UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. REGINALD WALLACE GARNER 01 DOMMINIQUE DEALVIN YOUNG 02 (2026)

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On July 17, 2026, the undersigned, after conducting a preliminary hearing and a hearing on the government's motion to detain Defendants Reginald Wallace Garner and Domminique Dealvin Young, entered orders setting conditions for the defendants' release. (See Dkt. Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24.) But it stayed the release orders pending the government's motion for review under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a). The government promptly filed its motion on July 23 and later was granted permission to submit additional evidence for the Court's consideration in connection with the motion. (See Dkt. Nos. 28, 33.)

Because Defendants were charged by criminal complaint, the government's motion for review was originally before United States District Judge Brantley Starr. Based the additional evidence proffered by the government—some of which existed at the time of the detention hearing and some that is “new, relevant, and probative”—and Defendants' arguments about that evidence, Judge Starr concluded the matter of detention should be referred back to the undersigned magistrate judge for consideration of the new evidence in the first instance. (Dkt. No. 42.)

On August 5, a grand jury issued an indictment charging both defendants. (Dkt. No. 36.) As a result, this case is now before United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay, who has entered a scheduling order setting the case for trial on October 14, 2026. (Dkt. Nos. 39, 43.)

As explained below, the undersigned magistrate judge recommends that the District Judge deny the government's motion in part and grant it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The government charged Defendants for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a large quantity of cocaine.

On July 9, 2026, the government charged Garner and Young by criminal complaint with conspiracy to possess at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). (See Dkt. No. 1.) According to the complaint, law enforcement executed a search warrant at a house on Comanche Drive in DeSoto, where they found Garner, Young, more than 28 kilograms of cocaine, and guns. (See id.)

The government moved to detain Defendants. (Dkt. No. 3.) It based detention eligibility on the crime charged—a controlled substance offense punishable by more than 10 years—and alleged Defendants posed a serious risk of flight. It contended that detention was warranted to secure their appearance in Court and for safety of the community and another person. (See id. at 1.) The government invoked the presumption for detention created by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). (See id. at 1-2.)

Defendants appeared in court the following day. (See Dkt. Nos. 4, 9.) Granting the government's motion to continue the hearings, the Court set Defendants' detention hearing and preliminary hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1 for July 17, 2026. (See Dkt. Nos. 8, 13.)

B. Pretrial Services prepared bond reports containing pertinent information.

Pretrial Services prepared bond reports prior to the detention hearing. (See 15-1 (“Garner Rpt.”), 16-1 (“Young Rpt.”).) As to Garner, the report reflects that he is 61 years old. He told Pretrial Services that he had been living with his sister for about a month in Arlington but did not know her address. (Garner Rpt. at 1-2.) Garner graduated from high school in 1984, holds a commercial driver's license, and stated that he had been working as a truck driver for a particular company but did not know how long. (Id. at 2.)

The report indicated that Garner's criminal history was old, beginning at age 20 when he was arrested for shoplifting and weapon possession. (Id.) The disposition of those charges was unknown. (Id.) In January 1993, he was sentenced to probation for crack cocaine possession, but that probation was revoked within the year and he was given two years in prison. (Id. at 3-4.) Between 1993 and 2004, Garner was arrested for offenses including unlawful gun possession (twice), and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, but the disposition of those charges are unknown. (Id. at 4.) In 2005, authorities in Harris County, Texas, charged Garner with burglary of a habitation and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The burglary charge was dismissed, and he was convicted of a lesser misdemeanor offense—deadly conduct—and sentenced to a year in jail. (Id. at 5.) Garner had an additional felony arrest in 2007 and a misdemeanor in 2011—both in Louisiana and both having no disposition information. (Id. at 5.) The probation officer who prepared the report recommended that Garner was not releasable. (Id. at 6.)

As for Young, a different probation officer determined that he was releasable on conditions. (See Young Rpt. at 4.) Young, 33 years old, reported that he resided in Forney with his mother but stated that, as of July 9, 2026, he would live at an address on Bolero Avenue in Dallas if released. (Id. at 1.)¹ He stated that he has a passport and last traveled outside the United States in March 2026, when he went to Aruba. (Id. at 2.) Young stated that he was unemployed while attending school to obtain his commercial driver's license and was in the process of applying to community college. (Id.) He was previously employed as a train operator for a public transit agency from 2022 to June 2026 and quit that job to enroll in trucking school. (Id.) The report reflected two entries on Young's criminal history: (1) a 2014 arrest in Richardson for a traffic offense, for which the disposition was unknown, and (2) a 2017 misdemeanor theft charge in Dallas that was rejected by the prosecutor. (Id.)

C. After a hearing, the undersigned found that the government established probable cause and concluded Defendants are releasable on conditions that include electronic monitoring and home detention.

Garner and Young appeared at the detention hearing and preliminary hearing in person and through counsel. (See Dkt. No. 25 (“Tr.”) at 1.) The government appeared through an assistant United States attorney. (See id.)

1. The government presented testimony from an investigator and proffered information from a 2005 police report.

FBI Special Agent Benavides, who has been an agent for about two years, testified at the hearings. (Tr. at 4.) He stated that in February 2026, Missouri Highway Patrol stopped Garner and found $148,000 hidden in the truck he was driving. (Tr. at 5.) Garner claimed not to know the money was in his vehicle and, after calling and speaking to a person referred to as “Ken,” he abandoned any right to that money. (Tr. at 5-6.) Garner was not arrested. (Tr. 24.) Authorities seized Garner's phone, searched it, and found a text message sent to a person believed to be Garner's significant other stating, “Look at me, I deal drugs.” (Tr. at 6.) Accompanying that message was a photo displaying a large amount of currency. (Tr. at 6.)

On July 7, 2026, investigators conducted a “trash pull” at the Comanche Drive house. (Tr. at 7.) They found 20 wrappers with cocaine residue on them—each thought to have held a kilogram—and 16 empty bags that investigators believed once contained currency. (Tr. at 7, 27.) They also found a credit application for an apartment complex in Louisiana with Garner's name on it. (Tr. at 7-8.)

Investigators obtained a search warrant for the Comanche house and executed it that same day. (Tr. 38.) Benavides was not present for the warrant execution. (See Tr. 35.) Based on investigation materials, he testified that Garner and Young were the only people inside the house. (Tr. at 9.) Law enforcement officers found Young in the living room, and Garner was coming out of a “front room.” (Tr. at 9.) The living room contained some leather chairs and a sectional sofa facing two televisions displaying feeds from multiple security cameras covering the exterior of the house. (Tr. at 9-10.) A seat in the sofa was reclined. (Tr. at 10.) Investigators found keys to Young's car “on the chair,” and, inside a compartment accessed by lifting an armrest, they found a loaded Glock handgun. (Tr. at 10-11.)

Authorities found about $41,000 in currency “out for display” in the kitchen, along with a digital scale, a money counter, and approximately half a kilogram of cocaine. (Tr. at 11.) Benavides testified there were two vehicles in the garage—a Volkswagen SUV registered to Garner and a Honda sedan containing documents belonging to Kiara and Ken. (Tr. 12, 48.)² A tote in the back of the Volkswagen held 28 kilograms of cocaine. (Tr. 12.)

Handguns were found in two bedrooms, both of which appeared to have people living in them. (Tr. 15-16.) In one of the bedroom closets, investigators found a gun box along with documents connected to a person named “Ken” who investigators believe is the same person Garner called after being stopped in Missouri. (See Tr. 16.) Law enforcement found six phones in the house—one that Garner admitted was his—and discovered a digital video recorder for the security cameras in the attic. (Tr. 16, 29.)

Investigators learned that the house was rented under a female's name in February 2026 using a false identification. (Tr. 17, 30.) They continued to look into the circumstances surrounding the house's rental at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 17.)

The government elicited testimony about investigators' examination of “Flock hits” involving Defendants' cars. (See Tr. 19.)³ An intelligence analyst searched for hits on Young's vehicle since February 1st near an address on Bolero Avenue, where Young told Pretrial Services he would live if released in this case. (Tr. 18, 36; see Young Rpt. at 1.) No hits were found. (Tr. 18.) But there were several hits in the vicinity of the Comanche house beginning on June 17 and continuing until July 5. (Tr. 19.) Garner's car, too, had hits near the Comanche address. (Tr. 19-20.)

Benavides also testified about a recorded jail call from Garner. Prior to his initial appearance in this case, Garner called a woman he called “Kiara” and “told her to tell Ken ․ that the house was busted.” (Tr. 21.) The agent said that Garner made two or three other calls to his sister and told her to “grab the personal items” from the Comanche house. (Tr. at 21-22.)

On cross-examination, Benavides testified that the overall investigation began on a tip in June 2025, but investigators first learned of Garner's potential involvement in February 2026 when he was stopped in Missouri. (Tr. 23.) Benavides had no information about foreign travel by Garner other than what was reported in the bond report. (See Tr. 33.) He also had nothing to add with respect to Garner's criminal history. (See Tr. 33-34.)

Benavides testified that Young's criminal history showed that he was arrested for a misdemeanor in 2017. (Tr. 43-44.) Asked to explain why he thought Young was a flight risk or danger, Agent Benavides testified:

Well, typically, in my training and experience, when people who deal drugs or like they have drug trap houses, especially one that that the time of the search contained 28.5 kilos of cocaine, equating to almost half a million dollars of street value, most people – the owner of that, of those drugs, would typically hire people to guard them from other rival drug dealers. And I believe, in my training and experience, that Mr. Young was acting in that capacity when we encountered him. And he has been doing it for at least since mid-June of this year.

(Tr. 44.) Benavides acknowledged that his estimate of the timeline for Young's involvement was based on the Flock hits near the Comanche house. (Tr. 44.) Asked specifically about any evidence tending to show flight risk, Benavides stated that Young “has had international travel in the past,” most recently a trip to Aruba in March 2026. (Tr. 46.) Based on information from Customs and Border Protection records, he believed Young had a couple of other international trips going back to 2022. (Tr. 46.) But he agreed with defense counsel's assessment that it appeared Young went on vacation around spring break each year—he was unaware of any other travel. (Tr. 46.)

On redirect, Agent Benavides testified that the value of the drugs and currency found at the Comanche house and equivalent accounted for in wrappers found in the trash pull comprised an aggregate value of approximately $816,000. (Tr. 46-47.)

In proffer, the government asked the Court to take judicial notice of the bond reports. (Dkt. No. 50.) The government also read from an offense report underlying Garner's 2005 arrest in Harris County for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, an offense pleaded down to a misdemeanor. (Tr. 50; Dkt. No. Garner Rpt. at 5.) According to the information in that report, Garner's ex-girlfriend and a male witness reported that Garner kicked in an apartment door, “came at” the witness with a knife, and, after losing the knife in a scuffle, went back to his vehicle and returned with a gun and shot two rounds in the witness's direction. (Tr. 50-51.) The report further stated that Garner was able to get to his ex-girlfriend through a locked bathroom door, pulled her down the hallway, kicked her in the face, and put a gun to her before he left. (Tr. 51.)

2. Defendants presented information by proffer.

Garner's attorney presented information by proffer. She stated that she interviewed Garner's sister, Ms. James, who is willing to allow her brother to live at her home. (See Tr. 52.) She has been employed at Arlington ISD for 27 years and serves as registrar at one of its campuses. (Tr. 52.) James stated that she has no firearms in her home, has never been arrested, and is willing to bring Garner to court if necessary. (Tr. 52-53.) No one else lives at her residence. (Tr. 53.) James told counsel that she understands that, if appointed as a third-party custodian, it would be her duty to report any violations to Pretrial Services and expressed her willingness to do so. (Tr. 53.) James was present at the detention hearing and available for examination. (See Tr. at 53.) Garner's attorney stated that she spoke with James's daughter, a 12-year veteran of the military, who lives near James and also could be considered as a custodian. (Tr. 54.)

Young's attorney also proceeded by proffer. (Tr. 54.) She had spoken with Young's mother, who is a nurse for a hospice clinic. (Tr. 54.) His mother stated that, if released, Young would live with her mother who suffers from dementia and her sister, who is her mother's caregiver. (Tr. 54.) Counsel represented that, other than the 2017 arrest, Young has no criminal history. (Tr. 54-55.) Counsel further represented that Young's mother reviewed the conditions that might be imposed if he is released and understood that she might be required to report any violations. (Tr. 55.) She, too, was present at the hearing. (See Tr. 55.)

In arguing the issue of Garner's detention, the government relied heavily on the volume of cocaine and money involved in the case—a “staggering” amount between the cash seized in Missouri, the cocaine wrappers and money bags found in the trash pull, and the drugs and cash discovered inside the Comanche house. (See Tr. 56-57.) Based on the braggadocious “Look at me” text, it argued that Garner's return to drug dealing after the Missouri traffic stop evinced dangerousness. (Tr. 57.58.) Additionally, it pointed to guns found inside the house, Garner's calls to his sister to take things out of the house, and the Flock hits tying him to the house. (Tr. 58.) The government argued that Garner was untruthful when he told Pretrial Services that he was living somewhere other than at the Comanche house. (Tr. 58.) It argued that Young, too, was untruthful in reporting living at an address on Bolero Avenue, where there were no Flock hits. (Tr. 59.)

The prosecutor acknowledged that the government “d[id] not have good evidence regarding risk of flight,” so he stated that he instead would “rely on what I've always relied on in these types of cases, the rebuttable presumption and the fact that each [of] them more than likely will be looking at a 10-to-life offense, plus five for [18 U.S.C. §] 924(c)(1), maybe a second 924(c), so they could be looking at a flat 20 years.” (Tr. 59.) That, in the government's view, would give them an incentive to flee, and both have traveled outside the United States. (Tr. 59-60.) Based on the volume of drugs and the “gun play,” the government argued there are no conditions that could “make the community safe[.]” (Tr. 60.) As to Garner, the government also argued that the 2005 episode in Harris County involving his ex-girlfriend further supports a finding of dangerousness. (Tr. 60.)

Garner urged the Court to discount the value of the Harris County events because they occurred more than 20 years ago and because he was convicted of a misdemeanor. (Tr. 61.) Counsel argued that Garner has strong ties to the Dallas area—particularly to his sister and niece, both of whom are willing to assist him—and contended that his request for his sister to get his personal items from the Comanche house had no coded or nefarious purpose. (Tr. 62.) Young argued that he was born and raised in the North Texas area and showed stable employment until recently beginning trucking school. (Tr. 63-64.)

3. The undersigned found probable cause as to both defendants and concluded they are releasable on certain conditions.

The undersigned found that the evidence presented at the hearing sufficiently established probable cause that Defendants conspired to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. (See Tr. 65.) Evidence supporting that finding included Garner's traffic stop in Missouri with apparent drug-trafficking proceeds and his decision to abandon the property after coordinating with someone else by phone. (Tr. 65-66.) Garner was present in the Comanche home with an “extensively large” amount of cocaine in his vehicle, and shortly after his arrest he told someone to tell another person that the house had been hit. (Tr. 66.) As to Young, the undersigned based its probable cause finding on his presence at the home when authorities executed the search warrant, where drugs and proceeds were found inside. (Tr. 66.) While his mere presence alone might be insufficient to establish probable cause, the undersigned credited evidence that tended to show Young's “continued presence” at the home—i.e., he was not a one-time guest who happened to be there on July 7 when authorities executed the warrant. (Tr. 66.) This, the undesigned found, was “far below all reasonable doubt,” but it was sufficient to establish probable cause “as the Supreme Court has applied that term[.]” (Tr. 67.)

Turning to the issue of detention, the undersigned acknowledged that the government invoked the rebuttable presumption that no conditions would reasonably ensure Defendants' appearance and community safety. (Tr. 67-68.) But information in the bond reports and Defendants' proposals of suitable third-party custodians were sufficient to rebut the presumption. (Tr. 68.) Even though the presumption had been rebutted, the undersigned considered that the presumption did once apply and the reasons why Congress created the presumption in the first place. (Tr. 69.)

Considering the § 3142(g) factors, the undersigned recognized that the case involves “an extremely large amount of drugs,” even compared to other drug cases that come before this Court and are charged by the federal government. (Tr. 69.) Additionally, there was evidence presented of cross-country movement of drug proceeds. (Tr. 69.) It is “a very serious offense[.]” (Tr. 69.)

Assessing the weight of the evidence, the undersigned explained that the evidence against Garner is “considerable,” pointing to the kilograms of cocaine found in his vehicle at the Comanche house, his Missouri traffic stop, and his jail call relaying what appears to have been a message to a coconspirator. (Tr. 70.) But the undersigned did “not share that same opinion” as to Young. (Tr. 70.) His presence at the house where drugs and guns were found was enough for probable cause, but the government did not show any involvement in other drug-trafficking activities beyond that day, and its proof was “far less convincing” than proof of Garner's involvement in the conspiracy. (Tr. 70-71.)

Turning to the nature and characteristics of the respective Defendant, the undersigned noted Garner's more substantial criminal history, including a prior felony conviction. (Tr. 71.) Although the undersigned considered the facts proffered about the events underlying his 2005 arrest in Harris County, particular weight was not given to those facts because the victim's statements were not tested in court, and Garner was convicted of a lesser offense. (Tr. 71.) And even if those facts were weighed more heavily, the events occurred in 2005, and the 21 years since without similar allegations of violence lessened concern that Garner would be prone to volatility and violence if released now. (Tr. 71-72.) With respect to Young, the undersigned considered that he has practically no criminal history, as it appears that he has never been convicted of even a misdemeanor offense. (Tr. 72.) This, the undersigned noted, is quite unusual in cases charged in this Court, particularly in large-scale drug trafficking offenses. (Tr. 72.)

The undersigned also weighed the nature of the danger should Defendants be released. (Tr. 72.) It was not persuaded that, if released, Defendants would pose a danger of physical violence. (Tr. 72.) With respect to the 2005 events involving Garner's ex-girlfriend, they occurred decades ago in Harris County, and there is no reason to believe Garner continues to have contact with her or would encounter her if released locally. (Tr. 72.) So the undersigned identified the relevant danger posed by Defendants' release as continued drug trafficking, which is a concern for community safety that can justify detention. (Tr. 73.)

The undersigned perceived the government as having acknowledged “that the risk of flight wasn't so much the concern” and that it is possible to impose conditions that would sufficiently address that risk. (Tr. 73.) Turning to dangerousness, the undersigned explained that the government's burden is an “extremely high” one—by clear and convincing evidence. (Tr. 73.) Showing by a preponderance that conditions could not reasonably assure community safety would be insufficient to justify Defendants' pretrial detention. (Tr. 73.) Considering all the evidence and relevant standards, the undersigned found that conditions can be imposed that would sufficiently mitigate Defendants' risk to community safety. (Tr. 73-74.)

As to Garner, the undersigned ordered his release on conditions that include appointment of a third-party custodian (his sister, Ms. James). (Tr. 74.) The undersigned ordered both Defendants on home detention ⁴ verified by electronic monitoring, to avoid contact with witnesses in this case (which would include each other), a prohibition on weapon possession, and drug testing. (Tr. 76-77.) Neither the government nor defense counsel wished to be heard on these or any other conditions. (Tr. 77-78.)

The government requested that the undersigned stay its release orders pending a forthcoming “appeal [of] the decision as contrary to the law and the evidence presented in court.” (Tr. 81.) The government stated that it would file its appeal within two days of getting the hearing transcript. (Tr. 81.) Overruling objections from Defendants, the undersigned stayed its release orders until 4:00 p.m. on Thursday of the following week.⁵ The undersigned noted that the government could request an extension of that stay if a transcript had not yet been received despite diligent efforts. (Tr. 82.)⁶

4. On review, the government presented new evidence that has been re-referred to the undersigned for consideration in the first instance.

The government promptly filed its motion for review under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a). (See Dkt. No. 28.) In its motion, the government seeks de novo review of the record presented at the detention hearing. (See generally id.) Once the motion was filed, the undersigned extended the stay indefinitely pending resolution of the motion. (Dkt. No. 27.) At a hearing before Judge Starr, the government asked to present additional evidence, and Garner requested additional time to file a response to the government's motion. (Dkt. No. 32.) Judge Starr granted those requests and set deadlines to submit the requested materials. (Id.)

On August 1, the government filed is supplemental motion and evidence. (Dkt. No. 33.) Generally, the new evidence provides additional data—much of it from phone extraction and records, video and photos from a doorbell camera—that connects Defendants to other people believed to be conspirators and to the Comanche Drive house. (See id. at 3-7.) The government also reports that one of the individuals discussed in Benavides's testimony has since been arrested in connection with what appears to be a different federal investigation in another state involving kilograms of cocaine. (Id. at 6.) This additional evidence, the government submits, provides “strong evidence demonstrating the defendants' guilt, the presumption of detention based on the nature of the offense, as well as [show that] all the considerations under section 3142(g) counsel in favor of detention.” (Id. at 7.)

Defendants filed their responses to the government's motion on August 5. (Dkt. Nos. 34, 35.) Garner argues that the additional evidence is cumulative of facts already weighed against him and does not meaningfully alter the § 3142(g) analysis. (Dkt. No. 35.) Young disputes that the new evidence is highly incriminating as to him, but he additionally argues that it adds nothing to the assessment of flight risk or danger. (Dkt. No. 34.)

Also on August 5, a grand jury issued a three-count indictment charging Garner and Young. (Dkt. No. 36.) Both Defendants are charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine (Count One), possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine on July 17 (including by aiding and abetting) (Count Two), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense (Count Three).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A judge's decision whether to release a defendant pending trial is guided by the Bail Reform Act (“BRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq. Described as an “elaborate scheme,” see United States v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir. 1988), the BRA adopts a structured process for determining whether a defendant should be detained. Generally, that process first considers whether the defendant is eligible for detention and, if so, whether he poses a risk of either nonappearance or danger that would not be sufficiently alleviated by conditions on his release. Under the BRA generally, release is the default, and detention is ordered only when it is shown that the defendant poses a sufficiently high and unmitigable risk. See United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992) (“There can be no doubt that this Act clearly favors nondetention.”). That is so because, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).

Eligibility is the first step of the detention assessment. A court cannot open a detention hearing until a case is first shown to be eligible. A case is eligible for a hearing if it involves at least one of the seven circumstances listed at § 3142(f). See United States v. Okhumale, 813 F. App'x 936, 939 (5th Cir. 2020). One avenue of eligibility is based on the charged conduct, such as when a case involves a drug offense punishable by more than ten years, a crime of violence, a firearm, or a minor. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). There, the government must establish a nexus between the offense(s) charged and at least one of the eligibility criteria. See Byrd, 969 F.2d at 110. A second pathway to establishing eligibility focuses more on the individual charged and is satisfied by showing a “serious risk” the defendant will flee or engage in obstructive conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). Under either route, the government must make some threshold showing that at least one such circumstance exists before a court can hold a detention hearing.⁷ A court is not permitted to open a hearing based merely on a conclusory allegation that a condition exists—for example, that a defendant poses a serious risk of flight. See Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109 (noting that the BRA “does not authorize a detention hearing whenever the government thinks detention would be desirable”).

Once eligibility is established and a hearing is convened, the BRA sets the considerations that must be weighed and the standards by which a defendant's non-releasability must be proved to justify detention. Based on the information presented at the hearing, see Jackson, 845 F.2d at 1265 (“A district court can only rule on the basis of the evidence before it[.]”),⁸ a judge assesses whether there are conditions that provide reasonable assurance the defendant will appear in court and will not pose a danger to another person or to the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that the statutory standard asks whether conditions will provide reasonable assurance, not a guarantee. See United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985).

Considering the risk of flight or danger has, in essence, two parts. First, a court assesses the degree of risk posed by the defendant, be it high, low, or somewhere in between. Or, it might determine that a defendant poses no risk, at which point the BRA instructs that the defendant be released on his own recognizance and ordered not to violate the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). Once the degree of risk is evaluated, the court then considers whether there are conditions that would sufficiently mitigate that risk to give reasonable assurance of appearance and safety (both community and personal). A defendant's history of violating court orders or supervision conditions or evidence that he commits crimes while awaiting trial may persuade a court that conditions would not mitigate the risk because the defendant is unlikely to comply with them. See United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992).

Whether detention is sought based on the risk of flight or the risk of danger is an important distinction because it implicates different burdens. Where the government contends that a defendant is not releasable based on a risk of flight, it must establish by a preponderance that no conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance. See United States v. Trosper, 809 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1987). “That is to say, to order detention on this ground the judicial officer should determine, from the information before him, that it is more likely than not that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the accused's appearance.” Fortna, 769 F.2d at 250. The government's burden is much higher when it is instead seeking detention based on danger. There, the BRA requires the government to show by clear and convincing proof that no conditions will reasonably assure the safety of another person or the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51. This necessarily means there will be instances in which the government's evidence shows it is more likely than not that conditions are inadequate to ensure community safety, yet the BRA will compel release because the showing is not clear and convincing. This is the regime Congress created and the Supreme Court approved. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–52 (relying on the clear-and-convincing standard as a feature of the BRA ensuring its constitutionality).

But Congress also identified a subset of cases in which the BRA's lean in favor of release is flipped, and detention is presumed instead. Relevant here, § 3142(e)(3) provides that in certain cases there arises a rebuttable presumption that no conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance and community safety. This presumption is created when a judge finds probable cause to believe the defendant committed at least one of multiple listed offenses, such as a sex or child-exploitation offense, a terrorism offense, or a drug offense punishable by more than ten years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).

When the presumption applies, it imposes upon the defendant a burden of production, not persuasion. See United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1989). To rebut the presumption, a defendant must come forward with some credible evidence suggesting that the defendant would appear in court and not pose a danger. See Trosper, 809 F.2d at 1110 (“[T]he burden imposed on the defendant is the production of evidence supportive of the point for which it is offered.”). The Fifth Circuit has been clear, though, that once the presumption has been rebutted, it does not leave the case entirely. See Hare, 873 F.2d at 799 (“[T]hat presumption is not a mere ‘bursting bubble’ that totally disappears from the judge's consideration after the defendant comes forward with evidence.”). Rather, the court may continue to weigh the fact that the presumption once applied and the reason why Congress created the presumption in the first place. See id. That is, the presumption no longer compels detention, but it may still be weighed in favor of detention. In this way, the Fifth Circuit has described the BRA as having created “an unusual set of weights and measures[.]” Id. at 799.

The BRA also provides the considerations that guide a judge's decision about the degree of risk and whether conditions will provide reasonable assurance. The statute compels the judge to “take into account the available information” in these areas:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;

(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including—

(A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and

(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of a sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

III. ANALYSIS

Garner and Young's eligibility for detention is extremely straightforward here. They were originally charged by complaint—and now by indictment—with a drug offense punishable by more than ten years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(B). That alone establishes Defendants' eligibility for detention and triggers the rebuttable presumption for detention. From this point, the undersigned considers each Defendant's releasability separately, particularly discussing how the government's new evidence influences the BRA analysis. It proceeds with Young's case first, as his is the easier one.

A. Incorporating the government's new evidence into the analysis, the undersigned concludes that Young remains releasable on the conditions imposed.

The undersigned's articulation the § 3142(g) factors in Young's case can be described as having weighed heavily Young's lack of criminal history and the less-than-formidable proof of his involvement in a large-scale drug trafficking conspiracy. At age 33, Young has practically no criminal history—a misdemeanor arrest and no convictions of any kind. This places Young's case outside the typical drug-trafficking conspiracy prosecuted in this Court. He has been a lifelong resident of the Metroplex, has demonstrated a stable work history, and recently left a job as a public transit train operator to attend training to become a truck driver. His mother—a nurse who communicated with Pretrial Services in preparing the bond report—was present at the detention hearing, and she has no characteristics of which the undersigned was made aware that render her unsuitable as a third-party custodian. She explained that Young would live with her mother and sister if released, which appears to be a stable environment.

The facts presented at the hearing showed that this conspiracy involved “an extremely large amount of drugs.” (Tr. 69.) But with respect to Young's involvement in it, there was nothing solidly connecting him to the full extent of the conspiracy shown. His presence at the house where half a kilogram of cocaine and proceeds were displayed—supported by Flock data suggesting that Young's presence there was not an isolated event—is certainly enough to create probable cause of his involvement in the conspiracy. But it falls “far below all reasonable doubt,” particularly with respect to the volume of the drugs involved in the larger conspiracy. (Tr. 67.) This assessment appears to be corroborated by the grand jury's decision to indict Young for possession of the half kilogram found in the kitchen, but not the 28 kilograms in the back of Garner's vehicle. (See Dkt. No. 36 (Count Two).) So, generally, the government's case against Young centered on his presence at the house when authorities executed the search warrant and evidence tending to show that he had been there with some frequency in the preceding weeks.

Before turning to the government's new evidence, the undersigned revisits its rulings concerning the rebuttable presumption. At the hearing, information contained in the bond report (which recommended release) and Young's proposal of a suitable third-party custodian were sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of detention. (See Tr. 68.) The bond report showed that Young has practically no criminal history, has maintained stable employment in the past, and had a stable living arrangement and supportive network available to him if released. (See Young Rpt.) The undersigned persists in the conclusion that the presumption has been rebutted, so it considers the government's new evidence and its impact on the assessment of the § 3142(g) factors understanding that the presumption, although rebutted, still weighs in that analysis.

The government's new evidence provides additional information tying Young to the central location and people involved in the charged conspiracy. Cell phone data places Young's phone “in the vicinity” of the Comanche Drive house 40 times between February and July 2026, although a video doorbell—apparently installed in early March 2026—shows his first appearance at the house in April. Of particular note, Young had an insurance card in his name for the truck in which Garner was stopped in Missouri with apparent drug proceeds. The new evidence also shows that Young communicated with a person credibly believed to be a co-conspirator, but the available information also suggests a family connection between them that might explain their communication beyond their involvement in a drug conspiracy. (See Tr. 56.) In all, the new evidence tends to give a modest boost to the government's attempt to show connections between Young and either the Comanche Drive house or coconspirators. But it does not persuade the undersigned the give substantially greater weight to the § 3142(g)(2) factor than was given at the detention hearing.

Nor does the grand jury's indictment for the three offenses charged against Young meaningfully change the analysis. It indicted Young for involvement in an ongoing conspiracy that involved at least five kilograms of cocaine (Count One), but for possessing—either directly or as an aider and abettor—only at least half a kilogram the day investigators executed the search warrant (Count Two). It also indicted Young for possessing in furtherance of the conspiracy a handgun found in the sofa or another in one of the bedrooms (Count Three). But the evidence presented at the detention hearing suggests the Glock was concealed in the arm of a recliner where Young's car keys were found.⁹ Again, it is undoubtedly enough for probable cause, but it is far from convincing proof of knowing possession.

The undersigned disagrees with Young's argument that the new evidence adds nothing to the Court's assessment of flight risk or danger. (See Dkt. No. 34 at 9.) The strength of the government's proof can have a corresponding effect on a defendant's incentive to appear at trial. That is to say, a defendant who will appear for trial when he believes he has a solid defense can be inclined otherwise when he believes his trial is merely a precursor to conviction and imprisonment.

Even so, assuming the government's new evidence lends additional heft to the government's case against Young, the undersigned finds that it does not alter the overall BRA analysis for two reasons. First, the strength of the evidence is considered by courts to be the least powerful of the § 3142(g) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, No. 3:18-CR-005-D, 2018 WL 620537, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2018) (noting that “courts have found [the weight of the evidence] to be of the least importance in the detention determination” (quoting United Sates v. Anamnonu, No. 3:12-CR-054-L, 2012 WL 1466557, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2012)). Second, the new evidence does not alter the analysis concerning the availability of conditions to mitigate the risks. That is, the new evidence does little, if anything, to suggest Young will not comply with the conditions imposed.

With respect to risk to community safety,¹⁰ it is apparent—as it was at the detention hearing—that the relevant danger is the possibility that Young will continue to be involved in drug trafficking. The Fifth Circuit has been clear in repeatedly stating that drug trafficking constitutes a community danger that can support detention under the BRA. See, e.g, Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586 (“We have ․ held ․ that the risk of continued narcotics trafficking on bail does constitute a risk to the community.”). In assessing the nature of that risk as required by § 3142(g)(4), the undersigned takes into account that the government does not suggest Young presents a danger of physical violence.

The undersigned does not assess the risk that Young will return to drug-trafficking activity as particularly high based on the objective facts presented. As explained above, Young has no criminal history, which means that—unlike in many drug-trafficking cases—there is no evidence that he has returned to illegal conduct despite prior convictions, in violation of court orders, or soon after discharging a prior sentence. Cf. Rueben, 974 F.2d at 583–84 (vacating release order where defendant was charged for possessing numerous kilograms of marijuana months after release from probation for similar conduct and months after being placed on probation for a firearm offense); Hare, 873 F.2d at 798 (noting defendant had “long history of drug related charges”). Nor does the evidence suggest that Young would likely return to drug trafficking for income because he lacks the education, job experience, or willingness to engage in lawful employment. The undersigned considers, however, that Young has ties to another person whom the government credibly believes may be a coconspirator in this case. But all things considered, the facts do not persuade the undersigned that Young's risk of returning to drug trafficking is extremely high.¹¹

After incorporating the government's additional evidence, the undersigned still does not find that the government has made a clear and convincing showing that the conditions imposed will not provide reasonable assurance of community safety as to Young. The modest risk he presents can be adequately mitigated by conditions that include supervision by a probation officer, severe limitation of his movement away from his house, a prohibition on drug use, and drug testing.

At bottom, the government's new evidence reinforces what it said at the detention hearing—that its case for detention is heavily (almost exclusively) predicated on the rebuttable presumption and the prospect of long sentences. (See Tr. 59.) But, as the prosecutor's argument acknowledges, the presumption and possibility of lengthy imprisonment—although both highly germane to the detention decision—apply to practically every drug-trafficking case without regard for particular facts about the offense or the defendant before a court. One thing that is evident from Fifth Circuit guidance is that the government cannot expect detention will be imposed in every case based on the mere fact that the defendant played some part in a drug-trafficking conspiracy. See, e.g., Jackson, 845 F.2d at 1266 (“[T]he government cannot reasonably argue that the § 3142(e) presumption, coupled with the allegations of the indictment against Jackson, are alone sufficient to satisfy § 3142(g).”). To allow the presumption to have that kind of determinative power—especially where countervailing information is presented persuasively rebutting the presumption—would suggest that detention is justified based merely on the offense charged. That would be unfaithful to the BRA, and it would not comport with our ordered notion of liberty. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951) (noting pre-BRA that “infer[ing] from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act” that “would inject into our own system of government the very principles of totalitarianism which Congress was seeking to guard against in passing the statute under which petitioners have been indicted”).

The undersigned recommends that the District Judge deny the government's motion for review, rescind the stay precluding Young's release, and allow him to be released on the conditions that have been imposed.

B. The government's new evidence persuades the undersigned that no conditions will adequately mitigate the risk that Garner will facilitate trafficking or obstructive conduct.

Garner's case is more difficult, because the § 3142(g) factors considered at the hearing did not weigh as heavily in favor of release compared to Young. As was shown at the detention hearing, the breadth of his involvement in the conspiracy is demonstrably more substantial—he was stopped in Missouri with a large amount of apparent drug proceeds; he lived at Comanche Drive, which was a hub of the trafficking activity; there were 28 kilograms of cocaine found in the back of his vehicle in addition to the half kilogram in the kitchen; and his residence in that house strengthens the connection between him and the guns found there. Even so, the undersigned determined that the same conditions imposed on Young—particularly electronic monitoring and home detention—plus appointment of Ms. James as a suitable third-party custodian would provide reasonable assurance that Garner would not pose a danger to the community or another person.

The undersigned found that Garner came forward with credible evidence that rebutted the presumption for detention. Specifically, the bond report shows that, although Garner has been convicted of offenses in the past, including a felony, his last known conviction occurred in 2005. So, as far as the bond report is concerned, Garner has incurred no convictions in the past 21 years. And he presented a sister as a potential third-party custodian. She is a longstanding employee of a local school district who holds what appears to be a position of responsibility, and no indicia of unsuitability have been shown as to her.¹² So, the undersigned assesses the government's new evidence from the point of the presumption having been rebutted.

The government's new evidence concerning Garner actually does not move the needle as much as it does as to Young with respect to involvement in the conspiracy generally. The doorbell camera, its app on his phone, and the photos and videos showing him at the Comanche Drive address provide additional reason to believe Garner lived there and would be in knowing possession its contents. The additional communications with the suspected coconspirator whom he spoke with after the Missouri traffic stop lend greater weight to an inference that he was consistently involved in planning and executing the conspiracy. (See Dkt. No. 33 at 4, 6.) But these inferences were already drawn in the government's favor at the detention hearing—the evidence showed that Garner coordinated with the other suspect to transport drug proceeds as early as February 2026, and the discovery of Garner's cars and documents in the house sufficiently demonstrated that he was an occupant of the house when authorities searched it. Additional evidence that Garner lived there does not add much to the analysis.

Like Young, the government's case for detention is primarily focuses on danger. But Garner's case has at least a facet of danger that is not present in Young's. Based on Garner's arrest for aggravated assault in Houston in 2005, the government put forward information that implicates the possibility of physically violent conduct and the safety of a particular person—his ex-girlfriend. As explained at the hearing, though, Garner was actually convicted of a misdemeanor offense, and the absence of similar conduct in the past 21 years considerably mitigates concern that Garner is a violent person who will engage in assaultive offenses if released in this case. Additionally, in the absence of any evidence that Garner is still in contact with the victim in that offense, who presumably does not live in the Dallas area, the undersigned does not find that he poses a heightened risk to her safety in particular.

Garner presents a greater risk of continued drug trafficking compared to Young. The government's evidence indicates that he has been a more central figure in this conspiracy. And unlike Young, he has a significant criminal history that includes a conviction for simple drug possession and an arrest for possession with intent to distribute, but they both occurred 33 years ago. More recently, Garner was stopped with a large amount of money in circumstances strongly suggesting his involvement in transporting drug proceeds. He was not arrested in connection with that conduct, but the fact that he returned to drug trafficking activity soon thereafter elevates the risk that he will return to it again if he is released.

So, the undersigned next considers whether conditions would reasonably assure that Garner would refrain from drug trafficking if released. Those same conditions for supervision, home detention, electronic monitoring, a limited travel area, plus the appointment of a suitable third-party custodian obligated to report noncompliance to the supervising officer would be necessary. Those conditions would create considerable friction for Garner if he attempts to resume the same illegal conduct, and they would improve the chances that such conduct would be discovered and trigger court intervention.

But the government's new evidence moves the needle significantly with respect to a different facet of risk. As discussed above, the government presented credible evidence at the hearing that suggests other members of the conspiracy have not been arrested. Garner conferred with one of them during the Missouri traffic stop, their documents were found in the house or a car, and, in a recorded jail call, Garner instructed a person to tell another that the house was raided by authorities. (Tr. 21.) The government's new evidence further proves coordination between Garner and coconspirators at large and heightens the risk that Garner will persist in illegal activities through them. For example, in the weeks before authorities searched the Comanche Drive house, Garner was discussing the possibility that papers might be needed in case another person was stopped, and he was being directed with respect to distribution of what appear to be drug proceeds to others.

This additional evidence suggesting Garner's coordination with coconspirators at large illustrates that the danger posed by Garner is not confined to the possibility that he will possess, transport, or distribute drugs. There is a real risk that he will coordinate with others to facilitate further trafficking or interfere with the investigation or apprehension of others. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (requiring a detention hearing based on serious risk of obstruction); see also United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206–07 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.) (recognizing post-BRA that risk of obstruction is a legitimate basis for detention).¹³ In considering whether the conditions will adequately guard against these additional risks to community safety, the undersigned finds that the government has proved by clear and convincing evidence they will not.

That finding is supported by Garner's post-arrest call to warn apparent unindicted coconspirators of the search of the Comanche Drive house. Undoubtedly aware that his conversation was recorded, Garner instructed someone to tell someone else that the house had been “busted.” Unlike the calls to his sister to remove his personal belongings, the facts surrounding this call strongly suggest that Garner intended his message to be a warning about authorities' investigation and to provide a head start for the deletion of data, dispossession of evidence, or flight. The conditions imposed might provide reasonable assurance that Garner will not shelter kilograms of cocaine in his sister's apartment or drive proceeds to other states. But they would not effectively prevent his determined efforts to communicate with coconspirators to facilitate their flight or frustrate what appears to be an ongoing investigation. And even if the Court might envision conditions designed to do so, proof that Garner sought to aid the conspiracy on a recorded jail call undermines any belief that he would comply with them.

For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that the government's evidence persuades by clear and convincing evidence that there are no conditions the Court can impose that would reasonably assure community safety if Garner is released. The undersigned therefore recommends that the District Judge grant the government's motion for review, revoke the order setting conditions (Dkt. No. 23), and order Garner be detained pending resolution of this case.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned recommends that the District Judge DENY in part the government's motion for review of the release order as to Young and GRANT in part the motion as to Garner. (See Dkt. No. 28.)

SO RECOMMENDED on August 18, 2026.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the detention hearing, the government argued that Young was untruthful when he provided this address to Pretrial Services because he did not live there. (See Tr. at 59.) As Young has pointed out, though, the bond report identifies it as his address “as of” July 9, 2026, the day before his initial appearance, suggesting that he identified the address where he would live if released, not where he had been living.

2.   In the complaint, the affiant alleged that the Honda contained “documentation bearing” Garner's name. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4 § 6.)

3.   Flock Safety is a company that maintains a network of automatic license plate readers (“LPRs”) that record the time and location where one of its LPRs detects a license plate and preserve a photo or video of the vehicle. See United States v. Jackson, No. 24-CR-10010-JWB, 2025 WL 1530574, at *1-3 (D. Kan. May 29, 2025) (providing detailed explanation of Flock system). A “Flock hit” refers to a record that a Flock LPR detected a particular license plate at a particular time and place. (See Tr. 40.)

4.   Under home detention, a defendant is permitted to be absent from his house for only limited purposes, such as work, school, medical and mental health appointments, court attendance, attorney visits, and other activities approved by the supervising officer. (Tr. 76-77.) For these Defendants, when allowed to be absent from their home, they would have to remain in Dallas County or an adjacent county unless permitted to go elsewhere by the supervising officer. (Tr. 76.)

5.   The hearing occurred on a Friday.

6.   The Court imposed the deadline it selected—but provided for extension of the stay—to minimize the risk that Defendants' detention would be unreasonably prolonged should the government later choose not to follow through with a motion for review under § 3145(a). (See, e.g., Dkt. No 58, United States v. White, No. 3:25-CR-364-L (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2025) (revoking stay and ordering release where, 13 days after release order was stayed on the government's request for review, the government ultimately did not file a motion for review and did not seek rescission of the stay).)

7.   This case does not require the Court to determine the standard by which the government must make this threshold showing of eligibility. The undersigned notes, though, that the BRA imposes the rebuttable presumption for detention based on probable cause to believe the defendant committed a qualifying offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). That suggests the threshold inquiry to even consider detention is no higher than the standard necessary a to create presumption favoring detention.

8.   See also United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 888 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Detention determinations must be made individually and, in the final analysis, must be based on the evidence which is before the court regarding the particular defendant.”).

9.   Benavides's testimony on this point is unclear. At one point, he described the items this way: “[I]nside of the armrest of the sectional, there was a loaded handgun, and then there was also car keys and a walkie-talkie.” (Tr. 10-11.) On continued questioning, however, he explained that the gun was “in that compartment you lift up” and the keys were “on the chair.” (Tr. 11.)

10.   The BRA requires a court to consider danger “to any other person” and the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1). The government has not argued that Young presents a danger to any particular person.

11.   The government has not argued that Young is a danger for reasons given by Benavides. (See Tr. 44 (stating based on his training and experience that drug cartels tend to hire people to guard drugs and proceeds from rival drug dealers and his belief that Young was dangerous because he served that role).) Even so, the undersigned addresses that testimony for the Court's consideration in the event the government relies on it in seeking further review. As stated at the hearing, the undersigned found Agent Benavides credible, and it is clear to the undersigned that he testified carefully and candidly, and there is no reason to believe any ambiguity or inconsistency that might exist in the record was the result of a lack of candor or forthrightness on his part. Even so, the undersigned accepts that Benavides's testimony on this point is based on his general training and experience. An agent's training and experience may—and often does—lend some credence to the subject of testimony. But it is not a talismanic incantation that imbues the testimony with an air of unquestionable truth proving particular circumstances. So, for example, the Court can accept that cartels often hire trusted individuals to guard drug inventories and proceeds. But viewed in the particular facts of this case, such testimony alone does not strongly establish that Young was there protecting the drugs. Like much about this case, it is not simply a matter of whether a fact is proved or not, but where the evidence lands on the continuum between something less than probable cause and beyond reasonable doubt.

12.   Benavides testified that Garner called his sister from jail and instructed her to remove his personal belongings from the Comanche Drive house implying that this communication was a veiled attempt to remove contraband or evidence from the house. (See Tr. 21-22, 33.) The undersigned does not draw that inference. Assuming Ms. Sparks is the sister whom he called, absent independent evidence showing her involvement in or facilitation of drug trafficking, the undersigned does not infer a nefarious purpose from a call to retrieve Garner's belongings from a rented house that might be turned over to its owners while he was in jail. Additionally, the undersigned presumes that investigators removed all contraband and items of evidentiary value from the house when they executed the search warrant.

13.   The government's additional evidence also shows that the person whom Garner directed to deliver to the message of the search warrant execution has since been arrested for transporting a large amount of cocaine. (See Dkt. No. 33 at 6.)

BRIAN McKAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE