MUTASIM IBRAHIM ABDOULRAHMAN NOUR v. TODD BLANCHE MARKWAYNE MULLIN TODD LYONS DAVID EASTERWOOD QUINN RIESS (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Mutasim Ibrahim Abdoulrahman Nour has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his immigration detention violates the Accardi doctrine. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29–36]. He seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a bond hearing. Federal Respondents resist. [ECF No. 9]. For the reasons that follow, the petition is DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Nour is a citizen of Sudan. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 7]. He unlawfully entered the United States on July 7, 2024. Id. ¶ 13. He was apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and placed in Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) custody without being admitted or paroled. Id. He has been in federal custody, without a bond hearing, ever since. Id.

Nour applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Id. ¶ 14. An immigration judge found that a militia in Sudan had abducted him, held him captive for ten days, and forced him to perform labor under the threat of death. [ECF No. 9 ¶ 17]. He then escaped, traveling through Africa, Europe, and South America before reaching the United States. Id. Despite these findings, the immigration judge denied his requests for relief. Id. He was ordered removed to Sudan. Id.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding Nour's CAT claim for reconsideration. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 14]. On remand, Nour's application for CAT withholding was granted. Id. ¶ 15. DHS appealed. Id. ¶ 16. That appeal remains pending. Nour has also appealed the denial of his asylum and withholding of removal claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id. ¶ 17. That appeal is being held in abeyance pending the BIA's resolution of DHS's appeal. Id.

On June 17, 2026, Nour filed this petition, alleging that his detention violates the Accardi doctrine. Id. ¶¶ 29–36. He cites a 2004 internal ICE memorandum (the “Garcia Memorandum”) stating that it is generally ICE's “policy to favor release of [noncitizens] who have been granted protection relief by an immigration judge, absent exceptional concerns such as national security issues or danger to the community and absent any requirement under law to detain.” Id. ¶ 31 (quoting Memorandum from Michael J. Garcia, Detention Policy Where an Immigration Judge Has Granted Asylum and ICE Has Appealed (Feb. 9, 2004)); see also [ECF No. 1-1 at 4]. The memorandum adds that ICE may continue detention pending appeal if a Field Office Director concludes that it is appropriate. [ECF No. 1-1 at 4]. In 2021, the Acting Director of ICE reaffirmed this policy, explaining that it exists to ensure that ICE's “limited detention resources are utilized appropriately.” [ECF No. 11-1 at 4]. Nour contends that the Garcia Memorandum requires his release while DHS's appeal is pending. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 34].

Federal Respondents contend that the Accardi doctrine applies only to violations of statutory or regulatory rights, not internal policy memoranda, and is thus inapplicable here. [ECF No. 9 at 10–11]. Additionally, they argue that Nour is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and that internal policy documents cannot supersede statutory detention obligations. Id. at 2, 11–13. Finally, they note that ICE has since departed from the policy set out in the 22-year-old Garcia Memorandum. Id. at 13.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal courts have statutory authority to hear habeas corpus petitions from persons claiming to be held in custody in violation of the Constitution, federal laws, or treaties of the United States. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (citation omitted). This authority extends “to those in immigration detention.” Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 770 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305–06 (2001)). Habeas petitioners bear the burden of showing that their detention is unlawful. Phongsavanh v. Williams, 809 F. Supp. 3d 864, 867 (S.D. Iowa 2025).

The Accardi doctrine, established in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), “bars administrative agencies from taking action ‘inconsistent with their internal regulations when it would affect individual rights.’ ” United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The relevant inquiry is whether Nour was deprived of any “rights guaranteed him by the statute or by the regulations issued pursuant thereto.” Accardi, 347 U.S. at 265. “ ‘Regulations with the force and effect of law supplement the bare bones’ of federal statutes,” and even when given broad discretion, “agencies must follow their own ‘existing valid regulations.’ ” Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 335 (D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266, 268).

The general rule is that the Accardi doctrine “does not apply to an agency's internal memoranda, at least those that are neither designed to protect individual rights nor intended to have the force of law.” Orellana v. Bondi, 141 F.4th 560, 566 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2021)). When that is the case, a familiar principle governs: “it is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it.” Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1970) (quoting NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1953)).

III. ANALYSIS

Nour's petition must be dismissed. [ECF No. 1]. He does not cite any statute or regulation in support of his Accardi claim, instead relying solely on the Garcia Memorandum—an internal agency memorandum—to allege that his individual rights have been violated. See id. ¶ 31. But that memorandum does not have the force of law, nor does it guarantee Nour any rights imposed by statute or regulation—as required to allege an Accardi violation. 347 U.S. at 265. Rather, it articulates a general discretionary agency policy when addressing similarly situated immigration detainees. [ECF No. 1-1 at 4]. Nour's claim thus fails.

Other district courts within the Eighth Circuit have similarly rejected Accardi claims because the petitioner did not identify a violation of a statutory or regulatory right. See Hanley v. LeJeune, File No. 23-CV-00063 (JMB/TNL), 2024 WL 4589856, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2024). Elsewhere, another district court recently did the same, rejecting an Accardi claim premised on “broad portions of USCIS's Policy Manual” because the plaintiff failed to identify “any specific federal rule or regulation that Defendants allegedly violated.” Patel v. USCIS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-3399-KSM, 2026 WL 1597469, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2026). This critical limitation is rooted in Accardi's plain language, which applies only to the deprivation of rights guaranteed to a petitioner by “statute or by the regulations issued pursuant thereto.” 347 U.S. at 265. A contrary outcome could pose numerous practical issues, many of which appear in the parties' arguments.

For example, Nour concedes that he “is an applicant for admission” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that “the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) detention in Avila includes him.” [ECF No. 10 at 7–8]. He is thus subject to mandatory detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); cf. Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). Nonetheless, Nour argues “that is beside the point of his petition,” because “his detention is contrary to the policy promulgated” in the Garcia Memorandum. [ECF No. 10 at 8].

If the Court accepted Nour's argument, it would bring the Garcia Memorandum into direct conflict with Section 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory detention scheme. Granting him relief would then require the Court to afford more weight to an internal memorandum drafted by an assistant secretary of an Executive Branch agency than to the statutory obligations imposed by an act of Congress. This runs contrary to our scheme of government. An internal memorandum lacking the force of law cannot supersede an act of Congress. Nor does Nour argue that Section 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to the procedural posture here given that he has been granted relief by an immigration judge. To the contrary, he admits that he falls within the meaning of Section 1225(b)(2) without explaining how a policy advanced in an internal agency memorandum trumps a statutorily permissible detention scheme, or how ICE could act to the contrary in light of In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Court previously disagreed with Avila and Hurtado, but that does not give Nour's argument any legal heft or make Avila any less binding.

Regardless, the Supreme Court has suggested that Accardi could apply beyond statutes and regulations promulgated through formal rulemaking. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235–36 (1974). And because the Eighth Circuit has not specifically answered whether Accardi applies to internal agency memoranda, the Court proceeds. Even if Accardi could apply to the Garcia Memorandum, Nour does not satisfy the test. The Garcia Memorandum was not designed to protect individual rights or have the force of law. See Diaz, 986 F.3d at 690. A 2021 reaffirmation of the memorandum stated that its purpose was to ensure “limited detention resources are utilized appropriately.” [ECF No. 11-1]. Accordingly, assuming the Garcia Memorandum remains in effect, it was not intended to protect Nour's rights. See Orellana, 141 F.4th at 566.

Other courts have recently reached this same conclusion. In Z.G. v. Olson, the court rejected an Accardi claim based on the Garcia Memorandum. --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 1279081, at *6 (N.D. Ind. May 11, 2026). It concluded that the “internal guidance expresses merely a general view,” not one having the force of law or established through rulemaking, and that the memorandum was written to benefit the agency, not detainees. Id.

Nour's best argument rests on the continued application of the Garcia Memorandum as outlined in Doe v. Smith, Civil No. 17-11231-LTS, 2017 WL 6509344, at *9 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2017). But Doe is nine years old—a lifetime in the current immigration policy environment—and rests, in part, on the fact that Respondents conceded there was no legal requirement for the noncitizen to be detained. Id. This is a key distinction given that Nour admits he is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2). Nour does not identify any other case favorably adjudicating an Accardi claim rooted in the Garcia Memorandum.

Nour's other citations are also inapposite. Both parties cite Sanchez-Acosta v. Sessions, No. 1:18-CV-00827, 2018 WL 4781177 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2018). But only Nour attempts to use the case as a sword and a shield. He distinguishes Sanchez-Acosta because it does not cite Accardi, but cites the case for the proposition that the Garcia Memorandum has not been withdrawn. [ECF No. 10 at 4–6]. The Court finds his first point most relevant: Sanchez-Acosta is not an Accardi case. And it is certainly not favorable to Nour's position—the court dismissed the Sanchez-Acosta petition because the Garcia Memorandum, and subsequent reaffirmations of the policy within, were insufficient evidence to support the petitioners' legal claims. 2018 WL 4781177, at *4. Similarly, in Kamel v. Lowe, the court made no reference to Accardi; it cited the Garcia Memorandum in passing while granting the petitioner relief on due process grounds because he was no longer an “applicant for admission” under Section 1225(b)(2). 2026 WL 1419135, at *3–5 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2026). Likewise, Tao J. v. Secretary of Homeland Security features no substantive analysis of the Garcia Memorandum, nor does it mention Accardi. Case No. 18-cv-1845 (NED/HB), 2018 WL 8141439, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 2, 2018).

In sum, the Garcia Memorandum does not guarantee Nour any individual rights. It is discretionary policy—designed to preserve agency resources—stating that ICE generally “favor[s] release of aliens who have been granted protection relief” and that government attorneys “should exercise their judgment” when determining what cases warrant appeal “based on the individual facts of each case.” [ECF No. 1-1 at 2, 4]; cf. Biron v. Carvajal, Case No. 20-cv-2110 (WMW/ECW), 2021 WL 4206302, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 16, 2021) (stating that discretionary responsibilities embedded within an agency's “established regulations” do not provide guarantees). Subsequent reaffirmations do not transform a discretionary policy into a guarantee of individual rights; they merely reaffirm the discretionary nature of that policy.

More importantly, Nour asks the Court to stretch Accardi farther than the Eighth Circuit has. In Lee, the Eighth Circuit rejected an Accardi claim, declining to find that a Department of Justice “internal regulation” created any enforceable rights. 274 F.3d at 492–93. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit noted that no case had ever held that the Accardi doctrine applies to the Department of Justice's internal regulations. Id. at 492 (citation omitted). In another immigration case, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it was “doubtful” that an internal agency memorandum establishing procedures for credibility findings in asylum cases “could confer substantive legal benefits upon aliens or bind the INS.” Prokopenko v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court affords Prokopenko less weight given that it does not feature an Accardi analysis, but notes its relevance in predicting how the Eighth Circuit would likely resolve the legal question here. Accordingly, the Court declines Nour's invitation to reach beyond the outer bounds of Eighth Circuit precedent.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court is sympathetic to Nour's position and laments the horrific abuse he suffered in Sudan. But Nour fails to demonstrate that the Accardi doctrine offers him legal refuge. Accordingly, his petition is DISMISSED. [ECF No. 1].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 2nd day of July, 2026.

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT