JACOB PAUTSCH 15263 REVOCABLE TRUST v. 400 RIVER LLC PETER STOPULOS CONDON ADAM HEHLKE (2025)

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Jacob Pautsch refiled a breach-of-contract claim following the dismissal of his first lawsuit for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [ECF No. 1].¹ Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. [ECF No. 4]. Because Plaintiff again fails to establish complete diversity of citizenship and he continues to engage in sanctionable conduct, Defendants' motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendants' reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Attorney Stephen T. Fieweger is ordered to SHOW CAUSE.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his first breach-of-contract action on May 6, 2024. Case No. 1, ECF No. 1. He alleged that Defendants had defaulted on a promissory note and invoked the Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendants moved to dismiss arguing that Plaintiff had failed to establish complete diversity of citizenship. Case No. 1, ECF No. 8. The Court agreed and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Case No. 1, ECF No. 18.

Throughout the litigation, Plaintiff engaged in a course of sanctionable conduct. He repeatedly harassed, threatened, and sought to intimidate Defendants, their families, their business associates, and defense counsel. The Court catalogued numerous instances of this misconduct conduct in the dismissal order. See id.

Plaintiff began his pattern of misconduct by threatening FBI raids and criminal charges, while suggesting that a Defendant's children would not have a father around. Id. at 5. He also resorted to name-calling in correspondence with defense counsel and contacted a senior partner at counsel's law firm, requesting that the partner “take” the case from defense counsel because Plaintiff needed “a worthy adversary” in the form of “a lawyer with a working brain.” Id.

Following Defendants' motion for sanctions, Plaintiff's misconduct escalated. Id. at 6. Specifically, he contacted the wife of an individual Defendant accusing him of marital infidelity. Id. More troubling still, he warned this woman that his brother—whom he described as a CIA contractor—would appear at her children's school event, instructing her to “say hi” to him while declaring that she should prepare for her husband “to be Federally imprisoned.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff further advised her that the FBI wanted to speak with her and implied that she would be indicted if she did not comply. Case No. 1, ECF No. 15-2.

Plaintiff also continued to harass defense counsel. Namely, he accused counsel of offering money and designer shoes to his ex-girlfriend in exchange for sex. Case No. 1, ECF No. 18 at 6. There is no evidence to support these allegations. Defendants and counsel unequivocally deny them.

This is not unique behavior for Plaintiff. He has a history of similar behavior in other lawsuits, including a recent sanction for contempt. Id. at 4. In a state court case, the presiding judge expressed regret that he lacked authority to award attorney's fees for what he termed Plaintiff's “reprehensible conduct”—engaging in extrajudicial threats and harassment after being told to stop—and expressly invited an appellate review of that determination. Id. at 10. The judge described Plaintiff's conduct during trial as “boorish, combative, verbally abusive, disrespectful and misleading with the Court and the jury.” Id. at 5. Although this Court acknowledged it could not sanction Plaintiff for conduct in state proceedings, it noted in the dismissal order that those proceedings placed Plaintiff on notice that such behavior was “unacceptable.” Id. at 10.

Despite Plaintiff's misconduct conduct in the first case, the Court initially declined to sanction him. However, the Court explicitly admonished Plaintiff that his “behavior and extrajudicial communications” were “wildly inappropriate and beyond the pale.” Id. at 14. The Court noted that Plaintiff had “continued to harass and threaten others in this case even after he was put on notice that Defendants were seeking sanctions for the very same conduct.” Id. at 12. As such, the Court informed Plaintiff it had “no doubt” that his conduct was sanctionable and that his communications—“filled with crude insults, veiled (and not so veiled threats), and sometimes outlandish insinuations” had “no place in litigation.” Id. at 10. The Court ultimately dismissed Plaintiff's case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the deputy clerk entered judgment accordingly. Case No. 1, ECF No. 19.

That same day, Plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment, contending that the Court had erred by entering judgment in favor of Defendants when it had “simply granted a motion to dismiss without prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Case No. 1, ECF No. 20. The motion identified no procedural rule, cited no legal authority, and failed to comply with the Local Rules. Defendants moved to sanction Plaintiff with attorney's fees. Case No. 1, ECF No. 21.

When confronted with the utter deficiency of his motion, Plaintiff doubled down. He claimed that every pleading he had filed “was appropriate, was supported with legal authority and did not constitute bad faith.” Case No. 1, ECF No. 22. His response, predictably, offered no legal authority to support the requested relief. Id.

The Court subsequently denied Plaintiff's motion and awarded attorney's fees to Defendants. Case No. 1, ECF No. 24. The Court characterized Plaintiff's motion as “merely another chapter in a book of bad-faith conduct” observing that Plaintiff had repeatedly engaged in sanctionable conduct; filed a motion to vacate devoid of any legal support; and advanced a position that was “flatly contradicted by case law.” Id. at 3–4, 7. Because past warnings had been insufficient to deter Plaintiff from engaging in such conduct, the Court imposed monetary sanctions. Id. at 6. It ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendants' attorney's fees incurred in defending against the baseless motion to vacate. Id. at 7. The Court warned that if Plaintiff continued to engage in bad-faith conduct, it would impose additional sanctions. Id.

On October 31, 2024, Plaintiff refiled his breach-of-contract claim. [ECF No. 1]. Defendants again moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) arguing Plaintiff had failed to establish diversity jurisdiction. [ECF No. 4]. Plaintiff did not file a timely response. Rather, he spent his time engaging in the very same sanctionable behavior: extrajudicial communications targeting Defendants. [ECF No. 7-1].

This time, Plaintiff contacted multiple business associates of an individual Defendant suggesting that he was “a scammer” engaged in “fraudulent business practices.” Id. at 1. He declared his intent to publicize allegations that Defendant was committing “ongoing felonious fraud ․ similar to his fathers (sic) fraud and imprisonment” adding that he had already reported Defendant to the government. Id. Plaintiff informed one business associate that they would “soon be implicated” in “criminal fraud” with Defendant and advised that investigators would contact him “sooner rather than later.” Id. He threatened another individual with litigation “on behalf of 8 different companies and non-profits” while referencing his “Tunisia team” that was purportedly investigating this man's business practices. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff eventually filed an untimely one paragraph resistance to Defendants' motion to dismiss. He argued that Defendants had defaulted on the promissory note by tendering payment to “Jacob Pautsch,” in his individual capacity, rather than “Jacob Pautsch, as Trustee of the 15263 Revocable Trust,” as allegedly required by the promissory note. [ECF No. 8].

Plaintiff supplemented this resistance on January 30, 2025, prompting two responses from Defendants on February 4. Defendants' second response revealed that Plaintiff had once again flouted the Court's dismissal order by resuming his campaign of harassment against defense counsel. [ECF No. 11]. This time, Plaintiff claimed that counsel had orchestrated an unspecified scheme known to “the bureaus in each respective jurisdiction and other agencies.” Id. He added that “Senior Army Officers have been hearing about [counsel] for years” and warned that counsel would not “get away with this.” Id. Defendants again requested dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for this conduct. Id.

Although Plaintiff left “this” undefined, the timing of his communication points to the ten-count criminal information filed against him the previous week. That document charged Plaintiff with three Class C felonies for committing a hate crime, intimidation with a dangerous weapon, and stalking using a technological device; five Class D felonies for extortion (including extortion of a Defendant in this case) and bribery; and two aggravated misdemeanors for interference with judicial process and witness tampering. See State v. Pautsch, Crim. No. FECR444853, Trial Information (Iowa Dist. Ct. Jan. 28, 2025).

On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff again defied the Court's admonition by resuming his harassment of the same Defendant. [ECF No. 16]. Plaintiff now emailed a business associate, the United States Department of Justice, and the Internal Revenue Service, alleging that Defendant and his wife were committing “egregious tax violations.” [ECF No. 16-1]. Plaintiff forwarded this email to the CEO of a real estate company—a close business associate of Defendant and his wife—instructing her to “separate yourself from these two as soon as possible.” Id. He then referenced the CEO's brother's past “battles” with the FBI, suggesting both the CEO and her son would face similar consequences if they continued to associate with Defendant and his wife. Id.

This harassment set the foundation for Plaintiff's August 5 filing. [ECF No. 14]. In this “supplemental response,” filed without leave six months after Defendants' last motion, Plaintiff amplified his tax-violation accusation against Defendant and his wife. He attached a Notice of Federal Tax Lien for unpaid taxes between 2013 and 2017, alleging this document impeached the credibility of Defendant, but cited no legal authority to support that proposition. Id.

B. Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Against this background, the Court turns to Defendants' pending motion to dismiss. The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's complaint and accepted as true for purposes of Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).

Defendants executed a promissory note with Plaintiff on March 15, 2024, for $275,000. [ECF No. 1]. Defendant 400 W River LLC assumed the obligation to make monthly payments, while Defendants Peter M. Stopulos, J.J. Condon, and Adam Hehlke signed as guarantors. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. The note provided that upon default, the entire balance would accelerate and become immediately due. Id. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants defaulted by failing to make the April 1, 2024, payment to him in his capacity as Trustee of the 15263 Revocable Trust. Id. ¶ 7. Defendants allegedly continued in default by failing to tender subsequent payments to Plaintiff as trustee. Id. ¶ 10. According to Plaintiff, this default renders Defendants jointly and severally liable for $275,000, plus a 5% interest rate on the unpaid balance and the costs of collection. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.

Defendants' move to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff again failed to establish diversity of citizenship. [ECF No. 4]. Alternatively, they argue that Plaintiff's claim fails on the merits and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. They further request dismissal with prejudice as a sanction. [ECF No. 11].

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff has the burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Little Otters of Love, LLC v. Rosenberg, 724 F. App'x 498, 501 (8th Cir. 2018); accord Great Rivers Habitat All. v. FEMA, 615 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction “ ‘may not be shifted to’ the other party”) (citation omitted). Diversity jurisdiction is a statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction that “requires ‘complete diversity, that is where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship’ ” at the time the lawsuit is filed. Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 830, 839 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

To establish state citizenship, an individual must be “physically present in the state and have the intent to make his home there indefinitely.” Eckerberg v. Inter-State Studio & Publ'g Co., 860 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also Altimore v. Mt. Mercy Coll., 420 F.3d 763, 768–69 (8th Cir. 2005). Once established, state citizenship continues until the individual acquires new state citizenship elsewhere. Altimore, 420 F.3d at 769.

A factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction may be resolved through evidence beyond the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits. Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914–15 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Thus, when diversity is challenged, courts may consider “[o]bjective factors” such as “declarations, exercise of civil and political rights, payment of taxes, obtaining of licenses, location of business or occupation, and ownership of property.” Lewis, 40 F.4th at 839–40 (quoting Eckerberg, 860 F.3d at 1085). However, courts give “little weight” to a “litigant's self-serving ‘statements of intention ․ when in conflict with facts.’ ” Eckerberg, 860 F.3d at 1085 (citation omitted). Further, the pleadings carry “no presumptive truthfulness” and “the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

B. Sanctions

“District courts have the inherent power to ‘fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.’ ” Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 844 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)). This power must be exercised with “restraint and discretion.” Schlafly v. Eagle Forum, 970 F.3d 924, 936–37 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Courts should invoke their inherent authority only when, “if in the informed discretion of the court,” neither the U.S. Code nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “are up to the task.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. Nonetheless, once properly invoked, this inherent power to sanction parties “reaches conduct both before and during litigation as long as that conduct abuses the judicial process in some manner.” Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 751 (8th Cir. 2004).

“[E]xtrajudicial communications intended to harass or intimidate opposing parties [and] their counsel” constitute “[a]busive conduct sanctionable under the Court's inherent power.” Jaye v. Barr, No. C19-0121-LTS, 2021 WL 1148953, at *10 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 25, 2021) (quoting Fredin v. Middlecamp, No. 17-CV-03058 (SRN/HB), 2020 WL 6867424, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2020)). Dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate when the conduct reflects “ ‘willfulness or bad-faith’ conduct in litigation.” Deering v. Lockheed Martin, 115 F.4th 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up) (citation omitted); see also Givens v. A.H. Robins Co., 751 F.2d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1984) (dismissal with prejudice is appropriate in “cases of willful disobedience”). Whether a court without subject matter jurisdiction retains inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice, however, remains an open question. See Borchardt v. Minnesota, 264 F. App'x 542, 542–43 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997); but see Ben E. Keith Co. v. Dining All., Inc., 80 F.4th 695, 699–701 (5th Cir. 2023).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. Despite multiple opportunities to establish complete diversity of citizenship, he has failed to carry his burden and the Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Further, Plaintiff's bad-faith conduct constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. Monetary sanctions are likewise warranted for Plaintiff's willful defiance of the Court's order to cease extrajudicial communications intended to harass, threaten, and intimidate Defendants, their families, business associates, and defense counsel. Additionally, Attorney Fieweger is ordered to show cause why his August 5 filing was not presented for an improper purpose and was warranted by existing law or nonfrivolous grounds. [ECF No. 14].

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Plaintiff alleges that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over his claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1332. It is undisputed that all Defendants are citizens of Iowa. Plaintiff claims that he is a citizen of Florida and that the 15263 Revocable Trust is registered in Florida.

Plaintiff fails to carry his burden of establishing complete diversity. As courts have repeatedly held, complaints must include factual allegations detailing each party's state citizenship, “conclusory allegations of law” are not enough. Stalley v. Cath. Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Taylor v. Wal-Mart Stores E. I, LP, Case No. 4:22-cv-00976-MTS, 2022 WL 4547020, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2022). Despite the Court's prior dismissal for failure to establish diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff's refiled complaint contains only a single legal conclusion that, “Jacob Pautsch is a citizen of Florida.” [ECF No. 1]. Without factual allegations supporting Plaintiff's claimed citizenship, the complaint is facially deficient.

Plaintiff's evidentiary submission in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss fares no better. For example, his September 2024 declaration of domicile states that he resides in Florida with the intent to remain permanently. [ECF No. 6-1]. As with his driver's license in the previous case, Plaintiff redacts critical information on this document including his current home address and—most importantly—the location where he maintains another place of abode. Id. This declaration fails to establish his Florida citizenship at the time he refiled this case. Eckerberg, 860 F.3d at 1085. Given the evidence suggesting that Plaintiff may be a citizen of Iowa, his repetition of this same deficiency appears deliberate. Case No. 1, ECF No. 11 at 2–3.

Whether Plaintiff or the Trust maintains a residence in Iowa bears directly on the Court's jurisdictional analysis. To the extent that Plaintiff is concerned about publicly revealing this information, the Court has already authorized him to file it under seal. Id. at 3. His persistent failure to comply with the Court's straightforward directive on this matter underscores his inability to establish complete diversity. Cf. Henderson v. Renaissance Grand Hotel, 267 F. App'x 496, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that district courts may dismiss an action for failure to comply with court orders).

Plaintiff further undermines his position by claiming that he was previously a citizen of Illinois. Although Plaintiff is well aware that residency and domicile are not synonymous, his declaration of domicile lists Davenport, Iowa, as his previous residence. [ECF No. 6–1]. During the same year he now claims that he was a citizen of Illinois, he claimed a homestead tax exemption on property in Davenport. Case No. 1, ECF No. 8-8. Plaintiff admits that he maintained this tax exemption until July 2024. [ECF No. 6-1 at 4]. This evidence strongly contradicts his Illinois citizenship claim and suggests that he was domiciled in Iowa during that period.

Further, Plaintiff offers no explanation for the substantial evidence of his continuing Iowa citizenship. Just four months before he refiled this case, Plaintiff's brother transferred a residential property in Davenport to the 15263 Revocable Trust. [ECF No. 7-3]. A police report from two weeks after refiling shows that law enforcement previously contacted Plaintiff at that address. [ECF No. 7–4 at 2]. Additionally, Plaintiff serves as CEO of DIFCO, Inc., an Iowa corporation, further demonstrating his strong, ongoing connection with the state. [ECF No. 4-10]. Moreover, after refiling, a state court found that Plaintiff was a resident of Davenport. [ECF No. 7-2 at 1]. Plaintiff has not denied any of these facts.

In sum, it is the Court's job to weigh the evidence. On one hand, Plaintiff offers only a legal conclusion that he is a citizen of Florida and a self-serving declaration with critical information redacted. On the other hand, Defendants' have submitted evidence that Plaintiff claimed an Iowa homestead tax exemption for years preceding this lawsuit, serves as CEO of an Iowa corporation, was found by a state court to be an Iowa resident after refiling, and owns residential property in Iowa through his trust. The balance of this evidence favors Defendants.

Plaintiff has once again fallen short of proving complete diversity, having shown neither Florida residence nor intent to remain there when he refiled suit. Lewis, 40 F.4th at 839. The Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the case must be dismissed. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). As such, the Court cannot reach the merits. Id. (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868)); Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that courts lack “authority to reach the merits” without jurisdiction).

The Court does not have the authority to dismiss with prejudice without subject matter jurisdiction. See Dalton v. NPC Int'l, Inc., 932 F.3d 693, 696 (8th Cir. 2019). However, if the Court had this authority, it would exercise it. Plaintiff has received three opportunities to establish diversity jurisdiction. He has failed each time. It is not the Court's role to act as a “ ‘super-lawyer,’ here to correct counsel's errors and omissions, or to provide a roadmap as to how to draft a proper complaint” and, at some point, the Court has a duty to prevent Plaintiff from treating his complaints as “risk-free trial balloon[s]” with the expectation that the Court will continue to detail the deficiencies. Rowayton Venture Grp. LLC v. McCarthy, Civil Action No. 19-12240-FDS, 2020 WL 6136377, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 19, 2020).

When Plaintiff's first complaint proved deficient, the Court allowed him to supplement. Case No. 1, ECF No. 11. When the supplemental evidence fell short, the Court explained the deficiencies, dismissed without prejudice, and permitted Plaintiff to refile. Case No. 1, ECF No. 18. Plaintiff then refiled a remarkably similar complaint again lacking factual allegations and evidentiary support. [ECF No. 1]. The evidence Plaintiff later offered repeated the same defects identified in the first case. His persistent failure to provide sufficient factual support, coupled with his apparent disregard for the Court's guidance, raises serious questions about the good faith basis for his jurisdictional allegations.

B. Sanctions

1. Plaintiff's Conduct

The Court must address Plaintiff's egregious misconduct while navigating unsettled law regarding its authority to dismiss cases without subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has implied that district courts may not dismiss with prejudice as a sanction absent jurisdiction. See Borchardt, 264 F. App'x at 542–43 (modifying judgment dismissing case with prejudice to dismiss without prejudice because the district court lacked jurisdiction). The Third Circuit has similarly concluded that such dismissal would impermissibly adjudicate the merits. In re Orthopedic, 132 F.3d at 156. The Fifth Circuit reaches the opposite conclusion, permitting dismissal with prejudice because this sanction “does not require the district court to assess a claim's merits, weigh the evidence proffered in support of or against the claim, or decide an issue that bears on the claim's legal substance.” Dining All., 80 F.4th at 700. Accordingly, the Court must carefully consider what sanctions remain within its authority while still addressing conduct that cannot be tolerated in our legal system.

For thirteen months, Plaintiff has engaged in a campaign of extrajudicial communications designed to harass, threaten, and intimidate Defendants, their families, business associates, and defense counsel. Such conduct, in defiance of the Court's admonition, constitutes bad faith warranting sanctions under the Court's inherent authority. Schlafly, 970 F.3d at 936–37 (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46); see also A.H. Robins Co., 751 F.2d at 263. This behavior abuses the judicial process and undermines the integrity of these proceedings.

Several attempts to curb this misconduct through less severe measures have been made, all without success. When Defendants first moved for sanctions, the Court declined to impose them but explicitly warned Plaintiff that his extrajudicial communications intended to harass, threaten, and intimidate must cease. Case No. 1, ECF No. 18. Rather than comply, Plaintiff intensified his harassment, contacting a Defendant's wife and making veiled threats regarding events at their children's school.

Within six weeks of the Court's warning, Plaintiff contacted business associates of a Defendant, accusing him of “ongoing felonious fraud” and warning they would be implicated in “criminal fraud” through their association. [ECF No. 7-1]. Two months later, while facing state charges for witness tampering and extortion involving the same Defendant, Plaintiff sent harassing communications to defense counsel. [ECF Nos. 11, 11-3]. Most recently, Plaintiff contacted additional business associates of the same Defendant. He implied that one would face FBI investigation unless she severed ties with the Defendant and his wife while also accusing them of committing “egregious tax violations.”

Neither judicial warnings, renewed sanctions motions, proceedings in other courts, nor pending criminal charges have deterred this misconduct. Although courts have sometimes imposed lesser sanctions for extrajudicial communications, those cases did not involve litigants who persisted despite multiple warnings and escalating consequences. See, e.g., Frumkin v. Mayo Clinic, 965 F.2d 620, 626–27 (8th Cir. 1992) (enjoining plaintiff from further communications); Myart v. Taylor, No. SA:16-CV-455-DAE, 2016 WL 5376227, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2016).

Indeed, courts facing similar defiance have dismissed cases with prejudice. See Barr, 2021 WL 1148953, at *10 (dismissing after plaintiff “repeatedly insulted, threatened, and harassed” opposing parties through extrajudicial communications); McCrudden v. DeMarco, Case No. 8:22-cv-00407-JDE, 2023 WL 2808707, at *11-12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2023) (dismissing after escalating warnings failed to stop violations causing severe prejudice); Cameron v. Lambert, No. 07 Civ. 9258 (DC), 2008 WL 4823596, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2008) (dismissing after threats of violence). Were the Court's authority clear, dismissal with prejudice would be warranted here.

However, given the Court's lack of jurisdiction, the Court is not satisfied that it has the authority to dismiss this case with prejudice. The Court thus exercises its inherent authority to impose monetary sanctions. The Court awards Defendants their attorney's fees incurred in defending against this action. [ECF Nos. 1-16]. This substantial sanction reflects both the severity of Plaintiff's bad-faith misconduct and the prejudice Defendants have suffered.

Should Plaintiff refile, the Court will enjoin him from any extrajudicial communications with persons involved in this litigation. If Plaintiff then violates such an injunction or again fails to establish jurisdiction, the Court will reconsider whether its inherent authority permits dismissal with prejudice.

2. Attorney Fieweger's Conduct

Attorney Fieweger's most recent filing requires the Court's attention. [ECF No. 14]. As an officer of this Court, Attorney Fieweger must comply with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules. These set the Court's expectation for how attorneys will conduct themselves during litigation. Accordingly, Attorney Fieweger is ordered to show cause why his August 5 filing complies with these professional responsibilities.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3) authorizes the Court to order an attorney to show cause why conduct has not violated Rule 11(b). Under Rule 11(b), an attorney presenting a paper to the Court certifies that, after reasonable inquiry, the filing is not presented for an improper purpose and that its claims and legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law. See Adams v. USAA Cas. Ins., 863 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 2017).

The Court previously questioned whether Attorney Fieweger's conduct approached the boundaries of Rule 11. Case No. 1, ECF No. 24. His recent “supplemental to resistance to motion to dismiss” raises similar concerns. [ECF No. 14]. The filing attaches a Notice of Federal Tax Lien and asserts, without legal authority, that this document demonstrates that Defendant's credibility “is in question on payment of debt” based on unpaid taxes from 2013 to 2017. The relevance of this assertion to any cognizable legal claim or defense remains unclear.

The Court has multiple concerns regarding this filing. First, its timing suggests an improper purpose. The filing arrived just days after Plaintiff contacted Defendant's business associates, the United States Department of Justice, and the Internal Revenue Services to allege “egregious tax violations.” [ECF No. 16-1]. These extrajudicial communications form part of the basis for sanctions against Plaintiff. Attorney Fieweger's filing, which similarly invokes unpaid taxes without establishing any legal relevance, appears designed to harass rather than advance legitimate litigation objectives. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). The lack of legal authority further suggests the filing lacks any basis in existing law. Id. r. 11(b)(2).

Second, the filing violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 regardless of its characterization. The tax liens at issue dates from 2013 to 2017 and were available long before Plaintiff's first resistance was filed. [ECF No. 14-1]. If construed as an amendment under Rule 15(a), the filing required leave of court or opposing party's consent, neither of which Plaintiff obtained. If construed as a supplement under Rule 15(d), it similarly required court permission. See United States v. Vorachek, 563 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1977) (detailing the difference between supplemental and amended pleadings). Six months after filing his resistance, Plaintiff cannot unilaterally submit additional arguments.

Third, the filing plainly violates Local Rule 7(e). A “party resisting a motion must, within 14 days after the motion is served, file a resistance” that includes “citations to the authorities upon which the resisting party relies.” Id. As previously noted, Plaintiff fails to cite a single authority in his supplemental resistance. This is not the first time he has failed to satisfy this requirement.

Attorneys serving as officers of the court have a duty of both distillation and exclusion. See Nesbitt v. Hopkins, 907 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 n.4 (D. Neb. 1995). They must distill facts and arguments into cogent claims, preserving judicial resources. Id. They must also exclude claims lacking factual or legal foundation, regardless of client pressure. Id. Without these guardrails, an attorney becomes “little more than a ‘hired gun ․ [who], once engaged, does his client's bidding, lawful or not, ethical or not.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

In the first case, Attorney Fieweger assured the Court that each filing “was appropriate, was supported with legal authority and did not constitute bad faith.” Case No. 1, ECF No. 22. His recent submission calls that assurance into question.

The Court therefore orders Attorney Fieweger to show cause why his August 5 filing complies with Rule 11(b). Attorney Fieweger shall demonstrate that the filing was not presented for an improper purpose and that its contentions are warranted by existing law or nonfrivolous argument. He shall file a written response with supporting legal authority within 14 days. If Attorney Fieweger fails to do so, the Court will consider sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) (affirming district court's authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions despite lacking subject-matter jurisdiction).

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Pursuant to its inherent authority, the Court sanctions Plaintiff for his willful disregard of this Court's prior warning. Plaintiff shall pay Defendants' reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. His extrajudicial communications intended to harass, threaten, and intimidate Defendants and defense counsel constituted bad faith warranting this sanction.

Attorney Fieweger is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why his conduct has not violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). He shall file a written response with supporting legal authority within 14 days.

Within fourteen days of this Order, Defendants shall submit to Plaintiff an accounting of the reasonable fees and costs incurred in defending against the pending lawsuit. [ECF Nos. 1–16]. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from receipt of the accounting to either pay the requested amount or to move the Court to modify the award as unreasonable.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 29th day of September, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court refers to Plaintiff's previously dismissed lawsuit as “Case No. 1.” See Pautsch v. 400 W River LLC, et al., No. 3:24-cv-00036-SMR-WPK (S.D. Iowa 2024).”

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT