DUANE YATES v. BETH SKINNER (2024)

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff Duane Yates brings this pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 10 at 1. Yates is an inmate at Newton Correctional Facility (“NCF”) within the Iowa Department of Corrections (“DOC”). See ECF No. 10-1. Yates originally filed his complaint in December of 2023, ECF No. 1, along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 3, motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 4, motion for court to take receivership of the Iowa Department of Corrections, ECF No. 5, and a motion for temporary restraining order. ECF No. 6. He later filed a motion to amend exhibits to his complaint. ECF No. 7.

Yates's original complaint and supporting memorandum totaled 165 pages. See ECF No. 1–1-1. It contained fifteen claims against twenty-one defendants. See ECF No. 1 at 2–86. The complaint and supporting memorandum consisted of 96,144 words, which is the length of a typical novel. See What's the Perfect Length for a Book?, Penguin Books UK, https://www.penguin.co.uk/articles/2020/09/book-length-debate-fiction-long-novels (last visited August 29, 2024) (noting “that 80,000 to 100,000 words is often given as the standard for adult novels, and much of what authors are trying to do can be done within that word count.”).

The Court entered an order to amend because Yates's novel-length complaint did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). ECF No. 9 at 5. The Court ordered Yates to file a new complaint containing “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’․that [is]․simple, concise, and direct.’ ” Id. (quotation omitted; emphasis original). Yates responded to the Court's order by filing a 41-page amended complaint containing 22,863 words, alleging the same number of claims against the same number of defendants. See ECF No. 10 at 1–25. While no longer novel-length, Yates's complaint still does not comply with Rule 8.

To put the word-count of Yates's amended complaint in perspective, a merits brief filed in the United States Supreme Court is limited to 13,000 words. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 33(1)(g)(v). When a party moves to file an overlength brief, the Supreme Court limits overlength briefs to 20,000 words. See, e.g., United States v. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., 557 U.S. 949 (2009). This is the average length of a scholarly law review article. See Scholastica Law Review Submission Insights: 2024 Edition, Scholastica, https://scholasticahq.com/law-review-submissions-insights/ (last visited August 29, 2024) (stating that the average number of words per article is 20,534 words).

Neither Supreme Court briefs, nor law review articles, must contain “short and plain statements” of their claims. As a result, these are often too long. See James W. Ely, Jr., Address, Through a Crystal Ball: Legal Education—Its Relation to the Bench, Bar, and University Community, 21 TULSA L. J. 650, 654 (1986) (“There is widespread agreement that law review articles are too long․”). Yet Yates's complaint, which must contain such “short and plain statements” of his claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), exceeds the length of both overlength Supreme Court briefs and scholarly law review articles by nearly 3,000 words.

Yates's amended complaint thus does little to address the several concerns enumerated by the Court's order to amend. See ECF No. 9 at 3–5. Chief among them is that Yates's amended complaint still “ ‘unfairly burden[s] defendants and courts’ by ‘shift[ing] onto the defendant and the court the burden of identifying the plaintiff's genuine claims and determining which of those claims might have legal support.’ ” ECF No. 9 at 4 (quotation omitted). See Crichlow v. Fischer, No. 12-CV-7774 NSR, 2015 WL 678725, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (noting “[i]t is difficult to determine what Plaintiff's claims or allegations are, as the Amended Complaint reads like a stream of consciousness the length of a short novel, covering approximately four years' worth of events of all sorts and citing long strings of statutes and cases.”).

For this reason, if the Court did not dismiss Yates's amended complaint for failing to state a claim, the Court would dismiss Yates's amended complaint for his failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See Olson v. Little, 978 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 complaint that was “wordy and confusing, and does not provide the district court with the ‘short and plain statement’ required by [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)].”).

Yates's failure to comply with Rule 8 notwithstanding, the Court will accept Yates's amended complaint as the operative complaint and review it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). See, e.g., Cisse v. Annucci, No. 922CV0156TJMATB, 2022 WL 1183274, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2022) (“Notwithstanding the Court's discretionary authority to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failing to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court in this case has nevertheless undertaken an arduous review of the complaint․”).

Yates's amended complaint, ECF No. 10, “super[s]edes [the] original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect.” In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000). Thus, the Court will not consider in its initial review Yates's original complaint or any exhibits supporting it. ECF Nos. 1–2. See Holloway v. Omaha Work Staffing, No. 8:18CV497, 2019 WL 77431, at *3 n. 2 (D. Neb. Jan. 2, 2019) (noting that where Court ordered plaintiff to file an amended complaint to comply with Rule 8, it would “conduct further review of Plaintiff's amended complaint ONLY and [would] not consider Plaintiff's original Complaint or his unsolicited ‘Supplements.’ ”).

I. INITIAL REVIEW STANDARDS

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to review all prisoner complaints filed against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). On review, the Court must identify the cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any part of it, that it determines (a) is frivolous or malicious, (b) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (c) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b).

A claim is “frivolous” if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a ‘sheer possibility.’ ” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

A pro se complaint “must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleading drafted by lawyers.’ ” Rinehart v. Weitzell, 964 F.3d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)). The Court must weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (determining what is “clearly baseless” is left to discretion of court ruling on in forma pauperis petition). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice ․ Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ․ a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 678–79 (citations omitted).

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). A complaint states a plausible claim for relief when its “factual content ․ allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Class action request

Before discussing Yates's claims, the Court must address his request for class action certification. Yates “requests the Court to grant class action status under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for all other[s] who have been denied certain constitutional and statutory rights․” ECF No. 10 at 30. This class would encompass “[a]ll inmates who are required by Iowa law and/or currently in prison within IDOC or under the supervision of the IDOC,” including inmates “on work release, parole[,] or other monitored supervision․” Id.

Class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979). Rule 23 ensures that the exception is justified and that “the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 (2011). District courts have broad discretion in determining whether a class should be certified under Rule 23. Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2015). A district court “must conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ to determine whether the prerequisites for a class action under Rule 23(a) are satisfied.” Rattray v. Woodbury Cty., IA, 614 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). “Though class certification is not the time to address the merits of the parties' claims and defenses, the ‘rigorous analysis’ under Rule 23 must involve consideration of what the parties must prove.” Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2006). Therefore, analysis may “entail some overlap with the merits.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351.

“To be certified as a class, plaintiffs must meet all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and must satisfy one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) requires showing that the class meets requirements of ‘numerosity, commonality, typicality, and fair and adequate representation.’ ” Ahmad v. City of St. Louis, 995 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). “Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find ‘that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’ ” Cody v. City of St. Louis for & on behalf of Medium Sec. Inst., 103 F.4th 523, 528–29 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). “A complaint's mere recital of questions that happen to be shared by class members is ‘not sufficient to obtain class certification.’ ” Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 487 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349).

i. Numerosity

The numerosity inquiry requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “In addition to the size of the class, the court may also consider the nature of the action, the size of the individual claims, the inconvenience of trying individual suits, and any other factor relevant to the practicability of joining all the putative class members.” Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 559–60 (8th Cir. 1982).

Yates defines the putative class as including all Iowa prisoners. See ECF No. 10 at 30. Yates maintains that “the IDOC has approximately 8,600 inmates being held in all the prisons in Iowa.” Id. The number of inmates and the impracticality of joining their suits establishes numerosity under Rule 23(a). Frazier v. PJ Iowa, L.C., 337 F.Supp.3d 848, 869 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (finding numerosity when “the number of potential class members is in the hundreds.”).

ii. Commonality

“Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be common questions of law or fact among the members of the class.” Paxton, 688 F.2d at 561 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’ ” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349–50 (quotation omitted). “This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” but “[t]heir claims must depend upon a common contention” which “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.” Id. at 350. “Nor does this mean that Plaintiffs can prevail by raising common questions in droves.” Cody, 103 F.4th at 529–30 (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350). “Instead, class-wide proceedings should have the capacity to generate common answers that ‘drive the resolution of the litigation.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted). “Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.” Ibid. (citation omitted).

“Commonality is subsumed within the predominance requirement,” Cody, 103 F.4th at 530 (citing Custom Hair Designs by Sandy v. Cent. Payment Co., 984 F.3d 595, 601 (8th Cir. 2020), “which requires [the Court] to ask ‘whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’ ” Id. (citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (citation omitted)). “This requires [courts] ‘to give careful scrutiny to the relation between common and individual questions in a case.’ ” Ibid. Individual questions are those where class members “will need to present evidence that varies from member to member.” Ibid. (citation omitted). Common questions are those “where ‘the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.’ ” Ibid. (cleaned up).

Because the putative class here is defined so broadly—to include “[a]ll inmates who are required by Iowa law and/or currently in prison within the IDOC or under the supervision of the IDOC,” ECF No. 10 at 30—there can be no commonality. Several of Yates's claims require a showing of injury or prejudice—for example, his claims for First Amendment retaliation claim (Counts 1 and 2), access to courts (Count 7), mailing labels and stamps (Count 8), prison library deficiencies (Count 9), inadequate food service (Count 10), prison lighting and other conditions (Count 11), overcrowding (Count 12), and the leaking roof (Count 13).

Every inmate “currently in prison within the IDOC or under the supervision of the IDOC,” ECF No. 10 at 30, would not suffer the same injuries or prejudice resulting from the allegations violations contained in those claims. These “ ‘[d]issimilarities within the proposed class[es]․impede the generation of common answers.’ ” Cody, 103 F.4th at 531, 533 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350) (citation omitted) (holding that because “[t]he City's liability for Plaintiffs' conditions claims—concerning plumbing, mold, and pests—will turn on both the severity of the conditions each plaintiff faced, and the length of exposure to those conditions,” plaintiffs failed to establish commonality to certify class). Other claims raised by Yates— including his claims concerning food as reward or a punishment (Count 3), the TIP Level system (Count 6), and inadequate food service (Count 10)—are based, at least in part, on equal protection theories. Where Yates compares his own treatment to the preferable treatment of other inmates in those claims, he necessarily cannot show that the class members “have suffered the same injury.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349–50.

iii. Typicality

To satisfy the typicality requirement, the proponent of certification must show that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Typicality is generally established by a showing that the claims of all proposed members of the class “arise from a single event or share the same legal theory.” In re Teflon Prod. Liab. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 354, 364 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (citing Paxton, 688 F.2d at 561–62). As long as the class shares a legal theory, “slight differences in fact will not defeat certification.” Id. (citing Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1540 (8th Cir. 1996). But “[t]he presence of a common legal theory does not establish typicality when proof of a violation requires individualized inquiry.” Elizabeth M., 458 F.3d at 787.

Yates's amended complaint, which contains fifteen claims based on numerous theories of liability, does not present a unifying legal theory among the class. Because so many of his claims require an “individualized inquiry” to prove them, a unifying legal theory would not establish typicality even if there was one. See id. Moreover, Yates's claims do not arise from a single event, either. His generalized claims presented in his amended complaint will thus have affected some inmates more than others, depending on whether, and when, an inmate was potentially affected by the allegedly unconstitutional policy or event.

iv. Fair and accurate representation

The fourth requirement under Rule 23(a) is that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). For these purposes, adequacy requires both that the class representative be “qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation,” and that the named plaintiffs not have interests “antagonistic to those of the class.” Maxwell v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 1:08CV00017-JAJ-TJS, 2012 WL 12541110, at *8 (S.D. Iowa July 19, 2012) (quotation omitted). Setting aside whether Yates is “qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation,” he has interests that are “antagonistic to those of the class.”

For example, Yates challenges many of the reward systems that NCF has in place to incentivize good behavior among inmates, as he does in Counts 3 and 6. If Yates prevailed on these claims, the prison would be required to, or may on their own, abolish such reward systems. This will not be received well by the prisoners who have maintained good behavior for years to enjoy the benefits those reward systems have conferred. If the systems were maintained and Yates was allowed to reap their benefits without exhibiting good behavior, other inmates would doubtless be resentful of this. Thus, Yates cannot fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Yates has failed to meet his burden under Rule 23(a). Because the Court has found that Yates has not met the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a), the Court need not discuss the Rule 23(b) requirements. Yates's request to certify a class must be denied.

B. Discussion of claims

Because most of Yates's claims are unrelated to a common set of facts, the Court will discuss the facts relating to each claim in its analysis of the claims.

i. The grievance system (Count 1)

Yates first takes issue with NCF's grievance system, which he calls a “paper shuffle.” ECF No. 10 at 4. Yates alleges that his grievances are “always met with dead end results.” Id. He claims prison officials do not follow their own policies and procedures; inmates must attempt informal resolution with the same staff who decide grievances; the grievance decisions do not provide enough explanation; or grievances are not processed because they do not contain enough information. Id. Yates maintains the grievance system violates his right to due process. See id.

“The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). “Once a liberty interest is established, the next question is what process is due.” Williams v. Norris, 277 F. App'x 647, 649 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224). But the Court “ ‘need reach the question of what process is due only if the inmates establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest․’ ” Smith v. McKinney, 954 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 125).

The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that prisoners have no liberty interest in a prison grievance system. See, e.g., Walker v. Bertsch, 745 Fed. App'x. 664 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that prisoner had no viable due process claim regarding the prison's grievance system, as the grievance system does not give rise to a liberty interest requiring due process protection); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that inmates have no “liberty interest” in the processing of their grievances, such as would support § 1983 claim for prison official's failure to pick up his completed grievance forms); Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in having prison officials follow prison regulations). Because Yates has no liberty interest in the grievance system, see Walker, 745 Fed. App'x. 664, his allegation that the grievance system is a “paper shuffle” does not state a due process claim. This claim is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

ii. First Amendment retaliation (Counts 1 and 2)

Yates's first count also alludes to a First Amendment retaliation claim. See ECF No. 10 at 4. Yates claims in Count 1 that “different unit managers try to deter Yates from filing grievances with threats on taking his prison job and his level [,] and [tell him] that his conduct in doing so is not prosocial and he should think this over.” Id. Yates maintains “[t]his is clearly thwarting and using machination[,] misrepresentation, or intimidation as a way to deter Yates f[rom] filing any grievances or addressing the issues he has․” Id.

Yates complains in Count 2 that unit manager John Mays directed other correctional officers to “bully and thwart his job at every turn and to find something wrong to write any type of report on to get Yates removed from this job․” ECF No. 10 at 5. Yates claims that Mays used case manager James Watson to remove Yates from “the highest level and special treatment cell house․” Id. Yates alleges he lost his job and classification “due to the fact that Yates and several other inmates filed a large federal lawsuit on the prison with the help of a major law firm․” ECF No. 10 at 5. He claims “prison officials became scar[ ]ed and had even[ ] mentioned this many times to Yates and the other inmates about this suit and its contents.” Id. Prison officials also “continually complained to Yates about his case and the other inmates who filed with him,” and those other inmates “were badgered and bullied.” Id. Yates claims that this started “only a short few weeks after this suit was dismissed in the district court.” Id.

“To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, [Yates] must show (1) that he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity; and (3) that the adverse action was motivated in part by [Yates's] exercise of his constitutional rights.” Scheffler v. Molin, 743 F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Yates satisfies the first element—both grievances and lawsuits are constitutionally protected activity. See Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The filing of a prison grievance, like the filing of an inmate lawsuit, is protected First Amendment activity.”).

As to the second element, “[a]dverse actions which may show retaliation include denial of privileges or acts worsening an inmate's working conditions.” Spencer v. Jackson Ctny., Mo., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013). “The question is not whether the plaintiff [himself] was deterred [by the adverse actions], though how plaintiff acted might be evidence of what a reasonable person would have done,” Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2003) (bracketed material added); rather, the Court must determine whether those adverse actions “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity.” Scheffler, 743 F.3d at 621.

Yates himself was not deterred. According to his complaint, he has filed thirteen grievances related to this lawsuit alone. See ECF No. 10 at 29. He has also filed a new lawsuit after this alleged retaliation, alleging fifteen claims against twenty-one defendants. See id. This is evidence that Yates was not deterred, Garcia 348 F.3d at 729, but Yates may not be representative of a “reasonable person” or a “a person of ordinary firmness.” See Garcia 348 F.3d at 729; Scheffler, 743 F.3d at 621.

Yates's lawsuit, though, was not brought on behalf of himself alone. The Court may have denied class certification after suit was filed, but Yates brought the lawsuit on behalf of himself and “[a]ll [o]ther [s]imilarly situated [i]ndividuals․currently held within the Iowa Department of Corrections.” ECF No. 10 at 1. According to his request for class certification, that includes every inmate under supervision by DOC. See id. at 30. Because Yates's lawsuit is brought on behalf of a large swath of prisoners (8,600 inmates, according to his complaint, id. at 30), this is evidence that a “reasonable person” or “a person of ordinary firmness,” like the prisoners he believes are similarly situated to him, would not be chilled from engaging in litigious activity after the alleged adverse actions. Yates has thus failed to satisfy the second element of this claim.

Even if Yates had sufficiently pled the second element of his claim, he has not sufficiently pled the third. To sufficiently plead the third element, a prisoner must satisfy the “heavy burden of showing that the prison officials who disciplined him had an impermissible motive for doing so, and that but for this impermissible motive, the disciplinary charges would not have been brought.” Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 529 (8th Cir.1990) (emphasis added). That burden cannot be met with speculative or conclusory allegations. See Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff's retaliation claim because defendant's motive was speculative and conclusory).

“Temporal proximity is relevant but not dispositive,” Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 592 (8th Cir. 2006), so the fact that the retaliation allegedly began after Yates filed his “large federal lawsuit” does not itself show that the prison officials' acts were done with a retaliatory motive. Rather, the question turns on whether Yates would have kept his job and his classification had officials not allegedly retaliated against him. See Foster v. Delo, 130 F.3d 307, 308 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff “did not produce evidence that his request for a new stereo and television would not have been denied but for the motive of retaliation for his filing numerous lawsuits against prison officials.”). Yates does not allege he would have remained in his job or retained his classification if officials did not allegedly retaliate against him. Therefore, this claim is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

iii. Using food as a reward or a punishment (Count 3)

Yates next alleges prison officials have “inflicted cruel and unusual punishment and the denial of equal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment” because “NCF staff use food for incentive and for punishment.” ECF No. 10 at 5–6. Yates maintains this because some classes of prisoners have access to the “snack shack,” “fancy cookouts with lusciously grilled beef burgers and hot dogs,” and larger portions of food at the dining hall, while other classes of prisoners do not. See ibid.

The Court construes Yates's Eighth Amendment claim as a conditions of confinement claim. “To establish that a prisoner's conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must show that (1) the alleged deprivation is, ‘objectively, sufficiently serious,’ resulting ‘in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,’ and (2) that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,’ meaning that the officials actually knew of and disregarded the risk.” Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). “Absent a showing that the prison officials consciously understood that prison conditions created such an excessive risk, the conditions are not a ‘punishment’ within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).

The Eighth Circuit has noted that there is “no constitutional right of access to a prison gift or snack shop.” Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996). It follows that there is no right to the more unusual privilege of attending a “fancy cookout.” “The denial of the ability to purchase or receive extra food does not rise to the level of a violation of a constitutional right.” Morrison v. Bond, No. 11-4047-CV-C-FJG-P, 2013 WL 11320957, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 24, 2013), aff'd, 607 F. App'x 608 (8th Cir. 2015). If that is so, depriving Yates of “snack shack” visits, cookouts, and seconds at dinner is not an “ ‘objectively, sufficiently serious,’ [deprivation] resulting ‘in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Williams, 49 F.3d at 445. Thus, denial of these privileges does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

“Because [Yates] does not allege he was a member of a protected class or that a fundamental right was violated, he must show that ‘similarly situated classes of inmates are treated differently, and that this difference in treatment bears no rational relation to any legitimate penal interest’ ” to state an equal protection claim. Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Not all inmates at NCF are similarly situated. Inmates in different tiers (Levels 1, 2, and 3, respectively), ECF No. 10 at 6, are not similarly situated to the NCF population as a whole. See, e.g., Daywitt v. Harpstead, No. 23-CV-2111 (KMM/JFD), 2023 WL 8378533, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 15, 2023) (“An MSOP client found to have violated MSOP rules and who is therefore demoted in tier is not similarly situated with an MSOP client who has been in full compliance with MSOP's rules, at least for purposes of applying a disciplinary policy.”) (citation omitted). Thus, inmates in Level 1 must be compared to inmates in Level 1, not inmates in Levels 2 or 3. Yates does not allege that inmates are treated differently within each level, see ECF No. 10 at 6, so he has failed to allege that “similarly situated classes of inmates are treated differently.” Phillips, 320 F.3d at 848.

Even if Yates could, he has not shown that “this difference in treatment bears no rational relation to any legitimate penal interest.” Id. The Supreme Court has observed that “[a]n essential tool of prison administration․is the authority to offer inmates various incentives to behave” and that “[t]he Constitution accords prison officials wide latitude to bestow or revoke these perquisites as they see fit.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 26 (2002). Thus, the food incentives described in Yates's amended complaint, ECF No. 10 at 6, bolster a prison's ability to maintain order, which is a prison's core responsibility. See Thongvanh v. Thalacker, 17 F.3d 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that “prison officials have a duty to maintain security within the prison․”). The incentives accorded to each Level thus bear a rational relation to a legitimate penal interest.

Because Yates has failed to adequately allege that the prison's food incentives constitute cruel and unusual punishment or violate his right to equal protection, this claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

iv. Generic notes (Count 4)

Yates maintains that “the generic notes that all correctional officers, administration[,] and other staff can write and place in an inmate[‘]s file is constitutionally unlawful as it denies the inmate his Fourteenth Amendment Right of Due Process of Law․” ECF No. 10 at 7. The Court recently considered and rejected this same claim. See Jeffries v. Tripp, 704 F.Supp.3d 912 (S.D. Iowa 2023) (concluding that “IDOC's use of generic notes cannot rise to a due process violation that can be brought under § 1983.”). This claim is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

v. Claims against the administrative law judge (Count 5)

Yates alleges that the administrative law judge “is not neutral and detached from the rest of the prison administration and upholds all the false and illegal conduct of the [correctional officers] and other staff who write reports on inmates using false information․” ECF No. 10 at 8 (caps omitted). Yates cannot sue the administrative law judge because such judges are absolutely immune from suit. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978) (holding agency hearing examiner or administrative law judge “functionally comparable” to judge and therefore protected by absolute immunity). This claim is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

vi. TIP Level system (Count 6)

Yates maintains the TIP level system and policy is unconstitutional because it does not treat all similarly situated inmates within DOC equally. See ECF No. 10 at 9. “TIP” stands for “Transition Incentive Program.” See Caples v. Marmor, No. 418CV00214RGECFB, 2020 WL 7041475, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 21, 2020), aff'd, 850 F. App'x 460 (8th Cir. 2021). Yates maintains this program is unconstitutional because “some inmates get better food, more yard time, more library time, and other preferential treatment than those in the lower levels.” ECF No. 10 at 41. In other words, he argues that the TIP program, like the food privilege allegation in Count 3, is cruel and unusual punishment and violates his right to equal protection.

While somewhat unclear, it appears that the TIP levels at NCF correspond with the food privilege levels described in Count 3. See ECF No. 10 at 10 (mentioning “Level 1” in his narrative); id. at 6 (describing “TIP system” and Level 1, 2, and 3 privileges). Accordingly, because the TIP levels operate as incentives in the same way that the food privilege levels do, the Court's analysis in Count 3 applies with equal force to this count. The TIP levels are not cruel and unusual punishment and do not violate Yates's right to equal protection. This claim is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

vii. Access to courts (Count 7)

Yates also claims that prison officials have interfered with his access to the courts. See ECF No. 10 at 11. “To prove a violation of the right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must establish the state has not provided an opportunity to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner's sentence or conditions of confinement in a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.” White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “To prove actual injury, [a prisoner] must ‘demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.’ ” Id. (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996)).

Yates variously claims that prison officials open prisoners' legal mail, remove the outside contents of envelopes, read outgoing legal mail, hold onto legal mail before sending it out or giving it to the inmate, interfere with his legal calls by not setting them up or limiting the time he can talk, read legal material in his cell, and take and destroy legal mail. ECF No. 10 at 11. But Yates only describes two examples of interference that would clearly be within the statute of limitations. First, he claims that on May 10, 2023, prison officials prevented Yates from viewing video of his oral argument in the Iowa Court of Appeals because prison officials falsely told him they did not have access to Zoom. See ECF No. 10 at 12. Second, he claims prison officials then confiscated and destroyed a flash drive containing information pertaining to his case on appeal. See id. at 12–13. Prison officials allegedly confiscated the flash drive for security reasons. Id. at 13.

These claims, individually or as a whole, do not state an access to the courts claim because Yates has not shown the necessary injury. Yates must allege that “a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” White, 494 F.3d at 680. The “nonfrivolous legal claim” cannot be just any claim. It must be “a legal claim in a criminal appeal, postconviction matter, or civil rights action seeking to vindicate basic constitutional rights.” Sabers v. Delano, 100 F.3d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1996). Yates does not state what his Iowa Court of Appeals case concerned. And it is not the Court's responsibility to supply those facts. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (while pro se complaint should be liberally construed, it still must allege facts to support claims advanced; court will not supply facts or construct legal theory for plaintiff).

But even if Yates's appeal in the Iowa Court of Appeals concerned a “criminal appeal, postconviction matter, or civil rights action seeking to vindicate basic constitutional rights,” Sabers, 100 F.3d at 84, his failure to attend oral argument by video or receive documents from the case did not deprive him of the “opportunity to litigate a claim.” White, 494 F.3d at 680. Yates had no right to be present at oral argument. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285–86 (1948), overruled on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (observing that “a prisoner has no absolute right to argue his own appeal or even to be present at the proceedings in an appellate court.”). Even if he did, Yates was represented at oral argument by counsel. See ECF No. 10 at 12. Yates's presence at oral argument, or lack thereof, would not have affected the appeal in any way. Nor would the inability to receive a flash drive containing his case file after the oral argument had concluded. See ECF No. 10 at 13. Because Yates has failed to allege injury, he has failed to state an access to the courts claim. This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

viii. Removing mailing labels and stamps from legal mail (Count 8)

Yates claims the prison's practice of removing stamps and labels to search for contraband allows prison officials or others to read the contents of privileged mail outside the presence of the inmate. See ECF No. at 15. “Privileged prisoner mail, that is mail to or from an inmate's attorney and identified as such, may not be opened for inspections for contraband except in the presence of the prisoner.” Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974)). Other mail, from the courts for example, do not fall within the scope of that privilege and therefore may be opened outside the presence of the inmate. See Moore v. Rowley, 126 F. App'x 759, 760 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a prisoner had no constitutional right to have his bankruptcy petition mailed without being inspected first); Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987) (court documents are not privileged legal mail because they are “public documents” available in the court's files).

When prison officials open privileged mail outside the presence of the inmate, this can give rise to an access to courts claim under the First Amendment. See Powells v. Minnehaha Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 198 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that inmate stated constitutional claim based on officers opening legal mail when he was not present); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that isolated incident of inadvertent opening of inmate's incoming legal mail, without evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with inmate's right to counsel or access to courts, does not rise to level of constitutional violation).

“To assert a successful claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from the inadvertent opening of legal mail.” Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1037 (8th Cir. 2012). “Absent an articulation of how the alleged wrongful conduct actually blocked [Yates's] access to filing a complaint, or caused a filed complaint to be deficient, [Yates's] alleged injuries are merely speculative.” Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 2008). Because Yates fails to allege that he was prejudiced by the prison opening his legal mail, he has failed to allege a First Amendment violation. This claim is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

ix. Complaints about the prison library (Count 9)

Yates next makes several complaints about the prison library. ECF No. 10 at 15–18. He claims the library requires him to write an inmate's name and prison number in the margin of their documents, as his amended complaint shows. See id. at 15–16. Yates alleges that library staff look at and comment upon his legal work. See id. at 16. He states that library staff have removed certain legal books from the library. Id. at 17. Yates claims that prison staff have removed “OffNet” computers for doing legal work and prevented inmates from using the library for legal work. Id. Yates claims that library staff yell at him from across the library when he is trying to assist others with legal work. See id. at 17–18.

“The Supreme Court has held that ‘the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.’ ” Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1004–05 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). Like other access to courts claims analyzed above, an inmate alleging an access to courts violation “must show an ‘actual injury’ by ‘demonstrat[ing] that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim,’ ” id. (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351), such as a direct appeal from a conviction for which he is incarcerated, a habeas corpus petition, or a civil rights action under § 1983. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Like his access to courts claims above, Yates fails to explain how any of the law library's deficiencies have prevented him from pursuing a legal claim. That Yates was originally able to file a 96,144-word complaint in December of 2023 and then a 22,863-word amended complaint in May of 2024 (less than one month after the Court ordered him to amend) is evidence itself that the law library's resources are constitutionally adequate and are providing him access to the courts. This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

x. Inadequate food service (Count 10)

Like Count 3, this claim concerns food. Yates claims here that “the food service and meals are not adequate[,] and the main kitchen does not properly make full meals available and are constantly running out of food.” ECF No. 10 at 18. (caps omitted). Yates maintains that the food is not served “in the right proportions” or at “proper serving temperatures.” Id. Yates sometimes only gets a half-scoop of vegetables and has gone without salad. Id. He may only get a half of a cinnamon roll or only two pieces of chicken. Id. Yates receives sack lunches for dinner on weekends. Id. at 19. These contain two slices of bread and some combination of meat, cheese, or peanut butter and jelly. Id. Weekend breakfasts consist of instant oatmeal, grits, or scrambled eggs on toast. Id. Inmates receive “[t]he same frozen doughnuts on Monday, the same kiddie cereal everyday,” cereal bars, or “old packaged muffins [that are] all dried[-]out and hard․” Id. Coffee has not been served at breakfast for over three years. Id. at 20.

While he does not identify how the prison food menu violates his federally protected rights, he claims “the inmates seem to get punished all the time from the lack of proper meals,” ECF No. 10 at 18, which suggests a cruel and unusual punishment claim under the Eighth Amendment. But Yates also maintains there is a “state created liberty interest in having a full meal and [being] equally treated as to the meals being nutritious and palatable,” id. at 19, which suggests a substantive due process claim.

“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing’ such a claim.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). The Eighth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection related to food. “The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes duties on prison officials requiring them to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement,’ which includes ensuring ‘inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ ” Weeks v. Birch, No. 21-1270, 2022 WL 2979756, at *1 (8th Cir. July 28, 2022) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, this claim should be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth Amendment's more generalized notion of “substantive due process.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 273.

“[P]risoners have a right to nutritionally adequate food.” Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Denial of nutritionally adequate food can provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. See Day v. Norris, 219 F. App'x 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). But to state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that “the food he was served was nutritionally inadequate or prepared in a manner presenting an immediate danger to his health, or that his health suffered as a result of the food.” Id. (reversing dismissal of Eighth Amendment inadequate food claim because plaintiff, “as a result of the inadequate diet,․had lost weight, was fatigued, and suffered hunger pangs and mental anguish.”). Yates has made no such allegation in his amended complaint.

Yates generally alleges that “the inmate [i]s left to go hungry,” ECF No. 10 at 18, but this conclusory and general allegation is insufficient to state a claim. See Ark. Right to Life State Pol. Action Comm. v. Butler, 146 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that to have Article III standing, a plaintiff “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ and such an injury must be concrete, particularized, and either actual or imminent․Vague and conclusory allegations of harm are insufficient to create standing.” (citations omitted)). Because Yates has failed to allege any particularized harm resulting from the prison's food options, he has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim. This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

xi. Prison lighting and other conditions (Count 11)

Yates next claims that the prison “continu[ously] leave[s] the cell lights on all day[,] and the night lights at night are so bright that this․is causing mental and medical issues.” ECF No. 20 at 41 (caps omitted). Prison officials claim “that [this] is a security matter as they cannot see in the cell and needed the lights on all day.” Id. Yates claims that the lights have not been on all day “until just recently.” Id. Yates alleges that the “night lights are so bright that you can read a book by them.” Id. The overhead lights in cells are only eighteen inches above the top bunk. Id. at 21. The night light makes sleeping on the top bunk “next to impossible.” Id. Yates claims these conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id.

The “Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons” or that prisons be “free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Nonetheless, prison conditions can violate the Eighth Amendment if they “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” and “correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed by the [alleged condition].” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). Deliberate indifference, as stated above in Count 3, requires prison officials to have “consciously understood that prison conditions created․an excessive risk [to inmate health and safety]” to constitute “ ‘punishment’ within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Williams, 49 F.3d at 445.

Yates has not alleged that constant illumination of cells deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” or that it created a substantial risk of harm to him. See Philmlee v. Byrd, No. 4:10CV00221, 2010 WL 6549829, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2010) (leaving dimmed lights on at night in cells and in guard's area did not deny detainee minimal civilized measure of life's necessities or constitute substantial risk of serious harm). Biesanz v. Ferguson, No. 10-5017, 2012 WL 601585, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 19, 2012) (jail's policy of dimming cell lights at night to simulate “night lights” for safety reasons was not unconstitutional punishment when pretrial detainee alleged only that he lost sleep, but did not seek medical help for his alleged sleeplessness and did not claim to have “any other physical impairment from the constant lighting”); Muick v. Reno, 2003 WL 22952703, at *2 (8th Cir. Dec. 10, 2003) (dismissing a prisoner's § 1983 claim because he “did not allege that he suffered any resulting physical injuries” due to unspecified “lighting problems” in his cell).

Further, the Eighth Circuit has “found no constitutional violation when prison officials subjected prisoners to constant lighting in circumstances where, as here, defendants proffered an explanation for why it was necessary.” Onstad v. Hobbs, 607 F. App'x 595, 596 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996); O'Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987)). Yates maintains in his complaint that prison officials kept the lights on in the cells because “they cannot see in the cell and needed the lights on all day.” ECF No. 10 at 20. The Eighth Circuit has upheld twenty-four-hour cell illumination under similar justifications when it was necessary “to keep the detainee under observation for both his medical condition as well as general safety concerns.” Ferguson, 88 F.3d at 650. The Eighth Circuit also upheld a district court's finding that “continuous lighting in the holding cell” did not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights because of “the need for jail security and the need to monitor [the plaintiff].” O'Donnell, 826 F.2d at 790. This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

xii. Overcrowding (Count 12)

Yates claims that overcrowding has caused prison officials to place beds less than two inches above the floor, when beds are supposed to be twelve inches above the floor. ECF No. 10 at 22. Yates further alleges that the cells are not large enough to hold three people. Id. He maintains this violates IDOC policy. Id. Also, there are not enough showers, the dining halls are not large enough to feed all the inmates, and there are not enough classrooms for sex offender programming. Id at 22–23. He claims the prison conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 22.

The Court set forth in its analysis of Counts 3 and 11 what a plaintiff must allege to state a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. The prison conditions described by Yates are “insufficient to support a conclusion that the overcrowding led to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation, nor increased violence among inmates or other conditions intolerable for prison confinement” necessary to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Rather, these conditions are “akin to mere inconveniences rather than intolerable deprivations.” Id.

The Eighth Circuit has held that “[d]ouble-celling could be viewed as cruel and unusual punishment only if it ‘[led] to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation’ or if it ‘increase[d] violence among inmates or create[d] other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.’ ” Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348). Lower courts in the Eighth Circuit have applied the same logic to triple-celling, holding that it is “only unconstitutional if it leads to ‘deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation.’ ” Simpson v. Cross, No. 1:20-CV-196 DDN, 2021 WL 1089648, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2021) (quoting Cody, 830 F.2d at 914). In Simpson, the court dismissed a § 1983 claim because the plaintiff “failed to allege how triple-ceiling produced conditions den[ied] him ‘basic human needs’ or ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities’․and that defendants inflicted those conditions deliberately or recklessly.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). The same conclusion is appropriate here. Yates has not plausibly alleged any facts indicating that three-man cells deprive him of his basic needs.

Similarly, placing a bed less than two inches above the floor does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Yates claims this violates prison policy, ECF No. 10 at 22, but “a violation of prison policy alone does not give rise to section 1983 liability.” Moore v. Rowley, 126 F. App'x 759, 760 (8th Cir. 2005). Yates's claims that there are not enough showers, the dining halls are not large enough to feed all the inmates, and there are not enough classrooms for sex offender programming, id at 22–23, are too conclusory to show a constitutional deprivation and do not show the individualized harm necessary to establish an Article III standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (noting that the Court has “consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”); Hobbs v. Arkansas Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 2:22CV00224-DPM-JTK, 2023 WL 354183, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 5, 2023) (noting that “[b]ecause Plaintiff's claims are made in terms of ‘we,’ the Court cannot determine whether any alleged harm was specific to Plaintiff.”). This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

xiii. Leaking roofs (Count 13)

Yates claims “[t]he roofs on all of the cell houses leak so bad that there is a significant health hazard and also a safety issues as the water that leaks․pours into the cell houses when it rains [ ] or when snow melts.” ECF No. 10 at 23. Yates's claim fails because he does not allege harm. Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 26869 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that where plaintiff was subjected to an “overflowed toilet in his cell for four days,” such “allegations regarding ‘raw sewage’ d[id] not rise to a level of constitutional significance” because plaintiff “did not allege that he was exposed to disease or suffered any other consequences of the exposure.”).

Yates makes the conclusory allegation that “mold or other bacteria can be growing [in] the ceiling and walls,” which “creates significant breathing problems for the inmates, especially those with asthma and bronchitis and other lung problems.” ECF No. 10 at 24. He claims the “possibility of some electrical shortages and possibility of an inmate or inmates being electrocuted is reasonably high.” Id. Yates maintains “[t]he water splashing on the tables during meals is a good source of bacteria being spread to the food as the inmates are force to eat on these tables during a meal․” Id. But these allegations of potential harm are too speculative and they are not particularized to Yates. Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds, 94 F.4th 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2024) (concluding that potential to contract COVID-19 “is too speculative to satisfy the injury in fact element” necessary to establish Article III standing); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (harm must be specific to plaintiff). As such, Yates has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim regarding the leaking roof. This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

xiv. Requiring inmates to wear lanyards is a safety hazard (Count 14)

Yates next claims that requiring inmates to wear lanyards with an identification card presents a safety risk. See ECF No. 10 at 24–25. Yates does not identify how this violates his federally protected rights, and the Court concludes that it does not. Requiring inmates to wear a lanyard with an identification card serves a valid penological purpose. See, e.g., Glass v. White, No. 1:09-CV-01245-MJS PC, 2011 WL 826360, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2011) (observing that “[n]o one could reasonably deny that the prison has a valid penological purpose in ensuring identification cards are left unobstructed so that prisoner identity can readily be checked and confirmed.”). This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

xv. Failure to follow prison policies regarding job placement (Count 15)

Yates last alleges the prison fails to “enforce their policies on prison work requirements at the NCF prison and selectively position and selectively place inmates they curry favor to for job placement over other inmates with skills in certain job areas․” ECF No. 10 at 25 (caps omitted). Yates claims this failure to follow IDOC policy violates his right to due process, creates unequal environments within the prison, and denies inmates their right under the law to have a job in the prison. Id.

Even assuming DOC policy or state law provides inmates with a right to a job in prison, the prison's failure to follow prison policy or state law is not actionable under § 1983. See Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (no federal constitutional liberty interest in having state officers follow state law, and an internal prison policy does not create such a right, nor does a prison official's failure to follow such a regulation rise to the level of a § 1983 claim); Gardner, 109 F.3d at 430 (failure to follow prison policy is not basis for § 1983 liability); Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 1993) (allegation of state law violation, statutory or decisional, does not, in itself, state a claim under federal Constitution or § 1983). Further, an inmate “ha[s] no constitutional right to a particular prison job.” Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002). This claim must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

C. Conclusion

Because Yates has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, his complaint is DISMISSED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

D. Pending motions

i. Motion to amend exhibits to complaint

Yates sought to amend exhibits attached to his original complaint. ECF No. 7. Because Yates's amended complaint superseded and replaced his original complaint, see supra, this motion is DENIED as moot.

ii. Motion for temporary restraining order

Yates also moves for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) related to the relief sought in his original complaint. ECF No. 6 at 1–2. In determining whether to issue a TRO, the Court evaluates four factors: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Kroupa v. Nielsen, 731 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). “No single factor in itself is dispositive; in each case all of the factors must be considered to determine whether on balance they weigh towards granting the injunction.” Baker Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1472 (8th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). “[W]hen the [g]overnment is the opposing party,” the balance of the equities and the public interest factors merge. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the propriety of a temporary restraining order by a preponderance of the evidence. Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003).

Yates has failed to show irreparable harm. To be entitled to injunctive relief, a movant must show “that irreparable injury is likely,” not merely possible, “in the absence of an injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (emphasis added). Yates has not pointed to an irreparable injury in his complaint. Thus, there is no harm to balance with injury to defendants. The Court has also determined that Yates cannot succeed on the merits. The Court DENIES his motion for a TRO.

iii. Motion for Court to take receivership of Iowa Department of Corrections

Yates moves the Court to take receivership of the Iowa Department of Corrections. ECF No. 5. This motion is DENIED because Yates has failed to show that the Iowa Department of Corrections violated his constitutional rights.

iv. Motion to appoint counsel

Yates moves for the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 4. That motion is DENIED as moot because his amended complaint is dismissed.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above,

IT IS ORDERED that Yates's amended complaint, ECF No. 10, is DISMISSED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (court shall dismiss complaint on initial review if complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state claim or seeks monetary relief from defendant who is immune).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Yates's request for permission to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 3, is GRANTED. Based on the information submitted, id., the Court does not assess Yates an initial filing fee. The remainder of the $350.00 fee owed shall be paid to the Clerk of Court from the prisoner's account in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Yates is proceeding in forma pauperis and is not assessed the $55.00 administrative fee. A notice of this obligation shall be sent to the appropriate prison official.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Yates's motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 4, is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Yates's motion for court to take receivership of the Iowa Department of Corrections, ECF No. 5, is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Yates's motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 6, is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Yates's motion to amend exhibits, ECF No. 7, is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 6th day of September, 2024.

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, Chief Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA