MARIA NELSON MICHELLE GARZA v. PLATINUM US DISTRIBUTION INC WELLNX LIFE SCIENCES USA WELLNX LIFE SCIENCES INC WELLNX LIFE SCIENCES DR INC (2026)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Maria Nelson and Michelle Garza's (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) motion for default judgment against Defendants Platinum US Distribution, Inc. d/b/a WellNX Life Sciences USA, WellNX Life Sciences, Inc., and WellNX Life Sciences DR, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 13. No opposition has been filed. Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendants manufacture, market, distribute, and sell SlimQuick weight-loss products, including SlimQuick Pure Extra Strength Caplets, SlimQuick Keto Pills, SlimQuick Regular Strength, and SlimQuick Drink Mix (collectively, the “Products”). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 46-87.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants falsely advertised the Products as capable of producing substantial weight-loss and body-altering effects, including increasing metabolism, burning fat, reducing appetite, boosting energy, reducing excess water, and helping consumers lose significantly more weight than dieting alone. Id. ¶¶ 47, 51, 59, 63, 69, 74, 80, 84. The Products allegedly claimed that users could lose up to 25 pounds or up to “3x” or “11x” more weight through use of the supplements and further represented that the Products could “speed up” metabolism, keep consumers full longer, support fat-burning hormones, and address the physical causes of weight gain in women. Id.

Defendants also allegedly advertised that the Products were supported by “real clinical research,” thereby suggesting that the Products could provide effects comparable to prescription weight-loss drugs and affect the structure and function of the human body. Id. ¶¶ 51, 63, 74. Additionally, Defendants marketed the Products with claims resembling those for prescription weight-loss drugs without obtaining FDA approval. Id. ¶¶ 12, 50, 62, 73, 83, 99. Plaintiffs allege that these representations rendered the Products an unapproved drug marketed and sold in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) and California's Sherman Law. Id. ¶¶ 24-28, 43-45.

Plaintiffs allege that the Products could not deliver the advertised benefits and that none of the ingredients in the Products, individually or in combination, safely and effectively increase weight loss, calorie burning, or fat oxidation. Id. ¶¶ 5, 37-42, 47, 59, 70, 80. The purported active ingredient in the Products is green tea extract, which Plaintiffs allege studies have shown does not produce clinically significant weight loss. Id. ¶¶ 35-42. Defendants also allegedly falsely represented that the Products were “made with safe and natural ingredients” and were “not harmful,” when the Products contained dangerous amounts of green tea extract associated with liver injury and liver failure. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13-14, 105-115.

Defendants marketed and sold the Products through Defendants’ website, Amazon, and retail stores such as Walmart throughout California. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff Maria Nelson states that she repeatedly purchased SlimQuick Keto Pills from a Walmart in San Jacinto, California between 2023 and 2025. ECF No. 13-3 ¶ 2. She used the product daily for approximately three years and estimates that she purchased the product approximately fifty-four times at a cost of about $20 per purchase. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff Michelle Garza states that she purchased SlimQuick Extra Strength Caplets and SlimQuick Drink Mix from a Walmart in Los Angeles, California in 2024 and 2025. ECF No. 13-4 ¶ 2. She purchased the Products approximately thirty-five times during that period, paying approximately $20 per purchase. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs allege that they purchased the Products in reliance on Defendants’ representations that the Products were safe, effective, and lawfully sold, but that the Products failed to deliver the advertised results. Compl. ¶¶ 118-120.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this action. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). On September 9, 2025, Plaintiffs sent Defendants a demand letter pursuant to the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), but Defendants failed to respond. ECF No. 13-2 ¶¶ 2-3

On February 10, 2026, Defendant Platinum US Distribution, Inc. was served with the summons and Complaint. ECF No. 9. On February 17, 2026, Defendants WellNX Life Sciences, Inc. and WellNX Life Sciences DR, Inc. were served with the summons and Complaint. ECF Nos. 5-6. Defendants failed to respond to the Complaint or otherwise appear in this action.

On March 9, 2026, Plaintiffs requested entry of default against Defendants Platinum US Distribution, Inc. and WellNX Life Sciences DR, Inc., and the Clerk entered default against WellNX Life Sciences DR, Inc. the same day. ECF Nos. 7-8. On March 10, 2026, the Clerk entered default against Platinum US Distribution, Inc. ECF No. 10. On March 11, 2026, Plaintiffs requested entry of default against WellNX Life Sciences, Inc., and the Clerk entered default against WellNX Life Sciences, Inc. on March 13, 2026. ECF Nos. 11-12.

On April 28, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Default Judgment seeking restitution, actual damages, punitive damages, declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction. ECF No. 13. No opposition has been filed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs default judgment, a process which requires two steps. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting the two-step process required by Rule 55); see also Symantec Corp. v Global Impact, 559 F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). First, under Rule 55(a) “when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the Plaintiff may seek a default judgment under Rule 55(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

At the default judgment stage, the factual allegations of the complaint—excluding damages—are deemed admitted by the non-responding parties. Amazon Content Servs. LLC v. DeBarr, 793 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 2025); see also Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (“With respect to the determination of liability and the default judgment itself, the general rule is that well-pled allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed true.”). “However, a defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted). “[I]t follows from this that facts which are not established by the pleadings of the prevailing party, or claims which are not well-pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment.” Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978).

The decision to grant or deny default judgment is within the discretion of the district court. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1090, 1092-92 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has enumerated seven factors for courts to consider “in exercising discretion as to the entry of default judgment:”

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff,

(2) the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim,

(3) the sufficiency of the complaint,

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action,

(5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts,

(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and

(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72.

“If the court determines that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish liability, it must then determine the amount and character of the relief that should be awarded.” Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quotations omitted). However, the scope of relief is limited; a “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). “In determining damages, a court can rely on the declarations submitted by the plaintiff or order a full evidentiary hearing.” Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003). “[A] default judgment for money may not be entered without a hearing unless the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation.” Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981).

Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which provides that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). To satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, the allegations must be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct” alleged to constitute the fraud “so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). To satisfy this standard, a complaint must generally allege “the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.1986)).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction and Service

As a threshold matter, the Court is obligated to review the question of jurisdiction sua sponte. WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see also Gupta v. Thai Airwys Intern., Ltd., 487 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 2007).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

There are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Relevant here, the Court has jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). CAFA grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over class actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and minimal diversity exists between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). CAFA further provides that jurisdiction applies to class actions “before or after the entry of a class certification order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). Thus, “post-filing developments do not defeat jurisdiction if jurisdiction was properly invoked as of the time of filing.” United Steel v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the denial or absence of class certification does not divest a federal court of CAFA jurisdiction. Id. at 1092 (“continued jurisdiction under § 1332(d) does not depend on certification”); Visendi v. Bank of America, N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (“a district court's subsequent denial of Rule 23 class certification does not divest the court of jurisdiction”).

Here, Plaintiffs allege in the original complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and that minimal diversity exists because Plaintiffs are citizens of California while Defendants are citizens of Delaware and Canada. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16-20. Although Plaintiffs now seek default judgment only as to the named Plaintiffs’ claims, the absence of class certification does not defeat CAFA jurisdiction because jurisdiction is determined at the time of filing. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction can be either “general” or “specific.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). For a corporation, the place of incorporation and the principal place of business establish general personal jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). Here, Plaintiffs do not allege facts establishing that any Defendant is incorporated in California or maintains its principal place of business in California. Accordingly, the Court concludes that general jurisdiction is lacking and therefore turns to whether specific jurisdiction exists.

Specific jurisdiction exists when a case “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum[.]” Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. The inquiry into whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant “focuses ‘on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ ” and “looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)). The Ninth Circuit conducts a three-prong test to determine whether a non-resident defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)).

The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test. Id. If the plaintiff succeeds, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)).

As to the first prong, purposeful direction can be established if “defendant's actions outside the forum state that are directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods originating elsewhere.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Pre-internet, the ‘distribution in the forum state of goods originating elsewhere’ was a paradigmatic example of conduct purposefully directed at the forum state.” (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803)); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the defendants’ conduct was expressly aimed at California where there was a plan to distribute a song throughout the United States and the defendants sent promotional copies to the United States, including California).

Here, Defendants marketed, distributed, and sold the Products throughout California through retail stores, Amazon, and Defendants’ own website. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 21-22. Plaintiffs further allege that the Products were “available for purchase throughout California,” Id. ¶ 21, and that both named Plaintiffs purchased the Products from Walmart stores in California. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 116-17. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants expressly aimed their conduct at the forum.

The second prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry requires that the plaintiff's claims “arise out of or relate” to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)). The Supreme Court has explained that while the first portion of the standard “asks about causation,” the phrase “or relate to” contemplates that certain relationships between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation may support jurisdiction even absent strict causation. Id. at 1026.

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims arise directly out of and relate to Defendants’ alleged contacts with California. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants distributed, marketed, and sold the Products in California through retail stores, Amazon, and Defendants’ website. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 21-22. Plaintiffs further allege that they purchased the challenged products from Walmart stores in California and relied on the allegedly deceptive representations appearing on the products’ labels, packaging, and online materials controlled by Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 46-87, 116-120. Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries therefore arise directly from Defendants’ alleged sale and distribution of the Products in California. See Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Plaintiff's claims—which allege harm caused by Defendants’ sales of products—clearly arise out of and relate to Defendants’ conduct of selling those same products to [forum] residents.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs satisfy the second prong of the Ninth Circuit's specific jurisdiction test.

Because Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendants purposefully directed their conduct toward California and that Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to Defendants’ California-related activities, Plaintiffs have satisfied the first two prongs of the Ninth Circuit's specific jurisdiction test. The burden therefore shifts to Defendants to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Because Defendants have failed to appear or otherwise challenge jurisdiction, they have not met that burden. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with fair play and substantial justice and is therefore proper.

C. Service

A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Direct Mail Specialist, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as a party receives sufficient notice of the complaint.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir.1984).

Here, the Defendants were properly served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(A), which permits service on a corporation “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). Rule 4(e)(1), in turn, permits service by “following state law ․ in the state the district court is located or where service is made”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Under California law, a corporation may be served by delivering the summons and complaint to “the person designated as agent for service of process” or to “a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.10(a), (b).

The proof of service demonstrate that each Defendant was served through an individual authorized to accept service of process on the corporation's behalf. Specifically, the summons and complaint for Platinum US Distribution, Inc. were served on Jamie Kelly, who was identified as the registered agent authorized to accept service of process on behalf of the corporation. ECF No. 9. The summons and complaint for WellNX Life Sciences, Inc. and WellNX Life Sciences DR, Inc. were served on Maryann Menders, who was identified as the registered agent designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of those corporations. ECF Nos. 5, 6. Accordingly, service complied with Rule 4 and California Code of Civil Procedure Section 416.10.

II. The Eitel Factors

Applying the seven Eitel factors, the Court finds default judgment is warranted in favor of Plaintiffs.

A. Prejudice to the Plaintiff

Under the first factor, the Court must examine whether Plaintiff will be prejudiced if the Court denies default judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). This factor weighs in favor of default judgment “when a defendant has failed to appear or defend against a suit, and the plaintiffs could not otherwise seek relief.” Vietnam Reform Party v. Viet Tan-Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citations omitted); see Amazon Content Servs. LLC v. DeBarr, 793 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1251 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“Prejudice can be shown if denying default judgment would leave a plaintiff without a remedy.”) Here, Defendants have made no appearance. Thus, Plaintiff would be prejudiced absent a default judgment as there would be no remedy. This factor weighs in favor of default.

B. Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint

The second and third Eitel factors “require that Plaintiff's allegations state a claim upon which it may recover.” Adobe Systems Inc. v. Kern, No. 09-CV-1076-CW(JL), 2009 WL 5218005, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009); see also Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.1978) (stating that the issue is whether the allegations in the complaint state a claim upon which plaintiff can recover). “In considering the sufficiency of the complaint and the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claims, facts alleged in the complaint not relating to damages are deemed to be true upon default.” Bd. of Trs. of Sheet Metal Workers v. Moak, No. 11-CV-4620-CW, 2012 WL 5379565, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012).

Plaintiffs allege violations of the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent prongs of California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), violations of California's False Advertising Law (“FAL”), and violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). Compl. ¶¶ 138-44, 149-61, 162-74. Plaintiffs rely on alleged violations of the FDCA and California's Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law as predicates for their UCL claim. Id. ¶¶ 98-104, 140-41.

a. FAL, CLRA, and UCL Fraudulent Prong

Plaintiffs assert claims under the FAL, CLRA, and the fraudulent prong of UCL based on Defendants’ allegedly false and misleading representations concerning the Products. Id. ¶¶ 90, 138-44, 149-61, 162-74.

The UCL proscribes business practices that are “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The FAL prohibits the dissemination of advertising “which is untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. The CLRA prohibits deceptive acts and practices in the sale of goods, including “[r]epresenting that goods ․ are of a particular standard, quality, or grade ․ if they are of another.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(7).

Under the FAL, the CLRA, and the fraudulent prong of the UCL, conduct is considered deceptive or misleading if the conduct is “likely to deceive” a “reasonable consumer.” Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). Because the three statutes use the same standard, courts often analyze the three statutes together. See Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc., No. 19-CV-1345-DMS-AGS, 2020 WL 6106813, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2020) (“Consumer protection claims under the CLRA, FAL and UCL are often analyzed together because they share similar attributes.”).

To state a claim under these statutes, a plaintiff must adequately allege a (1) misrepresentation or omission, (2) reliance, and (3) a resulting economic injury. Hammerling v. Google LLC, 615 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2022). Additionally, the claims must also satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). Under that standard, a plaintiff must plead the circumstances constituting fraud with sufficient particularity to identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged misconduct. Id.

Plaintiffs’ FAL, CLRA, and UCL fraudulent-prong claims are based on two related theories: (1) Defendants falsely represented that the Products were effective for weight loss and could increase metabolism, reduce appetite, and produce substantial weight-loss results; and (2) Defendants falsely represented that the Products were safe and made with natural ingredients while allegedly omitting material information regarding health risks associated with green tea extract. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5-14, 35-42, 43-87, 105-115.

First, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege deceptive efficacy claims. Plaintiffs identify numerous representations appearing on the Products’ labels, packaging, Defendants’ website, and Defendants’ Amazon pages, including claims that the Products “increase[ ] metabolism,” “reduce[ ] appetite,” “reduce[ ] excess water,” help consumers “lose up to 11X the weight,” “lose up to 25 lbs,” or “lose 3X the weight,” and are supported by clinical research. Id. ¶¶ 47, 51, 59, 63, 69, 74, 80, 84. Plaintiffs further allege that these statements were false because the Products could not deliver the advertised benefits and because scientific studies allegedly demonstrate that the Products’ primary active ingredient, green tea extract, does not produce clinically meaningful weight loss. Id. ¶¶ 35-42, 44, 47, 59, 70, 80. Plaintiffs support these allegations with multiple scientific studies concerning green tea extract, the Products’ purported active ingredient. According to the Complaint, one article found that green tea preparations produced only small, statistically insignificant weight loss; another scientific article concluded that any weight-loss effects were unlikely to be clinically relevant; and additional randomized controlled trials found no statistically significant difference between green tea extract and a placebo. Id. ¶¶ 38-42.

Second, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege deceptive safety representations and omissions. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants represented that the Products were “made with safe and natural ingredients” and were “not harmful to our bodies.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 13, 51, 105. Plaintiffs further allege that these statements were misleading because the Products allegedly contained dangerous amounts of green tea extract associated with severe liver injury, jaundice, hospitalization, liver transplantation, and liver failure. Id. ¶¶ 105-115. In support, Plaintiffs cite published reports and studies describing cases of acute liver injury allegedly associated with the Products, including reports of hospitalization and liver transplantation. Id. ¶¶ 107-114. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to disclose these alleged risks while simultaneously marketing the Products as safe and natural. Id.

In identifying these misrepresentations and omissions, Plaintiffs identify the speakers of the alleged misrepresentations, namely Defendants Platinum US Distribution, Inc., WellNX Life Sciences, Inc., and WellNX Life Sciences DR, Inc., the specific statements alleged to be false, where those statements appeared, including the Products’ packaging, Defendants’ website, and Defendants’ Amazon pages, and why the statements were allegedly false or misleading. Id. ¶¶ 18-22, 46-87, 88-115. The Plaintiffs also state that they relied on those misrepresentations and experienced economic injury by purchasing the products. Id. ¶¶ 121-28.

Accordingly, these allegations satisfy Rule 9(b), and thus, the Complaint provides Defendants with sufficient notice of the alleged misconduct. See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124.

b. UCL Unlawful Prong

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ advertising and labeling practices violate the unlawful prong of the UCL. The UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (alterations and citations omitted). Thus, “[v]irtually any law—federal, state or local—can serve as a predicate” for liability under the UCL. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718 (2001). However, where a plaintiff fails to adequately plead the underlying predicate violation, the unlawful-prong claim likewise fails. Stokes v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. CV 14-00278 MMM, 2014 WL 4359193, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014).

Further, where a plaintiff alleges a “unified course of fraudulent conduct,” Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard applies not only to the fraudulent-prong claim, but also to the unlawful- and unfair-prong UCL claims grounded in the same allegedly deceptive conduct. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, although Rule 9(b) does not automatically apply to every unlawful-prong claim, it applies where the claim is premised on allegedly deceptive advertising, labeling, and omissions. Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the unlawful prong of the UCL through violations of the FAL, the CLRA, California's Sherman Law, and the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). Compl. ¶¶ 138-44, 149-61, 162-74. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged predicate violations of the FAL and CLRA based on Defendants’ allegedly false and misleading representations concerning the Products’ efficacy and safety. Because Plaintiffs have adequately alleged violations of the FAL and CLRA, they have likewise stated a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL. See Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925, 933 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court therefore need not address Plaintiffs’ additional theories that Defendants’ conduct violated the FDCA and California Sherman Law. Accordingly, accepting the well-pleaded allegations as true upon default, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged unlawful business practices under the UCL.

c. UCL Unfair Prong

The unfair prong of the UCL prohibits business practices that are “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1473 (2006)). California courts apply varying tests to consumer unfairness claims under the UCL. See Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Some courts apply a balancing test that weighs the harm to consumers against the utility of the challenged practice, while others require that the challenged conduct be tethered to a legislatively declared policy. See Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 186 (1999); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit permits courts to apply either the balancing test or the tethering test in consumer actions. Lozano, 504 F.3d at 735-36.

Here, Plaintiffs adequately allege unfair business practices under either standard. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants marketed the Products through deceptive efficacy and safety representations, including claims that the Products could increase metabolism, reduce appetite, burn fat, and produce significant weight-loss results, despite allegedly being ineffective for those purposes. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5-14, 35-42, 43-45, 46-87. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants represented the Products as “safe” and “not harmful,” while failing to disclose alleged risks associated with green tea extract. Id. ¶¶ 105-115.

Under the balancing test, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege substantial consumer harm that outweighs any utility of Defendants’ conduct. Plaintiffs allege that consumers paid money for Products that could not deliver the advertised benefits and that allegedly posed serious health risks. Id. ¶¶ 118-127. Plaintiffs further allege that consumers could not reasonably avoid the injury because the Products were marketed as safe, effective, and supported by clinical research. Id. ¶¶ 118-125. Accepting these allegations as true, the alleged harm to consumers outweighs any utility derived from the challenged conduct.

Plaintiffs also satisfy the tethering test. The alleged conduct is tethered to legislatively declared policies embodied in the FAL and CLRA, which prohibit false and misleading advertising and deceptive business practices. See id. ¶¶ 90, 140; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500; Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). Accordingly, Plaintiffs adequately allege a violation of the unfair prong of the UCL.

The second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of default judgment.

C. The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Essentially, the court must evaluate whether relief sought is proportional to the harm caused. See Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2010). “Default judgment is disfavored where the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in relation to defendant's conduct.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2014). However, when “the sum of money at stake is tailored to the specific misconduct of the defendant, default judgment may be appropriate.” Bd. of Trs. v. Core Concrete Const., Inc., No. 11-CV-2532-LB, 2012 WL 380304, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 17, 2012) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff Maria Nelson seeks $1,080 in restitution and compensatory damages and $9,720 in punitive damages. Plaintiff Michelle Garza seeks $700 in restitution and compensatory damages ¹ and $6,300 in punitive damages. ECF No. 13-1 (“Mot.”) at 16.² Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing the challenged conduct. Id. at 21-23.

Plaintiffs’ request for damages is reasonable except for its request for punitive damages. The compensatory relief directly relates to the economic harm suffered by the two Plaintiffs when they purchased Defendants’ Products. Additionally, the injunctive relief does not involve any monetary sum and, thus, does not negatively affect the Court's evaluation of this factor. See United States v. Torres, No. CV 2:12–cv–10530–SVW (MRW), 2013 WL 7137587, *5 (C. D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013) (“There is no money at stake in this action, only permanent injunctive relief. Accordingly, this factor favors granting a default judgment”). Given the nature of the alleged misconduct and the relatively modest amount of restitution and compensatory damages sought, the Court does not find the requested relief disproportionate or unreasonable. See PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.

The punitive damages, however, do not support default judgment as discussed in more depth in a later section. Plaintiffs request nine times their actual damages without providing adequate support for that amount.

Accordingly, in the absence of punitive damages, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

D. The Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The fifth Eitel factor examines the likelihood of dispute between the parties regarding the material facts surrounding the case. See Alameda Elec. Distributors, Inc. v. Eco Eng'g Inc., 808 F.Supp.3d 1014, 1031 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). “Where a plaintiff has filed a well-pleaded complaint, the possibility of dispute concerning material facts is remote.” Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also Landstar Ranger, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 921-22 (“Since [plaintiff] has supported its claims with ample evidence, and defendant has made no attempt to challenge the accuracy of the allegations in the complaint, no factual disputes exist that preclude the entry of default judgment.”). In addition, the defendant is “deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint upon entry of default. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, Plaintiffs have filed a well-pleaded Complaint alleging that Defendants marketed and sold the Products through false and misleading representations regarding their efficacy and safety. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

E. Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect

The sixth Eitel factor examines whether Defendants’ failure to respond can be attributed to excusable neglect. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). This factor weighs in favor of entry of default judgment where the defendant was properly served. Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 922 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Here, Defendants were properly served but have failed to appear and defend. ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

F. Policy Favoring Deciding a Case on the Merits

“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. However, “deciding the case on the merits is impossible where a party refuses to participate.” Vietnam Reform Party v. Viet Tan - Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Thus, “Rule 55(a) allows a court to decide a case before the merits are heard if defendant fails to appear and defend.” Landstar Ranger, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 922. Because Defendants have forfeited the opportunity to defend themselves on the merits by failing to appear and respond, “[t]his factor thus weighs against, but does not preclude, entry of default judgment.” Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 970.

G. Conclusion as to the Eitel Factors

In assessing all the factors, the Court concludes that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of default judgment for all claims against Defendants.

III. Relief Sought

After establishing liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate the relief sought is appropriate. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). A “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Here, Plaintiffs seek restitution, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing the allegedly deceptive marketing, advertising, and sale of the Products. Mot. at 14-23.

A. Compensatory Damages

Under Rule 8(a)(3), a plaintiff “must ‘prove up’ the amount of damages.” Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Banh, No. 03-CV-4043-GAF(PJWx), 2005 WL 5758392, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 14, 2005). “Where the amount of damages is ‘liquidated or capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in documentary evidence or detailed affidavits,’ the Court may enter default judgment without a hearing on damages.” United States v. Sundberg, No. 09-CV-4085-EMC, 2011 WL 3667458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (quoting Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir.1983)); see also Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944) (“It is a familiar practice and an exercise of judicial power for a court upon default, by taking evidence when necessary or by computation from facts of record, to fix the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover and to give judgment accordingly.”).

Here, Plaintiff Maria Nelson allegedly purchased SlimQuick Keto Pills from 2023 to 2025 around 54 times. Compl. ¶ 116; ECF No. 13-3 at 2. Plaintiff Michelle Garza similarly purchased SlimQuick Extra Strength Caplets and SlimQuick Drink Mix throughout 2024 and 2025 around 35 times. Compl. ¶ 117; ECF No. 13-4 at 4. Both Plaintiffs estimate the products cost $20 per purchase and have submitted exhibits of the cost of these products. See ECF No. 13-3 at 2; ECF No. 13-4 at 4; ECF No. 1-2 at 20, 28, 35. Using these estimates, Plaintiff Maria Nelson seeks $1,080, and Plaintiff Michelle Garza seeks $700, representing the amounts allegedly paid for the Products. Mot. at 15. Because the requested amounts are supported by sworn declarations and readily calculable from the record, no evidentiary hearing is required. See Sundberg, 2011 WL 3667458, at *6.

Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff Nelson $1,080 and Plaintiff Garza $700 as a single recovery for their alleged economic losses.³

B. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are not favored and are awarded only in limited circumstances. As the California Supreme Court has explained, California Civil Code Section 3294 “codifies the universally recognized principle that ‘[t]he law does not favor punitive damages, and they should be granted with the greatest of caution.’ ” Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1392 (1987) (quoting Beck v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 355 (1976)). Likewise, “[a] plaintiff is not entitled to exemplary damages as a matter of right.” Bille v. Manning, 94 Cal. App. 2d 142, 145 (1949).

Under California law, punitive damages are available only in non-contract actions and only upon a heightened evidentiary showing. California Civil Code Section 3294(a) provides that, “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a); See also Johnson v. Monsanto Co., 52 Cal. App. 5th 434, 455 (2020) (“[p]unitive damages are available where the plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”). “Nevertheless, a corporate entity cannot commit willful and malicious conduct; instead, ‘the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.’ ” In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b)); see Roper v. Big Heart Pet Brands, 510 F. Supp. 3d 903, 926 (E.D. Cal. 2020). Accordingly, to recover punitive damages against Defendants, Plaintiffs must allege that an officer, director, or managing agent committed, authorized, or ratified the alleged acts of oppression, fraud, or malice. Id.

Here, Ms. Nelson and Ms. Garza seek $9,720 and $6,300, respectively, in punitive damages. Mot. at 16. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in a “consistent, long-term campaign to fraudulently market the Products as a safe and effective weight loss supplement.” Compl. ¶ 8.

However, punitive damages against a corporate defendant require allegations that an officer, director, or managing agent authorized, ratified, or had advance knowledge of the alleged misconduct, or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b). Although the Complaint attributes the challenged conduct to Defendants generally, it does not identify any officer, director, or managing agent who authorized, ratified, or had advance knowledge of the alleged misconduct. Nor does it allege facts showing that any officer, director, or managing agent was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice within the meaning of section 3294(b). See Roper, 510 F. Supp. 3d at 926-27. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established entitlement to punitive damages against the corporate Defendants.

C. Permanent Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing to market, distribute, advertise, and sell the Products. Mot. at 23-24. Plaintiffs contend that the Products violate federal and California law governing unapproved and misbranded drugs. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 143.

“[A] a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of the hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Id.; La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs satisfy each requirement here.

First, Plaintiffs have sufficiently established irreparable harm. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants market and sell the Products with deceptive representations regarding their efficacy and safety, including claims that the Products “increase[ ] metabolism,” “reduce[ ] appetite,” and are “made with safe and natural ingredients” and “not harmful.” Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs further allege that the Products “failed to deliver upon the specific advertised claims,” “cannot deliver the advertised benefits,” and are “not safe and effective for [their] intended purposes.” Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Accepting these allegations as true upon default, continued marketing and sale of the Products presents an ongoing risk that consumers will be misled regarding the Products’ efficacy and safety.

Second, legal remedies are inadequate to compensate for the alleged injury. Plaintiffs argue that monetary relief alone is insufficient because Defendants have failed to appear and there is no indication that the challenged conduct will cease absent injunctive relief. Mot. at 20. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that monetary relief for past purchases may be inadequate where consumers remain unable to rely on the truthfulness of a defendant's advertising in the future. In Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the court explained that a previously deceived consumer may suffer an ongoing injury where she “could not rely on [the] representations with any confidence” going forward and therefore remains unable to determine whether the defendant's representations are truthful. 889 F.3d 956, 972 (9th Cir. 2018).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants continue to market the Products through deceptive representations concerning their efficacy and safety. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 43-87, 105-15. While Plaintiffs have been harmed by their previous purchases, “Plaintiffs would consider purchasing SlimQuick in the future if they could do so with assurance that the products (1) would deliver the advertised benefits and (2) were sold in compliance with all federal and California regulations.” Id. ¶ 128. However, because of Defendant's allegedly deceptive representation, Plaintiffs are unable to rely on the Products’ labeling and marketing, constituting a continued harm. Additionally, although monetary damages may compensate Plaintiffs for their past purchases, such relief would not prevent future consumers from being exposed to the challenged representations, nor would it ensure that consumers may rely on Defendants’ representations in the future. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established that legal remedies are inadequate.

Third, the balance of hardships favors injunctive relief. Plaintiffs and the public face the risk of continued exposure to the challenged representations regarding the Products’ efficacy and safety. Plaintiffs allege that the Products are marketed as safe and effective despite being incapable of delivering the advertised benefits and despite alleged risks associated with green tea extract. Compl. ¶¶ 11-14, 35-42, 105-15. Absent injunctive relief, consumers may continue to purchase the Products in reliance on the same allegedly deceptive representations. By contrast, the principal hardship to Defendants is that they would be required to cease the challenged advertising and marketing practices. In consumer-protection actions, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that, “when a district court balances the hardships of the public interest against a private interest, the public interest should receive greater weight.” FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting FTC v. World Wide Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, the balance of hardships favors injunctive relief.

Fourth, the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. California's consumer protection statutes are designed to prevent deceptive business practices and protect consumers from misleading advertising. See, e.g., Clark v. Citizens of Humanity, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1208-09 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (recognizing California's “legitimate state interest in combating deceptive advertising” and “protecting its citizens from untruthful advertising”). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants marketed and sold the Products through false and misleading representations concerning the Products’ efficacy and safety. Compl. ¶¶ 3-14, 43-87, 105-15. Plaintiffs further allege that consumers may be exposed to ongoing deception if Defendants continue to market the Products using the challenged representations. Id.

Courts addressing allegedly deceptive marketing of dietary supplements and weight-loss products have also recognized the importance of injunctive relief requiring changes to product labeling and advertising. See Carr v. Tadin, Inc., No. 12-CV-3040 JLS (JMA), 2014 WL 7344093, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014) (approving settlement requiring “modifying the labeling of and packaging for the Products” in connection with allegedly misleading weight-loss products). Such relief serves the public interest by reducing the risk of future consumer deception. Accordingly, an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing the challenged advertising and marketing practices would further the public interest in preventing consumer deception and promoting truthful advertising. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of injunctive relief.

Despite the factors weighing favorably for injunctive relief, “an injunction must be narrowly tailored ․ to remedy only the specific harms shown by the plaintiff [ ] rather than to enjoin all possible breaches of the law.” Patagonia, Inc. v. McHugh, No. LA CV19-07666 JAK (AFMx), 2020 WL 4258818, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2020) (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, while the Court finds that the requirements for permanent injunctive relief are satisfied, the scope of that relief must be limited to the specific misconduct supported by the record. Plaintiffs challenge the Products on several grounds, including deceptive efficacy claims, misleading safety representations, and sales of an unapproved drug. See Compl. ¶¶ 3-14, 23-34, 43-115. Courts addressing allegedly deceptive marketing of dietary supplements and weight-loss products have recognized that consumer harm may be adequately addressed through injunctive relief requiring changes to product labeling, packaging, and advertising, rather than the complete removal of products from the marketplace. See Carr v. Tadin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 970, 976-77 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (approving settlement that provided injunctive relief through modifications to the labeling and packaging of weight-loss products and dietary supplements). Here, the present record establishes that injunctive relief directed at Defendants’ challenged efficacy and safety representations is warranted. However, the Court is not persuaded that the record supports the broader remedy of prohibiting Defendants from marketing, distributing, or selling the Products altogether. Accordingly, the Court will limit injunctive relief to Defendants’ use of the challenged efficacy and safety representations.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment.

1. The Court AWARDS Plaintiff Maria Nelson $1,080 and Plaintiff Michelle Garza $700 as a single recovery for their alleged economic losses.

2. Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is DENIED.

3. Plaintiffs’ request for permanent injunctive relief is GRANTED in part. Defendants Platinum US Distribution, Inc. d/b/a WellNX Life Sciences USA, WellNX Life Sciences, Inc., and WellNX Life Sciences DR, Inc., together with their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, successors, affiliates, subsidiaries, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them, are hereby ENJOINED from marketing, advertising, promoting, or labeling SlimQuick Pure Extra Strength Caplets, SlimQuick Keto Pills, SlimQuick Regular Strength, and SlimQuick Drink Mix through representations concerning the Products’ efficacy, safety, weight-loss benefits, metabolism-enhancing effects, appetite-suppressing effects, or similar claims unless such representations are truthful, non-misleading, and substantiated by competent and reliable scientific evidence.

The hearing date set for July 10, 2026 shall be VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiffs characterize these amounts as restitution under the UCL and actual damages under the CLRA arising from the same purchases of the Products. Mot. at 14-16. However, Plaintiffs may not obtain duplicative recovery for the same economic injury. See Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Sonner fails to explain how the same amount of money for the exact same harm is inadequate or incomplete.”). Although Plaintiffs may plead alternative theories of recovery under the UCL and CLRA, they are not entitled to recover both restitution and actual damages for the same economic loss. See also Castillo v. Prime Hydration LLC, 748 F. Supp. 3d 757, 768 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (noting plaintiff “d[id] not suggest that she s[ought] a different amount in damages than she d[id] in restitution”).

2.   Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination.

3.   The Court will grant the award as to compensatory damages rather than restitution. As discussed in an earlier section, although Plaintiffs may plead alternative theories of recovery under the UCL and CLRA, they are not entitled to recover both restitution and actual damages for the same economic loss. See Castillo v. Prime Hydration LLC, 748 F. Supp. 3d 757, 768 (N. D. Cal. 2024).

Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel United States District Judge