government, or if the defendant meets the “safety valve” criteria under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Id. at 499; see also United States v. Abrams, No. 21-60589, 2022 WL 1421831, at *1 (5th Cir. May 5, 2022). No such motion has been made, nor is the “safety valve” limitation applicable here. As a result, the Court does not have the authority or ability to further reduce Jones' sentence. See United States v. Alvarez, 51 F.3d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brown, 503 F. App'x 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2012). But even if it did, the Court would still deny Jones' request for the reasons below.

B. Extraordinary and compelling reasons

“As a general rule, federal courts ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.’ ” Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). But that general rule is subject to a few exceptions, including a motion for a reduction in sentence through 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Through the First Step Act, and under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the Court can modify a term of imprisonment on a defendant's motion if, after considering the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court concludes that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction. Handlon, 53 F.4th at 350. And the reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Congress has explained that a prisoner seeking a reduction in sentence must prove (1) an “extraordinary and compelling reason” justifies the sentence reduction; (2) the relief sought is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statements; and (3) the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh in favor of the requested relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In 2023, the Sentencing Commission amended its policy statement to cover motions for sentence reduction filed by defendants and to expand the list of extraordinary and compelling reasons sufficient to support such a motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The amendments became effective on November 1, 2023, and “supersede much of the case law that developed over the past several years while there was no applicable policy statement.” United States v. Campbell, No. 1:12-cr-439-CCE, 2023 WL 7220732, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 2023). Accordingly, the Court considers the guidance from the amended Guidelines.

Under Fifth Circuit precedent, “extraordinary” means “ ‘beyond or out of common order,’ ‘remarkable,’ and synonymous with ‘singular.’ ” United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Extraordinary, WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 903 (2d. ed. 1934; 1950) (“WEBSTER'S SECOND”)). So prisoners can seek relief under Section 3582(c)(1) only when “they face extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the time of sentencing, and unique to the life of the prisoner.” Escajeda, 58 F.4th at 186.

The Sentencing Guideline's policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, provides six extraordinary and compelling reasons that justify the reduction of a prison sentence. These reasons include (1) the medical conditions of the defendant, (2) age of the defendant, (3) family circumstances of the defendant, (4) if the defendant is a victim of abuse, (5) other reasons, or (6) the imposition of an unusually long sentence. The “catch-all” or “other reasons” category of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 explains that defendants present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” if they “present[ ] any other circumstances or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

Here, Jones alludes to “other reasons” in his motion. He asks this Court to reduce his sentence because his sentence would have been shorter if it were imposed pursuant to “new changes in the law” due to the distinction between “methamphetamine actual” and “methamphetamine mixture,” and because he has been a role model inmate. [45], pps. 2, 3. But even if courts—rather than the BOP—can properly invoke this catch-all provision, Jones does not present any sufficiently compelling “other reasons” for a reduction in his sentence. United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 n.4 (5th Cir. 2021) (recognizing a circuit split “as to whether this catch-all provision delegates only to the BOP, and not the courts, the task of identifying ‘other reasons’ justifying early release” and declining to “weigh in.”).

i. Methamphetamine purity

First, Jones asks this Court to reduce his sentence on the basis that “new changes in the law would have resulted in being sentenced to less time, if [he] were being sentenced today.” [45], p. 3. Specifically, he asks this Court to consider a reduction based on the distinction between “methamphetamine actual” and “methamphetamine mixture.” Jones relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which states that a court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines use drug purity as a proxy for a defendant's culpability for methamphetamine offenses. According to the Guidelines, “the fact that a defendant is in possession of unusually pure narcotics may indicate a prominent role in the criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 27(C). As a result, the Guidelines distinguish “methamphetamine actual” from “methamphetamine mixture.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). Generally, defendants caught with “methamphetamine actual” face longer sentences than defendants caught with “methamphetamine mixture.” Id.

But the factual distinction between “methamphetamine actual” and “methamphetamine mixture” is not overly significant for Jones because he possessed 98% pure, actual methamphetamine and 100% pure “ice.” [27], p. 8. And because of the high purity of the drugs involved here, the PSR explained that the methamphetamine “was more likely than not imported into this country ․ there were no known manufacturing laboratories in the United States that produce methamphetamine with the purity levels seized in this case.” Id. Still, Jones challenges the fairness of his sentence and argues that “some Judges ․ find ‘that Methamphetamine guidelines should be given less deference [than] guidelines that were properly crafted with empirical data and institutional expertise.’ ” [45], p. 3. But Jones presents no authority showing that a court has considered a similar argument and ruled that a finding of 98% actual methamphetamine and 100% pure “ice” from a laboratory report was considered a “mixture” for reducing their sentence.

Instead, Jones asks this Court to reduce his sentence because the Sentencing Guidelines use drug purity as a proxy for culpability. In doing so, Jones cites to Concepcion v. United States, which the Court interprets as a request to “consider intervening changes of law” and “consider[ ] the whole person ․ ‘as an individual.’ ” 597 U.S. 481, 486, 142 S. Ct. 2389 213 L. Ed. 2d 731 (2022). Jones further relies on United States v. Robinson, where the defendant argued that because the purity levels do not necessarily indicate a defendant's culpability, the court should not rely on the purity level distinctions in the Guidelines.⁴ United States v. Robinson, No. 3:21-cr-14, 2022 WL 17904534, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 23, 2022). Ultimately, that court concluded that culpability should not be directly linked to purity for that particular case, and instead the focus should be on examining all the circumstances of the defendant's case as instructed in Concepcion and granted the defendant's motion. Id. at *3; Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 481.

But the Court did consider all relevant circumstances to see Jones as a “whole person” before rendering a sentence. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 491. At the sentencing hearing, the Court recognized that Jones submitted letters of support, which it had reviewed. [28]. The Court also recognized Jones' close relationship with his family and various forms of employment. Id. But the Court also found that, despite Jones' talents, he has accrued several convictions, some of which relate to the possession of illegal substances. [27], pps. 9-10. And while Jones argues that “his sentence is excessive due to process of law under the 14th Amendment,” the Court finds that Jones' sentence reflects the seriousness of the crime, promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment for the offense. [45], p. 3; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).

And to the extent that Jones relies on Robinson, the Court previously considered and rejected an identical argument in United States v. Thomas, No. 1:23-cr-39-TBM-RHWR, 2024 WL 5108451, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 13, 2024).⁵ The Court adopts and incorporates by reference its reasoning in Thomas here. And even if this Court did follow the reasoning in Robinson, doing so would not equate to a non-guideline sentence because, based on their criminal histories, Jones is different as a criminal than the defendant in Robinson, whose criminal history score was zero which resulted in a criminal history category of I. United States v. Robinson, No. 3:21-cr-14 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 23, 2022) (Dkt. No. 112). Jones, on the other hand, has a criminal history score of three and a criminal history category of II, which includes prior convictions for harassing and threatening phone calls, possession of marijuana, resisting arrest, malicious mischief, and conspiracy to possess a controlled substance (cocaine). [27], pps. 9-10. Additionally, the Sentencing Commission has considered amending the methamphetamine guidelines and has declined to do so. This makes sense in light of all of the concerning statistics and dangers of methamphetamine that the Sentencing Commission itself has highlighted. See Thomas, 2024 WL 5108451, at *5-7; United States v. Johnson, No. 1:21-cr-48-TBM-RHWR, 2025 WL 35027, at *11 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 30, 2025).⁶

ii. Rehabilitation efforts

Second, Jones claims that he “has been a role model inmate ․ where he has made extraordinary strides of rehabilitation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).” [45], p. 3. Jones adds that he is also “enrolled in the FPC Montgomery, Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP).” Id. at p. 2. And he has “enrolled in numerous evidence based recidivism reducing programs,” including Re-Entry Seminar, Non-Residential Drug Abuse Program, K2 Awareness, Parenting Inside Out, Real Estate Investment, Home Ownership, House of Healing, Day Trading, Effective Planning, Walk with Ease, Brain Health as you Age, Abdominals (1 and 2), Health Fair, Money Smart, Yoga, and various self-improvement courses. Id. And Jones adds that his custody level is the lowest possible, allowing him to “leave the institution unescorted into the community for work details.” Id. He claims he was given this designation because he “pose[s] no threat, risk, or danger to anyone in society.” Id.

While Jones' dedication and efforts “are a noteworthy accomplishment, [they do] not diminish the need for just, temporal punishment for the grave crime committed.” United States v. Moran, No. 2:18-cr-34-KS, 2023 WL 3531730, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 15, 2023). “Rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of this policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d).⁷ As a result, though Jones has made great strides towards rehabilitation, that rehabilitation is not sufficiently extraordinary or compelling to merit a reduction in his sentence. Nevertheless, Jones is still encouraged to continue down this positive path.

C. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors

Even if Jones had established extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Court may still deny a reduction in sentence where the Section 3553(a) factors weigh against such relief. See United States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1089 (5th Cir. 2022). In reviewing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court shall consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); United States v. Rollins, 53 F.4th 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2022). The Court must also consider the kind of sentences available; the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3), (4), (6). The Court must further consider the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter other criminals, and protect the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).

As discussed previously in this opinion, Jones' history and characteristics, and the need to protect the public from future crimes by Jones, weigh heavily against a reduction in his sentence. Jones was previously convicted of harassing phone calls, resisting arrest, malicious mischief, and conspiracy to possess a controlled substance (cocaine). [27], pps. 9-10. And for this crime, Jones was sentenced to a term of 120 months of imprisonment, which is the statutory mandatory minimum. Id. at p. 16; [28]. The Court considered Jones' criminal history and found that the sentence imposed would deter criminal conduct, protect the public from Jones' future crimes, and promote rehabilitation. In making the same determination today, the Court recognizes, as it did at sentencing, the danger of a drug like methamphetamine and its dangerous impact on communities, families, and children. Thomas, 2024 WL 5109451, at *7. And the Court adopts its reasoning in Thomas as to “the dangers of methamphetamine trafficking” and its “short and long-term adverse effects.” Id. at *4-7.

A reduction in Jones' sentence would not reflect the seriousness of his methamphetamine offense and would be inconsistent with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As of the date of this opinion, Jones' projected release by the BOP is in less than two years. Even still, the Court finds that requiring Jones to serve the rest of his sentence is necessary. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). And for the same reasons the Court denied Jones' prior Motion for a reduction in sentence [34], the Court still finds that a sentence reduction would be inconsistent with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, the Court adopts the analysis and findings made in United States v. Jones, No. 2:20-cr-43-TBM-MTP, 2023 WL 11160280, at *5-6 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 30, 2023). For these reasons, Jones' Motion [45] for a reduction in sentence under the First Step Act is denied.

D. Appointment of counsel

Jones also asks that he “be appointed a Public Defender/CJA Panel Attorney, who can review this filing, evaluate his eligibility, amend this filing, if necessary, and represent him before this Honorable District Court in pursuit of this reduction in sentence.” [45], p. 4. For the reasons below, that request is also denied.

A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to assistance of counsel “at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.” Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S. Ct. 254, 257, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967). The right to counsel “flows from different constitutional provisions depending on the nature of the proceedings.” United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). A criminal defendant's right to counsel both during critical stages of the prosecution and at trial derives from the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43, 83 S. Ct. 792, 795-96, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). However, “due process requires the appointment of counsel in certain post-conviction proceedings in which fundamental fairness necessitates the assistance of a trained advocate.” Palomo, 80 F.3d at 141 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973)).

It is clear that Jones' Motion for a reduction in sentence is not a trial-related proceeding. Motions for a reduction in sentence necessarily take place after a judgment has been entered and a sentence imposed. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not automatically attach at this stage. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S. Ct. 2291, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1984) (“ ‘core purpose of the [Sixth Amendment] counsel guarantee is to assure aid at trial, ‘when the accused [is] confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.’ ”) (citations omitted). Because a motion for a reduction in sentence is a post-trial proceeding and not part of the criminal prosecution, any right to counsel at this stage must be grounded in either equal protection or due process. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974). And the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant does not have a statutory or constitutional right to appointed counsel in reduction of sentence proceedings. United States v. Hereford, 385 F. App'x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant has no right to be appointed counsel in § 3582(c)(2) reduction proceedings)). Reduction proceedings are “not a second opportunity to present mitigating factors to the sentencing judge ․ Rather, [they] are simply a vehicle through which appropriately sentenced prisoners can urge the court to exercise leniency to give certain defendants the benefits of an amendment to the Guidelines.” Id. (quoting Whitebird, 55 F.3d at 1011). As a result, Jones' request that he be appointed counsel is denied. Alternatively, for all of the reasons stated in this opinion, appointing counsel for Jones would be wholly unnecessary.

III. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Jones' Motion [45] for a reduction in his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Ice” means a mixture or substance containing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80% purity. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), note C.

2.   The record reflects that Jones also has numerous other criminal charges that were dropped or otherwise not pursued. [27].

3.   https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited July 20, 2026).

4.   Jones also cites to United States v. Hayes, where the court expressed “policy disagreement[s]” with the methamphetamine guidelines. 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025 (N.D. Iowa). But the Court rejects that argument for the same reason it rejects the Robinson argument.

5.   And in any event, Robinson was not an intervening change of law because Robinson is a district court case that is not binding on another district court. See United States v. Bradley, No. 1:17-cr-9, 2024 WL 625313, at *1-2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 14, 2024).

6.   See also United States Sentencing Commission, Methamphetamine Trafficking Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice System, June 2024, PDF p. 6; publication pagination p. 2, www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ research-and-publications/research-publications/2024/202406_Methamphetamine.pdf.

7.   Jones cites to United States v. Salliey, where the court found “that the length of [the defendant's] sentence, the substantial time he has already served, and his strong evidence of rehabilitation [were] collectively sufficient” to grant the defendant's motion for compassionate release. No. CR RDB-10-0298, 2023 WL 1970491, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2023). But the Court finds Jones' cases distinguishable. The defendant in Salliey served fifteen years of his seventeen-year sentence when the court granted his motion for compassionate release. Jones, however, has not yet served even half of his sentence of 120 months.

TAYLOR B. McNEEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE