REYES v. CHAPA LLC (2026)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION.

The H-2A visa program allows foreign workers to obtain temporary visas to perform agricultural work in the United States. The program also protects U.S. workers by requiring employers to provide them with the same level of wages and benefits that are provided to the foreign workers when the U.S. workers are at the same jobsite or are engaged in what federal regulations call “corresponding employment.” One of the primary disputes here is whether workers at a corn processing facility in Eastern Iowa were in “corresponding employment” with workers at a corn processing facility 450 miles away in Central Nebraska. The Court concludes the answer is “no” and therefore will dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims and theories that are premised on the “corresponding employment” concept.

In other ways, however, Plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims against Defendants, including parts of their first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. Thus, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (ECF 28; ECF 29.)

II. BACKGROUND.1

A. Facts.

Plaintiffs are seven migrant agricultural workers who reside in Texas. (ECF 25, ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs were recruited by Defendant Javier Chapa (“Chapa”) and his business, Chapa Global Contracting, Inc. (“Chapa Global”), to perform seed corn processing in Dewitt, Iowa, for Defendant Remington Seeds, LLC (“Remington”). (Id., ¶¶ 1, 55.) The Chapa Defendants performed these recruiting services pursuant to a contract with Remington in which Remington specified the number of workers Chapa was to hire. (Id., ¶¶ 75–76, 94.) With two exceptions, each Plaintiff worked in Iowa from approximately August to September each year from 2020 to 2024. (Id., ¶¶ 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44.) The exceptions were Plaintiff Luis Acuna, who worked in Iowa from approximately August to September each year from 2020 to 2023, and Plaintiff Manuel Ozuna Chavez, who worked in Iowa from approximately August to September in 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2024. (Id., ¶¶ 29, 32.) Plaintiffs' work included seed corn sorting, processing, and weeding. (Id., ¶¶ 146–47.)

Plaintiffs allege that each of Chapa, Chapa Global, and Remington were their “employers” for purposes of the Migrant and Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”) and Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). (Id., ¶¶ 49–50, 56–57, 77–78.) Plaintiffs were paid for their work by the Chapa Defendants (id., ¶¶ 150–52), but Remington had the power to fire them, controlled the hours they worked, maintained employment records for them, set the rate and method of their pay, and maintained worker's compensation insurance for them (id., ¶¶ 65–68). Remington also owned and controlled the facility where Plaintiffs worked, provided equipment for them to use, and set minimum expectations for how their work would be performed. (Id., ¶¶ 69–73.)

During the same years (2020 through 2024) that Plaintiffs performed work for Remington in Dewitt, Iowa, the Chapa Defendants separately provided workers to Remington for facilities in Iowa and Nebraska through the H-2A visa program. (Id., ¶¶ 153–54; ECF 25-1.) The H-2A program provides temporary work visas to people from foreign countries to allow them to work in agriculture in the United States for up to ten months per year. (ECF 25, ¶¶ 153–54.) To participate in the H-2A program, agricultural employers and their labor contractors must follow strict federal regulations designed to ensure that American workers are genuinely unavailable and that hiring H-2A workers will not lower wages or working conditions for American workers. (Id., ¶ 155.) H-2A employers must provide workers with free housing and transportation from their permanent residence to and from the job site. (Id., ¶ 156.) They also must pay a wage rate approved by the United States Department of Labor, among other requirements. (Id., ¶ 158.)

To obtain H-2A employees, employers must submit a “job order” to the Department of Labor for approval. (Id., ¶ 162.) The job order contains the terms and conditions of employment for the H-2A workers, as well as U.S. workers in “corresponding employment.” (Id.) The job order forms the work contract between the employer and those workers. (Id., ¶¶ 162–63.) Plaintiffs attached what they characterize as the “relevant job orders” to their Amended Complaint. (ECF 35, p. 4; ECF 25-1.) These job orders include the following:

• Job order for detasseling corn at Remington worksites in Eldrige and Walcott, Iowa, from June 28, 2021, to August 6, 2021 (ECF 25-1, pp. 1– 14);

• Job order for detasseling corn at Remington worksites in Eldridge and Walcott, Iowa, from June 27, 2022, to August 5, 2022 (id., pp. 15–26);

• Job order for rogueing, detasseling, seed corn sorting, flowers, and hand weeding at Remington worksites in numerous Iowa cities (including Eldridge, Long Grove, Davenport, Donahue, Dixon, Walcott, Stockton, and Durant) from July 3, 2023, to August 5, 2023 (id., pp. 27–45);

• Job order for rogueing, detasseling, seed corn sorting, flowers, and hand weeding at facilities owned by three different companies (Syngenta Seeds, CORTEVA, and Remington) in Iowa and Illinois, including Remington facilities in Wilton, Eldridge, Walcott, Durant, Davenport, Farmington, and Donahue, Iowa from June 24, 2024, to August 10, 2024 (id., pp. 46–80);

• Job order for sorting corn harvesting and maintaining work area at a Remington worksite in Hastings, Nebraska, from August 24, 2022, to October 4, 2022 (id., pp. 81–92);

• Job order for sorting harvested corn at a Remington facility in Inland, Nebraska, from August 28, 2023, to October 10, 2023 (id., pp. 93–105);

• Job order for sorting harvested corn at a Remington facility in Inland, Nebraska, from August 28, 2024, to October 11, 2024 (id., pp. 106–18);

• Job order for processing, bagging, rebagging, and repacking harvested seed corn at a Remington facility in Inland, Nebraska, from August 8, 2023, to February 2, 2024 (id., pp. 119–31); and

• Job order for processing, bagging, rebagging, and repacking harvested seed corn at a Remington facility in Inland, Nebraska, from August 17, 2024, to February 28, 2025 (id., pp. 132–44).

There is no job order for the facility in Dewitt, Iowa, where Plaintiffs worked. (ECF 25-1.)

Plaintiffs allege that the Chapa Defendants provided H-2A workers for Remington in accordance with these work orders. (ECF 25, ¶¶ 165–67.) The H-2A job orders included an obligation to pay “adverse effect wage rates” (“AEWRs”) as determined by the Department of Labor. (Id. ¶¶ 169–70.) The Department of Labor establishes AEWRs on a state-by-state basis each year, with rates in Nebraska ranging from $16.47 per hour in 2022 to $19.21 per hour in 2025. (Id., ¶¶ 169, 171–74.)

Plaintiffs are not H-2A workers, nor did they work at the same facilities as the H-2A workers provided by the Chapa Defendants to Remington. (Id., ¶¶ 145, 202; ECF 25-1.) Plaintiffs allege, however, that they were in “corresponding employment” with those H-2A workers between August and October 2022, 2023, and 2024 because Plaintiffs performed the same kind of work as those workers at Remington-owned facilities. (Id., ¶ 175.) Plaintiffs therefore allege that they were entitled to the same terms of employment as the H-2A workers, including: (a) being paid at least the AEWR for each hour worked; (b) receiving a premium based on the same AEWR for overtime hours; (c) free housing; (d) free transportation to and from the worksite; and (e) a copy of the work contract. (Id., ¶¶ 180–81.) Defendants did not provide these terms of employment to Plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 182.) Instead, the Chapa Defendants paid below-AEWR rates to Plaintiffs of $13 to $14.25 per hour for the first forty hours each week and $19.50 to $21.37 for overtime hours. (Id., ¶¶ 150–52.) The Chapa Defendants also did not provide free housing or transportation to Plaintiffs. (Id., ¶¶ 140–43.)

In addition to claims arising out of what they characterize as “corresponding employment,” Plaintiffs bring claims against Defendants in connection with work opportunities at one or more Remington facilities in Nebraska from the months of October through February. Each year from 2020 to 2024, Remington contracted with the Chapa Defendants to recruit U.S. and H-2A workers for detasseling and seed corn processing operations during those months. (Id., ¶ 183.) Chapa did not, however, tell Plaintiffs about these jobs in 2020, 2021, or 2022. (Id., ¶ 185.) When Plaintiffs learned about the jobs in late 2023, they expressed their interest to Chapa. (Id., ¶¶ 186–90.) They intended their expressions of interest to be job applications. (Id., ¶¶ 191–94.) Chapa told them he could not hire them to work for Remington in Nebraska because H-2A workers had hiring preference. (Id., ¶¶ 195–96.) Plaintiffs allege that this was not true, and that they could have been hired to perform work on the job orders in Nebraska because they are U.S. workers available and qualified to perform the work. (Id., ¶¶ 196–204.)

According to Plaintiffs, Chapa intended to deceive them into believing that he could not hire them for the work in Nebraska. (Id., ¶ 205.) They reasonably relied on his misrepresentations in choosing not to pursue employment with Defendants in Nebraska in 2023 or 2024. (Id., ¶ 206–08.) Plaintiffs instead returned home to Texas in late September or early October of 2023 and 2024 even though the Chapa Defendants had H-2A work available until February. (Id., ¶ 210.) This caused Plaintiffs to have diminished earnings. (Id., ¶ 211.)

B. Procedural History.

Plaintiffs assert five causes of action against all Defendants: Cause of Action 1, Violations of the AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.; Cause of Action 2, Breach of Contract; Cause of Action 3, Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA; Cause of Action 4, Unpaid Wages under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law, Iowa Code Chapter 91A (“IWPCL”); and Cause of Action 5, Fraudulent Misrepresentation. The Chapa Defendants move to dismiss all five pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the causes of action fail because Plaintiffs are not protected by H-2A laws and regulations. (ECF 28.) Remington moves to dismiss on the same basis, as well as based on separate arguments revolving largely around the fact that Remington is a separate entity from Chapa Global. (ECF 29.) Remington argues that only the Chapa Defendants can be held liable for any failure to comply with the AWPA or other relevant wage protection laws. (Id.) Remington and the Chapa Defendants also raise various other arguments for dismissal.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ․ to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Rydholm v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 44 F.4th 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a ‘sheer possibility.’ ” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In determining plausibility, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Richter, 686 F.3d at 850. The Court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions, however, and “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” United States ex rel. Ambrosecchia v. Paddock Lab'ys, LLC, 855 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

“Though ‘matters outside the pleadings’ may not be considered in deciding a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters outside the pleading.” Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004)). “In general, materials embraced by the complaint include ‘documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleadings.’ ” Id. (quoting Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012)).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS.2

A. Plaintiffs' Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Insofar as They Rest on the Theory that Plaintiffs Engaged in “Corresponding Employment” Under the H-2A Visa Program.

1. Overview of the H-2A Visa Program and the AWPA.

This case revolves in part around the H-2A visa program, which arises under two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”): 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) and 1188. The H-2A program allows employers to hire foreign workers to perform temporary agricultural work when there are insufficient domestic workers available. See Overdevest Nurseries, L.P. v. Walsh, 2 F.4th 977, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2021). As relevant here, the applicable laws and regulations have three goals: (i) ensuring an adequate supply of labor to perform agricultural work, including through the employment of foreign workers if necessary; (ii) protecting H-2A workers by setting minimum wage and benefit requirements; and (iii) protecting domestic workers from the risk that employers will “underpay[ ] foreign workers and thereby depress[ ] wages for similarly-employed American workers.” Id. at 981.

To obtain permission to use H-2A workers, an employer must submit an Application for Temporary Employment Certification to the Secretary of Labor. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.100 et seq. The employer must, among other things, certify the following:

(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in the petition, and

(B) the employment of the alien in such labor or services will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1). The employer also must submit a job order identifying the jobsite[s] (i.e., the “place[s] of employment”) where the work will be performed. 20 C.F.R. § 655.130(a)(3). Subject to narrow exceptions, these sites “must be within a single area of intended employment.” Id. § 655.130(e)(1).

Federal regulations establish the minimum wage that must be paid to H-2A workers, as well as mandating other benefits like free housing, meals, and transportation. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.120(a)–(d), 655.122(a)–(m). To help protect domestic workers, the employers “must offer to U.S. workers no less than the same benefits, wages, and working conditions that the employer is offering, intends to offer, or will provide to H-2A workers.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(a). The wages and other benefits must be provided to U.S. workers not just at the specific jobsite identified in the job order, but also at locations where “corresponding employment” occurs. Overdevest Nurseries, L.P., 2 F.4th at 980–81. The definition of “corresponding employment” is found in 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b):

Corresponding employment. The employment of workers who are not H-2A workers by an employer who has an approved Application for Temporary Employment Certification in any work included in the job order, or in any agricultural work performed by the H-2A workers. To qualify as corresponding employment, the work must be performed during the validity period of the job order, including an approved extension thereof.

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs here are not H-2A workers, nor did they perform work at a site that is expressly part of an H-2A job order. Instead, some of Plaintiffs' causes of action rest on the premise that they performed “corresponding employment” to H-2A job orders when they worked at a Remington facility in Dewitt, Iowa, between August and October of each relevant year. Plaintiffs argue that this was “corresponding employment” to work performed by H-2A workers pursuant to job orders for Remington facilities in Nebraska during the same months. The merits of this argument will be addressed in the next subsection.

Before getting there, though, it is necessary to mention the AWPA, which is designed to “assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, agricultural associations, and agricultural employers.” 29 U.S.C. § 1801. The AWPA states, in relevant part, that “[n]o farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or agricultural association shall, without justification, violate the terms of any working arrangement made by that contractor, employer, or association with any migrant agricultural worker.” Id. § 1822(c). H-2A workers are excluded from the protections of the AWPA, see id. §§ 1802(8)(B), (10)(B), and thus in most respects there is no overlap between the two laws. There is an exception, however, when U.S. workers perform work that is governed by an H-2A job order. In that scenario, the terms of the H-2A job order are the “terms of any working arrangement” under the AWPA. For this reason, among others, Plaintiffs' claims arise under the AWPA even though they revolve around H-2A job orders.

The parties agree that the relevant job orders here are the ones obtained by the Chapa Defendants for Remington facilities in Inland and Hastings, Nebraska, for the months of August through October 2022, 2023, and 2024. (ECF 25-1, pp. 81–118.) Plaintiffs assert that these Nebraska job orders involved the same agricultural work that Plaintiffs were performing at the Remington facility in Dewitt, Iowa, during the same months. Plaintiffs therefore assert that they were entitled under the AWPA to the same terms and conditions of employment for their work in Iowa that the H-2A workers received under the job orders in Nebraska.³ Defendants, by contrast, argue that the work in Dewitt is not “corresponding employment” to the work in Nebraska because the facilities are over 450 miles apart. Because this is a threshold issue that affects the viability of many (but not all) aspects of Plaintiffs' claims, the Court will address it first.

2. The Work Plaintiffs Performed in Iowa Is Not “Corresponding Employment” to the Work in Nebraska for Which Defendants Had H-2A Job Orders.

After careful review of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions relating to the H-2A visa program, the Court concludes that the work Plaintiffs performed at the Remington facility in Dewitt, Iowa, is not “corresponding employment” to the work performed by H-2A workers at Remington facilities in Hastings and Inland, Nebraska. It follows that Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law insofar as they are premised on a “corresponding employment” theory.

This conclusion emanates from the statutory text and purpose of the H-2A visa program. The purpose of the program is to allow employers to “temporarily hire foreign workers ‘when there are not enough qualified and available American workers to fill open jobs.’ ” Overdevest Nurseries, L.P., 2 F.4th at 980 (quoting Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). To achieve that purpose, the law requires an employer who wishes to participate in the H-2A program to certify, inter alia, that “there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in the petition.” 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). By including the words “at the time and place needed” in the statute, Congress unequivocally established that geographic proximity is relevant. Meaning: U.S. workers must be performing work in the same vicinity as the H-2A workers in order to be engaged in “corresponding employment.”

It is easy to understand why Congress chose to make geographic proximity part of the H-2A program. The number of available domestic workers may vary significantly depending on where the jobsite is. Accordingly, employers may be able to fill open positions entirely through domestic workers in some areas while needing to rely on the H-2A program in others. It would be inconsistent with the text and purpose of § 1188(a)(1)(A) to require an employer to provide H-2A wages and benefits everywhere the employer has operations simply because the employer needs H-2A workers in one discrete region.

Surrounding regulations reinforce the point. 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(a) is an “[o]verview” of the H-2A program that reiterates that an employer may bring foreign workers to the United States to perform agricultural work only if “there are not sufficient U.S. workers able, willing, and qualified to perform the work in the area of intended employment at the time needed ․” (emphasis added). The words “area of intended employment” are designed, in context, to carry out Congress's directive that H-2A workers may be hired only if there is a shortage of domestic workers “at the time and place needed” by the employer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A). To that end, the phrase “area of intended employment” is defined later in the regulation as follows:

The geographic area within normal commuting distance of the place of employment for which temporary agricultural labor certification is sought. There is no rigid measure of distance that constitutes a normal commuting distance or normal commuting area, because there may be widely varying factual circumstances among different areas (e.g., average commuting times, barriers to reaching the place of employment, or quality of the regional transportation network). If a place of employment is within a[ Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”)], including a multistate MSA, any place within the MSA is deemed to be within normal commuting distance of the place of employment. The borders of MSAs are not controlling in the identification of the normal commuting area; a place of employment outside of an MSA may be within normal commuting distance of a place of employment that is inside (e.g., near the border of) the MSA.

Id. § 655.103(b). The regulation essentially uses “normal commuting distance” as a proxy for determining whether work is being performed “at the time and place needed” by the employer for purposes of § 1188(a)(1)(A).

Here, Dewitt, Iowa, is more than 450 miles away from each of Hastings and Inland, Nebraska. See Ryno v. City of Waynesville, 58 F.4th 995, 1001 n.2 (8th Cir. 2023) (recognizing that courts may take judicial notice of the distance between two places). This is not within “normal commuting distance,” nor is there any other reasonable interpretation of the words “at the time and place needed” that would allow the Court to conclude that Dewitt is the same “place” as Hastings and Inland for purposes of § 1188(a)(1)(A). It follows that Plaintiffs' claims fail insofar as they rest on the premise that their work in Iowa was “corresponding employment” to the work performed on job orders in Nebraska.

In arguing otherwise, Plaintiffs emphasize that the definition of “corresponding employment” in 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b) does not contain any geographic limitation. The problem with this argument is that it reads the definition in a vacuum, divorced of the surrounding statutory and regulatory context. This is not how statutes and regulations are to be interpreted. “It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). When the definition of “corresponding employment” is interpreted in light of (a) the congressional directive to allow employers to hire H-2A workers only when there are insufficient domestic workers “at the time and place needed” and (b) the regulatory directive to consider the “area of intended employment” when implementing the H-2A program, it is clear that there is a geographical component to “corresponding employment.” Which is to say, the site of the “corresponding employment” must be within “normal commuting distance” of the H-2A jobsite.

Any other outcome would cast doubt on the lawfulness of the Department of Labor regulation defining “corresponding employment.” It is well established that an agency cannot implement a regulation that is inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the governing statute. See, e.g., United States v. J & K Market Centerville, LLC, 679 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 2012). Nor, in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), do courts defer to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutes. Here, Plaintiffs' position is essentially that when the Department of Labor defined “corresponding employment” in 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b), it took a statue designed to ensure the availability of labor “at the time and place needed” and turned it into a regulation setting minimum wage and benefit requirements on jobsites hundreds of miles away in totally different markets. Because this is far more power than Congress appears to have delegated, it is not a tenable interpretation of the phrase “corresponding employment.” See Nw. Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Serv. Corp., 687 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[I]t is well settled that courts are obligated to interpret a statute in a manner which avoids potential constitutional infirmities. The same principle applies equally to administrative regulations.” (internal citations omitted)).

The case cited by Plaintiffs does not counsel otherwise. In Bazan v. Coleman Industries, Inc., No. 6:19-cv-01823, 2021 WL 4498645, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 462414 (D. Or. Feb. 15, 2022), the employer had multiple farms in the Willamette Valley in Oregon, some of which were subject to H-2A job orders and others not. The employer allegedly had H-2A workers perform work on a non-H-2A site but refused to pay the U.S. workers at that site the H-2A level of wages. Id. at *3. The disputed issue in Bazan was not the geographic proximity of the two sites, but rather whether the entity that owned the non-H-2A site was the alter ego of the entity that owned the H-2A sites. See id. at *7. Accordingly, to the extent Bazan provides any guidance here, it simply confirms the unremarkable proposition that the definition of “corresponding employment” is broad enough to capture multiple sites within a discrete region of a single state where H-2A workers and domestic workers perform the same tasks. This does not mean that sites more than 450 miles apart from one another in different states are also “corresponding employment.” The definition of the phrase is simply not that broad.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs' work in Dewitt, Iowa, is not “corresponding employment” to the work performed by H-2A workers in Hastings and Inland, Nebraska. The ensuing sections will explain how this impacts each of Plaintiffs' five causes of action.

B. Cause of Action 1 Will Be Dismissed in Part as to Both Remington and the Chapa Defendants.

Cause of Action 1 alleges six theories for how Defendants violated the AWPA: (i) failing to provide information about H-2A job opportunities in Nebraska (ECF 25, ¶¶ 184–85, 214); (ii) failing to hire Plaintiffs for the H-2A jobs in Nebraska (id., ¶¶ 190–209, 214); (iii) unlawfully deducting housing and transportation expenses and failing to pay for time spent traveling between housing and the jobsite (id., ¶ 215); (iv) failing to pay the same level of wages that were being paid to H-2A workers (id., ¶¶ 216–18); (v) failing to provide acceptable housing (id., ¶ 219); and (vi) failing to comply with recordkeeping and disclosure requirements (id., ¶¶ 220–22). The parties' briefing on these theories was hard to follow, but the Court will do its best in this section to flesh out and address the parties' arguments.

1. The Chapa Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part as to Cause of Action 1.

The Court will start with the easy part: Plaintiffs' third and fourth theories on Cause of Action 1 fail as a matter of law as against the Chapa Defendants due to the failure of Plaintiffs' “corresponding employment” argument. Plaintiffs have not identified any provision of the AWPA that independently requires employers to pay wages or provide benefits in accordance with H-2A job orders. Instead, those two theories rest on the premise that the H-2A job orders were the “terms of [the] working arrangement” for purposes of the AWPA. 29 U.S.C. § 1822(c). Because this premise rests on the legally untenable premise that Plaintiffs were engaged in “corresponding employment,” the second and third theories under Cause of Action 1 fail as a matter of law.

One of Plaintiffs' remaining theories in Cause of Action 1 is that the Chapa Defendants violated federal law by failing to hire them for H-2A job opportunities in Nebraska. This theory emanates from 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3), which requires H-2A employers to “accept and hire all [U.S.] applicants who are qualified and who will be available for the job opportunity.” The Chapa Defendants argue, among other things, that the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege that Plaintiffs were qualified to perform the work identified in the relevant job order. Specifically, the Chapa Defendants argue that Plaintiffs merely alleged they could lift seventy-five pounds (ECF 25, ¶ 203) even though the job order requires the ability to lift seventy pounds “to shoulder height repetitively throughout the workday” and “two months prior work experience bagging and repacking corn, including using forklifts.” (ECF 28-1, p. 13.)

This argument overstates Plaintiffs' pleading burden. The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs could lift seventy-five pounds, had sufficient experience to meet the hiring criteria, and were available and qualified to perform the work. (ECF 25, ¶¶ 202–04.) This is enough to state a plausible claim against the Chapa Defendants for violating 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3). Accordingly, the Chapa Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be denied as it relates to the portion of Cause of Action 1 alleging a violation of 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3).

With some hesitation, the Court also will allow Cause of Action 1 to proceed against the Chapa Defendants insofar as it alleges that Chapa provided false and misleading information about job opportunities. This part of Plaintiffs' theory arises under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(f), which prohibits employers from providing “false or misleading information to any migrant agricultural worker concerning the terms, conditions, or existence of agricultural employment required to be disclosed by subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).” Here, the allegedly false statement involved Plaintiffs' eligibility to work at the sites identified in H-2A job orders for Remington facilities in Nebraska. It is unclear why these job opportunities would have been the subject of required disclosures under § 1821(a) through (d), but the Chapa Defendants did not raise that issue in their Motion to Dismiss. For this reason—and since other aspects of Cause of Action 1 are moving forward anyway—the Chapa Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be denied as it relates to Plaintiffs' false statements theory under § 1821(f).

The next theory under Cause of Action 1 is that the Chapa Defendants failed to provide suitable housing in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 1823(a), which states that “each person who owns or controls a facility or real property which is used as housing for migrant agricultural workers shall be responsible for ensuring that the facility or real property complies with substantive Federal and State safety and health standards applicable to that housing.” (ECF 25, ¶ 219(a).) Plaintiffs also allege that the Chapa Defendants did not obtain and post a certificate from an appropriate housing authority that the housing complied with governing health and safety standards, as required under § 1823(b)(1), and did not post or present to Plaintiffs a statement of the terms and conditions of occupancy, as required under § 1821(c). (Id., ¶¶ 219(b)–(c).)

The Chapa Defendants did not address these aspects of Cause of Action 1, and thus their Motion to Dismiss will be denied as to the allegations in Paragraphs 219(a), (b), and (c) of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs may continue to pursue their claims against the Chapa Defendants for violating the housing-related requirements in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c) and 1823. But see Renteria-Marin v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., 537 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that agricultural producer did not “control” the hotel where agricultural workers resided and thus could not be liable for violations of § 1823(a) or (b)(1), although liability could exist under § 1821(c)).

Plaintiffs' final theory in Cause of Action 1 is that the Chapa Defendants violated housing-related recordkeeping and disclosure requirements in the following ways: (i) failing to disclose, in writing, “the transportation, housing, and any other employee benefit to be provided, if any, and any costs to be charged for each of them,” 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(5); (ii) failing to maintain records showing “the specific sums withheld” from wages for inbound travel expenses and housing, id. § 1821(d)(1)(E); and (iii) failing to provide Plaintiffs with an “itemized written statement” of the sums withheld for inbound travel and housing, id. § 1821(d)(2). (ECF 25, ¶¶ 220–22.) Again, the Chapa Defendants did not address these aspects of Cause of Action 1, and thus their Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED as to the allegations in Paragraphs 220 through 222 of the Amended Complaint.

In sum, Cause of Action 1 will move forward against the Chapa Defendants for alleged violations of the following statutes and regulations: 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a), (c), (d), and (f); and 29 U.S.C. § 1823. In all other respects, the Chapa Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED as to Cause of Action 1.

2. Remington's Motion to Dismiss Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part as to Cause of Action 1.

Like the Chapa Defendants, Remington is entitled to dismissal of the aspects of Cause of Action 1 alleging that Plaintiffs were entitled to the level of wages and benefits set forth in the H-2A job orders. Because Plaintiffs were not in “corresponding employment” with those job orders, the job orders are not “terms of [the] working arrangement” for purposes of the AWPA.

On the remaining theories in Cause of Action 1, Remington argues, as a threshold matter, that it is not an “agricultural employer” as that term is used in the AWPA, see, e.g., § 1821(a), and thus is per se not liable under any theory. (ECF 29-1, pp. 6–7.) This argument is unpersuasive. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) adopts the definition of “employer” from the FLSA, which focuses largely on control. See generally id. § 500.20(5)(iv) (listing factors). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Remington exercised substantial control over the employment relationship, including alleging that Remington had the power to fire them, controlled the hours they worked, maintained employment records for them, set the rate and method of pay, and maintained worker's compensation insurance. (ECF 25, ¶¶ 65–68.) Remington also owned and controlled the facility where Plaintiffs worked, provided equipment for them to use, and set minimum expectations for how their work would be performed. (Id., ¶¶ 69–73.) In similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit held that Remington was the “joint employer” of agricultural workers even though those workers were recruited and paid by a third-party. See Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 405–09 (7th Cir. 2007).

Granted, under the Seventh Circuit's logic, the “joint employment” relationship only extends to the areas where Remington is alleged to have exercised control. See id. (holding that Remington was responsible “for events that occurred in the fields under its management or in its offices” but not with respect to housing). Accordingly, the Court must carefully analyze each part of Cause of Action 1 to determine whether it is viable as against Remington.

The analysis starts with Plaintiffs' theory that Remington violated the requirements of the H-2A program and the AWPA by failing to provide accurate information about and/or hire them for the H-2A opportunity in Nebraska. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1821(f). This theory revolves around Chapa's alleged statements to Plaintiffs during the cookout in late 2023 about Plaintiffs not being eligible to work at the Remington facility in Nebraska where H-2A work was being performed.

Plaintiffs have done enough to plausibly allege that Chapa served as Remington's agent at the time of his statements. Specifically, they allege that Remington hired Chapa to find workers over whom Remington would exercise significant control at facilities that Remington owned. This is enough to survive a motion to dismiss on a joint employment or agency theory. See, e.g., Padilla v. Caliper Bldg. Sys., LLC, No. 20-cv-00658, 2020 WL 5629837, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2020) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged “plausible, non-conclusory allegations related to [defendant's] supervision and control over [plaintiff's] working conditions and [defendant's] maintenance of employment records”). Accordingly, Remington's Motion to Dismiss will be denied as it relates to alleged violations of 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3) and 29 U.S.C. § 1821(f) in Cause of Action 1.

The remaining theories under Cause of Action 1 relate to housing, including allegations relating to the failure to provide suitable housing as required by 29 U.S.C. § 1823(a), the failure to post a certificate from a housing authority in accordance § 1823(b)(1), and the failure to satisfy recordkeeping and disclosure requirements as required by § 1821(a) and (d). These theories relate to Plaintiffs' work in Dewitt, Iowa, not the erstwhile H-2A opportunities in Nebraska. To the extent these theories are asserted against Remington at all, which is somewhat unclear, they are relatively weak given that the Amended Complaint largely admits the Chapa Defendants controlled the housing arrangements. See Reyes, 495 F.3d at 410 (affirming dismissal of housing-related claims against Remington based on lack of control). Even so, the Amended Complaint does enough to plausibly allege an agency relationship between Remington and the Chapa Defendants to allow the housing-related theories to survive for now.

For these reasons, Cause of Action 1 will move forward against Remington for alleged violations of the following statutes and regulations: 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a), (c), (d), and (f); and 29 U.S.C. § 1823. In all other respects, Remington's Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED as to Cause of Action 1.

C. Cause of Action 2 Will Be Dismissed in its Entirety as Against All Defendants.

Cause of Action 2, which alleges breach of contract, fails as a matter of law in its entirety. Plaintiffs' theory in Cause of Action 2 is that “the terms of Defendants' job orders constitute their ‘work contract’ as a matter of law.” (ECF 33, p. 7 (citing ECF 25-1, ¶¶ 162–63).) Because this theory rests on the incorrect premise that Plaintiffs were engaged in “corresponding employment,” there is nothing left of their breach of contract claim against any Defendant. Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss will be GRANTED as to Cause of Action 2.

D. Cause of Action 3 Will Be Dismissed in Part as to All Defendants.

Some parts of Cause of Action 3 fail as a matter of law due to the failure of Plaintiffs' “corresponding employment” argument. For example, Plaintiffs cannot recover under their FLSA theory that Defendants were required to pay the same regular and overtime rates of pay as the H-2A workers received in Nebraska. (ECF 25, ¶¶ 245–46.) Similarly, Plaintiffs cannot recover under the FLSA insofar as Cause of Action 3 revolves around the failure to provide free housing and transportation, as Defendants have no independent obligation under the FLSA to provide such benefits.

Plaintiffs argue, however, that Cause of Action 3 is also freestanding in the sense that the FLSA requires the payment of wages “free and clear” except in certain circumstances. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the “free and clear” requirement by withholding (or “kicking back”) expenses for transportation and housing. (Id., ¶ 242.) See 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.27, 531.35. The Chapa Defendants do not address this theory, and thus their Motion to Dismiss will be denied insofar as Plaintiffs are claiming violations of the FLSA's “free and clear” requirement. Remington also does not appear to have addressed this issue head-on, instead limiting their discussion of “deductions” to the separate issue of overtime pay. (ECF 29-1, pp. 12–13.) Thus, the Court will deny Remington's Motion to Dismiss on this aspect of Cause of Action 3, as well.

In sum, Plaintiffs will be allowed to pursue Cause of Action 3 as it relates to alleged violations of the “free and clear” requirement of the FLSA in connection with housing and transportation kickbacks. In all other respects, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED as to Cause of Action 3.

E. Cause of Action 4 Will Be Dismissed in Part as to All Defendants.

Cause of Action 4 alleges violations of the IWPCL, Iowa Code Chapter 91A. Like Cause of Action 3, parts of Cause of Action 4 fail as a matter of law due to the failure of the “corresponding employment” argument, including the portion of the IWPCL claim that is premised on Defendants being obligated to pay the same level of wages and benefits to Plaintiffs as they did to H-2A workers. Because Defendants were not obligated to do so, they cannot be liable on this theory under the IWPCL.

Plaintiffs also, however, assert a different theory under the IWPCL, which is that they must be compensated for travel time when they are required to use employer-provided transportation. (ECF 25, ¶¶ 249(b), 250; ECF 35, pp. 14–15.) See Iowa Code § 91A.13. Neither the Chapa Defendants nor Remington addressed this issue, and thus the Court will allow Cause of Action 4 to proceed against all Defendants on this narrow issue.

F. Cause of Action 5 Will Not Be Dismissed.

Plaintiffs' final claim, Cause of Action 5, is for fraudulent misrepresentation based on Chapa telling Plaintiffs at a cookout in late 2023 that they could not be hired for work in Nebraska from October to February due to H-2A workers having preference. (ECF 25, ¶¶ 186, 195–96, 253–266.) The Chapa Defendants did not directly address this claim in their Motion to Dismiss, and thus Cause of Action 5 will be allowed to proceed against them.

For their part, Remington argues that Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts as to Cause of Action 5 to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements for fraud. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Court disagrees. “To satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), the complaint must plead such facts as the time, place, and content of the defendant's false representations, as well as the details of the defendant's fraudulent acts, including when the acts occurred, who engaged in them, and what was obtained as a result.” U.S. ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiffs provided sufficient facts to establish the who (Chapa), what (false claims about Plaintiffs being ineligible for employment on the H-2A project in Nebraska), when (the end of the 2023 season), and where (a cookout at the jobsite in Dewitt) of the allegedly false statements, as well as the end result (Remington used H-2A workers instead of Plaintiffs and other U.S. workers). This is enough to survive a motion to dismiss. See Moeller v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 3d 978, 987 (S.D. Iowa 2022) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff “sufficiently alleged the ‘who, what, when, where and how’ of her [fraud] claim”). Moreover, as noted above, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged an agency relationship between Remington and Chapa given that Remington hired Chapa to recruit workers over whom Remington ended up exercising extensive control. See Padilla, 2020 WL 5629837, at *4. It is plausible to conclude that Chapa's statements were made within the scope of this agency relationship.

G. The Chapa Defendants' Statute of Limitations Argument Is Not Sufficiently Developed to Give Rise to a Meaningful Ruling Except in One Narrow Respect.

The Chapa Defendants' final argument is that “[s]ome or all of Plaintiffs' claims, even if they had any merit, are time-barred.” (ECF 28-1, p. 17.) They argue that the governing limitations period is two years on the state law wage claims under Iowa Code Chapter 91A and federal law H-2A and FLSA claims. (Id., pp. 17–18.) They further argue that the Court should “borrow” the same two-year limitations period for the AWPA claims. (Id.) Plaintiffs, for their part, appear to concede that the state law claims under the IWPCL are subject to a two-year limitations period but argue that they have done enough to plead willfulness to trigger the three-year statute on their FLSA claims. (ECF 35, pp. 24–25.) They further argue that the AWPA claims are governed by the ten-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract claims. (Id.)

Given the way this ruling has sliced up Plaintiffs' surviving Causes of Action, the Court for the most part cannot issue a meaningful ruling on the statute of limitations issues. For example, Plaintiffs' argument about applying the ten-year statute of limitations to the AWPA claims might have been compelling if their “corresponding employment” argument had been successful and the job orders were being treated as the “terms of [the] working arrangement” under the AWPA. As it is, however, the AWPA claims have been hollowed out to the point where only housing-related and false information theories remain. The statute of limitations for breach of contract claims does not seem like a good fit for those theories. The parties have not, however, thoroughly briefed what the appropriate alternative is. Accordingly, the Court will not definitively rule on the governing statute of limitations on the AWPA claims. Within reason, Plaintiffs may pursue discovery on their AWPA claims dating back to 2020. The same is true for their claims arising out of alleged violations of 29 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3).

As to the FLSA, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law on the existing record that the two-year limitations period applies, rather than the three-year period for willful violations. Accordingly—and because the parties will already be taking discovery back to 2020 anyway—the Court will not rule one way or the other on whether the two-year or three-year statute applies.

Finally, because Plaintiffs appear to concede that the IWPCL claims are subject to the two-year limitations period, the Court will hold as a matter of law that Plaintiffs may recover on IWPCL only for the two-year period predating the filing of their original Complaint.

V. CONCLUSION.

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (ECF 28; ECF 29.) The following claims and theories will move forward against all Defendants:

• Cause of Action 1 insofar as it alleges violations of 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a), (c), (d), and (f); and 29 U.S.C. § 1823;

• Cause of Action 3 insofar as it alleges violations of the FLSA “free and clear” requirement in connection with housing and transportation kick-backs;

• Cause of Action 4 insofar as it alleges failure to compensate Plaintiffs for travel time when required to use employer-provided transportation; and

• Cause of Action 5 in its entirety.

In all other respects, Plaintiffs' claims and theories are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE based on their repeated failure to assert viable theories.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

3.   The Amended Complaint also attaches two other categories of job orders. The first category consists of job orders for detasseling corn and similar tasks at Remington worksites in Iowa from June through August 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024. (ECF 25-1, pp. 1–80.) Plaintiffs do not claim to have been performing “corresponding employment” during these months, nor do they otherwise assert AWPA or FLSA violations in connection with this category of job orders.The second category consists of job orders obtained by the Chapa Defendants for Remington facilities in Inland, Nebraska, from August through February 2023, 2024, and 2025. (Id., pp. 119–44.) Plaintiffs allege that they were entitled under the AWPA to be hired for this work because, as qualified domestic workers, Defendants were obligated to make the work available to them before using H-2A workers. This theory will be addressed in a later section.

STEPHEN H. LOCHER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE