GAGNON v. MAHARISHI INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (2025)

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This case presents legal questions concerning the scope of Title IX's protections when invoked by an individual who is neither enrolled in, nor employed by, the education institution she seeks to hold accountable. Plaintiff Martha Gagnon, proceeding pro se, brings four causes of actions against Defendant Maharishi International University based on allegations that the school mishandled her complaint of sexual misconduct by Lucas Jaicks, a school employee with whom she had a personal relationship. Her claims raise fundamental questions about who may seek redress under Title IX and whether federal courts retain jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims that anchored them prove unavailing.

Upon considerations of the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot proceed with her Title IX claims. Because she lacks standing to bring these claims and because Title IX does not apply to individuals in her circumstances, the federal claims must be dismissed. The Court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. Defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED, and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. [ECF No. 9].

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Plaintiff was formerly in a romantic relationship with Jaicks. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 1]. She alleges that Jaicks raped, sexually coerced, physically abused, and stalked her both during their relationship and after it ended. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6–7. Jaicks was later hired by Defendant as Athletic Director and Women's Flag Football Coach. Id. Although Plaintiff is neither a student nor an employee of Defendant, she regularly used campus facilities. Id.

In January 2025, Plaintiff sought a protective order to prevent contact between herself and Jaicks. Id. ¶ 8. Jaicks denied Plaintiff's allegations but consented to the order. Id. at *24. The court did not make a finding on whether Jaicks had committed domestic assault. Id.

Several weeks later, Plaintiff reported to Defendant's Vice President of Human Resources that Jaicks had sexually assaulted her in May 2023. Id. ¶ 9. She was referred to Defendant's Title IX Coordinator, Katie Snyder. Id. On February 10, Plaintiff filed a formal Title IX complaint with Defendant alleging that Jaicks had committed sexual assault and harassment, and was using his position at the school to pursue inappropriate relationships with female students. Id.

Defendant initiated a formal Title IX investigation on February 12, 2025. Id. On April 2, 2025, Defendant dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, concluding the alleged conduct did not qualify as sex-based harassment and that it lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Id. at *42–43.

Plaintiff sought to appeal this ruling, claiming that Defendant had committed fifteen investigative and procedural violations. Id. ¶ 23. She also sent a demand letter alleging eight additional Title IX violations. Id. ¶ 24. Defendant denied Plaintiff's request for an appeal on the grounds that she had failed to demonstrate any basis for appeal. Id. at *76.

Plaintiff now alleges that the Title IX investigation and resolution were deficient in several respects. First, she contends that Snyder, who served as the investigator, had a disqualifying conflict of interest because she was Facebook friends with Jaicks. Id. ¶ 10. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Snyder declined to interview key witnesses, ignored important evidence, and invoked Defendant's lack of jurisdiction as an excuse to not investigate thoroughly. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. Third, Plaintiff alleges that Snyder improperly pressured her to mediate with Jaicks. Id. ¶ 14. Fourth, Plaintiff points to social media posts made by Jaicks, reshared by another school employee, as retaliatory. Id. ¶ 16. In these posts, Jaicks claimed Plaintiff's accusations were false and quoted someone involved in the investigation as suggesting that Plaintiff suffered from a personality disorder. Id. at *56. Fifth, Plaintiff alleges school employees ignored supplemental documentation detailing Jaicks's abuse and the school's mishandling of her complaint. Id. ¶ 19. Sixth, Plaintiff challenges the school's dismissal letter as erroneous. Id. ¶ 21.

Plaintiff also challenges other actions she attributes to Defendant. First, she expresses concern that Defendant allowed Jaicks to continue unsupervised access to female student-athletes, prospective female students-athletes, and other female students on campus during the pendency of the Title IX investigation. Id. ¶ 20. Second, she alleges that Defendant declined to investigate a new sexual harassment allegation against Jaicks involving a female volunteer. Id. ¶ 22.

On June 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against Defendant asserting three Title IX claims—retaliation (Count I), deliberate indifference to sexual abuse (Count II), and “procedural non-compliance” (Count III)—along with a state law defamation claim (Count IV). [ECF No. 1]. She seeks compensatory and punitive damages, damages for emotional distress, a declaratory judgment that Defendant violated Title IX, and injunctive relief. Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on Counts I–III and urging the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Count IV. [ECF No. 9].

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Healy v. Fox, 46 F.4th 739, 743 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cook v. George's, Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 2020)). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This plausibility standard requires more than mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must allege facts that permit the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant bears liability for the alleged misconduct.

B. Analysis

Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Congress enacted Title IX to achieve two principal objectives: (1) avoid using federal resources to support discriminatory practices, and (2) protect individuals from those discriminatory practices. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) (citation omitted). Plaintiff's Title IX claims do not further either of these objectives and her complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant's motion to dismiss is thus granted and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim for the reasons that follow.

1. Failure to State Plausible Claims Under Title IX

Each of Plaintiff's Title IX claims fail. Plaintiff concedes that her claim of “Procedural Non-Compliance” does not constitute a recognized cause of action under Title IX. [ECF No. 10 at *6]. The Court agrees and dismisses Count III with prejudice; however, the Court considers the factual allegations made within Count III in ruling on Plaintiff's remaining claims.

Counts I and II assert implied causes of action under Title IX. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005) (retaliation); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292–93, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (deliberate indifference). Count I alleges that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activities—filing the Title IX complaint and participating in the adjudication process—by summarily dismissing her complaint, pressuring her to mediate with Jaicks, refusing to address Jaicks's social media posts, and misconstruing and ignoring evidence. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28, 29]. Count II alleges that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse which caused Plaintiff “and other female students, volunteers, and recruits” to be “denied equal, safe access to [Defendant's] programs and activities.” Id. ¶ 33.

Both claims fail for multiple reasons. First, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert these claims. “Standing is a ‘jurisdictional prerequisite’ that the Court must address before addressing merits questions.” Kelley v. Iowa State Univ., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). “[W]hen a motion to dismiss is made on standing grounds the standing inquiry must, as a prerequisite, be done in light of the factual allegations of the pleadings.” City of Clarkson Valley v. Mineta, 495 F.3d 567, 570 (8th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing for each claim she brings. Kelley, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 1058.

“To demonstrate constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in court.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, statutory standing requires that “a plaintiff who seeks relief for violation of a statute must ‘fall within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue’ under that statute.” Tovar v. Essentia Health, 857 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up) (quoting Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014)).

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of others, she cannot do so. “Ordinarily, a party ‘must assert [her] own legal rights’ and ‘cannot rest [her] claim to relief on the legal rights’ ” of others. Kelley, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 1060 (citation omitted).

Third-party standing doctrine permits plaintiffs to assert the rights of another in limited circumstances. These circumstances require both (1) a close relationship between the plaintiff and the right-holder and (2) some hindrance to the right-holder's ability to protect her own interests. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would satisfy either requirement. Id. (citations omitted). The complaint fails to allege any facts suggesting that Plaintiff has a relationship with any students, volunteers, or prospective students, nor does it describe any impediments preventing those individuals from protecting their own interests. In Kelley, the district court held that a Title IX claim brought by a former equal opportunity director and Title IX coordinator on behalf of students and employees was insufficient to demonstrate third party standing when the complaint failed to explain how those individuals were “hindered in their ability to protect their own interest.” Id. at 1060–61. Plaintiff's complaint suffers from the same defect, and her relationship with these individuals is far more attenuated than the plaintiff in Kelley.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has only recognized two categories of individuals who have standing to bring a private right of action under Title IX: (1) students at federally funded institutions, and (2) employees of federally funded institutions.¹ Rossley v. Drake Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 959, 965 (S.D. Iowa 2018). The Eighth Circuit has declined to extend Title IX claims to prospective students. K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff, who concedes that she is neither a student nor an employee of Defendant, therefore lacks standing to assert a Title IX claim on her own behalf. See id. (stating that deliberate indifference must subject students to harassment); Rossley, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 966–67; Prey v. Kruse, Civil Action 2:08-cv-287, 2009 WL 10679036, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2009) (standing does not extend “beyond potential beneficiaries or employees of a federally funded education program”).

Courts across the country have routinely reached the same conclusion, often in cases involving plaintiffs with stronger connections to the educational institution. In Rossley, the district court concluded that “parents lack standing to bring their own Title IX sex discrimination claims because,” as required by Title IX, “they have not been subjected to discrimination under an education program or activity.” 336 F. Supp. 3d at 965; see also Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[I]n general, non-students such as parents do not have a personal claim under Title IX.”); Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Burrow ex rel. Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (N.D. Iowa 1996).

Likewise, Plaintiff has not alleged that she was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex under any education program or activity. Rossley, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 967. The core of Plaintiff's Title IX claims are that Defendant's employees mishandled the Title IX investigation and adjudicative process. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–36]. Even accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, these procedural deficiencies do not constitute discrimination under an education program or activity.

Title IX's requirement that the alleged discrimination occur under a “program or activity” is limited to education and employment contexts. Rossley, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 970; see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526–27, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982) (noting that Title IX applies only to discrimination in educational and employment benefits). The Code of Federal Regulations confirms this limitation, stating that Title IX prohibits discrimination only “under any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or other education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives Federal financial assistance.” 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(a); cf. Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 977 (8th Cir. 2009) (consulting the Code of Federal Regulations to determine whether a program qualified as an “education program or activity”) (citation omitted). The regulations also identify specific examples of programs and activities in the context of education: housing, facilities, course offerings, financial aid, employment assistance, athletics, counseling, admissions, and health benefits. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.31–.41. In the context of employment, the regulations identify recruitment, hiring, compensation, job classification, fringe benefits, and advertising. See id. §§ 86.51–.61.

When applied to Plaintiff, an individual who is neither a student nor a university employee, the Title IX grievance process bears no resemble to these examples. The grievance process simply is not an educational or employment program or activity as to her. See Roubideaux, 570 F.3d at 977–78; Rossley, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 970. Rather, Plaintiff's Title IX claims are an attempt to fit a proverbial square peg into a round hole. She fails to state a claim because Title IX does not provide a remedy for alleged deficiencies in a university's internal grievance process when the complainant stands outside the university community.

Rossley reached the same conclusion when it held that a parent could not state a claim for relief under Title IX based on his exclusion from his son's Title IX proceeding because the parent was not “excluded from participation in, [ ] denied the benefits of, or [ ] subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity” offered by the university. Id. at 970–72 (alterations in original). In reaching this conclusion, the district court emphasized that Supreme Court precedent does “not stand for the broader proposition that any individual who experiences retaliatory acts outside an education program or activity may bring a Title IX retaliation claim.” Id. at 967.

Notwithstanding these fundamental defects, Plaintiff's claims also fail on the merits. She has not stated a plausible claim for either retaliation or deliberate indifference under Title IX.

Although the Eighth Circuit has not formally adopted a test for Title IX retaliation claims, it has suggested that a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) she engaged in protected conduct, (2) she suffered materially adverse action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Du Bois v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 987 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that reporting sex discrimination constitutes protected activity under Title IX. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174, 125 S.Ct. 1497. But that is not the case here because Plaintiff makes no allegation of sex discrimination. Additionally, the acts that Plaintiff identifies as retaliatory—Defendant's handling of the investigation, correspondence with Snyder, and dismissal of her claim—are routine aspects of the grievances process itself. These are not sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Does 1–2 v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 999 F.3d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 2021) (stating that adverse public statements and actions during the Title IX proceedings “do not satisfy the adverse action element”).

Plaintiff's complaint also undermines her retaliation theory. For example, Plaintiff claims the summary dismissal of her complaint was an adverse action. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 29]. However, the complaint demonstrates that the investigation spanned nearly two months culminating in a seven-page dismissal letter. Id. at *38–44. Plaintiff also takes a contradictory position as she faults Defendant for taking too long to resolve her appeal. Id. ¶ 29. This allegation falls well short of demonstrating retaliation, particularly given Plaintiff's own explanation that the short delay resulted from one employee's conflict of interest and another's bereavement. Id. at *71. Moreover, Plaintiff claims Defendant retaliated by characterizing the protective order as “mutual.” Id. ¶ 29. This is not an adverse action. And, although Plaintiff initiated the protective order, Jaicks consented to the order, thus making it mutual. Id. at *24.

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to sexual abuse. To state a claim, Plaintiff was required to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant was “(1) deliberately indifferent (2) to known acts of discrimination (3) which occur under its control.” K.T., 865 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2003)). Under the first prong, “deliberate indifference must either directly cause the abuse to occur or make students vulnerable to such abuse.” Ostrander, 341 F.3d at 750 (citation omitted). Under the third prong, Defendant is only “liable for situations in which it exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.” Id. (cleaned up) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff's claim fails on two grounds. First, she offers only the conclusory assertion that “[a]s a direct result” of Defendant's deliberate indifference, “Plaintiff—and other female students, volunteers, and recruits—were denied equal, safe access to MIU's programs and activities.” [ECF No. 1 ¶ 33]. This legal conclusion lacks the necessary factual development to establish causation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Second, Defendant cannot be liable for deliberate indifference to Jaicks's alleged sex abuse of Plaintiff absent any allegation that Defendant had substantial control over Jaicks when the abuse occurred.

Additionally, Eighth Circuit precedent requires that “a plaintiff must allege that the funding recipient had prior notice of a substantial risk.” K.T., 865 F.3d at 1058. The complaint alleges that Jaicks was “later hired” by Defendant, but it provides no timeline relative to the alleged abuse, nor does it detail Defendant's knowledge preceding any sexual abuse. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 1]. Further, the complaint does not provide any facts connecting the alleged abuse to any context over which Defendant exercised control, and it does not state that Defendant remains deliberately indifferent to any ongoing abuse. These omissions are fatal to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim. See K.T., 865 F.3d at 1058 (dismissing a complaint that did not identify a “causal nexus” between the school's inaction and the harassment).

In sum, none of Plaintiff's Title IX claims can proceed. Count I and Count II both fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Plaintiff concedes that Count III does not state a recognized cause of action.

2. Supplemental Jurisdiction on Defamation Claim

Without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's defamation claim. “A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009); see also De Mian v. City of St. Louis, 86 F.4th 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 2023).

Plaintiff invoked federal question jurisdiction based on her now-dismissed Title IX claims. [ECF No. 1 at *3]. With those claims now dismissed, only the state law defamation claim remains. The Court declines to retain jurisdiction over this claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3); see also Wells ex rel. Glover v. Creighton Preparatory Sch., 82 F.4th 586, 594–95 (8th Cir. 2023) (stating that relevant factors weigh against exercising supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed). Count IV is thus dismissed without prejudice.

3. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief cannot survive dismissal of her substantive claims. The Declaratory Judgment Act does not create an independent cause of action or confer substantive rights; rather, it provides a procedural mechanism through which courts may declare the rights of parties in actual controversies. W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Herman, 405 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir. 1968). The statute expands the remedies available in federal courts but does not extend their jurisdiction. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677, 80 S.Ct. 1288, 4 L.Ed.2d 1478 (1960). Courts have consistently recognized that the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not create a cause of action without an underlying claim.” Pickrell v. Sorin Group USA, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 3d 865, 869 (S.D. Iowa 2018). The same principle governs requests for injunctive relief, which is a remedy, not an independent cause of action. Johnson v. Moody, No. 4:16-cv-00449-RGE-SBJ, 2016 WL 8839427, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 14, 2016) (collecting cases). Both declaratory and injunctive relief depend on the existence of a viable underlying claim.

Having determined that all of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed, no justiciable controversy remains. The Court cannot adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties without a cognizable legal claim to anchor such determinations. Pickrell, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 869. Plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory relief must therefore be dismissed along with the remainder of the complaint.

4. Plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend

In her reply brief, Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to address any deficiencies the Court might identify. [ECF No. 10 at *2, *6, *7]. The Court denies this request because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking leave to amend and because amendment would be futile.

Although Rule 15(a)(2) directs courts to freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, a district court acts within its discretion when it denies leave where the plaintiff made no proper motion and failed to explain the substance of her proposed amendment. United States ex rel. Ambrosecchia v. Paddock Lab'ys, LLC, 855 F.3d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Misischia v. St. John's Mercy Health Sys., 457 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2006)). The Court may deny leave to amend where compelling reasons exist, such as futility, undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or failure to comply with procedural requirements. Horras v. Am. Cap. Strategies, Ltd., 729 F.3d 798, 804 (8th Cir. 2013); Reuter v. Jax Ltd., Inc., 711 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff has failed to properly move for leave to amend her complaint. The requests first appear in her reply brief, where she asks that if the Court “finds the allegation[s] insufficient, Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2).” [ECF No. 10 at *2]. This conditional request falls far short of the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and Local Rule 15. Plaintiff's requests for leave to amend—only if the Court finds her complaint insufficient—are wholly inadequate. Clobes v. 3M Co., 106 F.4th 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2024) (stating that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff fails to follow local rules).

More significantly, Plaintiff has not explained the substance of any proposed amendment or detailed what new information it would include to address the deficiencies in her complaint. See Rivera v. Bank of Am., N.A., 993 F.3d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 2021) (finding no abuse of discretion when moving party “made no motion for leave nor attempted to explain the substance of the proposed amendment”). Without knowing what specific amendments Plaintiff seeks to make, the Court cannot determine whether such changes would cause undue delay or prejudice Defendant. See Goldfinch Lab'y, P.C. v. Iowa Pathology Assocs., P.C., No. 4:24-cv-00168-RGE-HCA, 2024 WL 5205936, at *10 n.3 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 13, 2024) (denying leave to amend where plaintiff failed to make proper motion under Rule 15 and did not explain proposed amendments). Finally, the Court is permitted to deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile. Hillesheim v. Myron's Cards & Gifts, Inc., 897 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2018). “An amendment is futile if the amended claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Mt. Hawley Ins. v. City of Richmond Heights, 92 F.4th 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Hillesheim, 897 F.3d at 955). The jurisdictional defects identified above—Plaintiff's lack of standing and the inapplicability of Title IX to her circumstances—cannot be cured by additional factual allegations. Any amended complaint would therefore suffer the same fatal flaws.

The decision whether to grant leave to amend rests within the Court's discretion. Moody v. Vozel, 771 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 2014). Given Plaintiff's procedural failures, her failure to explain the substance of any proposed amendment, and the futility of amendment, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend would not serve the interests of justice. Further amendment would inevitably generate additional rounds of motion practice without any likelihood of a different outcome, imposing additional burdens on both the Court and Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for leave to amend is DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. [ECF No. 9]. The complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. All Title IX claims (Counts I–III) are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff's defamation claim (Count IV) is dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff also fails to allege that Defendant is a federally-funded institution as required to establish a Title IX claim. See Cavner v. Univ. of Ark. Ft. Smith, No. 2:21-CV-02034, 2021 WL 772240, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 26, 2021); Roohbakhsh v. Bd. of Trs. of Neb. State Colls., 409 F. Supp. 3d 719, 732 (D. Neb.2019). Nonetheless, the Court takes no position on whether Plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to satisfy this threshold matter.

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE