JENNIFER LINN GOTT v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC MIKE ALLISON ANDREW WOOD BRIAN BELL JOHN SCHAAF NEIL MCKINNEY JULIE JENNINGS (2024)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND

I. INTRODUCTION.

Although Plaintiff Jennifer Linn Gott has raised only state law claims, Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, asserting that some or all of Gott's claims are completely preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act. For the most part, the Court disagrees with Defendants and concludes that Gott's claims are not completely preempted. There is, however, one exception: Gott's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is indeed completely preempted under binding Eighth Circuit precedent. Removal was therefore proper, and Gott's Motion to Remand is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND.

“In ruling on a motion to remand, the Court assumes as true all factual allegations of the state court petition.” King v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 4:23-cv-00069-RGE-WPK, 2023 WL 11197700, at *1 (S.D. Iowa May 5, 2023) (first citing Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987); and then citing Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 2011)). “The Court also considers, as necessary, ‘extra-pleading material,’ including a declaration, a collective bargaining agreement, and records of the grievance forms [the plaintiff] filed with his union.” Id. (citing Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2014)). The recitation of facts in this section is designed to be consistent with these principles.

Gott began working for Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”) over 28 years ago and has been employed at the Davenport, Iowa UPS center as a “small sort” employee since, at least, November 2022. (ECF 1–2, ¶ 14.) Gott is a member of the Teamsters Local 710, a chapter of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”), and has served as a “union steward” for the past four years. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 16; ECF 1, ¶ 14; see also ECF 1–6, pp. 23–26.) The employment rights of all Teamsters Local 710 members, including Gott, are established by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (ECF 1, ¶ 14; ECF 14, pp. 7–8.) The CBA consists of two agreements between UPS, IBT, and Teamsters Local 710: (i) the National Master UPS Agreement; and (ii) the Teamsters Local 710 Supplemental Agreement. (ECF 14, p. 7; ECF 14–1, ¶ 2.)

Starting in November 2022, Gott had a series of negative interactions and disputes with other UPS employees, which resulted in Gott making several verbal and written complaints to UPS management, security, human resources, and her union, as well as a complaint to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. (ECF 1–2.) The negative interactions began around November 9, 2022, when Defendant Neil McKinney, Vice President of the Teamsters Local 710, pulled Gott out of a panel room where she had been discussing workers' rights with union members and yelled at her “for educating union members as to their rights,” causing Gott to feel threatened. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 18–19.) Then, in late 2022, Defendant Julie Jennings, a fellow employee of UPS, accused Gott of dumping a bottle of water into her bag and damaging her phone. (Id., ¶¶ 10, 33.) Defendant Andrew Wood, a security employee for UPS, interrogated Gott at work about Jennings' claims and repeatedly accused her of destroying Jennings' phone, even claiming to have video evidence to support the allegations. (Id., ¶¶ 6, 21–22, 24–28, 30.) When Gott denied destroying Jennings' phone and asked to be shown the video, Wood admitted there was no video that showed Gott dumping water on the phone. (Id., ¶¶ 29, 31–32.) This interaction with Wood left Gott so “shocked and upset” that she received permission to take the remainder of her shift off that day. (Id., ¶ 35.) At the conclusion of Wood's investigation, Gott was not disciplined by UPS. (Id., ¶¶ 34, 38–39.)

After the cell phone incident, Jennings' behavior towards Gott began to make her feel unsafe. (Id., ¶ 41.) For example, a few days after Gott was interrogated by Wood, Jennings stood near Gott at work, stared at her, and asked, “what did I ever to do you?” (Id., ¶ 36.) That same day, Gott learned that Jennings told their co-workers not to trust Gott, that Gott “had ruined Jennings' phone, and that Jennings was going to take [Gott] to court.” (Id., ¶ 37.) A few weeks later, Gott received a police report and letter from Jennings threatening to file a petition in small claims court against Gott if she did not pay for the damage to Jennings' phone. (Id., ¶ 40.)

Following these interactions with Jennings, Gott complained to Defendant Mike Allison, the UPS Center Manager of the Davenport facility, saying she “was scared for her safety.” (Id., ¶¶ 5, 42.) Allison informed Gott that the matter would be forwarded to security and assured her the complaint would not jeopardize her employment with UPS. (Id., ¶¶ 42–43.) About a month later, when Gott complained again to Allison about “ongoing issues” she was having with Jennings, Allison told her someone would “follow up” with Jennings but that UPS could not address the legal issues between them. (Id., ¶¶ 44–46.)

On June 5, 2023, Gott was served with papers for a small claims court action filed by Jennings against Gott regarding Jennings' phone. (Id., ¶¶ 49–50.) Two days later, while Gott was at work, a private process server attempted to serve subpoenas to UPS employees on Jennings' behalf but was stopped by Gott's supervisor, who told the server he could not “pull employees off the job to be served.” (Id., ¶¶ 51–53.) However, a few days later, Gott learned that while she was not at work, Allison and other UPS employees helped serve subpoenas on Jennings' behalf while they were on the job. (Id., ¶ 55.) Gott also later learned that a local sheriff's office employee was given permission to serve UPS employees while they were on the clock. (Id., ¶¶ 75–76.)

Gott reported some of these matters to the UPS Human Resources Department in Des Moines, who then directed her to contact UPS security. (Id., ¶ 56.) On July 12, 2023, Gott met with Defendant John Schaaf, a UPS Security Supervisor, and informed him of all the events that preceded their discussion, including her safety concerns. (Id., ¶¶ 8, 57–58.) In response, Schaaf read Gott the UPS anti-harassment policy and confidentiality policy and told her that speaking out about her situation with Jennings could result in professional disciplinary consequences, “up to and including termination.” (Id., ¶ 59.) Schaaf then asked Gott to sign the policies, but Gott refused to do so because she felt Schaaf was trying to use her complaints against her. (Id., ¶ 61.) Later that same day, Defendant Brian Bell, a UPS Full-Time Pre-Load Manager in Davenport, told Gott she would need to work two shifts the following day even though this practice “had been challenged in the past and had stopped at the UPS Davenport center.” (Id., ¶¶ 7, 62–63.) Gott believed “she was being retaliated against for complaining” and complained about Bell's order to Allison and the District Manager of the Davenport UPS center, both of whom told Gott she was required to work as directed. (Id., ¶¶ 63–65.) Nonetheless, upon seeing Gott show up the next day for both shifts, Bell said, “[o]h, I'm surprised you're here.” (Id., ¶ 66.)

By this point, Gott had started therapy “due to the stress she was experiencing relating to Jennings' accusations against her and UPS management's involvement,” and had been diagnosed with workplace post-traumatic stress disorder. (Id., ¶¶ 67–68.) Gott's condition was exacerbated by her interactions with Schaaf, Bell, and Allison on July 12 and 13, 2023. (Id., ¶ 69.) As a result, and based on her therapist's advice, Gott did not go to work on July 14, 2023, and applied for short term disability benefits shortly thereafter, which were approved. (Id., ¶¶ 69–70.) A few days later, Gott filed an internal complaint at UPS—known as an “ethicspoint complaint”—regarding her interactions with her co-workers and supervisors and the general hostility of her work environment. (Id., ¶ 71.) Gott later updated the complaint as new information became available, including, for example, when she learned that Jennings had been “telling people at work about [her] PTSD and making fun of it.” (Id., ¶ 72.)

On August 16, 2023, after UPS management investigated Gott's ethicspoint complaint, Gott asked Schaaf what would be done to make her feel safe when she returned to work. (Id., ¶¶ 77–79.) Schaaf said he could not disclose that information but assured her there would be a “notable change in operations.” (Id., ¶ 80.) However, two days later, Gott's son, Seth Jackson, was terminated by UPS over a false allegation. (Id., ¶ 81.) Although Jackson's employment was later reinstated, Gott alleges that his termination was an act of retaliation against her for her own complaints. (Id., ¶¶ 82–83.)

Jennings' small claims action against Gott went to trial on August 31, 2023, with Wood and Allison both appearing as potential witnesses for Jennings. (Id., ¶¶ 84–85.) The judge ultimately ruled against Jennings, concluding she had failed to sustain her burden of proving that Gott damaged her phone. (Id., ¶ 87.) Nonetheless, a few weeks later, Jennings posted the following message on a national UPS employee Facebook page:

What happens when a co worker/union steward intentionally damages your phone by dumping your water bottle into your bag with your phone at the bottom, out of spite because you are allowed to work overtime․nothing. They have her on video, but too grainy for court. UPS also had still shots and clear video but․oops it time lapsed․so sorry․

(Id., ¶ 88.) Although the post did not identify Gott by name, it would have been easy in context for people who worked for UPS in Davenport to identify Gott as the target. (Id., ¶ 90.) The post accumulated “hateful” comments, some of which encouraged Jennings to retaliate against Gott. (Id., ¶ 89.)

Gott responded by filing another ethicspoint complaint, which mentioned both Jennings' Facebook post and the termination of Gott's son. (Id., ¶ 91.) Four days later, Gott filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission alleging “discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on the protected bases of sex, disability, and age.” (Id., ¶ 92.) A Human Resources representative at the Davenport UPS center told Gott a few weeks later that UPS would not act on her second ethicspoint complaint “until ‘something happened.’ ” (Id., ¶ 94.) When Gott “expressed concerns for her safety,” the representative called her a “pessimist” and asked if she was in therapy. (Id.)

Gott eventually returned to work when she could no longer afford to remain on short term disability, but she continued to have negative interactions and disputes with her co-workers and supervisors at UPS. (See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 93, 95–97.) For example, “[o]n November 27, 2023, while [Gott] was attempting to help a union member with an issue concerning vacation pay, [Gott] learned that Defendant Allison had told at least one other employee that [Gott] had been gone awhile and that she ‘do[es]n't know what she is talking about.’ ” (Id., ¶ 95.) “On December 18, 2023, another employee who had been acting very collegially with Defendant Bell told [Gott] that [she] ‘wasn't going to lose her job,’ at least according to management, so [she] can ‘act normal,’ now.” (Id., ¶ 96.) However, on January 8, 2024, Gott was shadowed and questioned about her work by a UPS District Manager as she performed her normal daily tasks. (Id., ¶ 97.) She was later told that “management was watching her area on camera.” (Id.) Four days later, while fulfilling her duties as a union steward, Gott became visibly upset when she saw Bell respond to another employee's complaint of racial discrimination by reading the employee the UPS anti-harassment policy. (Id., ¶¶ 98–99.) When the employee declined Bell's request to sign the policy, Gott wrote “RTS” for “refused to sign” on the form and noted that “the reason the employee refused to sign was because he was the person being harassed not doing the harassing.” (Id., ¶ 100.) When Bell disputed Gott's right to make such notations, Gott “refused to change what she had written.” (Id., ¶¶ 101–102.)

Gott filed another ethicspoint complaint after a dispute with Bell that took place on April 25, 2024. (Id., ¶¶ 103, 130.) That day, Bell approached Gott at work and accusatorily asked her what she was doing. (Id., ¶¶ 103–104.) After Gott explained that she was preparing her co-worker's work area before they arrived, Bell instructed Gott to perform the task that her co-worker was supposed to do upon their arrival. (Id., ¶¶ 104, 107–108.) When Gott attempted to explain that she still needed to complete several tasks to prepare her own work area before opening, Bell responded, “so you're not going to work as directed?” (Id., ¶¶ 109–11.) Gott, experiencing a “PTSD flare up,” started crying, and said she did not appreciate being harassed but would do as Bell directed. (Id., ¶¶ 112–13.) Although Gott then did as Bell directed (id., ¶¶ 114–15), upon her co-worker's arrival, Bell told her co-worker that “[Gott] was not working as directed and was not helping” (id., ¶ 116). When Gott tried to explain her actions to her co-worker, Bell told Gott, “I'm going to be talking to Mike Allison and I'm going to be getting security involved in this.” (Id., ¶¶ 117–18.) In response, Gott called the security employee herself and reported Bell, saying she couldn't take the harassment and targeting anymore. (Id., ¶¶ 120–22.) The security employee told Gott that Bell should not have threatened to call security and assured her the situation would be dealt with. (Id., ¶¶ 121, 123.) Nevertheless, later that day, Bell told Gott “this isn't over” and said she would have to talk to him and Allison after work. (Id., ¶ 124.) Gott tried to refuse to attend the meeting because she had a different appointment and wanted a union steward present anyway, but Bell insisted that the meeting would occur. (Id., ¶ 125.) Gott remained at work for the rest of the day but was “crying and shaking” throughout her shift and was not offered any assistance from supervisors. (Id., ¶¶ 126–27.)

In addition to the verbal, ethicspoint, and Iowa Civil Rights Commission complaints that Gott made between November 2022 and July 2024, she also filed five grievances with her union involving alleged breaches of the CBA, including: “harassing her and her son, Seth Jackson; violating seniority rights; engaging side dealing; and improper scheduling.” (ECF 14, pp. 11–12; ECF 14–2.) All of them were either settled or denied. (Id.)

On May 21, 2024, Gott filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Scott County alleging nine counts under Iowa law: Count 1: common law defamation against all Defendants; Count 2: common law tortious interference with employment rights against Defendants Allison, Wood, Bell, McKinney, and Jennings; Count 3: common law civil conspiracy against Defendants UPS, Allison, Wood, Bell, McKinney, and Jennings; Count 4: common law abuse of process against Defendants UPS, Allison, Wood, and Jennings; Count 5: common law intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants UPS, Allison, Bell, McKinney and Jennings; Count 6: sex discrimination and harassment under the Iowa Civil Rights Act against Defendants UPS, Allison, Schaaf, Wood, and Bell; Count 7: disability discrimination and harassment (including hostile work environment claims) under the Iowa Civil Rights Act against Defendants UPS, Allison, Schaaf, Wood, and Bell; Count 8: age discrimination and harassment under the Iowa Civil Rights Act against Defendants UPS, Allison, Schaaf, Wood, and Bell; and Count 9: retaliation under the Iowa Civil Rights Act against Defendants UPS, Allison, Schaaf, Wood, and Bell. (ECF 1–2, ¶¶ 134–212.) On June 26, 2024, Defendants removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. (ECF 1.) Gott now moves to remand. (ECF 10.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil action from state to federal court if the action could have been brought in federal court originally. Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 753–54 (8th Cir. 2017). The removal of a civil action from state court “is permitted as long as at least one claim falls within the original jurisdiction of the federal court.” Minnesota by Ellison v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 63 F.4th 703, 709 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Petrol. Inst. v. Minnesota, 144 S. Ct. 620 (2024). However, if the federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff may move to remand the case back to state court. Junk v. Terminix Int'l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 444–45 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). When the basis of removal is federal question jurisdiction, the civil action must “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1987). Whether a civil action arises under federal law for the purpose of federal question jurisdiction is “governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392.

“There are two important exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule” under which a civil action “is removable although no federal question appears on the face of the complaint.” Minnesota by Ellison, 63 F.4th at 709. These exceptions arise “when the state-law claims (1) are completely preempted by federal law or (2) necessarily raise a substantial, disputed federal question.” Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 35 F.4th 44, 51–52 (1st Cir. 2022)). As relevant here, a state law claim is completely preempted by federal law when “the pre-emptive force of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’ ” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)).

The complete preemption exception “is applied primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by § 301 of the [Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)].” Id. While § 301 of the LMRA “governs lawsuits to enforce collective-bargaining agreements ․ not every case involving a collective-bargaining agreement” is completely preempted by § 301. Boldt v. N. States Power Co., 904 F.3d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185). Rather, “the LMRA completely preempts only ‘claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements’ and ‘claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.’ ” Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 394). A state law claim is “substantially dependent” on the analysis of a “CBA if it requires the interpretation of some specific provision of a CBA.” Johnson v. Humphreys, 949 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 2020). If the claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the terms of the labor contract, the claim substantially depends on analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). However, “when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n.12 (1988)).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS.

A. Summary.

“Removal is permitted as long as at least one claim falls within the original jurisdiction of the federal court.” Minnesota by Ellison, 63 F.4th at 709. Accordingly, the Court must evaluate Plaintiff's claims one-by-one to determine whether complete preemption applies to any of them. For reasons explained below, the Court concludes that removal jurisdiction exists because one of Gott's claims—for intentional infliction of emotional distress—is completely preempted. Most others, however, are not.

B. Gott's Defamation Claim Is Not Completely Preempted Because It Can Be Proven Without Interpreting the CBA.

Gott's defamation claim revolves around several categories of allegedly false statements, including statements regarding Gott's: alleged involvement in the incident with Jennings' cell phone; “honesty or trustworthiness”; “knowledge of procedure as a UPS employee and/or union steward”; “ability to perform her job as a UPS employee;” and “competency as a UPS employee.” (ECF 1–2, ¶¶ 135, 138.) Defendants argue that the adjudication of Gott's defamation claim is dependent upon and inextricably intertwined with the CBA, and thus the defamation claim is completely preempted by § 301. (ECF 14, pp. 22–23.)

The Eighth Circuit has evaluated preemption under the LMRA or the analogous Railway Labor Act in the context of defamation claims on at least five occasions, concluding twice that preemption applied and three times that it did not. The earliest such case was Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 1989), which is factually analogous to Gott's situation in that it involved an employee who brought defamation claims against co-workers who falsely accused the employee of destroying a co-worker's property. In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit concluded that one of the employee's defamation claims “relate[d] to a dispute over an event occurring at the workplace and would be governed by the grievance procedure [in the CBA].” Id. at 624. Johnson held that the claim was preempted because it “cannot be resolved without interpreting or analyzing the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” Id.

In three subsequent cases, starting with Luecke v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 85 F.3d 356, 359–61 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit held that preemption did not apply to defamation claims relating to workplace events. In Luecke, the plaintiff's co-workers falsely accused him of having refused to take a drug test following a workplace accident. Id. at 358–59. The Eighth Circuit held that the defamation claim was not preempted because it did not require a court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, but rather simply to determine whether the co-workers disseminated false information about the plaintiff. Id. at 359–61. At most, the Eighth Circuit concluded, provisions of the collective bargaining agreement might need to be “consulted,” not interpreted. Id. at 362. Importantly, Luecke distinguished Johnson because the latter involved an employee who was terminated based on the allegedly false statements, thus making it necessary to interpret the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. As the employee in Luecke was not terminated, no similar interpretation was required. Id.

The Eighth Circuit again held that preemption did not apply to an employee's defamation claims in Meyer v. Schnucks Market, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1049 (8th Cir. 1998), which involved statements about the employee being a “poor and substandard employee” and “trouble maker.” In Meyer, the Eighth Circuit explained that although the events giving rise to the defamation claim occurred on the job, “the claims themselves are not inherently tied to any provision of the relevant CBA.” Id. at 1051. The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion again two years later in Graham v. Contract Transportation, Inc., 220 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 2000), in which an employee sued for defamation after being accused of using methamphetamine. Graham held that preemption did not apply because the employee's “defamation claim does not rely on any rights conferred by the CBA. He is instead availing himself of a right created by state law (namely, to be free from false and harmful statements made about him to others), which is a right that is independent of any CBA.” Id. Graham criticized language from Johnson suggesting that defamation claims are always preempted if they arise out of workplace disputes governed by a grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 914. Graham stated that “the narrower approach to preemption, as outlined in Meyer, is more faithful to Supreme Court precedent.” Id.

Finally, but conversely, the Eighth Circuit concluded in Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2000), that preemption applied to an employee's defamation claims arising out of statements by supervisors that he was dangerous and posed a threat to co-workers. Gore held that the employee's defamation claim “will require the court to construe whether the defendants' actions conformed to the rights and duties created under the collective bargaining agreement” and “will need to be evaluated within the framework of the contract terms governing the standard by which TWA must handle employee safety complaints.” Id. at 950. This was enough to make the collective bargaining agreement “inextricably intertwined with the resolution of this dispute.” Id.

It is not easy to reconcile these Eighth Circuit cases; indeed, Graham describes them as “conflicting precedents.” 220 F.3d at 914. Ordinarily, “when faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earliest opinion must be followed as it should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the conflict.” Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011). There are, however, two important caveats to this principle. First, “[t]he prior panel rule only applies when panel opinions actually conflict․” United States v. Spotted Horse, 916 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 2019). Second, “it is well settled that a panel may depart from circuit precedent based on an intervening opinion of the Supreme Court that undermines the prior precedent.” T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2006). Here, the Court concludes that Johnson and Gore are partly reconcilable with Luecke, Meyer, and Graham. To the extent they are not fully reconcilable, the Court will follow the Luecke line of cases because they rely substantially on two Supreme Court cases decided after Johnson: Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994). See T.L. ex rel. Ingram, 443 F.3d at 960–61 (following line of cases that was arguably later decided because of intervening Supreme Court precedent). In other words, the Court will follow the Luecke line of cases because Johnson has been “undermine[d]” by intervening Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 960.

Consistent with this understanding of Eighth Circuit precedent, the Court concludes that Gott's defamation claims are not completely preempted by § 301. The Court reaches this conclusion in part because the allegedly defamatory statements did not result in Gott's termination, and thus it is not inherently necessary to evaluate those statements in the context of the CBA's grievance procedures or otherwise determine whether the statements, if false, would have improperly caused her to be fired. This distinguishes Gott's case from Johnson and makes it more like Luecke and Meyer. Moreover, unlike Gore, the defamatory statements alleged by Gott arise largely out of matters unrelated to the CBA, including, especially, whether Gott was falsely accused of damaging Jennings' cell phone. Defendants have not identified—and the Court cannot independently locate—any provision of the CBA that will have to be interpreted to adjudicate these aspects of Gott's defamation claim.

To the extent Johnson and Gore are not completely distinguishable on their facts, the Court notes that they found federal removal jurisdiction to exist only after considering the extent to which the employers' defenses would hinge on the collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Gore, 210 F.3d at 950 (“The defendants assert that their actions were required by specific provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.”). This is what Luecke, Meyer, and other Eighth Circuit cases have concluded is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent pre- and post-dating Johnson. See Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 833 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the “broader approach to LMRA preemption, that is, an approach where the employer's defenses are relevant”); accord Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 879 n.13 (8th Cir. 2009) (“We agree with Bogan and Meyer that the narrower approach to section 301 is more faithful to Supreme Court precedent and consider only the Players' CPA claim itself, and not the NFL's defenses to liability, in determining whether the claim is preempted.”). In these circumstances, the Court will not treat Johnson and Gore as governing precedent on the defamation claims; instead, it will follow the Luecke line of cases by concluding that those claims are not completely preempted. See Graham, 220 F.3d at 913; Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1050–51.

There is one issue left to address. Gott's defamation claim is predicated, in part, on Allison's alleged statement that Gott lacked knowledge of proper CBA procedures. (ECF 1–2, ¶¶ 95, 135; ECF 14, p. 22.) Defendants argue that this part of the defamation claim “necessarily requires Gott to prove she was correctly interpreting the CBA provisions regarding her role as a union steward.” (ECF 14, pp. 22–23.) The premise of this argument may be correct, but it does not mean removal jurisdiction exists. The governing question for purposes of complete preemption—and thus for removal—is not whether some piece of Gott's defamation claim might be subject to a federal preemption defense, but rather whether the claim is preempted in its entirety. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63–64 (stating that removal jurisdiction exists only where Congress has “so completely pre-empt[ed] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character”); Johnson v. MFA Petrol. Co., 701 F.3d 243, 248 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has explained that complete preemption exists only where federal preemption is so strong that ‘there is ․ no such thing as a state-law claim.’ ” (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003))). Here, at most, Defendants have merely shown that part of Gott's defamation claim is subject to preemption. This is not enough to establish removal jurisdiction. See Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 398 (“The fact that a defendant might ultimately prove that a plaintiff's claims are pre-empted under the NLRA does not establish that they are removable to federal court.”); Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that removal jurisdiction did not exist over retaliatory discharge claim even though employer intended to rely on collective bargaining agreement to argue just cause for termination).

Stated differently, Gott's defamation claim occupies the space recognized by the Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n.12 (1988), in which § 301 might limit one aspect of her claim but “the underlying state-law claim, not otherwise pre-empted, would stand ․ In such a case, federal law would govern the interpretation of the agreement, but the separate state-law analysis would not be thereby pre-empted.” Removal jurisdiction is not present in these circumstances because Gott still has a state law claim, albeit not one that is as broad as she originally alleged. See Markham, 861 F.3d at 757 (holding that district court lacked removal jurisdiction over state law claims even though they “may require a court to refer to or consult the CBA and related standards”); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Loc. Lodge No. 967 by McCadden v. Gen. Elec. Co., 713 F. Supp. 547, 554 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Since the plaintiff's claims are only partially preempted by federal law it would not be proper to recharacterize them as claims ‘arising under’ federal law.”); cf. Richardson v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2 F.4th 1063, 1069 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding that complete preemption did not apply to claim that could be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement).

C. Gott's Tortious Interference with Employment Rights Claim Is Not Completely Preempted Because It Can Be Proven Without Interpreting the CBA.

In her tortious interference claim, Gott alleges that five Defendants—Allison, Wood, Bell, McKinney, and Jennings—tortiously interfered with her employment relationship with UPS “by making unsupported accusations against her and by attempting to make her employment so stressful that she will quit, and including but not limited to by making and/or perpetuating unsupported complaints against her (e.g. the complaint regarding the cell phone).” (ECF 1–2, ¶ 147.) UPS argues that because the employment relationship is governed by the CBA, Gott's claim is substantially dependent upon and inextricably intertwined with the CBA. (ECF 14, pp. 14–15.) Gott, by contrast, argues that she is not alleging that UPS terminated her or breached any specific provision of the CBA; instead, she relies on an Iowa Supreme Court case, Conaway v. Webster City Products Co., 431 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1988), to argue that tortious interference may be proven under Iowa law without respect to the interpretation of any provision of the CBA. (ECF 18, pp. 3–4.)

As with defamation claims, the Eighth Circuit has analyzed preemption in the context of tortious interference claims on several occasions, with mixed results. The earliest such case was Johnson, which, as noted above, is factually similar to Gott's situation because it involved an employee who allegedly destroyed another employee's property. 876 F.2d at 622. Johnson held that the accused employee's tortious interference claim was preempted because it would require a court to “decide whether [the defendant] could rightfully discharge [the plaintiff] under the union contract. Discharge for just cause is a subject governed by the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 624. Several years after Johnson, the Eighth Circuit again held that preemption applied to a tortious interference claim in Oberkramer v. IBEW-NECA Service Center, Inc., 151 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 1998), which involved an employee who was allegedly terminated based on sexual orientation. In a single paragraph with no meaningful discussion, Oberkramer relied on Johnson to hold that resolution of the plaintiff's tortious interference claim “would require a determination of whether [the defendant in the tortious interference claim] caused [the employer] to breach the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 756.

Shortly after Oberkramer, the Eighth Circuit evaluated preemption in the context of tortious interference claims in Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051. Meyer concluded that Johnson improperly considered the employer's defenses when analyzing preemption, instead of limiting the analysis to the plaintiff's claims as required by governing Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1050–51. Using the proper approach, Meyer held that the employee's tortious interference claims were not preempted: “[e]xcept for the existence of the valid business expectancy itself, which can be demonstrated by mere reference to the CBA without any analysis of it, neither of these causes of action is based on, or substantially dependent upon an interpretation of, the CBA.” Id. at 1051. Meyer essentially tracks the Iowa Supreme Court's analysis in Conaway, which likewise held that preemption did not apply to a tortious interference claim because “[t]he existing valid contractual relationship here is the employment relationship, the existence of which is a factual question that does not depend on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” 431 N.W.2d at 799.

The Eighth Circuit's most recent decision on § 301 preemption in the context of a tortious interference claim appears to be Holschen v. Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades/Painters Dist. Council #2, 598 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 2010). There, applying Missouri law, the Eighth Circuit held the plaintiff could not prove his state law claim without establishing the terms of a contract or valid business expectancy, which, in turn, would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 460–61. Preemption therefore applied. Id. at 461. Holschen is consistent with the strong weight of authority from other circuits holding that employment-related tortious interference claims are preempted. See, e.g., Adamo Demolition Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Loc. 150, AFL-CIO, 3 F.4th 866, 873–75 (6th Cir. 2021); Healy v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 804 F.3d 836, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2015); Anderson v. Aset Corp., 416 F.3d 170, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2005); Steinbach v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 253 F.3d 538, 540–41 (10th Cir. 2001).

In other circumstances, the Court would follow the weight of authority, as it seems self-evident that most state law tortious interference with contract claims cannot be proven without evaluating the terms of the contract (i.e., the CBA). For present purposes, however, the Court must give effect to the Iowa Supreme Court's conclusion that in a tortious interference claim under Iowa law, “[t]he existing valid contractual relationship [ ] is the employment relationship, the existence of which is a factual question that does not depend on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Conaway, 431 N.W.2d at 799. In other words, the Iowa Supreme Court has held in circumstances indistinguishable from those present here that a state law tortious interference claim indeed can be proven without evaluating the terms of the CBA. The Court must follow Conaway on matters of state law. See, e.g., Bogan, 500 F.3d at 832 (following state court precedent to determine the elements of the plaintiff's claim). The Court therefore must conclude that Gott's tortious interference with contract claim is not completely preempted by § 301. See Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051–52; Conrad v. Xcel Energy, Inc., No. 12-CV-2819 PJS/FLN, 2013 WL 1395877, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Apr. 5, 2013) (concluding tortious interference claim was not removable because state law allowed the claim to be proven without reference to collective bargaining agreement).

D. Gott's Common Law Civil Conspiracy Claim Is Not Completely Preempted Because It Can Be Proven Without Interpreting the CBA.

Defendants argue that Gott's civil conspiracy claim is completely preempted because it is “derivative of her ․ tortious interference claim.” (ECF 14, p. 16.) The Court has concluded, however, that the tortious interference claim is not completely preempted. The civil conspiracy claim is therefore not completely preempted, either. See Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1052.

E. Gott's Abuse of Process Claim Is Not Completely Preempted Because It Can Be Proven Without Interpreting the CBA.

Gott's abuse of process claim arises out of Jennings' filing of a small claims action regarding the cell phone incident, as well as the participation by other Defendants in that proceeding. (ECF 1–2, ¶¶ 160–65.) Under Iowa law, an abuse of process claim requires proof of three elements: “(1) the use of a legal process (2) in an improper or unauthorized manner (3) that causes the plaintiff to suffer damages as a result of that abuse.” Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 398 (Iowa 2001). To prove these elements, Gott will not need the Court to interpret the CBA, and thus the abuse of process claim is not completely preempted.

In arguing otherwise, Defendants rely on Gott's allegation that Defendants participated in the small claims proceeding to “punish[ ] [Gott] for informing UPS workers of their legal rights.” (ECF 14, p. 23; see also ECF 1–2, ¶ 166.) This allegation does not, however, require interpretation of any provision of the CBA, nor does it even appear to matter whether the information Gott provided to other workers was right or wrong. Thus, this aspect of the abuse of process claim at most will require the CBA to be “consulted,” not interpreted. Luecke, 85 F.3d at 362. This is not enough to establish complete preemption. See id. Indeed, even Johnson held that a malicious prosecution claim—which is analogous to abuse of process—was not preempted by § 301. See 876 F.2d at 625. The same conclusion is appropriate here.

F. Gott's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Is Completely Preempted Because It Requires Interpretation of the CBA.

Gott's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on a wide range of alleged conduct, including acts involving, among other things: the incident with Jennings' cell phone; disclosure of Gott's mental health information; violations of her seniority rights; errors regarding her pay and vacation time; the scheduling of meetings when she had personal conflicts; interference with her performance of job duties; the making of demands to perform tasks without any reasonable basis for doing so; and retaliation against her son. (ECF 1–2, ¶ 170.) To prove her claim, Iowa law requires Gott to satisfy four elements: “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant intentionally caused, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, the emotional distress; (3) plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) the defendant's outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the emotional distress.” Fuller v. Local Union No. 106 of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 567 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Iowa 1997) (citing Steckelberg v. Randolph, 448 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Iowa 1989)).

The Eighth Circuit has evaluated preemption in the context of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims even more often than it has done so in the context of tortious interference and defamation claims. The results are again mixed, with preemption applying in at least four cases and not applying in at least three others. This time, however, it is less difficult to reconcile the cases. In cases where preemption was held not to apply, the Eighth Circuit usually emphasized that the conduct giving rise to the intentional infliction of emotional distress was not based on any provision of the collective bargaining agreement. See Bogan, 500 F.3d at 832 (declining to apply preemption where the agreement “does not give [the plaintiff] any rights upon which she could base a claim. Thus, it is clear [her] claim is not based on the CBA provision at issue.”); Hanks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1990) (declining to apply preemption because the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims “involve duties owed by GM to every member of society, not just to employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement”). Alternatively, in one instance, the Eighth Circuit did not apply preemption because the collective bargaining agreement simply repeated rights the employee independently possessed under state law. See Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051. Thus, the state law claims “are not dependent upon an interpretation of the CBA.” Id.

By contrast, the Eighth Circuit has generally applied preemption in situations where the plaintiff's allegations were expressly based on the collective bargaining agreement or necessarily required the interpretation of its terms. For example, in Johnson, the plaintiff argued that events giving rise to and including his termination constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress, which “would require us to decide whether his discharge was warranted under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” 876 F.2d at 624. Similarly, Oberkramer applied preemption to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the collective bargaining agreement was the only source of the right on which the claim was based. 151 F.3d at 757. Williams went a half-step further by holding that preemption applied to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the outrageousness of the defendants' conduct could only be evaluated in light of the parties' agreement. 582 F.3d at 882. Finally, in the case that is most closely on point, the Eighth Circuit held in St. John v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 139 F.3d 1214, 1218–19 (8th Cir. 1998), that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were “clearly preempted” when the claims arose out of employee working conditions, including “hours of work and shift assignments.”

Here, Gott's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim undeniably arises in part out of the rights granted to her in the CBA, including, most directly, the aspects of the claim relating to her seniority rights, vacation time, and pay. To determine the outrageousness of Defendants' conduct relating to those matters, the CBA will have to be interpreted to understand what rights Gott possessed in the first place and whether they were violated. See id. The same is true for her allegation that Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress by interfering with her job duties and scheduling meetings when she had personal conflicts. In context, these allegations revolve at least in part around McKinney's criticism of Gott for educating co-workers regarding union activities and Gott's disagreements with Bell and others about her rights and responsibilities as union steward and whether she was entitled to union representation during after-hours meetings. The CBA will have to be interpreted to evaluate these claims so that the factfinder will know whether McKinney's and Bell's criticisms were valid. See id.; Williams, 582 F.3d at 882.

Moreover, unlike Gott's defamation claim, the Court cannot split Gott's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim into “preempted” and “not preempted” parts because the outrageousness of Defendants' conduct must be evaluated in light of the employment relationship as a whole. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 882 (“However, one can only evaluate the outrageousness of the [employer's] conduct ․ in light of what the parties have agreed to in the [collective bargaining agreement].”). In other words, the Court cannot set the CBA aside for any aspect of Gott's claim. See id. This is unlike a defamation claim, in which the truth or falsity of each allegedly false statement is analyzed one-at-a-time. See, e.g., Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 48–50 (Iowa 2018) (analyzing each statement individually). It follows that Gott's intentional inflection of emotional distress claim is completely preempted, and thus Defendants properly removed the case to federal court. See Minnesota by Ellison, 63 F.4th at 709.

G. Gott's Remaining Claims Are Not Completely Preempted Because They Can Be Proven Without Interpreting the CBA.

Gott's remaining claims are for sex discrimination, disability discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation. The first three are not completely preempted because the rights giving rise to those claims come at least in part from sources independent of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Deneen v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 439 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that state law complaint for disability discrimination was not preempted because the employee's rights arose under state law, not the collective bargaining agreement); Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). Similarly, the retaliation claim is not completely preempted. See Markham, 861 F.3d at 758. This case is not like King v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 4:23-CV-00069-RGE-WPK, 2024 WL 1832428, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 27, 2024), where preemption was held to exist because the plaintiff cited the collective bargaining agreement throughout his state court pleading.

V. CONCLUSION.

Although most of Gott's claims are not completely preempted by the LMRA, her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is completely preempted. Removal jurisdiction therefore exists, and Gott's Motion to Remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 7th day of November, 2024.

Stephen H. Locher UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE