UNITED STATES v. WILBANKS (2026)

ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant Winston R. Wilbanks was indicted for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and felon in possession of a firearm. [ECF No. 2]. He moves to suppress all evidence—direct and derivative—resulting from law enforcement's warrantless entry into a residence and his hotel room. [ECF No. 34-1 at 4–5]. He also alleges that law enforcement obtained involuntary statements in violation of his Miranda rights which must be suppressed. Id. at 8. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED. [ECF No. 34].

I. BACKGROUND

Davenport police responded to a report of an altercation involving weapons at the Relax Inn just after 3 P.M. on April 4, 2025. When police arrived, they learned that Wilbanks and his associate, Vann Edwards, were purportedly involved in a fight with two individuals outside the hotel. One individual alleged one of the men possessed a gun and threatened to shoot them. The other individual stabbed the armed man with a knife multiple times and disarmed him. These individuals then contacted hotel staff while the injured man jumped a fence and fled the scene in a blue or gray Ford Bronco. Law enforcement later recovered the firearm, but not the magazine.

The owner of the Relax Inn reviewed footage of the altercation. He identified Wilbanks as the man who possessed the firearm and informed law enforcement that Wilbanks was staying in room 126. Wilbanks contacted the hotel during this time, identified himself as the occupant of room 126, stated that he had been stabbed, inquired about the police presence, and requested the return of his firearm. The hotel owner provided police access to Wilbanks's room. Police found a dark gray plastic bag containing an unknown substance in plain view.

Police then began looking for Wilbanks and Edwards. One of the individuals appeared to be familiar with the men, leading police to West 61st Street—an area where Wilbanks and Edwards were known to spend time. There, police found Edwards outside a residence on West 61st Street, carrying a stick. A blue Ford Bronco was parked behind the home.

Law enforcement knocked on the door of the residence. M.N., an adult male, answered. He explained that he lived at the residence, but it was owned by his stepfather. M.N. stated that he was the only person home at the time. Police informed him that they were looking for Wilbanks. M.N. claimed that Wilbanks had been there earlier but had since left. He rejected law enforcement's request to enter and told them to return with a warrant. Police remained outside and began attempting to locate M.N.'s stepfather while they sought a search warrant. M.N. left the door to the home open and sat in a chair just inside the door frame.

After several minutes, M.N. began pointing at officers to get their attention before making silent gestures—raising his eyebrows, tilting his head, and motioning toward a hallway—suggesting that someone was inside. Police interpreted this as consent to enter. They asked M.N. if he “wanted to step out” for his safety and observed a bloody shirt on the floor of the living room. M.N. agreed to exit the home, grabbed his dog, and stood by without objection.

Police found Wilbanks hiding in a bedroom closet, suffering from stab wounds. He was arrested and searched. Officers read Wilbanks his Miranda rights and seized his cell phone. Wilbanks confirmed that he understood his rights and that he did not have to speak with police. He then told law enforcement that he had been stabbed multiple times, complained of pain, and repeatedly questioned why he was being arrested.

Law enforcement transported Wilbanks to the hospital and spoke with him approximately 30 minutes later. Wilbanks was in pain but appeared responsive and alert. He discussed his version of the events and denied possessing a firearm.

Officers obtained search warrants for room 126 of the Relax Inn, the residence, and the Ford Bronco. After controlled substances were found in the residence and the Ford Bronco, police obtained an updated search warrant. Inside the Bronco, police found ecstasy pills, methamphetamine, and marijuana packaged in individually sealed bags. Inside the residence, police found bloody clothing, marijuana, a holster, and ammunition. They also found a key to the Ford Bronco inside a jacket Defendant was seen wearing during surveillance.

Wilbanks filed this motion to suppress on March 2, 2026. [ECF No. 34-1]. The Court held a hearing on April 21. [ECF No. 45]. Wilbanks argues that the warrantless searches of the hotel room and residence violated the Fourth Amendment. [ECF No. 34-1 at 5–8]. He also alleges that his statements to law enforcement were involuntary and obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Id. at 8–12. He contends that all resulting evidence should be suppressed. Id. at 12–13.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Warrantless Searches

Wilbanks argues that law enforcement's warrantless entry into his hotel room and the residence cannot be justified by any exception to the warrant requirement and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. [ECF No. 34-1 at 5]. He claims standing to challenge the search of the residence because, he alleges, he was an occasional overnight guest at the home. Id. at 7. He also alleges that M.N.'s non-verbal gestures were erroneously interpreted by police as consent to enter. Id. Nonetheless, even if consent could be inferred, Wilbanks contends that M.N. lacked authority to consent to a search of the entire home. Id. at 7–8.

Additionally, Wilbanks argues that the warrantless search of the hotel room was unlawful. Id. at 8. He claims that law enforcement's stated purpose for entering the room—a protective sweep—lacked a sufficient basis because the suspects involved in the altercation had reportedly left the area, and no exigency to enter without a warrant thus existed. Id.

The Government asserts that Wilbanks lacks standing to challenge the search of the residence and, even if he had standing, entry was independently justified by (1) M.N.'s consent and (2) the Emergency Aid Doctrine. [ECF No. 39 at 6–9]. The Government also contends that the challenge to the hotel room search is moot because nothing of evidentiary value was found. Id. at 5–6. The Court agrees.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of the person, houses, papers, and effects. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A defendant may assert a Fourth Amendment violation only if he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched. United States v. Juneau, 73 F.4th 607, 613 (8th Cir. 2023). An overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that location, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), but an individual who is on the premises for a short period of time does not. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998).

Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable absent an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Hernandez Leon, 379 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2004). Consent is one such exception. The Government bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 957 F.3d 887, 895 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Emergency aid presents another exception. Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. ––––, 146 S. Ct. 500, 505, 223 L.Ed.2d 382 (2026). “[P]olice may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009).

Here, the search of the residence did not violate Wilbanks's Fourth Amendment rights. Whether Wilbanks had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence hinges on an examination of all facts related to his presence there. United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2003). Those facts demonstrate that he lacks standing to raise this challenge.

There is no evidence to support Wilbanks's assertion that he was an “on and off guest of the residence.” [ECF No. 34-1 at 4]. Even if he was, that would not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence on the day it was searched. Wilbanks was staying at the Relax Inn. He retreated to the residence only after he was stabbed outside the hotel and fled. He was not inside the residence for long; law enforcement immediately responded to the altercation, promptly located the Ford Bronco behind the home, and made contact with M.N. Even assuming Wilbanks had previously slept at the residence on some prior occasion, that does not mean he was an overnight guest there on the day in question. Rather, the facts make clear that he was “simply permitted on the premises” and thus lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, 119 S.Ct. 469.

Even if Wilbanks had standing, his Fourth Amendment challenge would fail because the search was justified under the Emergency Aid Doctrine. Law enforcement knew that Wilbanks had recently been stabbed multiple times. Behind the residence, they located a Ford Bronco matching the description of the vehicle Wilbanks was allegedly driving. M.N. told law enforcement that Wilbanks had been inside the home briefly but had since left. However, as the conversation continued, M.N. appeared to suggest Wilbanks was still inside, and law enforcement saw a bloody shirt on the floor. When law enforcement called out for Wilbanks, he did not respond. Cf. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (entry was lawful when reasonable officer could conclude someone was inside the residence but unable to respond). These facts gave officers “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance was needed.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49, 130 S.Ct. 546 (cleaned up) (citation omitted).

Consent provides an independent basis for the search as well. A reasonable officer could have believed that M.N. consented to the search. See United States v. Pena-Ponce, 588 F.3d 579, 584 (8th Cir. 2009). Consent may be inferred “from words, gestures, or other conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). The totality of the circumstances must show consent was voluntarily given. United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 2010).

Although M.N. did not own the residence, he had common authority over the premises to consent to the search. See United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 2008). He clearly stated that he resided there, and there was no indication that his authority to consent to a search was limited in any way. Even if M.N. lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the bedroom, officers could have reasonably relied on his apparent authority to do so. See United States v. Amratiel, 622 F.3d 914, 915–16 (8th Cir. 2010) (common authority or apparent authority will suffice).

M.N. spoke with police for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. When he initially denied law enforcement entry and denied that Wilbanks was inside, police remained outside and respected his denial. As the encounter continued, M.N.'s demeanor softened. He sought an officer's attention and gestured toward the inside of the home—raising his eyebrow, tilting his head, and pointing toward a hallway. When an officer calmly asked if M.N. “wanted to step out,” he grabbed his dog and walked outside of his own volition. M.N. then discussed details of the home with law enforcement and stood by without objection. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed M.N. voluntarily consented to the search. See Johnson, 619 F.3d at 918; United States v. Rodriguez, 834 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2016) (reversing grant of a motion to suppress because resident's non-verbal actions, including opening the door and moving aside, were sufficient).

The challenge to the search of Wilbanks's hotel room is moot. Nothing of evidentiary value was found there, so there is nothing to suppress. Although subsequently obtained search warrants noted law enforcement's discovery of a gray bag containing an unknown substance, those warrants were supported by probable cause even without that information. See, e.g., [ECF No. 39-5]; cf. United States v. Mayo, 97 F.4th 552, 555 (8th Cir. 2024) (reviewing search warrant for probable cause after omitting allegedly unlawfully collected evidence). The challenge thus fails.

B. Statements Made to Law Enforcement

Wilbanks asserts that his statements to law enforcement should be suppressed because they were involuntarily made and obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. [ECF No. 34-1 at 8]. He acknowledges making various statements to police after being read his Miranda rights, however, he alleges that his injuries, pain, and medication prevented him from executing a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Id. at 9–10. He also independently alleges that his statements were involuntary and the product of coercion. Id. at 10–11. More specifically, he claims that he was either suffering the effects of a serious injury known to law enforcement, under the influence of medication, or receiving medical treatment when he was questioned. Id. These arguments overlap, and Wilbanks fails to define the exact contours of each.

The Government contends that Wilbanks intelligently and voluntarily agreed to speak with law enforcement after being advised of his Miranda rights. [ECF No. 39 at 10]. It notes that Wilbanks acknowledged hearing and understanding the Miranda warnings before speaking freely and coherently with law enforcement at the residence and the hospital. Id. at 12.

Miranda warnings “are required when interrogation is ‘initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” United States v. New, 491 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In such scenarios, individuals are entitled to counsel, but may make a knowing and voluntary waiver of their Fifth Amendment rights after receiving these warnings. United States v. Rooney, 63 F.4th 1160, 1167 (8th Cir. 2023).

The inquiry into whether an individual's waiver was knowing and voluntary focuses on the totality of the circumstances, asking whether the individual's relinquishment of his rights “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). A defendant knowingly waives his rights if he acts “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 483 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). In assessing voluntariness, courts consider “the degree of police coercion, the length of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, and the defendant's maturity, education, physical condition, and mental condition.” United States v. Magallon, 984 F.3d 1263, 1284 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). A waiver is involuntary if “the overall impact of the interrogation caused the defendant's will to be overborne.” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, a statement to law enforcement “is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant's will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination.” United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Here, there is no evidence that police extracted statements from Wilbanks with threats, violence, or promises. See id. Law enforcement read Wilbanks his Miranda rights shortly after finding him hiding in a closet and detaining him at the residence. He clearly articulated that he understood his rights and that he did not have to speak with law enforcement. He described his injuries and winced when officers attempted to help him to his feet. He questioned why he was going to jail but stopped when officers read him his Miranda rights. During the brief exchange at the residence, Wilbanks was responsive and competent.

Immediately after being read his rights, he asked law enforcement to recover his belt buckle from the floor. When told he would be taken to the hospital before receiving an opportunity to speak with officers, he repeatedly asked why he was being arrested. Shortly thereafter, he began recounting his version of the altercation. He recalled the exact number of wounds on certain body parts, repeatedly denied ever possessing a firearm, and asked to use his phone to call his girlfriend. The totality of the circumstances overwhelmingly indicates that Wilbanks voluntarily provided statements to law enforcement at the residence and knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See Magallon, 984 F.3d at 1284. Wilbanks has a lengthy criminal history. He confirmed that he understood his rights and that he did not have to speak with law enforcement, then engaged in conversation anyway. There is no evidence of police coercion. The conversation at the residence lasted just a few minutes. Although Wilbanks was in pain, he demonstrated a clear state of mind with a firm understanding of the events that had transpired. His will was not overborne by his physical condition or police coercion. See id.

The same is true regarding the questioning at the hospital. Although Wilbanks was given an unidentified medication, that alone “does not show that a defendant's will has been overborne if there is evidence that the patient answered ‘reasonably’ and understood what was occurring.” United States v. Mattox, 27 F.4th 668, 675 (8th Cir. 2022). That is the case here. Wilbanks was of sound mental capacity—able to recall his social security number, height and weight, and medical history. He sat up in the hospital bed and maneuvered himself with minimal assistance.

Wilbanks also recounted the events of that day again. He claimed that he did not exit the residence when law enforcement arrived because he was scared. He described the altercation at the Relax Inn at length, speaking clearly, raising his voice, and gesturing with his hands while recalling specific details. He repeatedly denied ever possessing a firearm and asked why the man who stabbed him had not been charged with a crime. Additionally, he voluntarily reinitiated the conversation with police between discussions with medical professionals.

Even assuming that Wilbanks's medication had an intoxicating effect, there is no indication that his pain, medication, or wounds caused his will to be overborne. See United States v. Harris, 64 F.4th 999, 1002–03 (8th Cir. 2023). He was alert, coherent, and responsive to questions. Id. His criminal history and his consistent refusal to acknowledge possession of the firearm reflect a clear understanding of the alleged crimes—a consideration that cuts against him. See id.; cf. Mattox, 27 F.4th at 675 (statements in hospital room while on pain medication and recovering from gunshot wound were not involuntary).

United States v. Jones, 842 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2016) is instructive. There, police read a defendant his Miranda rights before questioning him while he was under the influence of prescription medication. Id. at 1083. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress finding that the district court did not clearly err in concluding the defendant's statements were voluntary even though he spoke slowly and answered some questions unresponsively. Id. Here, Wilbanks's speech pattern did not appear to change, no intoxicating substance has been identified, and he was responsive throughout his interactions with police. The Court thus concludes that Wilbanks voluntarily spoke with law enforcement and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.

C. Suppression of Direct and Indirect Evidence

Finally, Wilbanks contends that all evidence seized as a result of the search of the residence and his statements to law enforcement must be suppressed. [ECF No. 34-1 at 12–13]. He alleges that all evidence obtained by law enforcement—including his arrest and statements to law enforcement—derived from the warrantless entry of the residence. Id. at 13. Then, this evidence was used to obtain a search warrant for the residence and the Ford Bronco. Id.

The exclusionary rule applies to both the direct product of an illegal search as well as indirect evidence later discovered as a result. See United States v. Marasco, 487 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 2007); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). The rule is designed to deter Fourth Amendment violations, and it prevents the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also United States v. Houck, 888 F.3d 957, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2018).

The Court has already concluded that Wilbanks's challenge to the search of the residence fails. Suppression of evidence directly obtained from this search is thus not appropriate. Nor is suppression of derivative evidence later obtained as a result of the search. This conclusion extends to using that information to obtain search warrants, arresting Wilbanks, seizing his cell phone, and his subsequent statements to law enforcement.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Wilbanks's arguments fail. He lacks standing to challenge law enforcement's entry into the residence and, even if he had standing, the warrantless entry was justified. His challenge to the search of the hotel room is moot because nothing of evidentiary value was found in the room and the subsequent search warrants were supported by probable cause independent of the gray bag. Additionally, Wilbanks made voluntary statements to law enforcement after he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Because neither the search of the residence nor Wilbanks's statements to law enforcement violated his constitutional rights, suppression of direct and derivative evidence is not appropriate. The motion to suppress is DENIED. [ECF No. 34].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE