PIATZ v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (2023)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

The jury returned a verdict awarding considerably less in damages to Plaintiff Alaina Piatz than she had requested for injuries arising out of a serious car accident. She moves for a new trial, arguing the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Because the Court finds the verdict effected substantial justice between the parties, it DENIES Piatz's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Piatz's Accident, Surgeries, and Physical Condition.

Piatz suffered serious injuries to her neck and back in an accident on May 4, 2019, while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Alexander Mann. (ECF 1-2, ¶¶ 4–5.) It is undisputed that Mann caused the accident, and Piatz reached a settlement with him, presumably at the limits of his insurance coverage. (Id., ¶ 16.) Piatz brought this case against her insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (“State Farm”), for coverage under an underinsured motorist clause. (Id., ¶ 19). Liability was stipulated, and thus trial revolved entirely around damages. (Tr., p. 87; ECF 44, p. 22.)¹

On May 5, 2019, Dr. Andrew Pugely performed surgery on Piatz to repair a C7 fracture she sustained in the accident. (ECF 72-3, p. 7.) Within six weeks of surgery, Piatz said her pain was well controlled, she had returned to a part time job at a bowling alley, and she did not require physical therapy. (Tr., pp. 145–47.) Within twelve weeks, Piatz, an avid horseback rider, had resumed this hobby—albeit while wearing a neck collar—and no longer needed pain medication. (Id., pp. 147–49.) Within six months, Piatz had “returned to all of [her] normal activities,” subject to a permanent restriction from “lifting over 50 pounds repetitively.” (Id., p. 155; ECF 70-3.) She was a member of her school's bowling team (bowling at least three times per week), rode horses without a collar, and was no longer reporting any neck pain. (Id., pp. 149–51, 154.)

As of March 6, 2020, Piatz was officially cleared by an associate of Dr. Pugely, Jonathan Rueter, to “lift over her head and from the ground” and run, jump, and carry items on her back. (Tr., pp. 155; ECF 70-3.) According to medical records, Piatz had “no problems with disc below surgical area at this time” and “[a]nother surgery is not warranted at this time,” although Piatz could be “[m]ore prone to adjacent level arthritis years from the surgical date” (Tr., pp. 155–56; ECF 70-3). By Fall 2020, Piatz's role at the bowling alley had evolved to working in the attached bar and banquet hall as well as the bowling alley. (Tr., p. 159.) Her duties included fixing bowling lanes if pins got stuck; cooking; serving food; and cleaning, including stacking chairs, sweeping, mopping, vacuuming, and taking out the garbage. (Id., pp. 160–62.) Piatz also completed a six-week phlebotomy course. (Id., pp. 167–68.) At the time of trial, she was working part time as a phlebotomist at a hospital in Clinton, Iowa, and working part time at the bowling alley. (Id., p. 175–76.) She agreed she “could be working full time as a phlebotomist if [she] wanted to,” she was simply “choosing to do [part time] and then work part time at the bowling alley.” (Id., p. 176.)

Piatz began competitively barrel racing horses in Fall 2020, purchasing a new horse to do so. (Id., p. 162.) Piatz described barrel racing as a timed sport requiring riders to weave their horses between three barrels as quickly as possible. (Id.) Piatz stated she was proficient enough at the sport to complete events at a “faster cantor,” which she likened to a “faster jog,” but she was not yet skilled enough to complete events at a “professional level” gallop. (Id., pp. 162–63.) To prepare for competitions, Piatz was practicing two to three times a week, and she acknowledged she was “back on a horse riding about the same amount that [she] would have [been] prior to the accident.” (Id., p. 163.) In Summer 2021, Piatz competed in twenty to thirty horse riding competitions—either barrel racing or otherwise. (Id., p. 169.) In Summer 2022, Piatz competed in around ten more barrel racing events. (Id., p. 168.) She had success in these competitions, sometimes earning prize money. (Id., p. 170.)

In December 2020, Piatz slipped on ice in her driveway and fell to the ground, breaking her fall with her right hand. (Id., pp. 164–65.) In February 2021, she reported numbness and tingling in her hands to Dr. Pugely. (Id., p. 165.) She had not experienced this numbness or tingling before. (Id., p. 165.) Dr. Pugely referred Piatz to Dr. Maen Hosn, who diagnosed her with thoracic outlet syndrome. (ECF 72-3, pp. 11–12.) Dr. Hosn performed surgery in May 2022 to relieve the symptoms. (Id., p. 22–23.) Piatz returned to work within six to seven weeks and, at trial, reported she was “doing better with the numbness and tingling” in her hands, had not suffered “any loss of strength or range of motion,” and had not seen a doctor about the issue since her follow-up appointment several months before trial. (Id., pp. 166–67.)

At trial, Piatz testified that because of her fusion surgery immediately after the car accident, she had slightly reduced movement in her neck and would occasionally get headaches and have shoulder pain, particularly after looking at a computer screen for long periods of time. (Id., pp. 140, 172.) This conflicted with prior deposition testimony in which she said her shoulder pain had resolved. (Id., pp. 172–73.) Piatz similarly acknowledged that she had not complained of headaches during medical appointments following the fusion surgery, much less sought medical treatment for them. (Id., pp. 173–75.) She also admitted that she did not claim to be suffering from headaches in sworn interrogatory responses, nor did she ever supplement those responses to mention headaches. (Id., pp. 174–75.)

The parties presented conflicting expert testimony on the lingering effects of the accident and Piatz's surgeries. Piatz's expert, Dr. Pugely, testified that her fusion surgery permanently inhibited her range of motion and increased her risk of future spinal disk degeneration. (ECF 72-3, pp. 13–14.) He further opined that degenerative disks could lead to chronic pain and maybe require additional surgeries. (Id., pp. 14–19, 48–49.) Dr. Pugely believed the probability that Piatz would need surgery in the future to repair degenerative disks was “not 100 percent” but “more likely than not.” (Id.) He agreed, however, that Piatz had generally returned to normal activities, subject to her restriction from repetitively lifting over 50 pounds. (Id., p. 50.)

Dr. Pugely did not treat Piatz after June 1, 2021, when he referred her to Dr. Hosn to examine potential thoracic outlet syndrome. (Id., p. 47.) Dr. Pugely attributed Piatz's thoracic outlet syndrome to the accident but stated he would defer to Dr. Hosn's determination on causation, because that was Dr. Hosn's “realm of expertise” and Dr. Hosn was “more of an expert in that area than [Dr. Pugely] was.” (Id., pp. 11, 47.) Piatz did not, however, call Dr. Hosn as a witness at trial. Dr. Pugely's expert report did not mention Piatz's competitive barrel racing, nor could he recall whether he was aware of her involvement in that activity at the time he prepared the report. (Id., pp. 42–44.) He was not aware of her slip and fall on the ice at the time of his expert report, nor was he provided with chiropractic records relating to that incident. (Id., pp. 42–44.)

State Farm's expert, Dr. William Boulden, agreed Piatz had “some loss of motion” as a result of the accident but said it was “minimal” and she “had no neurological deficits.” (ECF 72-2, pp. 21–24.) He testified that Piatz “had an excellent outcome” from the fusion surgery following the accident and that while it was “possible” she would need additional surgeries in the future, it was not “probable” because Piatz “had a clean spine otherwise.” (Id., pp. 26–28.) Boulden did, however, agree that an individual who had undergone spinal fusion surgery was more likely to develop adjacent disc disease. (Id., p. 41.) He further opined that Piatz's thoracic outlet syndrome could have been caused by her avid bowling and horseback riding (including the barrel racing), rather than the accident. (Id., pp. 30–32, 34, 49.) He testified that he did “not anticipate any future loss of function ․ based on her motor vehicle accident.” (Id., pp. 43–45.)

B. Piatz's Work History.

Piatz testified that she began working part time at the bowling alley in 2016 or 2017, and that the accident in May 2019 caused her to miss “six to seven weeks” of work, although she also agreed she was able to return to her job “about six weeks after [her] surgery.” (Tr., pp. 121, 132, 147.) Piatz could not recall how many hours she would have worked per week during that time frame, testifying only that “[i]n the summer I was probably working more to 25 hours a week.” (Id., p. 132.) However, Piatz's mother testified that Piatz “missed the last four weeks of her junior year” following the accident, and Piatz did not explain how many hours she typically worked while school was in session. (Tr., p. 75.) She also did not clarify whether she was using the word “summer” colloquially to describe the period starting when the school year ended or literally in the calendar sense—i.e., June 21, which would have been almost seven weeks after her accident on May 5. Moreover, when asked by her counsel whether she was “sure about the number of hours,” Piatz acknowledged it “could have varied.” (Id.)

Similarly, when pressed on how much she was making per hour, Piatz was not able to provide a clear answer, stating only that “[i]n 2019 I was ․ probably making $10 an hour, whatever their minimum wage was at the time.” (Id.) Follow up questions did little to add clarity:

Q. Okay. So that would be the Illinois minimum wage; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So if the minimum wage was only eight and a quarter in Illinois at that time, that's what you were making; right?

A. Yes.

(Id., pp. 132–33.) Other than her counsel's hypothetical, Piatz did not present any evidence of what the Illinois minimum wage was in May 2019.

Piatz also said she received tips while working at the bowling alley, but, again, her testimony was vague:

Q. So did you have any other compensation at the bowling alley?

A. What do you mean by that?

Q. Did you get tips?

A. Yes.

Q. And were the tips pretty good?

A. It all depended when you worked.

Q. Sometimes great and sometimes not so good?

A. Yes.

(Id., p. 133.) Piatz did not provide any information—not even an estimate—regarding how much in tips she received on an average workday or workweek. (Id.) On cross examination, Piatz confirmed she didn't know the specific number of hours she would have been working per week at the time of the accident or her wage rate:

Q. And I was listening to your testimony on direct examination, but is it -- I think what I heard you say is you don't know the specific number of hours you would have been working per week at the time of the accident; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you don't know exactly what your wage rate would have been at that time other than it would have been whatever the minimum wage was which you don't know, correct?

A. Correct, and that's because the Illinois minimum wage changes every six months, so that is the only reason why I don't know it. I don't know where it would fall within that six months because by 2025 Illinois's minimum wage will be $15 an hour.

Q. Okay. But that wasn't what it was at the time of the accident; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And as we sit here today, you don't know what that number was; right?

A. Correct.

Q. And you don't have any documentation -- at least not that I've seen -- of either what hours you worked or what you made at that point in time; correct?

A. Correct.

(Id., pp. 171–72.)

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard.

Piatz moves for new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(1)(A), which gives the Court discretion to order a new trial “after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Because the Court is sitting in diversity, the adequacy of the jury's verdict is a question of Iowa law. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996); Rustenhaven v. Am. Airlines, 320 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The question of the [propriety] of a verdict in a diversity case such as this is judged in accordance with state substantive law.”). The Court's review of the evidence on a motion for a new trial is, however, a procedural matter governed by federal law. Rustenhaven, 320 F.3d at 806. “On a motion for new trial, the district court is entitled to interpret the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, but it may not usurp the role of the jury by granting a new trial simply because it believes other inferences and conclusions are more reasonable.” Id. (quoting Van Steenburgh v. Rival Co., 171 F.3d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir. 1999)).

Courts applying Iowa law have “considerable discretion in ruling upon a motion for new trial based upon the ground that the verdict was inadequate.” Fisher v. Davis, 601 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Iowa 1999). Courts should, however, be “loath to interfere with a jury verdict” because “[f]ixing the amount of damages is a function for the jury.” Sallis v. Lemansky, 420 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Iowa 1988); see also Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 891–92 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e have affirmed the denial of a new trial where evidence of the cause or extent of the injury was disputed; and we have reversed the granting of a new trial where evidence of the extent of the injuries was disputed.”). Courts “do not disturb jury verdicts pertaining to damages unless they are flagrantly excessive or inadequate, so out of reason so as to shock the conscience, the result of passion or prejudice, or lacking in evidentiary support.” Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 799 (Iowa 1984).

“[A]n inadequate damage award merits a new trial as much as an excessive one.” Foggia, 543 N.W.2d at 891. “The key question is whether after examining the record ․ ‘the verdict effects substantial justice between the parties.’ ” Id. (quoting Kautman v. Mar-Mac Community Sch. Dist., 255 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Iowa 1977)). If the Court determines a damages issue needs to be retried, all elements of damage may need to be retried. Brant v. Bockholt, 532 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1995) (“[W]e believe that it would be inappropriate to order retrial of only a single element of damage.”). This is because “[j]ury determinations of various elements of damages are apt to be influenced by the recovery allowed for other elements of damage.” Id.; but see Fisher v. Davis, 601 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Iowa 1999) (retrial not required for all elements of damage where plaintiff allegedly suffered multiple injuries but jury's verdict reflected clear conclusion that most of those injuries did not occur).

B. The Jury Was Entitled to Resolve the “Battle of Experts” as to Alleged Future Loss of Mind and Body and Pain and Suffering.

“The element of loss of function of the body is ․ the inability of a particular body part to function in a normal manner.” Brant, 532 N.W.2d at 804–05. An award for loss of mind and body is meant to compensate a plaintiff who is no longer able to “generally engage in the normal functions of life.” Leet v. Burbridge, No. 03-0557, 2004 WL 573798, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2004). Physical pain and suffering, by contrast, “includes bodily suffering, sensation, or discomfort” and “mental anguish, embarrassment, loss of enjoyment of life, a feeling of uselessness, or other emotional distress.” Est. of Pearson ex rel. Latta v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 347 (Iowa 2005). “Damages for physical and mental pain and suffering cannot be measured by any exact or mathematical standard and must be left to the sound judgment of the jury.” Id. A plaintiff may recover for future pain and suffering if it is “reasonably certain to result from the injury.” Mercer v. Ridnour, 218 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Iowa 1974).

“Although evidence presented at trial may justify a higher damage award, this alone does not control.” Foggia, 543 N.W.2d at 891. The Court must “giv[e] the jury its right to accept or reject whatever portions of the conflicting evidence it chose.” Id. This extends to expert testimony: “[t]he fact finder is not obliged to accept expert testimony, even if it is uncontradicted.” Waddell v. Peet's Feeds, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa 1978).

The Court will not disturb the jury's verdict awarding no damages for future loss of mind and body and pain and suffering. Piatz argues the jury should have credited Dr. Pugely's opinion that she was likely to experience degenerative disk disease in the future and that this could lead to chronic pain and a need for additional surgeries, as well as his testimony that her ability to move her neck is limited as a result of the accident and related fusion surgery. (ECF 72-1, 3-5.) Dr. Pugely's opinions were largely disputed by Dr. Boulden, who did not agree Piatz was at risk of any future loss of function and did not think it probable that the accident would necessitate additional surgeries or cause her future pain. At most, Dr. Boulden merely agreed there were certain activities—such as marathon running or driving a truck—that would be unadvisable. There was no evidence, however, that Piatz had any interest in marathon running or driving a truck. Instead, the evidence showed that she returned to the activities she enjoyed, including bowling and horseback riding, within six months after her accident. In fact, Piatz expanded on those activities in subsequent years, such as when she began competitive barrel racing and expanded her duties at the bowling alley in 2020. The evidence further showed that her shoulder pain had resolved by the six-month mark and she did not complain of headaches until shortly before trial—more than three years after the accident. Meanwhile, Dr. Pugely apparently did not even realize Piatz had begun competitive barrel racing after her injury, nor did he claim to be the most qualified person to offer opinions on her thoracic outlet syndrome. Instead, he deferred to Dr. Hosn on that issue, but Piatz chose not to call Dr. Hosn as a witness.

Given the conflicting evidence, the case presented a quintessential jury question regarding which evidence was more persuasive, keeping in mind that it is the plaintiff's burden to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2000) (“The ․ trier of fact is not obligated to accept opinion evidence, even from experts, as conclusive. When a case evolves into a battle of experts, we, as the reviewing court, readily defer to the [fact finder]’s judgment as it is in a better position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.”). The jury ultimately either found Dr. Boulden more persuasive than Dr. Pugely as to future loss of mind and body and pain and suffering or found them equally persuasive (and thus that Piatz had not satisfied her burden of proof). Either way, after independently reviewing the evidence and making its own credibility evaluations, the Court concludes the verdict “effects substantial justice between the parties.” Foggia, 543 N.W.2d at 891 (quoting Kautman, 255 N.W.2d at 148).

Dr. Boulden's opinions were, for example, arguably better supported than Dr. Pugely's by surrounding evidence that Piatz returned to (and expanded upon) her normal activities without pain in the year or two after surgery, including physically challenging tasks like bowling and horseback riding. The jury likely construed this evidence as confirming Dr. Boulden's opinions that Piatz had an “excellent outcome” from the surgery and was unlikely to experience future pain and suffering or need future surgeries. Conversely, the jury likely interpreted the same evidence as casting doubt on Dr. Pugely's opinions, particularly as he apparently did not realize the full scope of Piatz's activities in the two years after the accident. The jury “had a right” to accept Dr. Boulden's opinions and reject those of Dr. Pugely. See Waddell, 266 N.W.2d at 31–32 (holding that trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial); Jackson v. Roger, 507 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to order new trial where jury declined to award damages for loss of full mind and body despite awarding damages for medical expenses and pain and suffering); Shumate v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., No. 03-1538, 2004 WL 1899220, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004) (affirming denial of new trial when jury evaluated conflicting expert testimony and evidence on causation). This Court will not disturb the jury's conclusion by ordering a new trial.

C. Piatz Failed to Prove Lost Wages with a Reasonable Degree of Certainty.

An award of lost wages is intended to compensate a plaintiff for his or her “loss of time in that person's occupation.” Hopping v. Coll. Block Partners, 599 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 1999). “When the occupation is as a wage earner, the value of the lost time is properly measured by the claimant's regular earnings.” Id. Piatz did not need to prove her earnings with “mathematical precision,” but she was “obliged to establish the amount of [her] respective damage claims with some reasonable degree of certainty.” Oak Leaf Country Club, Inc. v. Wilson, 257 N.W.2d 739, 747 (Iowa 1977); see also Ridge v. Omega Cabinets, Ltd., No. 02-1711, 2003 WL 22342808, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2003) (affirming lost wages award when the award amount was established “within a reasonable degree of certainty”).

In her motion for new trial, Piatz argues the jury should have awarded her at least $1,200 in lost wages based on her alleged inability to work for eight weeks after the accident, during which she argues she would have been earning “$8 per hour plus tips.” (ECF 72-1, 5.) The first problem with her position is that Piatz testified at trial that she only missed “six to seven weeks” of work, not eight. The second—and much bigger—problem is that the trial evidence was remarkably vague as to her lost earnings during that “six to seven week” period. For example, Piatz was not able to explain how many hours she worked in an average week beyond testifying that she “probably” worked twenty-five hours per week “in the summer.” She never explained, however, what “in the summer” meant, which was a noticeable omission in a situation where, according to other testimony, there were still at least four weeks left in the school year at the time of her accident. The jury had no information about how many hours she typically worked when school was in session. Moreover, although Piatz might have been using the word “summer” colloquially to refer to the period starting immediately after the school year ended, she also might have been using it in the literal calendar sense, in which case “summer” would not have started until June 21, almost seven weeks after her accident. If the jury interpreted her use of the word in the latter sense, it would mean, again, that the jury had no information about how many hours she would have worked during the “six to seven weeks” she was unable to work following the accident. Similarly, the jury had only vague information as to how much Piatz earned during the unspecified number of hours she might have worked but for the accident. She could not provide her hourly rate beyond saying it was “minimum wage,” which she did not know. Likewise, she could not say how much she earned in tips except that it “all depended on when you worked” and they were “sometimes great and sometimes not so good.”

The jury was not required to fill in the gaps in the evidence to help Piatz satisfy her burden of proof. See Shumate, 2004 WL 1899220, at *2 (holding award of minimal lost wages was appropriate when, inter alia, plaintiff's evidence of lost wages was premised on her own speculation); Ransom v. Zeien, No. 06-1051, 2007 WL 1827495, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 27, 2007) (affirming refusal to grant new trial on lost wages when, inter alia, the claim relied on plaintiff's “estimated ․ annual average income”). Instead, the jury was permitted—indeed, it may have been required—to conclude that the absence of specificity in her testimony meant she had not proven lost wages by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Thornton v. Am. Interstate Ins. Co., 940 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2020) (reversing jury verdict where plaintiff failed to present concrete evidence on an item of damages that is “ordinarily ascertainable”). “[T]he jury as the trier of fact is not ․ required to accept and give effect to testimony which it finds to be unreliable, although it may be uncontradicted.” Matthess v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 521 N.W.2d 699, 704 (Iowa 1994) (quoting Kaiser, 263 N.W.2d at 526).

Piatz could have presented documentary evidence to help overcome the shortcomings in her testimony, such as paystubs, a W-2, or bank statements, all of which presumably would have been easily accessible to her. Given her failure to do so, and the overall ambiguity in her testimony, the Court will not disturb the jury's conclusion that she did not satisfy her burden of proof as to lost wages. See State v. Jauregui, No. 20-0629, 2021 WL 1663598, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. April 28, 2021) (holding evidence was insufficient to support damages award for missed shifts at work “given the fact that no documentary evidence was presented [to establish whether PTO was taken during] those shifts,” despite oral testimony regarding missed shifts). “It was up to the jury, and not this Court, to determine whether the lack of corroborating documentary evidence should defeat [Piatz's] claim.” See Exodus Partners, LLC v. Cooke, No. 04 CIV. 10239 GEL, 2007 WL 120053, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2007).

III. Conclusion.

Because the jury verdict is supported by the evidence and effected substantial justice between the parties, the Court DENIES Piatz's Motion for New Trial (ECF 72).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All references to “Tr.” are to the rough draft of the trial transcript. Neither party ordered the full transcript following trial. The rough draft is consistent with the Court's independent recollection of the trial testimony.

Stephen H. Locher, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE