CRANE v. CITY OF ARLINGTON TEXAS (2021)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On February 1, 2017, Arlington police initiated a routine traffic stop of Tavis Crane, which led to Crane's car running over an officer twice, and another officer, defendant officer Craig Roper, shooting Crane dead. Crane's mother, on behalf of his estate, sued Roper and the City of Arlington, claiming Roper used excessive force. The law pardons an officer's use of force—even deadly force—when the officer reasonably believed that a suspect posed a threat of serious harm. That was true here. But Plaintiffs argue that the threat of harm only arose because Roper escalated the situation. Although the Court is sympathetic to this argument, it isn't the law. The Court can only consider the threat from the officer's perspective “at the moment of the threat ․” Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). Applying the applicable law, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and Roper is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Roper's motion will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2017, at about 11:45 p.m., Arlington police officer Bowden was patrolling the streets when she noticed something shiny—possibly drug paraphernalia—tossed out of a car. Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 2. She stopped the car on the side of the road, parking her car behind it. Roper's MSJ App'x at 151, ECF No. 69. The suspect car had four occupants. Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 1. Tavis Crane, the decedent in this wrongful-death and survival action, was driving. Id. The front passenger was an adult male, and the backseat had an adult woman and a toddler. Id. Officer Bowden obtained their ID cards and asked them about the object. As she talked with them, the toddler threw a chunk of candy cane out the window. Id. at 2. The candy's plastic wrapper shined in the light. Id. at 2. Officer Bowden now believed there was no drug paraphernalia, only candy. Id.

But when she ran Crane's name, he was wanted for five warrants, including one for violating parole on an evading-arrest charge. Roper's MSJ App'x at 135, 138. Due to these warrants, and the car's three other occupants, Bowden called for backup. Id. at 138. Two other officers arrived, including defendant Officer Roper, and together they approached the car—which was still running. Id. Bowden and Roper stood on the driver's side. Bowden respectfully asked Crane to get out of the car. Id. at 151 (Bowden's dashboard video). He refused. Id. Demonstrating model policing, Bowden politely, calmly, and firmly negotiated with Crane—for more than two minutes—to turn the car off and step out of the car. Id. But he refused. Id. As this continued, Crane's cooperation vanished and was replaced with hostility. Id. He would not listen to Bowden and justified himself by saying he had done nothing wrong. Id. The officers started to suspect that Crane would drive off, and the passenger-side officer asked the front-seat passenger to turn the car off. Id. at 138–39, 151. Crane stopped the passenger and said that he was not turning the car off. Id. at 144, 151.

As Crane's resistance hardened, Roper promoted his role from sideline participant to main player. All the car's doors were locked, so Roper gestured for the backseat passenger to unlock her door. Id. at 144, 151. She complied, and Roper opened the door. Id. at 151. He stepped into the car, one foot in and one foot out. The tension immediately and drastically increased. Id. Although the accounts differ, it is undisputed that Roper quickly unholstered his pistol and aimed it at Crane. Id. at 144; Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 2. The other two officers scrambled around the car, trying to bust the windows so they could reach in and turn off the ignition. Def.’s MSJ App'x at 151. The scene was chaotic. Inside the car, Roper used his left arm to wrestle Crane, and his right hand had his gun pressed against Crane's side. Id. at 144; Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 2. Roper threatened to kill Crane if he would not turn the car off. Id. During this struggle, Crane pressed the gas down, causing the car's engine to roar, tires to spin, and sending smoke up around the car. Def.’s MSJ App'x at 151.

The following events occurred very quickly. As Officer Bowden started to run around the back of the car, the car launched into reverse, plowing over Bowden, and smashing into her police car. Id. Crane's car then changed gears and took off forward. Id. As it moved forward, the back of Crane's car visibly rises and falls as it runs over Bowden a second time. Id. As Crane's car continues down the street, an officer radios out, “officer down!” Id. Somewhere amidst this chaos, Roper point-blank shot Crane in the ribs. Id. at 146; Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 3. The backseat passenger swears the shot occurred before the car started reversing. Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 3. The officers claim Roper fired his gun after the car ran over Bowden the second time. Def.’s MSJ App'x at 146. The gear shift was on the steering column. Id. at 144. Either way, as the car sped down the road, Roper—hanging partially out the open back door—shot Crane two more times. Id. at 146, 151. Roper then managed to put the car into neutral and guide it to a controlled stop into a curb. Id. at 146. Crane was later pronounced dead. Id. at 147.

Crane's mother, acting as administrator of his estate, sued Roper and the City of Arlington, seeking damages for Roper's use of excessive force. Pl.’s 2nd Amend. Comp't at 14, ECF No. 30. Roper asserted the defense of qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment on the issue. ECF No. 67. The issue is now briefed and ripe for review.

STANDARD

The Court must grant summary judgment when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rationale trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Malbrough v. Stelly, 814 F. App'x 798, 802 (5th Cir. 2020). Thus, “the ‘mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient’ to defeat summary judgment; ‘there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). When making these judgments, the Court must view the facts and draw reasonable inference in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary-judgment motion. But when a “videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by” that party, the Court has no duty to accept it. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (Scalia, J.). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769.

ANALYSIS

“When a defendant claims qualified immunity as a defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense.” Goldston v. Anderson, 775 F. App'x 772 (5th Cir. 2019). Therefore, in this case, Crane must show (1) that Roper violated a constitutional right and (2) that Roper's conduct was “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation.” Id. Crane alleges that Roper violated Crane's right to be free from excessive force. To satisfy the first element, Crane must show “(1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Id. at 773 (quoting Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005)). This case's outcome hinges on whether Roper's use of force was “clearly excessive” and “clearly unreasonable.”

Binding precedent sharpens the meaning of these platitudes. To begin with, an “officer's use of deadly force is not excessive when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or others.” Id. (quoting Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009)). Also, the “ ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). “Importantly, the inquiry focuses on the officer's decision to use deadly force, therefore ‘any of the officer's actions leading up to the shooting are not relevant for the purposes of an excessive force inquiry in the Fifth Circuit.’ ” Waller v. City of Fort Worth, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, 2021 WL 233571, *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2021) (Pittman, J.) (quoting Harris, 745 F.3d at 772). These precedents built qualified immunity into a nearly insurmountable obstacle. See e.g., Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 844 F. App'x 710 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding qualified immunity barred suit when officers found suspect doused in gasoline, knew their tasers would ignite him, and quickly tased him, “causing him to burst into flames”).

Applying this law to these facts, Crane failed to show Roper's use of force was clearly excessive. This is true even under Crane's account of the shooting, where Roper shot Crane before the car went into reverse. Even under Crane's account, the following facts are true: Crane had not been complying for more than two minutes; he was wanted on a parole violation for evading arrest; he refused to turn the car off and rolled up the windows; inside the running car were four occupants, including a toddler, and outside the car were two officers; the car was on a residential street; and Roper was half-in and half-out an open door. Given these facts, it was reasonable for Roper to conclude that Crane posed a threat of serious harm to both himself and others. See Goldston, 775 F. App'x at 773 (holding reasonable for officer to use deadly force when he knew (1) other officer was behind suspect's car, (2) suspect had been disobeying commands, and (3) suspect had warrants for evading arrest).

However, a reasonable jury could not believe Crane's account of the shooting. Under Crane's account, after Roper shot Crane, Crane's “head [fell] backwards and then the car began to move backward until it ran into something. After the car ran into something, it started to go forward ․” Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 3. Not only does this not make sense (how is the car shifting gears?), the video contradicts it. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769. The car did not merely “move” backward and forward, it accelerated—fast. These events require coordination between a foot on the accelerator and a hand shifting gears. Only Crane was in position to do this. And in Crane's account, his head was back and he was apparently unconscious while this occurred. Pl.’s MSJ App'x at 3. Thus, Crane's account excludes the possibility that he drove the car after being shot. But if he didn't drive the car, nobody else could have. Given the facts before the Court—including the dashboard video—the Court concludes that Crane's account is unbelievable and therefore adopts the officers’ story. Under the officers’ story, the reasonableness of Roper's use of force becomes even stronger. See Malbrough, 814 F. App'x 3d at 805 (holding officer's use of force reasonable when suspect drove car near officers and heard “officer down”).

Crane's counter argument is reasonable but wrong. Crane argues that Roper escalated the situation. The Court agrees that a reasonable jury could conclude that Roper's acts intensified emotions and contributed to the dangerous situation. But that is irrelevant. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, the “excessive force inquiry zeros in on whether officers or others were ‘in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in the officer's use of deadly force.’ ” Id. at 803 (quoting Harris, 745 F.3d at 773 (emphasis in original)). In other circuits, an officer's “reckless and deliberate conduct” that creates the need to use deadly force must be considered. Id. (quoting Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997)). But in the Fifth Circuit, these facts are irrelevant—and not just irrelevant, their consideration is prohibited. Id. This is well-settled law. See Waller, ––– F. Supp. 3d at –––– n.2, 2021 WL 233571, at *4 n.2 (citing cases). As a result, Crane's argument is unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Crane failed to show that Roper violated his right to be free from excessive force because Roper reasonably believed that Crane posed a threat of serious harm to himself, officers, or others. Since this conclusion disposes of Plaintiff's claim, analysis of the remaining issues is unnecessary. Accordingly, Roper's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. As a result, Crane's claims against Roper are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Further, a municipality like the City of Arlington cannot be held liable when its employee did not violate the Constitution. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986). Since the Court has concluded that Roper did not violate Crane's right to be free of excessive force, the City cannot be liable. Accordingly, Crane's claims against the City of Arlington are also DISMISSED with prejudice.

SO ORDERED on this 8th day of June, 2021.

Mark T. Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE