OKORIE v. FIRST BANK (2026)

ORDER

Appellant Dr. Ikechukwu H. Okorie has appealed from a Bankruptcy Court Order granting motions to dismiss filed by First Bank, Eileen N. Shaffer, Wells Fargo Bank and Erno D. Linder, and sua sponte dismissing Dr. Okorie's claims against Timothy Matthew Farris. The Bankruptcy Court's Order is affirmed, and this appeal is dismissed.¹

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Royal Oaks Rental Properties, LLC, one of Dr. Okorie's companies, received a commercial loan for $116,800.00 from Wells Fargo in November of 2013. Three years later, Inland Family Practice Center, LLC, another one of Dr. Okorie's companies, received a commercial loan from Wells Fargo for $400,000.00. Dr. Okorie's companies eventually defaulted on the commercial loans, and Wells Fargo filed suit in the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi. On October 9, 2018, Wells Fargo was awarded summary judgment against Dr. Okorie and the other obligors, jointly and severally, in the amount of $532,950.05, plus post-judgment interest and post-judgment attorney fees.²

In addition to obtaining commercial loans from Wells Fargo, Royal Oaks also obtained a $750,000.00 commercial loan from First Bank in August of 2017. Dr. Okorie's condo in Destin, Florida, (“Destin property”) and the assignment of rents, was used as collateral. Royal Oaks defaulted on this loan too.

Ultimately, Dr. Okorie filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 on February 27, 2019. Wells Fargo and First Bank timely filed their proof of claims. In his bankruptcy schedules, Dr. Okorie did not dispute Wells Fargo's claim of $535,000.00 or First Bank's claim of $816,063.89. Two years later, the case was converted to Chapter 7 and Dr. Okorie's assets were sold by the Trustee—including the Destin property for $1,500,000.00. Dr. Okorie received a discharge on October 5, 2021. By January of 2023, all property of the bankruptcy estate had been liquidated, and the case appeared to be in wind down mode. That summer, however, Dr. Okorie filed numerous pro se motions and objections to the creditor's claims.³ The Bankruptcy Court overruled Dr. Okorie's objections and eventually ordered sanctions against Dr. Okorie, requiring him to pay the Trustee's attorney's fees and costs and prohibiting him from filing certain papers without the court's approval.

After the Bankruptcy Court entered its sanctions order, Dr. Okorie filed suit against First Bank, Eileen N. Shaffer, Timothy Matthew Farris, Wells Fargo Bank, and Erno D. Linder—the Appellees in this action. Okorie v. First Bank, et al, No. 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024). A few weeks later, Dr. Okorie filed another suit against Wells Fargo Bank and Erno D. Linder. Okorie v. Wells Fargo Bank, et al, No. 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024). In both actions, Dr. Okorie asserted the same causes of action relating to proofs of claims filed by First Bank and Wells Fargo and arising out of his belief that the Trustee's sale of the Destin property violated his rights and constituted abuse of the bankruptcy process. Specifically, Dr. Okorie asserted claims for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, fraud on the court, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss in both actions, Magistrate Judge Rath consolidated the cases, and Chief District Judge Ozerden referred the consolidated action to the Bankruptcy Court.

Dr. Okorie appealed the consolidation order and the District Court's referral to the Bankruptcy Court. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court stayed the proceedings, but allowed briefing to continue on the pending motions to dismiss.⁴ The stay, however, prevented Farris from filing his own motion to dismiss. Okorie v. First Bank, 24-06017-KMS (S.D. Miss. Bkr. Jul. 18, 2024) (“all matters in these consolidated adversary proceedings should be stayed pending the appeal, EXCEPT that Plaintiff Okorie will be allowed to file a response to the Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum filed by Defendants Lindner and Wells Fargo ․ and Defendants will be allowed to file a reply.”). After the Fifth Circuit dismissed Dr. Okorie's appeal, the Bankruptcy Court granted the motions to dismiss, which were originally filed in the District Court, and sua sponte dismissed Dr. Okorie's claims against Farris. The Bankruptcy Court specifically found “[t]he complaints raise issues that have already been litigated in this Court and other courts and relief is precluded under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” [1-4], p. 9. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 158(a), district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final bankruptcy court orders, from interlocutory orders issued under Section 1121(d) of Title 11, and with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a); see also In re Phillips, 844 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he district courts may hear appeals from final judgments of the bankruptcy courts or appeals from interlocutory orders, if they grant leave.”). This Court's review of a bankruptcy court's rulings on issues of law are reviewed de novo. In re Evert, 342 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Dr. Okorie asserts that the Bankruptcy Court erred in (1) holding that his claims arising under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices ACT (“FDCPA”) were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel; (2) treating the Trustee's Section 363 sale of the Destin property as conclusive and preclusive of independent statutory violations committed by First Bank, Wells Fargo, and their counsel; (3) exercising jurisdiction to dismiss federal statutory claims that fell within the original jurisdiction of the District Court; (4) dismissing his complaint with prejudice without granting leave to amend under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (5) giving preclusive effect to orders that remain pending on appeal; and (6) dismissing Okorie's claims against Timothy Matthew Farris sua sponte. Upon consideration, this Court finds no clear error in the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact. See In re Spillman Dev. Group, Ltd., 710 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining that in bankruptcy appeals, the Fifth Circuit performs “the identical task as the district court” and applies a clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact, even where the district court referred the case to the bankruptcy court). And reviewing its conclusions of law de novo, the Bankruptcy Court properly found that Dr. Okorie's claims for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Bankruptcy Court's decision is affirmed.⁵

In the alternative, even if dismissal of Dr. Okorie's claims based on res judicata or collateral estoppel was not proper, dismissal of his RESPA and FDCPA claims would nevertheless be warranted because his claims are based on commercial loans. See Adler v. Enery Debt Holdings LLC, No. 4:24-cv-02381-AHB, 2025 5153588, *2 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 24, 2025) (“A district court reviewing a bankruptcy appeal may affirm on any ground supported by the record, including grounds not reached by the bankruptcy court.”) (citing Hammervold v. Blank, 3 F.4th 803, 813 (5th Cir. 2021)).

A. Res judicata and collateral estoppel

In its Order, the Bankruptcy Court found that Dr. Okorie's debts to First Bank and Wells Fargo have been “conclusively decided.” [1-4], p. 8 (citing In re Okorie, No. 19-50379-KMS, Dkt. No. 932, pps. 5, 7-8). Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court previously determined that Dr. Okorie has presented no evidence of misconduct by the Trustee or the attorneys of First Bank or Wells Fargo. In re Okorie, No. 19-50379-KMS, Dkt. No. 932, p. 20; Dkt. No. 1198, p. 11. And these findings are, therefore, “not subject to further attack” under the principals of res judicata and collateral estoppel. [1-4], p. 8. On appeal, Dr. Okorie argues his RESPA and FDCPA claims “were never raised, litigated, or adjudicated on the merits in prior proceedings.” [5], p. 11. This Court will address the Bankruptcy Court's findings on both res judicata and collateral estoppel in turn.

i. Res judicata

The Baudoin case sets forth the test for res judicata in the bankruptcy context, stating “[a]n arrangement confirmed by a bankruptcy court has the effect of a judgment rendered by a district court. Any attempt by the parties to relitigate any of the matters that were raised or could have been raised therein is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.” In re Baudoin, 981 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1993 (emphasis in original). Indeed, “[r]estraining litigious plaintiffs from taking more than ‘one bite of the apple’ has been our avowed purpose since the common law doctrine of res judicata first evolved.” Id. (citing Sure–Snap Corp. v. State St. Bank and Tr. Co., 948 F.2d 869, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)). Thus, in the bankruptcy context, a subsequent suit is barred by res judicata if “1) both cases involve the same parties; 2) the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the prior decision was a final judgment on the merits; and 4) the same cause of action is at issue in both cases.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Dr. Okorie only challenges the fourth element.⁶

The Fifth Circuit applies a “transactional test to determine ‘whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action.’ ” Houston Professional Towing Ass'n v. City of Houston, 812 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2016). “The transactional test focuses on whether the two cases ‘are based on the same nucleus of operative facts.’ ” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “It is the ‘nucleus of operative facts, rather than the type of relief requested, substantive theories advanced, or types of rights asserted’ that defines the claim.” Id. “Even though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several kinds of relief, it is still a single cause of action for purposes of claim preclusion.” 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 973. “When the same factual allegations form the basis for the two allegedly different causes of action, the fact that a party seeks different relief does not prevent the operation of res judicata.” Id. This Court must now decide whether Dr. Okorie's RESPA and FDCPA claims are based on the same nucleus of operative facts that were previously decided by the Bankruptcy Court in its November 6, 2023, Order [932] in 19-50379-KMS.

Dr. Okorie's District Court complaints asserting RESPA and FDCPA claims, which were consolidated and transferred to the Bankruptcy Court, and ultimately form the basis of this appeal, are based on the loans Dr. Okorie entered into with First Bank and Wells Fargo. In both of his complaints, Dr. Okorie asserts that “[t]he dispute forming the substance of this action is based on Dr. Okorie's bankruptcy case at the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the Southern District of Mississippi ․ Case No. 19-50379-KMS.” Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 2); Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 2). And Dr. Okorie specifically disputed “the existence of the alleged debt” owed to both First Bank and Wells Fargo. Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 5); see also Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 3). He also argued that his “ownership rights have been threatened by the Defendant's fraudulent conduct,” and assisted through “its attorney(s).” Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], pps. 3-4); Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], pps. 4-5). In short, the basis of Dr. Okorie's RESPA and FDCPA claims arise out of the loans he obtained from First Bank and Wells Fargo, and the subsequent sale of the Destin property.

In the Bankruptcy Court's Order [932] in 19-50379-KMS, upon which it based its finding of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the Bankruptcy Court explained that “Okorie's claims against First Bank ․ relate to the proofs of claims filed by First Bank in the bankruptcy case for commercial debt secured by Lot 49, Destiny by the Sea ․ and the alleged wrongful sale of the Destin Property by the Trustee.” [1-4], p. 5. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court determined that Okorie's allegations against Wells Fargo “boil down to his assertion Wells Fargo's Claim filed in his Bankruptcy Case ․ was inaccurate and misleading and not supported by documentation ․ [and] by filing this Claim, Defendants intended to defraud him from his property and perpetrated fraud on the Bankruptcy Court.” [1-4], p. 6.

Dr. Okorie's RESPA and FDCPA claims are based on the same nucleus of operative facts: Dr. Okorie's bankruptcy case and his disputes regarding the proofs of claims of First Bank and Wells Fargo filed based on Dr. Okorie's loans he obtained. As a result, this Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court's finding that Dr. Okorie's debts to First Bank and Wells Fargo have been “conclusively decided and is not subject to further attack.” [1-4], p. 8.⁷ And to the extent Dr. Okorie's RESPA and FDCPA claims asserted against Linder, Shaffer, and Farris are based on such misconduct, the Bankruptcy Court did not error by finding such claims are barred by res judicata.

ii. Collateral estoppel

“Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude litigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979)). It is undisputed that the Bankruptcy Court previously decided in its November 6, 2023, Order [932] in 19-50379-KMS that Dr. Okorie's loans with First Bank and Wells Fargo were commercial loans. RESPA, however, does not apply to commercial loans. Okorie v. Foxworth, No. 25-60431, 2026 WL 614859, *3 (5th Cir. 2026); Okorie v. Univ. Mall, No. 25-60185, 2025 WL 2604468, *1 (5th Cir. 2025). And neither does the FDCPA. Id.

Since the Bankruptcy Court previously decided an issue of law necessary for Dr. Okorie's RESPA and FDCPA claims—that his loans from First Bank and Wells Fargo were commercial, not consumer—the Bankruptcy Court did not error in finding his RESPA and FDCPA claims against First Bank, Wells Fargo, Shaffer, Farris, and Linder are barred by collateral estoppel.

B. Trustee's Section 363 sale of Destin property

In its Order, the Bankruptcy Court found that the “[v]alidity of the Section 363 sale of the Destin Property” has been “conclusively decided and not subject to further attack.” [1-4], p. 8. But in this appeal, Dr. Okorie claims that he “does not seek to unwind the sale; he seeks damages for violations like FDCPA-prohibited threats or RESPA-noncompliant responses, which survive independently.” [10], p. 13. Further, Dr. Okorie asserts that the Section 363 “sale addressed liquidation, not liability for deceptive collections or undisclosed fees.” [5], p. 12. As a result, Dr. Okorie argues that because “debtors retain causes of action not part of the estate or waived,” the Bankruptcy Court erred in treating the “Sale of the Destin Property as Conclusive and Preclusive” of his RESPA and FDCPA claims. [5], pps. 12-13. But because Dr. Okorie's RESPA and FDCPA claims are based on commercial loans,⁸ his appeal based on “FDCPA-prohibited threats or RESPA-noncompliant responses” fail regardless.

Indeed, the “principal purpose of RESPA is to protect home buyers from material nondisclosures in settlement statements and abusive practices in the settlement process.” Okorie v. Univ. Mall, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-63-TBM, 2025 WL 978403, *6 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2025) (citing Cortez v. Keystone Bank, Inc., No. 98-2457, 2000 WL 536666, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2000)). So RESPA “does not apply to credit transactions involving extensions of credit ․ primarily for business, commercial, or agricultural purposes.” Okorie, 2025 WL 978403, at *6 (citing Pearson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 4:18-cv-627, 2019 WL 2057223, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 9, 2019)). Similarly, FDCPA does not apply to his loan given that the property concerns a commercial loan and not a consumer loan. See Hall v. Phenix Investigations, 642 F. App'x 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not apply to commercial debt collection practices); First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Smith, 62 F.3d 133, 134–36 (5th Cir. 1995) (collection efforts related to personal guaranty of business debt are not “debts” within the meaning of the FDCPA because they are not for personal purposes). Dr. Okorie's appeal on this issue is meritless.

C. Jurisdiction

Dr. Okorie contends that the Bankruptcy Court exceeded its authority by “disposing of” his RESPA and FDCPA claims. [10], p. 7. Dr. Okorie submits that the Bankruptcy Court's Order was in error because the Bankruptcy Court “did not distinguish between core and non-core claims, did not analyze constitutional limits under Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), and did not address whether final adjudication was appropriate.” [10], p. 7. This Court finds his arguments are baseless and will address each in turn.

Dr. Okorie claims that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his RESPA and FDCPA claims under Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011), which prohibits bankruptcy courts from entering final judgments in non-core private rights disputes without consent.” According to Dr. Okorie, the “Bankruptcy Court exceeded its authority in disposing of non-core federal claims. While referral under 28 U.S.C. § 157 permitted the Bankruptcy Court to consider the claims, it did not authorize summary extinguishment of independent federal statutory causes of action, such as RESPA and FDCPA, without careful jurisdictional and procedural analysis.” [10], p. 7. His arguments lack merit.

“For purposes of determining whether bankruptcy jurisdiction exists—that is, whether the proceeding arises under title 11, arises in title 11, or is related to a case under title 11—the classification of a proceeding as ‘core’ is helpful, as core proceedings have been equated with those ‘arising under’ or ‘arising in’ title 11.” In re Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans, 653 B.R. 524, 531 (E.D. La. 2023) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 476, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011) (“Under our reading of the statute, core proceedings are those that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Title 11.”); In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1987) (observing that “section 157 apparently equates core proceedings with the categories of ‘arising under’ and ‘arising in’ proceedings” to conclude that “the phrases ‘arising under’ and ‘arising in’ are helpful indicators of the meaning of core proceedings”)). Proceedings “arise under” title 11 when they “involve a cause of action created or determined by a statutory provision of title 11.” Wood, 825 F.2d at 96. Similarly, proceedings “arise in” title 11 when they “are not based on any right expressly created by title 11, but nevertheless, would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy.” Id. at 97.

The Fifth Circuit has explained that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) “designates certain cases as ‘core proceedings’ and authorizes a Bankruptcy Court to ‘enter appropriate orders and judgments’ in such cases.” In re BP RE, L.P., 735 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)).⁹ Section 157(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a nonexclusive list of core proceedings, including “matters concerning the administration of the estate;” “proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;” “orders to turn over property of the estate,” and “other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O).

In referring Dr. Okorie's consolidated cases to the Bankruptcy Court, Chief Judge Ozerden found that “[a]ccording to Plaintiff's allegations ․ he is plainly raising claims arising out of his pending bankruptcy case.” Okorie v. First Bank, No. 2:24-cv-46-HSO (S.D. Miss. May 29, 2024). Specifically, Chief Judge Ozerden explained that Dr. Okorie:

Raises several claims for damages against Defendant First Bank, a creditor in his bankruptcy case, along with two of its lawyers Eileen N. Shaffer and Timothy Matthew Farris, on the ground that the sale of the property in Destin, Florida, in his bankruptcy case, which the Trustee carried out following a Bankruptcy Court Order in 2021 authorizing the sale of property, violated his rights and constituted an abuse of the bankruptcy process․ He alleges the sale was for the benefit of Defendant First Bank․ Plaintiff acknowledges that ‘[t]he dispute forming the substance of this action is based on [his] bankruptcy base at the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the Southern District of Mississippi.

In the second, consolidated case, Case No. 2:24cv61-HSO-BWR ․he also raises claims related to the sale of the Destin, Florida, property in his pending bankruptcy case. He names as Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, a creditor in the bankruptcy case, and its attorney, Erno D. Linder․ Plaintiff asserts that the sale was in favor of Wells Fargo․ He likewise alleges that ‘[t]he dispute forming the substance of this action is based on Dr. Okorie's bankruptcy case at the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Id. Thus, in accordance with the Local Rules, Chief Judge Ozerden referred Dr. Okorie's consolidated cases to the Bankruptcy Court.

And upon referral, the Bankruptcy Court found that “Okorie's claims against First Bank, Shaffer and Farris relate to proofs of claim filed by First Bank in the bankruptcy case for commercial debt secured by Lot 49, Destiny by the Sea, in Okaloosa County, Florida (“Destin Property”) and the alleged wrongful sale of the Destin Property by the Trustee.” [1-4], p. 5. The Bankruptcy Court similarly determined that “Okorie's allegations in the Complaint boil down to his assertion [that] Wells Fargo's Claim filed in his Bankruptcy Case ․ was inaccurate and misleading and not supported by documentation ․ [and] by filing this Claim, Defendants intended to defraud him from his property and perpetrated fraud on the Bankruptcy Court.” Id. at p. 6. In sum, Dr. Okorie's complaints involved his disputes regarding “the existence of the alleged debt” to both First Bank and Wells Fargo. Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 5); see also Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 3). As well as arguments that Dr. Okorie's “ownership rights have been threatened by the Defendant's fraudulent conduct.” Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 3); Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 4).

Based on Dr. Okorie's allegations, this Court agrees that his claims fall under the “core proceeding” umbrella. In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987) (“A claim against the estate is instituted by filing a proof of claim as provided by the bankruptcy rules. The filing of the proof invokes the special rules of bankruptcy concerning objections to the claim, estimation of the claim for allowance purposes, and the rights of the claimant to vote on the proposed distribution. Understood in this sense, a claim filed against the estate is a core proceeding because it could arise only in the context of bankruptcy.”). Since Dr. Okorie's RESPA and FDCPA claims challenged the validity of First Bank and Wells Fargo's proof of claims asserted against his bankruptcy estate, it follows that his claims “ ‘would have no existence outside of’ [Dr. Okorie's] bankruptcy.” In re Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans, 653 B.R. 524, 532 (E.D. La. 2023). Which is further evidenced by Dr. Okorie's statement that these claims are “based on [his] bankruptcy case.” Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 2); Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 2).

Even if Dr. Okorie's consolidated adversary case did not fall under the “core proceeding” umbrella, Dr. Okorie's claims nevertheless “relate to” his bankruptcy proceeding such that the Bankruptcy's jurisdiction was proper. Jurisdiction for bankruptcy cases is rooted in the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The Supreme Court has held that § 1334(b) gives bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over “more than simply proceedings involving the property of the estate, [but] a bankruptcy court's ‘related to’ jurisdiction is not limitless.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 305, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 131 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1995). “In determining the scope of the jurisdictional provisions of § 1334(b), we have noted that it is not necessary to distinguish their meanings because they ‘operate conjunctively to define the scope of jurisdiction.’ ” In re Walker, 51 F.3d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93). “Instead, to ascertain whether jurisdiction exists, ‘it is necessary only to determine whether a matter is at least ‘related to’ the bankruptcy.’ ” Id.

“For bankruptcy jurisdiction to exist based on a case being related to a case under Title 11, the proceeding must be capable of causing an effect on a bankruptcy estate.” Firefighters’ Ret. System v. Consulting Grp. Services, LLC, 541 B.R. 337, 351 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2015) (citing In re Bass, 171 F.3d 1016, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1999)). Thus, “a proceeding is related to a bankruptcy if the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” In re Bass, 171 F.3d 1016, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Stated another way, “ ‘[a]n action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.’ ” In re Majestic Enery Corp., 835 F.2d at 90 (quoting Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994) (alteration in original). The law is well established that when testing “related to” jurisdiction, an effect is not required to be certain. Certainty, or even likelihood, of such an effect is not a requirement. Rather, jurisdiction will exist based on a finding of any conceivable effect. In re Canion, 196 F.3d at 587. The exercise of jurisdiction over cases related to bankruptcy cases is primarily intended to encompass tort, contract, and other legal claims by and against the debtor, claims that, were it not for bankruptcy, would be ordinary stand-alone lawsuits between the debtor and others but which § 1334(b) allows to be forced into bankruptcy court so that all claims by and against the debtor can be determined in the same forum. In re Zale Corporation, 62 F.3d 746, 751 (5th Cir. 1995).

By his own complaints, Dr. Okorie admits that “[t]he dispute forming the substance of this action is based on Dr. Okorie's bankruptcy case at the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the Southern District of Mississippi ․ Case No. 19-50379-KMS.” Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 2); Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 2). And Dr. Okorie specifically disputed “the existence of the alleged debt” to both First Bank and Wells Fargo. Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 5); see also Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 3). He also argued that his “ownership rights have been threatened by the Defendant's fraudulent conduct.” Okorie v. First Bank, et al, 2:24-cv-46-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 3); Okorie v. Wells Fargo, et al, 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024) (Complaint, [1], p. 4). Accordingly, at minimum, Dr. Okorie's claims “relate to” his bankruptcy proceeding such that the Bankruptcy's jurisdiction was proper.

D. Leave to amend under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Dr. Okorie argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in dismissing his complaints with prejudice without granting him leave to amend his RESPA and FDCPA claims. As Dr. Okorie recognizes, Rule 7015 provides that Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies in adversary proceedings. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015. Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). And denial of leave must be predicated on a “substantial reason.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 2000). Courts consider five factors in deciding whether a “substantial reason” exists: (1) whether there was undue delay in moving to amend; (2) whether the amendment is the product of bad faith or a dilatory motive; (3) whether the movant repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies with prior amendments; (4) whether the opposing party will suffer undue prejudice; and (5) whether the amendment is futile. SGK Properties, L.L.C., 881 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004)). Dr. Okorie's argument fails at the first factor, as he did not seek leave to amend.

Even if he had, however, any such amendment would be futile because RESPA and FDCPA do not apply to commercial loans. Okorie v. Foxworth, No. 25-60431, 2026 WL 614859, *3 (5th Cir. 2026); Okorie v. Univ. Mall, No. 25-60185, 2025 WL 2604468, *1 (5th Cir. 2025). Thus, the Bankruptcy Court did not err and Dr. Okorie's appeal on this issue is dismissed.¹⁰

E. The preclusive effect on orders on appeal

Dr. Okorie argues that the Bankruptcy Court's prior Order [932] and other “cited orders ․ are under appeal in higher courts, rendering them non-final for preclusion purposes.” [5], p. 15. So according to Dr. Okorie, the Bankruptcy Court's reliance on its prior Order [932] “deprived [Dr. Okorie] of review, thus violating the appellate process.” [5], p. 15. He is mistaken. The Fifth Circuit has held that “a judgment is entitled to preclusive effect even though an appeal is pending.” Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov't, 17 F.4th 563, 571 (5th Cir. 2021). Dr. Okorie's appeal on this issue is without merit.

F. Dismissal of Okorie's claims against Timothy Matthew Farris sua sponte

In this appeal, Dr. Okorie argues that the Bankruptcy Court's sua sponte dismissal of his claims against Timothy Matthew Farris, one of First Bank's attorneys, violated his due process rights by denying him notice and opportunity to be heard. [5], p. 15. The Court disagrees.

As explained by the Bankruptcy Court, Dr. Okorie's “claims against First Bank, Shaffer and Farris relate to proofs of claim filed by First Bank in the bankruptcy case for commercial debt secured by ․ ‘Destin Property’ ․ and the alleged wrongful sale of the Destin Property by the Trustee.” [1-4], p. 5. Before this action was consolidated and referred to the Bankruptcy Court, motions to dismiss were filed by First Bank, Shaffer, Wells Fargo, and Linder. Then, Dr. Okorie appealed the consolidation and referral to the Fifth Circuit. The Bankruptcy Court then stayed the proceedings. And according to the Bankruptcy Court's Order, Farris was prohibited from filing his own motion to dismiss. See Okorie v. First Bank, 24-06017-KMS (S.D. Miss. Bkr. Jul. 18, 2024) (“all matters in these consolidated adversary proceedings should be stayed pending the appeal, EXCEPT that Plaintiff Okorie will be allowed to file a response to the Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum filed by Defendants Lindner and Wells Fargo ․ and Defendants will be allowed to file a reply.”). After Dr. Okorie's appeal to the Fifth Circuit was dismissed, the Bankruptcy Court granted the pending motions to dismiss. In the same Order, the Bankruptcy Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint against Farris based on res judicata.

“Generally, res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded, not raised sua sponte.” Mowbray v. Cameron County, Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 281 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)). The Fifth Circuit, however, has recognized “two limited exceptions to this rule.” Id. “The first exception allows ‘[d]ismissal by the court sua sponte on res judicata grounds ․ in the interest of judicial economy where both actions were brought before the same court.’ ” Id. (quoting Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980)). Here, the Bankruptcy Court previously found that “there was no evidence of attorney or creditor misconduct in the underlying bankruptcy case.” [1-4], p. 8. So when Dr. Okorie once again raised claims related to alleged attorney misconduct,¹¹ a finding of res judicata was proper. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting “it would be ‘incongruous’ and ‘unfair’ to allow some defendants to prevail, while not providing the same benefit to similarly situated defendants”); see Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty., Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 281 (5th Cir. 2001) (courts can sua sponte invoke res judicata when uncontroverted facts in the record establish the defense). In short, the Bankruptcy Court found a finding a res judicata was proper as to Dr. Okorie's allegations of misconduct as to Shaffer and Linder, and allowing the same baseless allegations proceed against Farris would be in opposition to judicial economy. Dr. Okorie's appeal on this issue is denied.¹²

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that the Bankruptcy Court Order is AFFIRMED. This CASE is CLOSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As previously described by this Court, and others, Dr. Okorie is a litigious pro se plaintiff. In the last several years, Dr. Okorie has filed more than thirty civil actions in the Southern District of Mississippi alone. The undersigned has presided over fifteen separate cases with Dr. Okorie. A Westlaw search also shows that dozens of opinions from various judges have addressed deficiencies in the claims or defenses raised by Dr. Okorie. Indeed, the undersigned has authored many of those—including multiple bankruptcy appeals.To further illustrate Dr. Okorie's litigious nature, he has filed more than twenty separate appeals to the Fifth Circuit, and even a few appeals to the United States Supreme Court. In addition to filing actions in the Eastern District of Texas, Dr. Okorie has also filed actions in the state courts of Mississippi, Texas, Florida, New York, and New Jersey. Through these numerous actions, Dr. Okorie has incurred sanction warnings and sanctions orders. University Mall, LLC v. Okorie, No. 2:24-cv-91-KS, 2025 WL 2978874 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2025); see also In re Okorie, No. 19-50379-KMS, 2024 WL 5688801 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 25, 2024), aff'd, No. 2:24-cv-51-KS-MTP, 2024 WL 4186937 (S.D. Miss. Sep. 9, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-60469, 2024 WL 4867073 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2024).

2.   A settlement agreement was eventually reached between Wells Fargo and the obligors. In that settlement, Dr. Okorie specifically agreed that Wells Fargo was entitled to retain its claim in his bankruptcy proceeding, and in Inland's, and that Wells Fargo was entitled to receive a distribution on its claim in Dr. Okorie's bankruptcy case.

3.   In fact, Dr. Okorie also filed adversary proceedings against Wells Fargo, the Trustee, and Erno Linder and a separate adversary proceeding against First Bank and the Trustee. See Okorie v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n, et al, No. 23-06021-KMS (S.D. Miss. Bkr. Aug. 1, 2023); see also Okorie v. First Bank, et al, No. 23-06020-KMS (S.D. Miss. Bkr. Aug. 1, 2023). Both adversary proceedings were ultimately dismissed.

4.   Dr. Okorie also appealed the Bankruptcy Court's order staying proceedings, which was dismissed in July of 2025 by this Court. Okorie v. First Bank, No. 2:24-cv-111-TBM-RPM (S.D. Miss. Jul. 25, 2025).

5.   The complaints also assert two other causes of action: (1) fraud on the Court and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dr. Okorie argues that his district court complaints were dismissed in error, so these claims could possibly be at issue. But since Dr. Okorie does not brief those claims on appeal, they are not properly before this Court. Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 399 (5th Cir. 2009) (“claims ․ not briefed on appeal ․ [are] waived.”) (citation omitted).

6.   But to be sure, there is no dispute that both cases involve the same parties, as defendants Wells Fargo and First Bank were creditors in Dr. Okorie's Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding; while Erno Lindner was the attorney for Wells Fargo and Elieen Shaffer and Timothy Farris were the attorneys for First Bank in that same proceeding. Additionally, Dr. Okorie filed adversary proceedings against Wells Fargo, Shaffer, Linder, and First Bank regarding their proof of claims filed in his bankruptcy proceeding. See Okorie v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n, et al, No. 23-06021-KMS (S.D. Miss. Bkr. Aug. 1, 2023); see also Okorie v. First Bank, et al, No. 23-06020-KMS (S.D. Miss. Bkr. Aug. 1, 2023). Nor is there any dispute that the Bankruptcy Court's Order [932] in the Chapter 7 proceeding was considered a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. See In re Baudoin, 981 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1993) (“we read our prior holdings to establish that an order allowing a proof of claim is, likewise, a final judgment.”); see also In re Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc. v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, L.L.C., 647 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that courts “routinely consult the disclosure statement in deciding whether res judicata and judicial estoppel apply.”).

7.   Specifically that: (1) Okorie does not have standing to object to the administration of the estate; (2) the amount, validity and sufficiency of First Bank and Wells Fargo's proofs of claims as evidence of debt owed by Okorie; (3) the debts of First Bank and Wells Fargo are commercial not consumer; (4) the Trustee properly administered the estate; (5) lack of evidence of misconduct by the Trustee, creditors, or their counsel; (6) validity of the Section 363 sale of the Destin Property; and (7) validity of Wells Fargo's settlement with Okorie and his wife. [1-4], p. 8.

8.   Okorie v. Wells Fargo Bank et al, No. 2:24-cv-61-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2024 (Complaint, [1], p. 2) (“The loan was initially intended for Inland and Royal Oaks Rental, not Dr. Okorie and his wife.”).

9.   The Fifth Circuit has stated the difference between core proceedings and non-core proceedings as follows:If the proceeding involves a right created by the federal bankruptcy law, it is a core proceeding; for example, an action by the trustee to avoid a preference. If the proceeding is one that would arise only in bankruptcy, it is also a core proceeding; for example, the filing of a proof of claim or an objection to the discharge of a particular debt. If the proceeding does not invoke a substantive right created by the federal bankruptcy law and is one that could exist outside of bankruptcy it is not a core proceeding; it may be related to the bankruptcy because of its potential effect, but under section 158(c)(1) it is an ‘otherwise related’ or non-core proceeding.In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1987).

10.   Alternatively, this Court “may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if not [explicitly] relied on by the [bankruptcy] court.” United States v. Gonzalez, 592 F.3d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 2009). Thus, the Bankruptcy Court's Order would nevertheless be affirmed because Okorie's district court complaints did not state a claim under RESPA or the FDPCA since his claims relied on commercial loans. Additionally, Okorie provides zero factual allegations that would state any claim for fraud on the court or intentional infliction of emotional distress. In fact, his district court complaints appear frivolous on their faces. Thus, Okorie's claims would be subject to dismissal, regardless.

11.   In re Okorie, No. 19-50379-KMS, Dkt. No. 1198, p. 11.

12.   Also, Dr. Okorie does not argue there was any other argument he could have otherwise brought against Farris that is not applicable to the other Defendants, and this Court is unaware of any.

TAYLOR B. McNEEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE