UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ASHLEY CHACON (2023)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1

On December 4, 2022, Trooper Spencer Baltes with the Iowa State Patrol received information from Special Agent J. Curtis Hale with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that a suspected load of illegal narcotics was entering Iowa via I-80 eastbound in a black 2021 Toyota Highlander bearing a California license plate. He was informed that the suspect vehicle was possibly occupied by a female named Ashley Chacon.

With this information, Trooper Baltes positioned his patrol vehicle on the median of I-80 near the 6-mile marker to monitor the eastbound traffic. At approximately 9:00 p.m., he observed a black SUV as described by the DEA agent speeding towards his location. He confirmed via radar the suspect vehicle was traveling 59-mph in a 55-mile zone and initiated a traffic stop for the speeding violation at approximately 9:01 p.m.

He approached the vehicle, identified himself to the two female occupants and stated the reason for the stop. The driver identified herself as Ashley Chacon (“Defendant”) and provided her California driver's license. The front seat passenger was identified as Cynthia Quintana. Defendant stated that the vehicle was a rental and showed the trooper the rental agreement on her phone. The rental agreement showed the rental term started on December 1, 2022 in California and ended eight days later with the return of the vehicle in the same location. The contract also showed that Defendant's aunt rented the vehicle. Defendant was only listed as an authorized driver. The trooper asked her to accompany him to his patrol vehicle. She agreed to his request, exited the rental car and sat in the front passenger seat of his patrol car.

In the patrol car, he asked her questions about her itinerary. Defendant stated she was traveling to pick up her kids after they had spent Thanksgiving with her ex-husband in Des Moines, Iowa. She then shared that she did not fly to pick up her kids because she had lost her passport and her kids did not have passports. Trooper Baltes found these comments odd, as she offered this information unprompted and because a U.S. citizen with valid identification may travel domestically in the United States without a passport. He observed in his report that she appeared unfamiliar with her destination city, Des Moines. He asked her about her plans in Des Moines and she stated she planned to remain in Iowa until December 6, 2022.

While this conversation was taking place, approximately five minutes and twenty seconds after the stop began, Trooper David Wonders arrived on scene with his trained drug-detection dog. Trooper Baltes instructed the recently arrived trooper to conduct an open-air sniff of the vehicle with the canine. With these instructions, Trooper Wonders first took the front-seat passenger, Quintana, to his patrol car and then deployed the drug dog. Within one minute and nine seconds of its arrival, the drug dog had circled the vehicle three times and alerted twice on the same section of the vehicle.

During the open-air sniff, the drug dog made some contact with the suspect vehicle. The characterization of the contact is disputed by the parties. Defendant claims the drug dog touched the surface and seams of the vehicle with its nose, and that its nose entered the wheel well areas. Defendant also claims the drug dog momentarily touched the side of the vehicle with its paws when it jumped up on its hind legs once near the area where it ultimately alerted twice. The Government does not deny that the drug dog made some brief contact with the vehicle but adds that the canine did so instinctively and not at the direction of the trooper.

As the open-air sniff took place, Trooper Baltes continued to ask Defendant questions about the rental car and the speeding violation. He later noted in his incident report that she “had a difficult time paying attention” and “her demeanor visibly changed” when the drug dog arrived.² At approximately 9:08 p.m., he informed her that he would be issuing a written warning for the speeding violation. Trooper Wonders returned at this time and informed her that the dog alerted to narcotics in the vehicle. She admitted there was “a little bit” of cocaine in the car.

A search of the vehicle was subsequently conducted. Multiple bundles of narcotics were found in the trunk area, which lab results determined to be 54,800 grams of methamphetamine. In addition, approximately 29.5 grams of suspected cocaine was later recovered inside a white makeup bag located behind the front passenger seat.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 19, 2023, a grand jury indicted Defendant on two counts. [ECF No. 23 (Sealed Indictment)]. She was charged with a count of Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance, specifically methamphetamine, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). Id. at 1. The indictment charged Defendant with one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, also methamphetamine, a violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Id. at 2. The grand jury issued a superseding indictment the next day with no substantive changes as it relates to these charges. [ECF No. 28 (Sealed Superseding Indictment)].

On October 2, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress. [ECF No. 131]. In the Motion, Defendant requests that the Court exclude “the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure of her vehicle.” Id. at 1. The asserted grounds for relief are that the trooper impermissibly extended the traffic stop and the drug dog trespassed against the vehicle by intermeddling with the exterior of the vehicle. [ECF No. 131-1 at 4-9]. In essence, the Motion contends these events violated “her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” [ECF No. 131 at 1].

The Government resists, explaining the stop was not extended because the open-air sniff occurred as Trooper Baltes was completing tasks related to the traffic stop. [ECF No. 146 at 11-12]. By the time the trooper issued the written warning for the speeding violation, the drug sniff was completed. Therefore, “[n]othing the Troopers did added time to the stop” and thus “the stop was not extended.” [ECF No. 146 at 12]. The Government asserts, in the alternative, that any extension was supported by reasonable suspicion Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The Government claims the troopers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the following reasons: the trooper's prior knowledge that the suspect vehicle was transporting narcotics into Iowa; Defendant's “non-sensical” explanation why she did not travel by plane; her apparent confusion about the city of Des Moines, the place where her children had been staying since Thanksgiving; and the fact that her rental paperwork showed “her rental was rented on December 1st and due on December 8th, yet she had not reached her destination, and explained she was departing Iowa on December 6th.” Id. at 13. The Government further contends that any contact with the exterior of the suspect's vehicle by the drug dog was brief and instinctual to a lawful open-air sniff, not a trespass infringing upon any Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 14-16.

On October 23, 2023, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. [ECF No. 150 (Minute Entry)]. It accepted a dash camera video, an in-car video, an incident report, a photo of the suspect vehicle and testimony from Special Agent Hale and Trooper Wonders at the hearing. Id. At the end, the Court informed the parties it agreed with the Government's positions on why the Motion to Suppress should be denied. For the reasons discussed below, which are the same as those stated on the record at the hearing, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

III. GOVERNING LAW

A. Background on Searches and Seizures

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “As a rule, searches and seizures are unreasonable [under the Fourth Amendment] unless accompanied by a warrant.” United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 442 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)). However, there are exceptions to this general rule. Under the automobile exception, for example, “an officer who has lawfully stopped a vehicle can search the vehicle without a warrant if the officer has probable cause.” United States v. Beard, 708 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013).

B. Probable Cause

Probable cause exists if “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). To determine if probable cause exists, “we look at the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ ” United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 776 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (1994) (en banc)).

A positive alert from a drug-sniffing dog, standing alone, may also establish probable cause for a search. United States v. Tuton, 893 F.3d 562, 570 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007)). “In determining whether a dog's alert establishes probable cause to search an area, the inquiry is ‘whether all the facts surrounding a dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.’ ” Id. (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendant raises two issues in her Motion: (A) whether the trooper impermissibly extended the traffic stop to obtain a drug dog by asking questions purportedly unrelated to the original purpose of the stop, and (B) whether the trooper impermissibly directed the drug dog to trespass against the suspect vehicle in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches.

A. Extended Traffic Stop

Defendant's first contention is that Trooper Baltes improperly extended the stop in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). [ECF No. 131-1 at 4]. The Government resists, explaining that there was no delay because Trooper Baltes was completing tasks related to the speeding violation and was asking Defendant routine questions as permitted under United States v. Qunitero-Felix, 714 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that “[a]n officer also may request that the driver sit in the patrol car to answer questions and may ask questions about his itinerary.”). [ECF No. 146 at 11]. In the alternative, the Government argues that any delay was supported by reasonable suspicion that a crime may have been committed. Id. at 12. The Court agrees with the Government for the reasons below.

The Court finds that the traffic stop was not prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the original purpose of the stop. Trooper Baltes observed a black SUV, with an out-of-state registration license, traveling 59-mph in a 55-mile zone. A minute later, he initiated the traffic stop for the speeding violation and approached the suspect vehicle driven by Defendant. After providing her driver's license, Defendant stated the black SUV was a rental car and showed the rental agreement on her phone. The trooper observed the name of the renter on the rental agreement did not match the Defendant's on her driver's license. He later observed additional discrepancies with the rental agreement and her travel plans. The trooper asked her to sit in his patrol car to answer additional questions. Defendant agreed. Once in the patrol car, the trooper began to write a warning for the violation and, at the same time, asked her questions about her itinerary. At approximately five minutes and twenty seconds after the stop began, Trooper Wonders and his trained dog arrived. Within one minute and nine seconds of its arrival, the trained dog had alerted not once, but twice, on the suspect vehicle. Trooper Baltes completed his paperwork and issued Defendant a warning for speeding. Trooper Wonders contemporaneously completed the open-air sniff of the exterior of the car and informed Defendant of the positive alert. Based on these facts and circumstances, the Court finds there was no delay – let alone an impermissible delay – of the traffic stop.

Defendant appears to suggest, however, that Trooper Baltes could have issued the written warning earlier and completed the stop prior to the arrival of the drug dog. Instead, she alleges, he impermissibly extended the stop for less than five minutes by asking her questions about her travel plans and the rental agreement. Defendant claims these questions were unrelated to the original purpose of the stop and suggests the primary purpose of these questions was to delay the stop until the arrival of the drug dog. The Government resists, arguing that it is well settled in the Eighth Circuit that an officer may detain a driver during the course of a valid traffic stop to ask questions about his or her travel plans, citing to United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407 (8th Cir. 2017). The factual similarities between this case and Murillo-Salgado are hard to ignore.

In Murillo-Salgado, the Eighth Circuit held that a highway patrolman did not unreasonably extend the traffic stop to ask the driver permissible questions regarding the purpose of his trip. On April 7, 2014, the patrolman observed a rental truck, with California registration plates, speeding on I-29 in Missouri. Soon after the stop was initiated, the patrolman asked the driver to accompany him to his patrol vehicle. In the patrol vehicle, the patrolman began to write a warning ticket for the speeding violation and, at the same time, asked the driver questions about his job, any criminal history, the rental agreement, and the purpose of the trip. Based on the driver's answers, the patrolman with specialized training and experience with drug-trafficking investigations developed reasonable suspicion that the driver was engaged in drug-related criminal activity. Similar to the present case, the patrolman first observed discrepancies with the rental agreement. For example, the name on the rental agreement did not match the driver's and it was clear the driver would be unable to complete his trip within the rental period. The driver also claimed he was an electrician traveling to complete a large electrical wiring job, which was unlikely to be true based on the driver's limited electrical-wiring experience and the lack of sufficient equipment inside the truck for the scale of the job. In determining the lawfulness of the extended stop, the court explained:

The video recording of the roughly twenty-three-minute traffic stop indicates that [the patrolman] spent that time asking permissible questions of [the occupants] regarding the purpose of their trip and their travel route, attempting to corroborate the responses to those questions, placing calls to dispatch, waiting for responses to verify [the occupants'] identification and criminal history, and entering information into the patrol car's computer.

Id. at 416 (emphasis added). The court distinguished the case from United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 2008), where the Eighth Circuit held that an additional three minutes to extend or expand the scope of a traffic stop was unwarranted when there was “nothing unusual or out of place with the van's registration or the driver's documents” to warrant a “longer-than-typical detention.” Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d at 416. Unlike the trooper in Peralez, the Murillo-Salgado patrolman observed several discrepancies in the rental agreement and seeming inconsistencies with the driver's story that warranted further investigation. Id.

This present case is similarly situated with the facts and circumstances of Murillo-Salgado. Here, Trooper Baltes's suspicion was reasonably aroused by the driver's unusual responses to routine questions about the discrepancies in the rental agreement, the seeming unlikelihood that she would complete her return by the end of the rental period, the inaccurate explanation as to why issues with her and her children's passports prevented her from flying domestically, and her odd unfamiliarity with her ex-husband's place of residence where her children had been staying since Thanksgiving. Trooper Baltes asked permissible questions that arose during the course of the stop in response to certain irregularities. Therefore, even if the stop was extended, these irregularities were sufficient for the trooper to develop a reasonable suspicion that drug-related criminal activity was afoot. As the trooper had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to extend a valid traffic stop, there was no violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights on the ground that she had been subjected to an unreasonable seizure.

B. Drug Dog's Sniff: Trespass or Instinctive

Defendant's second and final contention is that the drug dog impermissibly trespassed against the vehicle during the drug sniff, which amounted to an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. [ECF No. 131-1 at 5]. The Government resists, explaining that any contact between the dog and the vehicle occurred after the drug dog showed positive indications of narcotics and, nevertheless, the contact was brief and instinctive during the open-air sniff, not as a result of any police misconduct. [ECF No. 146 at 14]. Neither party claims the dog intruded on the interior space of the vehicle; instead, the issue centers on the drug dog's purported intrusion against the exterior of the vehicle. The Court finds that the drug dog's contact with the vehicle did not amount to a trespass against the exterior of the vehicle for the reasons below.

As a preliminary matter, the law as to the use of a drug-sniffing dog on the exterior of the vehicle is well-settled in the Eighth Circuit. In United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up), the Eighth Circuit explained:

The use of the drug-sniffing dog on the exterior of a vehicle during a valid traffic stop does not infringe upon any Fourth Amendment rights. Because the dog sniff of the exterior of [the co-defendant's] car was not a search, the officer did not need probable cause nor reasonable suspicion before calling for the drug dog unit.

Under this general rule, the troopers' use of the drug dog to sniff the exterior of Defendant's rental vehicle was permissible because the dog sniff in this context did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. There is, however, an exception to this rule if police misconduct is found. United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 373 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Police misconduct may be found if an officer directs the drug dog to enter a space that he or she would be otherwise prohibited from intruding. See United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1998). “Absent police misconduct, [however,] the instinctive actions of a trained canine do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Lyons, 486 F.3d at 373 (citations omitted). In this case, there was no convincing evidence to show that the trooper directed the drug dog to make any physical contact with the vehicle. A review of the video footage instead supports the Government's position that the drug dog acted instinctively when the points of contact were made. Therefore, the drug dog unit's conduct during the open-air sniff did not infringe upon any Fourth Amendment rights.

C. Summary

The aforementioned discussion leads the Court to conclude that Trooper Baltes asked permissible questions during the course of a stop. The brief extension of the stop, if any, was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The drug sniff of the vehicle's exterior did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. Any contact between the drug dog and the vehicle, if any, was instinctive and not a trespass infringing upon any Fourth Amendment rights.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 9th day of November, 2023.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Having reviewed the video recording of Trooper Baltes's and Defendant's interactions, the Court concurs that Defendant's demeanor visibly shifted into a nervous and distracted state when she noticed the arrival of the drug dog.

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT