MACLEAN PATTERSON v. ERIE COUNTY OHIO (2020)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

Introduction

In December 2016, Richard “David” MacLean was booked into the Erie County Jail (Doc. 1 at ¶ 23). Four days later, he was found hanging by his neck from a bedsheet tied to an air vent in his cell (id. at ¶ 40). This Court is tasked with parsing what happened during those three days, and which parties -- if any -- may be liable for this tragedy.

Background

MacLean was arrested for breaking and entering on December 29 and booked into the Erie County Jail (id. at ¶ 23). During booking, he denied being suicidal (Doc. 73-7 at 3). On both of the next two days, MacLean called his father Richard MacLean, who made it very clear he no longer wanted contact with his son: “I'm not [going to] be taking phone calls like this ․ don't call me no more ․ I'm not coming to visit you ․ I don't [want to] deal with you no more ․ I don't think you're savable dude. I don't.” (Doc. 53-1 at 2–3).

On December 31, three inmates informed Officer John Nolder that MacLean made comments about jumping off the top tier (Doc. 72 at 12). Nolder questioned MacLean, who claimed the inmates were just “messing with him” (id. at 14). Nolder was unsure if MacLean was telling the truth (id.). He secured MacLean in a holding cell, and alerted his supervisor, Officer Brittany Hausman (id.). Hausman directed Nolder to place MacLean on the phone with the suicide hotline that Erie County maintained through an “Affiliation Agreement” with Defendant Firelands Regional Hospital (id. at 14–15; Doc. 53-4). Nolder then took MacLean into a private office and called the hotline; Defendant Katharina Boyer, a Firelands employee, picked up (Doc. 72 at 15). Nolder informed her of the inmates’ allegations and that MacLean denied being suicidal (id.). Boyer then spoke with MacLean (id.). Boyer testified that MacLean was “cooperative” and “not distraught” (Doc. 71 at 8). MacLean expressed that “he was depressed with the situation” and “felt like he let his family down” but “was not going to kill himself” (id.). He further stated that he “had a lot of life left to live,” and that he had been to prison before and “kn[ew] how to deal with being incarcerated” (id. at 8, 10). In response, Boyer informed MacLean that he could sign up for “jail adjustment counseling” (id. at 10). The call lasted five minutes (id. at 13).

MacLean then handed the phone to Nolder, who had been sitting across the desk (Doc. 72 at 16). Boyer told Nolder “she had no safety concerns for MacLean” (id.). After hanging up the phone, Nolder again asked MacLean if he planned to commit suicide (id. at 17). MacLean, who Nolder says was “handling the whole thing kind of in a joking manner,” denied being suicidal and asked Nolder if he would bring him chewing tobacco (id.). Nolder then informed Hausman that “Firelands had cleared” MacLean (id.). Hausman instructed Nolder to take MacLean back to his cell, which he did (id.). Later that night, Nolder returned and moved MacLean to a different pod because he believed MacLean was “being bullied” (id. at 8).

On January 2, MacLean called his father again (Doc. 53-1). MacLean asked for help with bail, to which Richard responded: “You're [going to] stay in prison and you're [going to] stay there for a while dude. There ain't no getting out ․ I mean you don't understand David, it's over dude. You're a criminal” (id. at 2). MacLean told his father he “didn't think he was going to relapse” if he got out (id. at 3). Richard responded: “[L]isten, I'm not [going to] argue with some thief, heroin addict who is just [going to] get out and ruin more people's lives, that's not [going to] happen dude” (id.). He went on: “Your life is over David ․ you're a criminal ․ you don't deserve a second chance” (id.).

On his way back to his cell, MacLean asked another inmate for a piece of paper (Doc. 73-11 at 3). Approximately 30 minutes later, an officer discovered MacLean had hanged himself (id.). A note left in MacLean's cell began: “First of all dad I love you and you afforded me every chance but you are right ․” (Doc. 53-3). He was pronounced dead at Firelands Regional Hospital two days later (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1).

MacLean's estate (“Plaintiffs”) then sued Defendants Erie County Board of Commissioners (“Erie County”), Sheriff Paul Sigsworth, several Erie County corrections officers, Firelands Regional Hospital (“Firelands”), and Firelands employee Katharina Boyer (id. at ¶¶ 8–19). Opting for a kitchen-sink approach, Plaintiffs allege several constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous state-law torts (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 54–73). Plaintiffs’ briefing appears to advance (1) a failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against Sigsworth and (2) Monell claims against Erie County and Firelands under multiple theories. Plaintiffs also allege negligence against Erie County; as well as wrongful-death, survivorship, and loss-of-consortium claims against all remaining Defendants.

The parties exchanged letters (Docs. 56-1, 56-2) and this Court held a Record Hearing (Doc. 54). During that Hearing, Plaintiffs dismissed their claims against several individual Defendants (Tr. at 4).¹ This Court also ordered the submission of a joint statement of agreed-upon facts; the parties did not comply (see Docs. 57-1, 57-2, 58). Defendants move for summary judgment, now fully briefed (Docs. 65–70), which is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal Civil Rule 56(a). In viewing the evidence, this Court “draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Brandenburg v. Hous. Auth. of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, 897 (6th Cir. 2001).

Deliberate Indifference

Generally, claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under Section 1983 are based on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Winkler v. Madison Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th Cir. 2018). However, when “asserted on behalf of a pre-trial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper starting point.” Id. (citation omitted). The claim has two parts: objective and subjective. Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2009). “For the objective component, the detainee must demonstrate the existence of a sufficiently serious medical need.” Id. (citation omitted). In the context of prisoner-suicide, “proof of a prisoner's psychological needs manifesting themselves in suicidal tendencies with a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his own life are sufficiently serious for purposes of the objective component.” Mantell v. Health Prof'ls Ltd., 612 F. App'x 302, 306 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We will assume the objective element is satisfied, based on the reports made to Officer Nolder that MacLean had verbalized a plan to commit suicide.

The subjective component is Plaintiffs’ biggest hurdle. “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The subjective component requires proof of three elements: (1) the prison official subjectively perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk to the prisoner; (2) the official did in fact draw the inference; and (3) the official disregarded that risk.” Mantell, 612 F. App'x at 306 (citations omitted).

Individual Capacity Claim Against Sigsworth

Plaintiffs first assert a failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against Sigsworth in his individual capacity (Docs. 1 at ¶ 56; 56-2 at 9). In cases such as this, where the defendant is both supervisor and policymaker, individual-capacity claims “may appear indistinguishable” from official-capacity claims, which actually lie against the municipality. Essex v. Cty. of Livingston, 518 F. App'x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2013). Public officials are liable in their individual capacities only if they “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). This means “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs must demonstrate Sigsworth “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs argue Sigsworth “knew that it would needlessly endanger the inmates if his policy was not followed ․ [but] did nothing to ensure the policy was followed” (Doc. 68 at 3). At best, this is an allegation of inaction. “A mere failure to act will not suffice to establish supervisory liability.” Essex, 518 F. App'x at 355 (citation omitted). See also Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] supervisory official's failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs point to the suicide of an inmate five days prior as proof Sigsworth knew inmates were still at risk, but disregarded that risk (Doc. 56-2 at 2). Not so. That inmate took his life within 24 hours of denying any suicidal thoughts during his intake, and there is no evidence he was ever placed on the Firelands hotline (see Docs. 59-1, 59-2 at 8, 59-3 at 3). This single instance of a prior suicide, unrelated to the suicide-prevention policy and Affiliation Agreement, is insufficient to demonstrate that either Sigsworth knew the hotline was deficient or should have known based on the circumstances. Nor can it show that Sigsworth had “actual knowledge of a breakdown in the proper workings of the [Jail].” Winkler, 893 F.3d at 899.

True, Sigsworth knew Erie County Jail housed individuals with mental-health issues (Doc. 68 at 3). But that's exactly why he put the suicide-prevention policy and Firelands hotline in place -- to assist inmates experiencing mental-health crises by providing access to “mental health professionals” (Doc. 73-5). To the extent Plaintiffs argue that Sigsworth implementing those protocols amounts to deliberate indifference, they merely assert Sigsworth “did not take appropriate action.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (citation omitted). But that's not enough. “[L]iability must lie upon more than a mere right to control employees and cannot rely on simple negligence ․ There must be some conduct on the supervisor's part to which a plaintiff can point that is directly correlated with the plaintiff's injury.” Essex, 518 F. App'x at 355 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Further, individual-capacity claims -- unlike the official-capacity claim addressed below-- are subject to qualified immunity, which bars individual liability if “a reasonable official in the defendant's position would not have understood his or her actions to violate a person's constitutional rights.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 738 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to prevail on the individual-capacity claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate “a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right ․ that [ ] was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs point to no case holding that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, inmates have a constitutional right to immediate access to a licensed doctor -- as opposed to a suicide-screening hotline staffed by “qualified behavioral health specialists” (see Tr. at 13). Therefore, even if a constitutional violation had occurred, the individual-capacity claim would still fail.

Monell Claims Against Erie County

Plaintiffs next allege claims against Erie County under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). To defeat summary judgment, Plaintiffs must show MacLean's injuries were the result of some “policy or custom” attributable to Erie County. See id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Plaintiffs argue two theories for their Monell claim: they allege the existence of (1) “an illegal official policy or legislative enactment” and (2) “a policy of inadequate training or supervision.” Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 880 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

 Official Policy

To proceed under this theory, Plaintiffs must show an “official policy” resulting in a constitutional violation. Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 829 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs argue Erie County's suicide-prevention policy, including the Affiliation Agreement with Firelands, is such an illegal policy (Doc. 1 at ¶ 30):

The customs, practices and policies of the Erie County Defendants not to provide proper and adequate psychological evaluation and care, treatment and counseling for inmates at increased risk of suicide were driving forces behind the constitutional deprivations suffered by MacLean ․ These deprivations included the Erie County Defendants’ denial of adequate evaluation, care, treatment and counseling, ignoring MacLean's serious medical needs, causing him to suffer conscious pain and suffering, and directly and proximately causing or contributing to his [suicide].

As an initial point, it is not “unconstitutional for municipalities and their employees to rely on medical judgments made by [private] medical professionals responsible for prisoner care.” Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This means the Affiliation Agreement with Firelands to provide inmates with mental-health care is facially constitutional. Winkler, 893 F.3d at 901. Plaintiffs must therefore “demonstrate that the [government] action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Id. (citing Gregory, 444 F.3d at 752).

Plaintiffs cannot meet this high bar of deliberate indifference for two reasons. First, they are unable to point to a single prior instance of constitutional violations related to Erie County's suicide-prevention policy, or -- more importantly -- the Firelands hotline. Consequences of an alleged constitutionally deficient policy must be known or obvious. “A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.” Winkler, 893 F.3d at 901 (citation omitted). Second, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Erie County “caused the constitutional violation.” Doe v. Claiborne Cty., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted). There must be “a direct causal link between the custom and the constitutional deprivation; that is, [Plaintiffs] must show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Id. Plaintiffs’ medical expert opines that “significant system failures, including the lack of a mental health treatment program, policy/procedural deficiencies and barriers to the access to appropriate mental health care [ ] contributed to Mr. MacLean's death” (Doc. 68-2 at 30). But, as outlined above, MacLean's suicide occurred two days after his interactions with Nolder and conversation with Boyer. At no point did MacLean express any desire to speak with a mental-health professional. Nor did he express to Jail staff a desire to commit suicide. In sum, Plaintiffs allege no facts demonstrating a connection between the Erie County policy and MacLean's suicide, which came just moments after MacLean's father told him that he was a “criminal” whose “life [was] over” (Doc. 53 at 3).

Plaintiffs assert a separate but related argument that Erie County had a custom of not following its own policies. They assert Erie County continually failed to place potentially suicidal inmates on the Firelands hotline with a “qualified mental health professional,” as required by the suicide-prevention policy (Doc. 68 at 9). However, such a claim is viable only if Erie County had constructive notice of “a persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct.” Winkler, 893 F.3d at 902. Because Plaintiffs present no evidence of prior instances indicating the Firelands hotline staff was indifferent to the rights of suicidal prisoners, this claim fails. In the same vein, Plaintiffs argue Erie County's failure “to perform timely cell safety checks w[as] the moving force behind the constitutional deprivations suffered by MacLean” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 46). At the time, Erie county had a policy of conducting cell checks on inmates every 30 minutes (Doc. 59-4). Records reflect MacLean's cell went unchecked for 35 minutes (Doc. 73-10). But this five-minute delay fails for the same reasons noted earlier: “[A] plaintiff cannot rely solely on a single instance to prove the existence of an unconstitutional custom.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 763 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

 Failure to Train

Although Plaintiffs style their failure-to-train-or-supervise claim as one against Sigsworth in his official capacity (Doc. 56-2 at 3), such a claim “is treated as a suit against the municipality.” Doe, 103 F.3d at 509. Failure-to-train under Monell is broader than an individual-capacity claim; it “implicate[s] the conduct of a defendant supervisor insofar as he acted with deliberate indifference in his official capacity as a policymaker.” Essex, 518 F. App'x at 355 (citations omitted). “When determining whether a municipality has adequately trained its employees, ‘the focus must be on adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform.’ ” Wright, 962 F.3d at 881 (quoting Jackson, 925 F.3d at 834). Plaintiffs may succeed by showing either “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that [Erie County] had notice that the training was deficient and likely to cause injury but ignored it,” or “evidence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that [Erie County] had failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.” Jackson, 925 F.3d at 836 (citation omitted).

As with their claims against Sigsworth, Plaintiffs argue the prior suicide put Erie County on notice of issues regarding suicidal inmates in the Jail (Doc. 56-2 at 12). This argument fails. First, that inmate committed suicide less than 24 hours after denying suicidal ideations during his intake, and the Firelands hotline was not involved (Docs. 59-1, 59-2 at 8, 59-3 at 3). Plaintiffs must show “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the municipality had ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Burgess v Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). This single instance, unrelated to the suicide-prevention policy or Firelands hotline, cannot provide Erie County with actual notice of a pattern of constitutional violations. Second, even if the prior suicide put Erie County on notice, the record shows Erie County did not simply ignore it. Erie County began implementing several suicide-prevention measures, including: (1) a new 30-minute cell-check policy; (2) replacing bed sheets with blankets; (3) disciplining officers for late cell checks; and (4) after consulting Firelands and the Ohio Department of Corrections on how to improve the Jail's mental-health protocols, placing a mental-health professional in the Jail 40 hours per week (Docs. 59-4; 73 at 8, 26). Simply put, Erie County was not deliberately indifferent.

The second argument -- that Erie County failed to train officers on the recurring situation of inmate suicide attempts -- fails for similar reasons. Officers received suicide-response instruction during their initial training at the Corrections Academy, were educated on Erie County's suicide-prevention policy, and were required to pass annual tests based on online suicide-prevention training sessions (Docs. 72 at 22, 27; 74 at 6–7). No reasonable jury could conclude Erie County ignored the fact that officers would likely face attempted suicides.

Monell Claims Against Firelands

Plaintiffs’ last attack is against the Firelands hotline, which they claim was staffed by “uneducated, untrained, non-professionals,” and therefore constitutionally impermissible (Doc. 68 at 9). This claim centers on whether (1) Firelands had a custom or policy of failing to properly train its hotline staff amounting to deliberate indifference, and (2) that official policy was the “moving force” behind MacLean's injuries. Shadrick v. Hopkins Cty., 805 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2015).

Firelands moves for summary judgment on this federal claim only, arguing it cannot be liable for a constitutional violation because it is not a state actor (Doc. 67 at 3). But Firelands is a state actor. Private corporations that perform traditional state functions, such as providing inmates with mental-health care, may be liable under Section 1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55–58, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App'x 748 (6th Cir. 2003). See also Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993) (“It is clear that a private entity which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function such as providing medical services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 as one acting under color of state law.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs can therefore establish a Fourteenth Amendment Claim by showing Firelands knew of, and disregarded, an excessive risk to MacLean's safety. Shadrick, 805 F.3d at 738. They must demonstrate Firelands “was ‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm’ existed and that [Firelands] drew the inference.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). This requires Plaintiffs to show: (1) the Firelands training program and supervision were inadequate for the tasks the hotline staff were required to perform; (2) this resulted from Firelands’ deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy actually caused, or is closely related to, MacLean's injury. Id.

First, Plaintiffs argue Boyer was not properly trained to staff the hotline (Doc. 56-2 at 5–7). As noted by Firelands (Tr. at 13), the Ohio Administrative Code (“AC”) outlines that “behavioral health hotline services” must be staffed by “qualified behavioral health specialists.” AC 5122-29-08. These individuals must “receive[ ] training for or education in either mental health or substance use disorder competencies,” and “demonstrate[ ] the minimum competencies in basic mental health or substance use disorder and recovery skills ․” AC 5122-29-30(D). They must be basically competent and understand several factors relevant to hotlines, including “mental illness or substance use disorder treatment and recovery,” “[c]risis response procedures,” and “[d]e-escalation techniques.” Id. At the time of the hotline call, Boyer had a degree in criminal justice and was working toward a degree in social work (Doc. 71 at 3). Boyer underwent a monthlong training period when she began her employment (id. at 33). She observed hotline staff taking calls for approximately two weeks, and then began taking calls of her own under supervision of a trained staff member (id. at 34). Boyer also had to “review suicide lethality screenings in ․ [the Firelands] learning system” (id. at 27). Based on her training, Boyer understood that her job was to “assess the caller[s] needs” and provide access to services, including an evaluation by a licensed counselor, if necessary (id. at 27, 34). Throughout her tenure, she received written evaluations of her work (id. at 34). Despite all of this training and supervision, Plaintiffs believe Boyer was unqualified merely because she was not a state-licensed mental-health professional (Doc. 56-2 at 5–7). But under Ohio law, licensure is unnecessary for hotline workers. See AC 5122-29-30(D)(1).

Was Boyer the most qualified person to staff the Firelands hotline? Perhaps not. But that does not mean Firelands’ training program and supervision “were inadequate for the tasks” she performed. Shadrick, 805 F.3d at 738. Even if Boyer's training was inadequate, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate deliberate indifference. Alleging that the harm could have been avoided if Boyer had “better or more training, sufficient to equip [her] to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct” is insufficient. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). To prove Firelands was deliberately indifferent, Plaintiffs must show “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” and “continued adherence to an approach that [Firelands] knows or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees.” Shadrick, 805 F.3d at 738–39 (citation omitted). But they do not allege a single prior instance demonstrating the hotline was ineffective. And because Boyer received multiple weeks of training, supervision, and lethality-screening instruction, Plaintiffs cannot show Firelands “failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.” Jackson, 925 F.3d at 836 (citation omitted).

State-Law Claims

Plaintiffs dismissed their wrongful-death, survivorship, loss-of-consortium, and negligence claims against the individual Erie County Defendants (Tr. at 4–5). Under Ohio Revised Code (“RC”) 2744.02(B)(4), Erie County is immune from suit on those claims. Therefore, to the extent any state-law claims against Erie County remain, they fail. The same is true for any claims remaining against Sheriff Sigsworth. Based on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could conclude that he acted “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” RC 2744.03(A)(6)(b).

This leaves us with Plaintiffs’ wrongful-death, survivorship, and loss-of-consortium claims against Firelands and Boyer, which will proceed. See Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that “supplemental jurisdiction does not disappear when the federal claim[s] that gave rise to original jurisdiction in the first place [are] dismissed”) (citation omitted).

Conclusion

A tragic outcome does not always equal constitutional liability. Weighing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to MacLean's medical needs. Erie County provided all corrections officers with suicide-prevention training and established suicide-prevention policies designed to connect inmates to mental-health professionals. Likewise, Firelands trained its hotline staff to handle suicide screenings, and there is no evidence of prior instances demonstrating the training program was inadequate.

Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are dismissed. The Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 65, 67) are granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The citation “Tr.” refers to the unofficial transcript of the Record Hearing held March 30, 2020.

JACK ZOUHARY, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE