HUDSON v. THAXTON (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Self-proclaimed activist and pro se Plaintiff Anthony Hudson spoke at his town's city council meetings more than sixteen times in two years. He never had a problem until the meeting at issue here. Hudson alleged in his Amended Complaint that Councilman George Carmichael and Councilwoman Andrea Ellis interrupted him from speaking at the citizens’ forum portion of the city council meeting and that Council President Anthony Thaxton stopped him from speaking when he had two minutes and fifty seconds left before his five minutes were up. The undisputed summary judgment evidence, including an audio recording, paints a different picture.

Councilwoman Ellis is not heard on the recording once. With 17 seconds left of Hudson's five-minute allotted time, Hudson singled out the black council members with pointed attacks. Only after being berated did Councilman Carmichael respond by saying he had heard enough. Even if his response was a First Amendment violation, it was not based on viewpoint. And none of the topics discussed were novel. Hudson—who is black—had voiced his concerns about the city's infrastructure and treatment of the black community several times before. The only new factor was Hudson's undisputed violation of decorum rules. Nor did President Thaxton cut Hudson off in a discriminatory manner. Rather, Thaxton declined Hudson's request to finish his comments after the five-minute mark. In other words, Hudson ran out of time. Each Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hudson lives in Laurel, Mississippi. He is a self-proclaimed community activist. [77-2], p. 8. In 2022, he started talking to the Laurel City Council (“Council”) at its citizens’ forum about issues in his ward. Id. Other Laurel residents, including those from other wards, took notice and began voicing their concerns to Hudson. Id. Acting as their liaison, Hudson relayed these concerns to the Council over the years. Id. He spoke at the citizens’ forum at least ten times in 2022 and six times in 2023. Id. at p. 6.

The mechanics of the citizens’ forum are straightforward. Laurel's ordinance allocates thirty minutes during each meeting for Laurel residents to address the Council. [77-4], p. 3. Each speaker is limited to five minutes. Id. Speakers may discuss any topic so long as it pertains to “City business or concerns.” Id. But they must do so in an appropriate manner. The ordinance requires that all remarks be “addressed to the Council as a body and not to any member thereof, or any other individual.” Id. And speakers may not “make personal, impertinent, profane, or slanderous remarks; ․ engage in violent or disruptive behavior; ․ nor otherwise disturb the order and decorum of any Council meeting.” Id. The ordinance tasks the Council President with summoning and directing the proper authorities to remove violators. Id. Hudson is aware of these rules, [77-2], pps. 7–8, and never encountered an issue before the meeting at issue here, id. at p. 6.

The Council convened a citizens’ forum in February 2024. The first speaker used her five minutes to oppose an economic development project. [77-1], p. 17; [25-3], p. 1. She advised the Council to invest the taxpayer money in street renovations and the community instead. [77-1], p. 17; [25-3], p. 1. Hudson spoke next. An audio recording captured his remarks. Hudson began by echoing the first speaker's opposition to the economic development project for the first minute and 20 seconds. [77-5]. He then claimed that the city had “three dire needs.” Id. (Minute 1:20). First, Hudson spoke for 29 seconds about the need for a “black iron” fence around a playground. Id. (Minutes 1:27–1:56). Second, Hudson discussed the need for a separate fence, lights, and video cameras at a cemetery for 39 seconds. Id. (Minutes 1:57–2:36). For the remaining 2 minutes and 23 seconds, Hudson—who is black—expressed his frustrations with the Council's alleged treatment of the “black communities.” Id. (Minute 2:37). Hudson, with an increasingly confrontational and louder tone, said:

When it comes to our black communities, if you can't get no grant, we don't get nothing. When it comes to these other communities, communities with these white people in there that are making a decent income, they come in here, they fill these seats up, they need something, it don't even take you a month to get it in and off that [unintelligible]. But us, we beg for years and years and then we suffer mentally and emotionally because we coming to our government officials to try help keep our communities up. Our community—as a matter of fact, I even know that you can use that TIF money to put housing up. I know a lot about that TIF loan, that it could be used for, the CDBG grant could be used for our community. All you black people sit up there and let our communities just die. Just die. Our school die. Rot. And you sit up there and you get these checks but you don't. Look, you have got to go into these black communities and keep them alive. But the only reason why you go in the black communities is to put our black men in jail. That's it. And to keep our women out there with children that they can barely take care of, so you can put them in the project. That's not right. Ain't nothing right that y'all have done up here in the last 20 years. And the Lord has given me strength, through two bouts of cancer, and now kidney cancer, to fight y'all. And I guarantee he's going to let me live long enough to fight. My body might break down, but my spirit ain't gone. Because y'all have destroyed our community. It started out with the [POUNDS PODIUM] white people, the [unintelligible] white people sitting up there [POUNDS PODIUM] destroying us. Then we came up here and we got our four blacks, and you ain't done nothing.

Id. (Minutes 2:37–4:41). With 17 seconds left before the five minutes were up, Councilman Carmichael—one of the singled-out black council members—exclaimed that he had “heard enough!” Id. (Minute 4:43). With 14 seconds remaining, Hudson responded to Councilman Carmichael, and the following exchange took place:

Hudson (4:46): [talking over Carmichael] You cannot stop me during my speech. That clock has not rung.

Councilman Carmichael (4:51): [gavel pounding in background] Let's move on. This is a disruption to this council meeting.

President Thaxton (4:55): You have made your point.

Hudson (4:57): I've got one more point.

Council Carmichael (4:58): You had enough!

Hudson (5:00): I got one more point to make.

President Thaxton (5:01): Your time is up, Mr. Hudson.

Id. (Minutes 4:43–5:01).

Following the citizens’ forum, Hudson emailed the Council. Hudson noted that his final point concerned a road's hazardous conditions, which stemmed from erosion and flooding. [80-2]. Hudson's deposition testimony is consistent with his email. There, Hudson claimed that he would have used his remaining seconds to display a picture “of a police vehicle in a ditch” and say the following:

We got those ditches in my community right around the street from my house. Every time it rains, it floods with raw sewage. And then, the roads is eroding and everything. And they done had several cars to run off in there. So I figured we keep on telling them, they'll fix it. And that's—and if you go through them, my years of.

[77-2], p. 19. Hudson also attended the next citizens’ forum following the incident, where the Council voted to give him additional time to speak if needed. Id. at p. 24. Hudson declined the offer. Id. Hudson later sued Councilman Carmichael, President Thaxton, and Councilwoman Ellis for viewpoint discrimination.¹ The trio now moves for summary judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Clark v. Champion Nat'l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 578 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). And a “dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. But a genuine dispute of an otherwise material fact does not preclude summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In that situation, the “failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial” and, consequently, “the moving party ‘is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at 322–23. In sum, “the court must conclude—without resolving any fact disputes—that the movant ‘must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” 11 Moore's Federal Practice § 56.21 (2025) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

“ ‘[W]here the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence,’ which ‘shift[s] to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.’ ” Dewolff v. Pethick, 133 F.4th 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). “Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden. Rather, the Court requires ‘significant probative evidence’ from the nonmovant to dismiss a request for summary judgment.” Boggs v. Krum Indep. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 714, 719 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (quoting In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982)). The court should view “all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Clark, 952 F.3d at 578–79. But “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007).²

III. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate. The Defendants point to a lack of evidence supporting Hudson's viewpoint discrimination claims. In fact, they claim the audio recording contradicts Hudson's allegations.³ Hudson, in turn, did not carry his burden. Although his response is hard to follow, two things are noticeably absent. Hudson did not cite any law supporting his position. See [80].⁴ And he failed to produce competent summary judgment evidence that would create genuine disputes of material fact as to whether any Defendant engaged in viewpoint discrimination. After setting out the legal standard, the Court considers each Defendant separately.

A. Legal Standard

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law ․ abridging the freedom of speech.” But its protections are not absolute. “Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). “Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities.” Id. at 799–800. The applicable standard used to “determine whether a state has unconstitutionally excluded a private speaker from use of a public forum depend[s] on the nature of the forum.” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106, 121 S. Ct. 2093, 150 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2001). The citizens’ forum is a limited public forum.⁵

“When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech.” Id. “The State may be justified ‘in reserving its forum for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.’ ” Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995)). Still, the State's power to restrict speech is not unfettered. Id. “The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint” and “must be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” Id. at 106–07 (internal citations omitted). “Viewpoint discrimination exists ‘when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.’ ” Heaney, 846 F.3d at 802 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829) (noting the plaintiff must prove “that the defendant acted with a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose”). Conversely, there is “no constitutional violation” if the silenced speaker “violated a reasonable restriction, such as a topic or time constraint.” Id. (citing Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 140 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1998); Lowery v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)).

B. Application

Hudson violated the ordinance and he also ran out of time. The ordinance provides: “All remarks shall be addressed to the Council as a body and not to any member thereof, or any other individual,” and the remarks cannot be “personal.” [77-4], p. 3. Hudson knew about this requirement. [77-2], p. 7. Hudson also knew that the Council included white and black members. Id. at p. 16. Hudson said, “you black people sit up there and let our communities die,” “the only reason why you in the black communities is to put our black men in jail,” and “[w]e got our four blacks, and you ain't done nothing.” [77-5] (Minutes 3:26–4:41).⁶ No party challenges the reasonableness of the ordinance either. Hudson's claim thus turns on whether he “suffered a natural consequence of its nondiscriminatory application.” Gonzales v. Dankel, No. 4:22-CV-416, 2024 WL 2958958, at *8 (E.D. Tex. June 12, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-40456, 2024 WL 5297817 (5th Cir. Oct. 22, 2024); see Lowery, 586 F.3d at 435 (“No violation occurs when the same result would have occurred in the absence of any illegitimate motive.”); Platt v. Mansfield, 162 F.4th 430, 440–41 (4th Cir. 2025).⁷

i. Councilman George Carmichael

Hudson argues, without evidentiary support, that Councilman Carmichael thought Hudson was going to start talking about the relocation of a festival and so he stopped Hudson from talking. [80], p. 3. His argument fails for two reasons.

First, Steinburg v. Chesterfield County Planning Commission recognizes that a non-presiding member's response to a personal attack does not always violate the speaker's First Amendment rights. 527 F.3d 377, 389 (4th Cir. 2008). In Steinburg, the plaintiff criticized the entire planning commission during his allotted time in a “raised” and “argumentative” tone. Id. at 380–82. Nobody interrupted until the plaintiff called out a non-presiding commissioner. Id. at 382. The commissioner responded: “[Y]ou will not talk to me that way. I am not going to listen to what you've got to say ․” Id. A back-and-forth argument ensued, prompting the commission's chairman to step in and remove the plaintiff. Id. at 382–83. The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment. It reasoned that no evidence supported “a claim that [the commissioner] silenced [the plaintiff's] speech, nor that [he] requested the [c]hairman to do so.” Id. at 388. Rather, the commissioner “simply challenged the premise underlying [the plaintiff's] criticism and expressed his intent not to listen.” Id. at 389.

A similar scenario played out at the February 2024 citizens’ forum. Hudson's comments became more confrontational with each minute that passed. Like the Steinburg commissioners, the Laurel council members did not interrupt Hudson despite the pointed attacks. Councilman Carmichael, similar to the non-presiding commissioner in Steinburg, only spoke up after four minutes and 43 seconds when Hudson pounded the podium twice and singled him out by race. And rather than seeking Hudson's removal, Councilman Carmichael initially only exclaimed that he had “heard enough!” In this sense, he was seemingly expressing his “intent not to listen,” which is not the same as “silencing” Hudson. Id. Nor has Hudson provided evidence that Councilman Carmichael asked President Thaxton to step in. Steinburg therefore counsels against imputing any impact of President Thaxton's decision to Councilman Carmichael.

Second, even if Councilman Carmichael's response effectively silenced Hudson, nothing in the record suggests it was intended to stifle a disfavored viewpoint. Hudson never indicated that he planned to speak about a festival. To the contrary, Hudson said he wanted to talk about “three dire needs.” He proceeded to speak about all three and never said there was actually a fourth point until three seconds were left. Regardless, it is unclear how Councilman Carmichael could have stifled a viewpoint about a local festival that Hudson did not express. Notwithstanding this speculative logical leap, Hudson spoke to the Council about the festival at least eight times without incident before the February 2024 citizens’ forum. See generally [77-1]. The other topics were not novel either. Hudson admits to raising his concerns about the eroding streets, playground, cemetery, and injustice toward the black community several times over the years during the citizens’ forum, [77-2], p. 23, which included all three Defendants, see generally [77-1]. Hudson spoke at the citizens’ forum at least sixteen times from 2022 to 2023. [77-2], p. 6. Yet Hudson admits that he never encountered an issue. Id.

The only difference between the February 2024 citizens’ forum and Hudson's prior sixteen times before the Council was his undisputed violation of the ordinance. Hudson concedes that Councilman Carmichael did not speak until he specifically addressed the four black Council members. [77-2], p. 15; [104], p. 2. No other evidence suggests why Hudson's repetitive concerns prompted a response this time. Because the only new factor was Hudson's violation of the ordinance, Councilman Carmichael's response was viewpoint neutral. See Monroe v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CV H-19-1991, 2019 WL 13252407, at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2019) (finding school's enforcement of policy was viewpoint neutral where plaintiff expressed the same views “for years without being banned”); Wenthold, 2012 WL 467325, at *10 (rejecting viewpoint discrimination claim because, in part, council member allowed plaintiff “to speak even though he had criticized the City Council in the past either privately or publicly”). Councilman Carmichael is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

ii. Council President Anthony Thaxton

Next up is Council President Thaxton. Hudson appears to argue that President Thaxton applied the ordinance in a discriminatory manner by declining Hudson's request to finish the speech. See [80-2]. The audio does not support Hudson's characterization.

Contrary to Hudson's argument, President Thaxton did not stop Hudson's speech. [77-2], p. 23. Hudson's request came at the five-minute mark, and Hudson never said he actually had an additional point to make until three seconds were left. [77-5]. Also, President Thaxton did not respond until after Hudson's time had expired. [77-5] (Minute 5:01). President Thaxton's only other comment was telling Hudson that he had “made [his] point” to seemingly calm the rising tensions. Id. (Minute 4:55). Had President Thaxton officially silenced and removed Hudson, the ordinance required him to “summon the proper authorities to remove” Hudson. [77-2], p. 6. That did not occur. President Thaxton's conduct was entirely consistent with the reality that Hudson's time expired.

But even if President Thaxton did stop Hudson's speech, it was not done in a discriminatory manner. Hudson noted during his deposition that other speakers have similarly addressed council members by their race. [77-2], p. 15. But again, Hudson has not provided competent summary-judgment proof corroborating his claim. Nothing in the record suggests that President Thaxton has permitted other citizens to continue speaking after addressing council members by their race. See Davison v. Rose, 19 F.4th 626, 636 (4th Cir. 2021) (rejecting viewpoint discrimination evidence where comparators, unlike the plaintiff, “did not comment about individual board members”). “The absence of disparate treatment ․ renders Plaintiff [Hudson's] allegations of viewpoint discrimination impotent in these circumstances.” Gonzales, 2024 WL 2958958, at *8. It “stands to reason that Plaintiff [Hudson] would have been prevented from speaking even in the absence of any improper motive because [he] did not comply with the public comment procedures.” Id. President Thaxton therefore did not apply the ordinance in a discriminatory manner. Rather, Hudson “suffered a natural consequence of [the ordinance's] nondiscriminatory application.” Id. There is no genuine dispute of material fact precluding President Thaxton from judgment as a matter of law.

iii. Councilwoman Ellis

That leaves Councilwoman Ellis. At the pleading stage, Hudson alleged that Councilwoman Ellis “began yelling to remove Mr. Hudson from the Council Chambers.” [25], p. 4. The audio recording now makes clear that his allegation is frivolous.

Councilwoman Ellis is not heard at any point during the recording. Hudson acknowledges this fact. [77-2], p. 18. And Hudson offered no evidence suggesting that Councilwoman Ellis spoke at the citizens’ forum even if the recording did not capture her voice.⁸ Absent such evidence, no reasonable jury would believe that Councilwoman Ellis interrupted Hudson. She is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law too. See Gjemre v. Leffingwell, No. A-13-CA-729-SS, 2015 WL 433506, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2015) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff provided “no evidence of any actions taken by the City Council Members or the City Officials in violation of his rights” during city meeting); Schnekloth v. Deakins, No. 21-CV-5131, 2022 WL 1050380, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 7, 2022) (“With few exceptions, liability attaches only where a public official personally participated in an alleged violation.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

To the extent the Court has not addressed any of the parties’ remaining arguments, it has considered them and determined that they would not alter the result.⁹

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that George Carmichael, Andrea Ellis, and Anthony Thaxton's Motion for Summary Judgment [77] is GRANTED. Anthony Hudson's claims are DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [84] is MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that George Carmichael, Andrea Ellis, and Anthony Thaxton's Motion to Strike [85] is MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion for Leave to File Out of Time [86] is MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Defendant Travelers [89] is WITHDRAWN.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply [92] is MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion for Revision of Interlocutory Order [94] is WITHDRAWN.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion for Leave to File Out of Time and Motion to Withdraw Pending Motions [104] is MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion for Leave to File Omnibus Response and Notice of Concession Out of Time [106] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED only to the extent that it seeks to “[w]ithdraw all claims against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America” and proceed solely “against the City Defendants.” It is DENIED in all other respects.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [107] is WITHDRAWN.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Anthony Hudson's Motion to Withdraw Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [108] is GRANTED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Hudson also brought a free speech claim under the Mississippi State Constitution against the three council members. Unless otherwise stated, references to Hudson's First Amendment claim refer to both the state and federal free speech claims. See Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 n.2 (5th Cir. 2017).

2.   Although the Fifth Circuit declined to decide whether “recorded oral assertions ․ may or may not by themselves be enough to discredit [plaintiff's] statements,” it did recognize that the Scott opinion “does not limit its holding to video evidence.” See Garcia v. Orta, 47 F.4th 343, 351 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2022). Several circuit courts have applied the Scott exception to audio recordings. See e.g., Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2010); Coble v. City of White House, Tenn., 634 F.3d 865, 868–69 (6th Cir. 2011); Pierson v. Bassett, 534 F. App'x 768, 771 (10th Cir. 2013). District courts in the Fifth Circuit have too. See e.g., Hightower v. Fam. Health Care Clinic, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-934-DPJ-FKB, 2022 WL 866264, at *13 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 22, 2022); Allbritton v. Int'l Mins. & Chem. Corp., No. CIV.A. 06-0774, 2007 WL 3146249, at *3 n.11 (W.D. La. Oct. 24, 2007); Widder v. Texas A & M Univ.--Corpus Christi, No. 2:11-CV-282, 2012 WL 3776480, at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:11-CV-00282, 2012 WL 3776477 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2012); Easley v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, No. 4:10-CV-03734, 2011 WL 6002644, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011).

3.   Had the Defendants reasserted qualified immunity, their initial burden would have been even lower. A public official need only make “a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity” to alter “the usual summary-judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” See Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016)) (discussing how qualified immunity alters the normal summary judgment standard). The procedural history makes it a close call on whether the Defendants made a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity. They raised it in their motion to dismiss, [26], p. 9, and answer, [52], pps. 6–7. The Court analyzed the motion to dismiss through a qualified-immunity lens, and the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment engages with the primary case in the motion to dismiss's “clearly established” analysis. Hudson, 2025 WL 1737808, at *7; [78], p. 7. That said, Fifth Circuit precedent suggests that the Defendants’ failure to explicitly reassert it at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to invoke the affirmative defense's protections and more lenient standard. See Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329–30 (acknowledging that official “can raise qualified immunity at any stage ․ and continue to raise it at each successive stage”); Culberson v. Clay Cnty., 98 F.4th 281 (5th Cir. 2024) (noting defendant shifted summary judgment burden by asserting qualified immunity); see also Spears v. McCraw, No. 1:15-CV-511-RP, 2018 WL 1463711, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2018); Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir. 2016).

4.   Hudson did file a notice of supplemental authority [88] after the motion for summary judgment became ripe. But the cases provided are neither binding nor persuasive for all the reasons discussed in this opinion and in the Defendants’ response. See [91].

5.   The parties agreed on this characterization at the pleading stage. Hudson, 2025 WL 1737808, at *6. The Defendants’ memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment reflects that they still adhere to this understanding. See [78], p. 7. And Hudson has not suggested that he does not remain in agreement. The law supports their characterizations. See e.g., Wenthold v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., No. 3:11-CV-0748-B, 2012 WL 467325, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2012) (finding city created limited public forum when it provided public comment period at city council meeting), aff'd sub nom., 532 F. App'x 474 (5th Cir. 2013); Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 759 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding the “comment session” was a “limited public forum ‘for the limited time and topic of the meeting’ ”).

6.   Hudson acknowledged in his deposition that he was “pointing out specific black members based on their race.” Id. He is now attempting to change this statement by attaching an errata sheet to his response. See [80-10], p. 3. His attempt is unsuccessful. This opportunity is available only if the deponent requests the opportunity to review the transcript before the deposition's completion and provides the reasons for any alterations to an answer's form or substance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e)(1). The certifying officer must note if such a request is made and attach any changes to the certification. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e)(2). “The Fifth Circuit has stated that strict compliance with Rule 30(e)(1) is required.” Reynolds v. Werner Etnerprises, Inc., No. 3:15CV764-HTW-LRA, 2016 WL 4821651, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 13, 2016) (citing Reed v. Hernandez, 114 F. App'x 609, 611 (5th Cir. 2004)). Hudson does not claim that he requested a transcript to review or that he did so before the deposition was completed. The court reporter's certification does not suggest that he did either. See [77-2], p. 24. Nor does the certification have any alterations attached to it. The Court therefore refuses to consider his proposed changes. See Durham v. AMIKids, Inc., No. CV 17-343-JWD-RLB, 2019 WL 12290115, at *5 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2019) (declining to strike deposition where no request was made). Even if Hudson could circumvent this requirement, he did not provide any reasons for his proposed changes. These omissions are also fatal. See Nucor Corp. v. Requenez, 578 F. Supp. 3d 873, 910 (S.D. Tex. 2022).

7.   Because it is now undisputed that Hudson “violated a reasonable restriction,” and since Hudson's initial allegations are not accurate as they relate to his interactions with Council members and how much time he had left, Heaney—a case the Court thoroughly analyzed at the motion to dismiss stage—is inapplicable. 846 F.3d at 802.

8.   Hudson appears to insinuate that the Defendants tampered with the audio. See [80], p. 3. Aside from conclusory responses, however, Hudson has not cited any relevant evidence supporting his tampering allegation. His allegation is therefore insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Allbritton, 2007 WL 3146249, at *3 n.11 (accepting defendant's evidence of prior audiograms where there were “no allegations or indications that the audiograms were fabricated or doctored”).

9.   Since the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [77] became ripe, Hudson has flooded the Court's docket with untimely and confusing motions. Hudson filed a motion for “Leave to File Omnibus Response and Notice of Concession out of Time.” [106]. It is granted only to the extent that it seeks to “[w]ithdraw all claims against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America” and proceed solely “against the City Defendants.” [106], p. 1. Therefore, Hudson's motion to reconsider dismissal of Defendant Travelers [89] and motion for revision of interlocutory order [94] are withdrawn. These motions would have been denied anyway as second and third attempts to improperly seek reconsideration. See Benson v. St. Joseph Reg'l Health Ctr., 575 F.3d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The federal rules do not provide for a motion requesting a reconsideration of a denial of a reconsideration.”). Hudson's motion for “Leave to File Omnibus Response and Notice of Concession out of Time” [106] is denied in all other respects. Hudson's motion to withdraw his Rule 11 sanctions [108] is granted and his motion for Rule 11 sanctions [107] is withdrawn. The Court's holding renders Hudson's remaining motion for partial summary judgment [84], motion for leave to file after the dispositive motion deadline [86], motion for leave to file sur-reply [92], and motion for leave to file out of time and withdraw pending motions [104] moot. Defendants’ motion to strike [85] is also moot.

TAYLOR B. McNEEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE