UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAFETH ISAIAS OCHOA MORENO (2025)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

Defendant Jafeth Isaias Ochoa Moreno was indicted on a charge of unlawful user in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). [ECF No. 2]. He originally pled guilty, but later withdrew that plea and moved to dismiss the indictment in light of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit's decisions in United States v. Baxter, 127 F.4th 1087 (8th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir. 2025).

Defendant argues that Section 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). [ECF No. 44]. The Court reserved ruling on Defendant's motion pending his trial and a post-trial dangerousness hearing. [ECF No. 69]. Defendant proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts and evidence. [ECF Nos. 80–81]. The Court found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, conditioned upon his reserved constitutional challenge. [ECF No. 102]. The Government then presented witnesses and evidence to establish that Section 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to Defendant.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Defendant was indicted on one count of unlawful user in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(8). [ECF No. 2]. He pled guilty on February 3, 2025. [ECF No. 40]. Following the Eighth Circuit's decisions in Baxter and Cooper, Defendant withdrew his plea and moved to dismiss the indictment. [ECF No. 44]. In support of his motion, Defendant argued that the charge was unconstitutional as applied to him and violated his Second Amendment rights under Bruen. Id.

The Government requested that the Court reserve ruling on the motion to dismiss and bifurcate the proceedings. [ECF No. 54]. The Court agreed, reserving ruling on the motion pending the outcome of a trial on the statutory elements of a Section 922(g)(3) offense. [ECF No. 69]. If Defendant were found guilty, the Court would then proceed to a separate post-trial dangerousness hearing to address Defendant's constitutional challenge. Id.

Defendant waived his right to a jury and proceeded to a bench trial with stipulated facts. [ECF Nos. 80–81]. The Court provisionally found Defendant guilty of the Section 922(g)(3) charge pending the resolution of the post-trial dangerousness hearing. [ECF No. 102 at 34]. That hearing spanned two days. The Government elicited testimony from Detective Jeffrey George regarding Defendant's gang activity, conduct on the night of his arrest, and recurrent marijuana use and firearm possession. The Government also introduced the testimony of Dr. Marilyn Huestis, an expert witness who discussed the effects of marijuana on users generally. Defendant did not present any evidence, and both parties submitted written closing arguments. [ECF Nos. 109, 110].

B. Factual Background 1

On September 23, 2024, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. [ECF No. 81 ¶ 1]. Defendant fled on foot with a pistol in hand. Id. ¶ 2. He discarded the pistol shortly after exiting the vehicle. Id. When law enforcement recovered the firearm, it was loaded with ten rounds of ammunition, including one in the chamber; the hammer was cocked; and the safety was off. Id. Three days later, Defendant tested positive for marijuana. Id. ¶ 3. Defendant admitted to law enforcement that he was “high as hell” the night of his arrest and that he was a marijuana user. Id. ¶ 4. When Defendant possessed the pistol, he knew he was a marijuana user and that his marijuana use was unlawful. Id. ¶ 5.

C. Burden and Standard of Proof

The Court has previously applied a preponderance standard in addressing the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 4:23-cr-00108-SMR-WPK, Order, ECF No. 120 (S.D. Iowa 2025). Nonetheless, Defendant urges the Court to utilize a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. [ECF No. 110 at 3]. Regardless of which standard applies in this case, the burden rests with the Government.

When an individual's conduct is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, it is presumptively protected by the Constitution. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. The Government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating consistency with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Id. The Supreme Court emphasized this point, explaining that the Government bears the burden of proving constitutionality when it restricts other constitutional rights, such as free speech under the First Amendment. Id. The Eighth Circuit has consistently applied this principle. See United States v. Sitladeen, 64 F.4th 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2023) (requiring the Government to identify a relevantly similar historical regulation); see also Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677, 688 (8th Cir. 2024) (“[W]hen the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when the Government regulates other constitutional rights, it bears the burden to justify its regulation.”) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024)).

The requirement that the Government prove every element necessary of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt does not extend to Defendant's as-applied challenge. Whether Defendant is the type of drug user whose disarmament comports with the historical analogue is not an element of the offense. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the charged crime). Nor is it a determination that increases the minimum or maximum penalty for the crime. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013). The Due Process Clause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt every time the Government must justify a burden on a fundamental right. See United States v. Taylor, Case No. 4:20CR058 SEP/NAB, 2022 WL 3636860, at *10 (E.D. Mo. June 14, 2022) (applying preponderance standard to warrantless searches) (citing United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Bey, 911 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying the preponderance standard to Terry stops).

The framework established in Bruen is two-fold, based on “text and historical understanding.” Veasley, 98 F.4th at 909 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26). Step one asks: does the law prohibit conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment? Id. (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17). If so, the Government must demonstrate “the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17).

In answering the first question, district courts in the Third and Seventh Circuits have consistently held that the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his conduct falls within the scope of the Second Amendment. United States v. Diaz-Rojas, Criminal No. 22-CR-650 (KMW), 2025 WL 1202013, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2025) (citing Binderup v. Att'y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1); United States v. Rogers, Crim. Action No. 23-582 (SDW), 2024 WL 2844545, at *7 (D.N.J. June 5, 2024) (requiring preponderance showing for lawful carry); Barnett v. Raoul, Case No. 3:23-cv-141-SPM, 2024 WL 756161, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2024); United States v. Jenkins, 697 F. Supp. 3d 380, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (noting that Bruen places the burden of production on the Government only at step two).

Although the Eighth Circuit has not established such a standard for Section 922(g)(3), this approach is instructive. See Veasley, 98 F.4th at 910 (holding that 922(g)(3) covers conduct within the plain text of the Second Amendment). These cases suggest that factual determinations in Second Amendment challenges should be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. This aligns with the burden imposed in other constitutional challenges. See Sasser v. Payne, 999 F.3d 609, 616 (8th Cir. 2021) (applying preponderance standard to Eighth Amendment intellectual disability claim).

For these reasons, it is proper for the Court to make its essential findings by a preponderance of the evidence. Nonetheless, the Court would also make the following essential findings based on the record in Defendant's trial and post-trial dangerousness hearing under a clear and convincing or proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

D. Essential Findings

Beyond the stipulated facts, the Government presented substantial evidence essential to determining whether Section 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to Defendant. This includes dozens of messages documenting Defendant's frequent marijuana use, firearm possession, and gang activities beginning in September 2021. Many of these messages, in addition to other exhibits, displayed marijuana use in close temporal proximity to firearm possession and gang activity. Defendant possessed a variety of firearms, both handguns and rifles, which he often waved recklessly and pointed toward the camera.

For example, on August 26, 2024, Defendant recorded multiple videos of himself brandishing a handgun while displaying gang signs and repeating rap lyrics about murder. Exs. 315, 317. He recorded a second video that day smoking marijuana while riding in a car. Ex. 316. He also took photos of himself displaying the firearm on the porch of a residence. Exs. 220–22. His text messages from later that evening indicate that he was distributing marijuana to others. Ex. 115 at 6–12; [ECF No. 102 at 96].

The next day, Defendant again recorded multiple videos of himself waving a firearm while smoking and displaying gang signs in several different locations. Ex. 318–22. He also discussed smoking marijuana with a friend. Ex. 113E at 3. And he recorded himself smoking marijuana. Ex. 323; [ECF No. 102 at 93–94]. The following day, Defendant accused others of robbing him of his marijuana and threatened that if they did not make things right, he would “make a call” from which “there's no turning back.” Ex. 115 at 56–70.

Approximately a week and a half later, Defendant again recorded a video of himself pointing a firearm at the camera while rapping and displaying gang signs. Ex. 330. That same day, he told an individual that he would come over to smoke. Ex. 113I at 2. Defendant engaged in similar conduct on September 9, recording a video displaying gang signs and waving a firearm. Ex. 331. He also instructed another individual to open the door to their home “[b]efore I get in a shoot out,” suggesting that he was carrying a firearm. Ex. 113J. Later that evening, he confirmed that he was going to acquire marijuana. Ex. 113K. Similar conduct occurred on September 13, Exs. 105, 228, 332, September 17, Exs. 106, 118, 335, and September 20, Exs. 107, 336, 337. Other evidence suggests that Defendant smoked marijuana on the same days he displayed a firearm. See, e.g., Exs. 210–15, 217, 218 (August 16, 2024); Exs. 229, 334 (September 15, 2024); Exs. 207A–C, 304 (September 19, 2024); Exs. 117D, 231–32, 338–40 (September 21, 2024). The frequency of this conduct demonstrates the habitual nature of Defendant's drug use and firearm possession in the days leading up to his arrest.

In total, the Government introduced over 40 exhibits of Defendant recklessly waving, displaying, or pointing firearms at a camera. See, e.g., Exs. 207–209, 211, 213–14, 219–22, 224–26, 231–32, 305–06, 310–315, 317–322, 326–27, 330–332, 334–35, 337–340. None of these exhibits show Defendant engaged in safe firearm use. Several videos and photos show Defendant displaying a firearm while simultaneously smoking what appears to be marijuana. See, e.g., Exs. 228, 319, 335. Substantial evidence also corroborates Defendant's gang activity, including visits to grave sites, rapping gang-related lyrics, association with gang members, and repeated display of gang signs. See, e.g., Exs. 210, 216, 305, 313–15, 320, 322, 327, 330–31, 336, 340. This evidence establishes Defendant's frequent possession of firearms, marijuana use, and gang activity, often in close temporal nexus.

The Government also presented compelling evidence that Defendant was actively involved in the Strap Gang in Des Moines for several years. Based on police reports, Defendant's self-documented associations, and Detective George's testimony, the Court finds that Defendant has been associated with the Strap Gang since at least March 2021. The Court finds Detective George credible and accepts his testimony that the Strap Gang and its affiliated gang members, a group of 10-40 young men at any given time, have been actively engaged in violence for many years. [ECF No. 102 at 36–37]. Detective George testified “the majority of [ ] shootings in the city of Des Moines are gang-related” with “constant conflict[s]” between the Strap Gang and its rival, OMB. Id. at 37–39. Detective George noted the Des Moines Police Department had more than 100 documented shootings between the Strap Gang and OMB in 2022 and early 2023. Id. at 39. During this same time frame, Strap Gang also actively engaged in “property damage shootings, shots fired, shooting victims where somebody's actually hit, and then homicides as well” and partook in “robberies of individuals, drug rip-type robberies, sometimes carjackings,” robberies of gas stations, and drug distribution. Id. at 36–37. In one particularly telling piece of evidence, Defendant is seen displaying Strap Gang signs while standing on the headstone of a rival gang member who was shot and killed by a fellow Strap Gang member. [ECF No. 102 at 80]; Ex. 216.

Defendant's repeated interactions with police further demonstrate his pattern of dangerous conduct. In 2020, at the age of 14, Defendant was charged with second-degree robbery after he allegedly assaulted another individual, stealing his necklace and phone. Ex. 124 (sealed); [ECF No. 102 at 46–47]. Although Defendant denies involvement in this event, a witness identified him as a participant. Id. In 2021, Defendant was present at the scene of a gang-related shooting. [ECF No. 102 at 47]; Ex. 125 (sealed). That evening, along with other known Strap Gang members, he was located inside a vehicle that smelled like and contained marijuana. Ex. 126 (sealed). Just over a month later, Defendant was found driving a stolen vehicle with Strap Gang associates. Ex. 127 (sealed); [ECF No. 102 at 51–52]. Defendant admitted to stealing the vehicle. Ex. 127 at 16. In 2022, Defendant's text messages reveal detailed planning of a drug-related robbery. Ex. 112H. Although there is no police report for this incident, that is unsurprising given the illegality of the object targeted by the robbery. In 2023, Defendant was arrested after he stole merchandise valued at over $500 from a retail store, damaging a display case in the process. Ex. 128 (sealed); [ECF No. 102 at 73]. On the same day, Defendant was involved in the theft of another car. Ex. 129 (sealed). Between these incidents, Defendant was in and out of state custody.

While the Court recognizes that many of these incidents involve uncharged conduct and juvenile behavior, they illustrate Defendant's consistent pattern of dangerous and erratic behavior from an early age. Cf. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 686–87 (discussing the defendant's uncharged conduct). Since 2021, Defendant has been drug tested at intermittent intervals. Ex. 133 (sealed). Six of the nine tests were positive for marijuana, despite Defendant's knowledge that he was under court supervision and that he would be drug-tested routinely. Id. When these results are viewed together with the other evidence, it is clear Defendant has been a habitual marijuana user for several years. Thus, Defendant's habitual marijuana use coincides with an escalating trajectory of increasingly dangerous conduct.

Defendant's dangerous pattern of behavior culminated in his conduct on the night of September 23, 2024. Earlier in the day, Defendant contacted individuals seeking marijuana and indicated that he had obtained some. Ex. 108. Defendant then met with other Strap Gang associates before driving to a memorial site for deceased Strap Gang members. Ex. 130 (sealed).

Detective George participated in the traffic stop of a vehicle containing Defendant and his Strap Gang associates that evening. [ECF No. 102 at 16]. As Detective George approached the rear passenger door, Defendant—wearing a ski mask—sprang from the vehicle and fled on foot, eluding Detective George's grasp. Detective George immediately recognized that Defendant was carrying a handgun in his right hand. Detective George loudly announced, “Don't move. Don't move. Gun. Gun.” Ex. 303 1:18–:30. He then warned Defendant, “I'm gonna shoot you. I'm gonna shoot you. You're gonna get shot. You're gonna get shot.” Id. Defendant threw the gun into the yard of a nearby residence early in the chase.

The pursuit ended in a residential neighborhood approximately two minutes later when witnesses informed Detective George that Defendant was hiding under a parked vehicle. Id. 3:04–12. After placing Defendant in handcuffs, Detective George told him, “Don't jump out with a gun like that. Do you know how close I was to shooting you? It ain't worth it, man. I don't know what you are doing, okay?” Id. 6:24–35. Defendant's behavior was erratic and posed a significant danger to the occupants of the vehicle, law enforcement, witnesses, nearby residents, and himself.

When law enforcement recovered Defendant's handgun, it was loaded with ten rounds of ammunition, including one in the chamber, with the hammer cocked and the safety off. [ECF No. 81 ¶ 2]. Detective George executed a search warrant to drug test Defendant several days later. Id. ¶ 3. During that exchange, Defendant explained to Detective George that he “was high as hell,” the night he was arrested. Id. ¶ 4. Unsurprisingly, Defendant tested positive for marijuana. Id. ¶ 3.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The contours of that right have been shaped and clarified throughout our Nation's history. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, holding that the District's “total ban on handguns” violated that right. 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008). Two years later, the Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment against the states. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). At that time, it was clear that the Second Amendment permitted “law-abiding, responsible citizens” to possess firearms “in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.

In Bruen, the Court expanded Second Amendment protections beyond the home to include firearms possessed outside the home for “ordinary self-defense needs.” 597 U.S. at 71. In reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified the proper analytical framework for considering Second Amendment challenges. Id. at 17. Under Bruen, courts must determine whether the challenged regulation comports with the historical tradition of firearms regulation in the United States. The inquiry is “rooted in the Second Amendment's text, as informed by history.” Id. at 19. Accordingly, if the plain language of the Second Amendment covers the conduct at issue, that conduct receives presumptive constitutional protection. The burden is on the Government to “affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. However, the Government need not identify a historical twin, the imperative consideration is “whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692.

B. As-Applied Challenge to Section 922(g)(3)

1. Protection of Conduct

The Bruen analysis proceeds in two steps based on “text and historical understanding.” Veasley, 98 F.4th at 909 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26). First, the Court must determine whether the challenged law prohibits conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. If it does, the Government must demonstrate that “the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. (cleaned up). In Veasley, the Eighth Circuit resolved this initial inquiry for Section 922(g)(3), finding that the statute covers conduct within the Second Amendment's scope because “drug users are part of the people whom the Second Amendment protects, and handguns are weapons in common use today.” Id. (citations omitted) (cleaned up). The Government does not contest that Section 922(g)(3) prohibits conduct covered by the Second Amendment. Because Defendant was an unlawful drug user in possession of a handgun, his conduct falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment.

2. Historical Analogue

In Veasley and Cooper, the Eighth Circuit identified two historical analogues for Section 922(g)(3). First, this Nation has a longstanding tradition of disarming individuals who are both mentally ill and dangerous, often through confinement or restraint. Veasley, 98 F.4th at 912–14. This analogue rests on the behavioral overlap between drug users and the mentally ill. Id. at 912–13 (contrasting the effects of drug use—memory impairment, lack of control, and poor decision-making—with the symptoms of mental illness—deficient processing, memory, reasoning, problem-solving, and social cognition). The underlying rationale for removing firearms from presumptively dangerous individuals thus aligns with Section 922(g)(3) “as applied to drug users and addicts who pose a danger to others.” Id. at 916.

Second, there is a historical tradition of disarming those who terrorize or threaten others. Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1096. Historically, the possession of firearms accompanied by terrorizing behavior justified disarmament. Veasley, 98 F.4th at 917 (explaining that arming oneself with deadly weapons “for the purpose of an affray, and in such manner as to strike terror to the people” violated the law) (quoting O'Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849)). Drug use can cause “terrifying and dangerous behavior” analogous to conduct prohibited under historical “Terror of the People” offenses. Id. at 916–17. Accordingly, disarming drug users who terrorize others with firearms comports with the historical practice of temporarily depriving those who act unlawfully and dangerously of their arms. Id. This rationale extends equally to individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1096 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 700).

The Government argues that Section 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to Defendant under both analogues. Specifically, the Government argues that Defendant's drug use caused him to act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous, and that he terrorized others or posed a credible threat to public safety while armed. See id. Defendant responds that the Government cannot establish consistency with the historical tradition of firearm regulation as applied to his conduct. His argument primarily rests on the required nexus between his drug use and the conduct encompassed by the historical analogues. Although Defendant acknowledges the analogues identified in Veasley and Cooper, he asserts that the Government must prove his marijuana use either induced mental illness or caused him to act in a terrorizing manner. Defendant contends the Government failed to prove either.

a. Mentally Ill and Dangerous

Defendant claims that applying Section 922(g)(3) to his conduct fails to satisfy the mentally ill and dangerous historical analogue for two reasons. First, he did not suffer from a marijuana-induced mental illness. Second, the Government has failed to prove that marijuana use caused him to act like someone who is mentally ill and dangerous. As stated in Veasley and Cooper, the standard established by the Eighth Circuit does not require that a defendant's drug use actually induce mental illness. Rather, the analogue's validity rests upon the behavioral overlap between the mentally ill and drug users. Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1095. When drug use induces similar effects—causing users to behave like mentally ill and dangerous individuals who historically would have been denied the right to bear arms—Section 922(g)(3) is consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of firearm regulation. See id. (citation omitted). The dispositive inquiry, as Defendant's second argument recognizes, is whether marijuana use caused Defendant to act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized the danger posed by the combination of guns and drugs, but more is required to sustain an as-applied challenge to a Section 922(g)(3) charge. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993). As Defendant identifies, the Government must prove his dangerousness on an individualized basis. Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1096–097; but see United States v. Perez, 145 F.4th 800, 806–07 (8th Cir. 2025) (noting that “certain categories of active drug users” may be disarmed without an individualized determination).

The mentally ill and dangerous analogue requires the Court to consider whether Defendant's “marijuana use caused him to act in an outwardly erratic or aggressive manner that would, in context, be reasonably perceived as disturbing or dangerous to others.” Perez, 145 F.4th at 807 (citing Veasley, 145 F.4th at 917). At the Founding, individuals who behaved in such a manner “could be confined and temporarily deprived of their civil liberties, including any right to possess a firearm, until they regained their faculties.” Id. at 805. The purpose of such laws was “ ‘to preserve the peace of the community’ from those who posed a danger to others.” Veasley, 98 F.4th at 915 (citation omitted). Contemporaneous possession of a firearm while using drugs is not required. Rather, the focus is on the effect of the drugs on a user's conduct. Perez, 145 F.4th at 806 (citing Veasley, 98 F.4th at 916).

Although the precise nexus required between a defendant's drug use and resulting behavior remains unsettled, the evidence clearly establishes that Defendant's habitual marijuana use is connected to conduct consistent with that of an individual who is mentally ill and dangerous. See Veasley, 98 F.4th at 912 (noting that “mental illness and drug use are not the same thing,” but that they are similar “because their behavioral effects overlap”) (citation omitted). Defendant's conduct the night of his arrest best demonstrates this point as he acted in an erratic and dangerous manner. See Perez, 145 F.4th at 808 (noting that “a single erratic or dangerous episode” is sufficient).

The Government introduced the testimony of Dr. Huestis, an expert in pharmacology and toxicology, to establish the causal relationship between Defendant's marijuana use and his dangerous conduct. Ex. 134. Dr. Huestis holds a bachelor's degree in biochemistry, a master's degree in clinical chemistry, a Ph.D. in toxicology, and a doctor honoris causa in Medicine and Surgery. She has 55 years of experience, including decades running a research program at the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Now retired, she operates a consulting firm and teaches a course on cannabinoid pharmacology at Thomas Jefferson University.

The Court found Dr. Huestis to be credible, although it acknowledges the limitation inherent in her testimony because she never evaluated Defendant specifically. Several general principles emerge from her testimony and expertise. Although marijuana use does not necessarily produce the severe behavioral effects associated with substances like PCP, it is a controlled substance that affects users differently. Dr. Huestis explained that marijuana interacts with brain receptors and impairs functions ranging from memory and body temperature regulation to executive function and decision-making capacity. This is especially true for individuals who, like Defendant, engage in regular marijuana use at a young age, as the drug can adversely affect both brain development and behavior. Dr. Huestis's testimony was supported by studies indicating that individuals who frequently use marijuana are more likely to engage in risky behaviors and display greater negative emotional behavior. See, e.g., Ex. 144.

Dr. Huestis also testified that studies have shown that males over the age of 18 who engage in continued cannabis use are seven times more likely to engage in violence. She further stated that certain studies strongly support a causal effect of continued marijuana use on subsequent violent behavior. See Ex. 149 at 11. Additional evidence demonstrates that cannabis users are more likely to commit criminal weapon offenses. Ex. G at 7. This is especially true of individuals who began cannabis use earlier in life, such as Defendant. Id.; see also Ex. C at 1 (noting that “teenagers may be particularly vulnerable to exposure to exogenous cannabinoids”); Ex. N at 2; Ex. 151 at 6. Other studies have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Ex. 141 at 3–4 (multiple studies showing a significant increase in violence with regular cannabis use); id. at 13–14 (noting that there is scientific support that cannabis use plays “a causal role in violence in young men” and “persons who are heavy or problem users”); Ex. 151 at 4–5 (finding that “persistent use of cannabis significantly predicted violence occurring in the following time-point when comparing to no use of cannabis”). Further, there is a strong association between the cognitive impairment created by cannabis use and increased violence or impulsive acts. Exs. 138 at 5, 141 at 14, 157 at 6, 149 at 11 (finding that “a single dose of cannabis can cause” impairments in behavioral control “that may underlie” impulsive and violent behavior); cf. Ex. I (1977 study noting mixed results). Such impairment, and additional withdrawal symptoms, can persist for days. Exs. 137, 138 at 5–6, 142. Dr. Huestis testified that some of these withdrawal symptoms may include anger and irritability, which may lead to violence.

This data and testimony—paired with Defendant's conduct over several years—leads the Court to conclude that Defendant falls into the category of marijuana users experiencing compromised executive functioning, decision-making, and impulse control which causes him to act like individuals who are mentally ill and dangerous. Defendant's own documentation demonstrates that his marijuana use consistently coincided with gang activities, firearm possession, and other dangerous conduct. These repeated behaviors, often in close temporal proximity to his marijuana use, support the conclusion that such behavior is caused by both the long-term and short-term effects of marijuana as outlined by Dr. Huestis.

Defendant's conduct the night of his arrest best demonstrates the Court's conclusion. Nonetheless, it is also supported by additional evidence of Defendant's conduct. Since Defendant began smoking marijuana, he discussed committing “stains.” See Exs. 112H, 112J, 112K. Detective George testified that “stain” is a street term for robbery. [ECF No. 102 at 54]. One of these discussions occurred within two days of Defendant appearing to engage in a drug deal. [ECF No. 102 at 66]; Ex. 112I. In other messages, Defendant threatened to assault individuals, Ex. 112E, and accused others of robbing him of his marijuana, threatening physical injury if they did not make amends. Ex. 115 at 56– 70. One of these instances came the day after he discussed smoking with another individual and recorded a video of himself doing so. Exs. 113E, 323. He frequently documented himself recklessly pointing or waving firearms, often in the presence of others, while smoking, or both. See, e.g., Exs. 207A, 231, 306, 310–11, 319, 331. This conduct further demonstrates that marijuana causes Defendant to act like an individual who is mentally ill and dangerous.

Given Defendant's chronic marijuana use and admission to being high at the time of his arrest, he was experiencing the direct effects of marijuana at that time. In many of the other instances noted above, he was also likely experiencing either the direct effects of marijuana or withdrawal. Defendant's conduct—suddenly emerging from a vehicle during a traffic stop while wearing a ski mask, carrying a loaded handgun, and actively under the influence of marijuana; fleeing from law enforcement through a residential neighborhood; and refusing to stop despite warnings that he would be shot—demonstrates significant behavioral overlap with a mentally ill and dangerous individual. It is precisely the type of behavior that would have historically led to disarmament under this analogue.² Veasley, 98 F.4th at 913.

b. Induce Terror or Pose a Credible Threat

The Government also contends that Defendant terrorized and posed a credible threat to public safety while armed, rendering his disarmament consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Defendant disagrees. He argues that (1) his conduct cannot be causally linked to marijuana, (2) many of his past interactions with law enforcement are irrelevant, and (3) his behavior the night of his arrest was neither terrorizing nor posed a credible threat to others. The Court finds all evidence introduced at the dangerousness hearing relevant to determining whether Defendant terrorized others or posed credible threats while armed, though it accords particular weight to his conduct during his arrest.

Since the Founding, criminal prohibitions have existed against individuals “taking up arms to terrify the people.” Veasley, 98 F.4th at 916. These laws often led to the arrest and imprisonment of individuals who disturbed the peace while “armed offensively” or who committed a crime against the public peace by “going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons” and “terrifying the people of the land.” Id. at 916–17 (citations omitted). The core purpose of these laws was not to criminalize firearm possession; rather, “terrorizing behavior had to accompany the possession.” Id. at 917.

Consistent with this purpose, Section 922(g)(3) “requires another act, the taking of drugs, which itself can cause terrifying and dangerous behavior.” Id. It is thus “[t]he decision to engage in illegal and dangerous conduct” that may render temporary disarmament constitutional. Id. Not every drug user who possesses a firearm, however, necessarily falls within this analogue. Id. For example, it is “exceedingly unlikely” that an “80-year-old grandmother who uses marijuana for a chronic medical condition and keeps a pistol tucked away for her own safety” will pose “a danger or induce terror in others.” Id. at 917–18. In that situation, Section 922(g)(3) would likely be unconstitutional as applied to her. But see Perez, 145 F.4th at 806 n.5 (noting that the “80-year-old grandmother who uses marijuana” could be disarmed in certain circumstances). Defendant's conduct is readily distinguishable, and the Court has little trouble concluding that his marijuana use caused him to induce terror and pose a credible threat.³

Defendant's argument that his conduct the night of his arrest neither terrorized others nor created a credible threat to public safety is unconvincing. Defendant—while “high as hell”—burst from a vehicle during a traffic stop carrying a loaded firearm capable of immediate discharge. He escaped the grasp of Detective George, fled from law enforcement, and ignored warnings that he would be shot. Detective George stated at trial that these actions led him to “expect[ ] a shootout” because this was the first time in his career that somebody had drawn a firearm and maintained it for a brief period. [ECF No. 102 at 133–34, 138–39]. Defendant then led Detective George through a backyard into a residential neighborhood, where witnesses informed Detective George that Defendant was hiding under a car. The terror such actions caused to law enforcement and bystanders is readily apparent, as is the threat to public safety. The Court need not look beyond Detective George's body camera footage to reach this conclusion.

Although Defendant notes that he discarded his firearm into the front yard of a residence early into the chase, the Court cannot overlook the risk of an accidental discharge Defendant created by throwing the firearm in such a state. The fact that the gun did not actually discharge does not eliminate the credible threat posed by this action.

Even so, Defendant disregards the credible threat to public safety he posed prior to discarding the firearm. Defendant's behavior inside the vehicle—possessing a loaded firearm immediately capable of discharge while under the influence of marijuana and in close confinement with other individuals—posed a threat to the other passengers. Defendant's abrupt exit from the vehicle—while wearing a ski mask and recklessly waving a loaded firearm in the immediate vicinity of law enforcement—posed a threat to Detective George, other officers, nearby residents, and the occupants of the vehicle who were, in practical terms, traveling in a vehicle while at gunpoint as a result of his conduct. Although it does not appear Defendant intentionally aimed the firearm at Detective George, the barrel was nonetheless pointed in the general direction of law enforcement. Exs. 300, 300A, 300B, 303A, 303B. Even assuming Defendant had no intention to shoot Detective George, the risk of an accidental discharge was high. See United States v. Harris, 144 F.4th 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2025) (“[A] buzzed brain with a loaded gun sounds like a misfire waiting to happen—the exact risk that our historical tradition suggests justifies disarmament.”). Moreover, any discharge—accidental or intentional—would have likely drawn return fire from law enforcement, further compounding the threat created by Defendant's conduct. Taken together, the facts demonstrate that Defendant's possession of the firearm while under the active influence of marijuana posed a significant threat to public safety. Cf. Perez, 145 F.4th at 806 n.6 (noting that the Eighth Circuit has not yet determined whether carrying a firearm while actively intoxicated is sufficient to render Section 922(g)(3) constitutional as applied to all members of that group).

Defendant's other actions further demonstrate that marijuana caused him to possess firearms in a manner that would induce terror. For example, in a photo and video posted on Instagram just five days before his arrest, Defendant is seen with a Strap Gang member smoking and pointing a firearm directly at a camera. Exs. 207, 304; see also [ECF No. 102 at 119–20]. The public sharing of such images appears calculated to intimidate or terrify a certain subset of the community.

Ultimately, Defendant bears no resemblance to the “frail and elderly grandmother” who “uses marijuana for a chronic medical condition” and “keeps a pistol tucked away for her own safety.” See Veasley, 98 F.4th at 909. He habitually combines unlawful marijuana use with firearm possession and violent and criminal gang activity. He endangered and terrorized others while armed the night of his arrest and posed a credible threat to public safety.

“When ‘a court has found that the defendant represents a credible threat,’ a ban on firearm possession ‘fits neatly within the tradition.’ ” Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1096 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698–99) (internal quotations omitted). The same principle governs disarming drug users who engage in “terrifying conduct.” Id. (quoting Veasley, 98 F.4th at 917). Defendant's conduct while using marijuana was terrifying and “could reasonably be seen to threaten others' physical safety.” Perez, 145 F.4th at 806 (citing Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693). The Government has established that prohibiting Defendant, as an unlawful user of a controlled substance, from possessing firearms is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment is DENIED. [ECF No. 44]. The Government has met its burden in demonstrating both historical analogues identified in Veasley and Cooper. Section 922(g)(3) is thus constitutional as-applied to Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 5th day of December, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Defendant's exemplary behavior on pretrial release further highlights the impact marijuana has on his conduct. He has not tested positive for marijuana since his arrest, nor did he violate any conditions of his pretrial release. [ECF No. 102 at 166]. This represents a significant departure from his past pattern, in which he continued to use marijuana and failed to comply with conditions imposed upon him. Ex. 132 (sealed). This behavioral change further suggests that marijuana causes him to engage in dangerous behaviors and, when sober, he can refrain from doing so.

3.   Defendant argues that the Government cannot prove that his conduct the night of his arrest was induced by his marijuana use. However, for the reasons articulated in the analysis of the “mentally ill and dangerous” analogue, Defendant's habitual marijuana use and status as an unlawful user demonstrate that his drug use consistently impacts his behavior. His own admission that he was high the night of his arrest, as well as his terrorizing and threatening conduct, further demonstrate that marijuana use triggered an “erratic or dangerous episode.” Perez, 145 F.4th at 808.

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT