UNITED STATES v. AGUILAR GARCIA (2026)

ORDER on PRE-TRIAL MOTION

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States of America (the “Government”) has obtained a one-count indictment that charges defendant Marvin Wotsbeli Aguilar-Garcia (“defendant”) with assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b). Dkt. No. 10.

The case is set for a jury trial on Tuesday, February 17, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Utica, New York. Defendant has moved to compel discovery. Dkt. No. 21. After the motion was briefed, Dkt. Nos. 49, 56, the Court heard argument from the parties at the final pre-trial conference on February 10, 2026 in Utica, New York.

Decision was reserved.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant is a citizen of Guatemala. He entered the United States unlawfully. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings. He was detained for a while, but in 2018 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered defendant released on bond. Defendant was later ordered removed on June 1, 2022. But defendant appealed the order of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Defendant's BIA appeal remains pending as of today.

On May 22, 2023, while he was out on the immigration bond, defendant was convicted in state court of aggravated vehicular assault (a felony) and aggravated driving while intoxicated (a misdemeanor). Defendant was sentenced to a brief state-court prison term and he was thereafter placed on probation under the supervision of the Lewis County Probation Department (“LCPD”) in Lewis County, New York.

In December of 2025, U.S. Border Patrol (“USBP”) determined that defendant should be arrested. Border Patrol Agent (“BPA”) Trevor Baize reached out to the LCPD to determine his whereabouts. There, he spoke to LCPD Director Matthew Morrow and, in conjunction with the Lewis County Sheriff's Office (“LCSO”), formulated a plan to arrest defendant at a traffic stop on his way to a scheduled probation visit.

On December 15, 2025, LCPD Morrow and LCSO Investigator James Blackwell staked out defendant's residence. At about 7:45 a.m., LCPD Morrow saw defendant leave in the front passenger seat of a white 2014 Audi SUV. Investigator Blackwell alerted LCSO Deputy Kevin Bush, who was lying in wait with a marked patrol car near the Naumberg Mennonite Church at 5463 NYS Route 410 in Castorland, New York.

Deputy Bush spotted the white Audi driving towards him and observed that the vehicle's front license plate was obstructed with snow. Deputy Bush executed a traffic stop. He exited his LCSO cruiser and approached the driver's side door of the stopped Audi. While Deputy Bush talked to the driver, BPA Baize and BPA Jordan Bastedo arrived in an unmarked USBP vehicle.

BPA Baize hopped out of his vehicle and started walking toward the passenger side of the stopped Audi. But as BPA Baize reached the rear corner of the car, the front passenger door opened, defendant emerged from the passenger seat, and “BPA Baize was struck with an object in the face near his left eye.”

Defendant fled into the woods and deep snow. BPA Baize, BPA Bastedo, and Deputy Bush gave chase. After a few hundred meters, defendant stopped and surrendered. BPA Baize arrested defendant. As the pair walked back to the vehicle, BPA Baize claims that he asked defendant: “Why did you run?” Defendant responded: “I had to try.”

BPA Baize secured defendant in the back of a law enforcement vehicle. Thereafter, the BPAs “observed a mark near BPA Baize's left eye,” which “was consistent with being hit with an object near BPA Baize's left eye.” “Both BPAs searched the area near the traffic stop but did not find an object consistent with the injury.”

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant was initially charged by a criminal complaint sworn out by Special Agent Jonathan Adamowich, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security officer who heard about the alleged assault from his “law enforcement colleagues.” Dkt. No. 1. But a few days later, the Government sought and obtained from a grand jury a one-count indictment that charges:

On or about December 15, 2025, in Lewis County in the Northern District of New York, the defendant MARVIN WOTSBELI AGUILAR-GARCIA, knowingly and intentionally did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, and interfere with any person designated in 18 U.S.C. § 1114, that is a Border Patrol Agent, while the agent was engaged in official duties, and inflicted bodily injury, in that AGUILAR-GARCIA thew [sic] a book at the agent during a traffic stop, striking the agent near the eye and causing injury, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 111(a)(1) & (b).

Dkt. No. 10 (emphases in original).

Title 18 U.S.C. § 111 criminalizes “assault upon a federal officer while engaged in the performance of his official duties.” United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 673, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975); United States v. Melhuish, 6 F.4th 380, 394 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding § 111 is a general intent crime).

Section 111(a) provides in relevant part that:

Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with [certain federal officers] while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties ․ shall, where the acts ․ constitute only simple assault, [be guilty of a misdemeanor], and where such acts involve physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to commit another felony, [be guilty of a felony].

18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (emphases added).

Section 111(b), which is labeled “Enhanced Penalty,” provides in relevant part that:

Whoever, in the commission of any acts described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon (including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but that fails to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts bodily injury, shall be [penalized a more significant amount].

18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (emphasis added).

Despite being labeled otherwise, § 111(b) “defines a separate offense rather than simply a sentencing enhancement.” United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1999). Thus, as a practical matter, § 111 criminalizes three distinct categories of conduct: (1) simple assault; (2) felony assault; and (3) assault involving a specified weapon or bodily injury. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 980 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 2020).

“Congress's purpose in enacting § 111 was expansive: to protect both federal officers and federal functions.” United States v. Hertular, 562 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). “In order to protect the law enforcement function itself, the statute must be read as prohibiting any acts or threats of bodily harm that might reasonably deter a federal official from the performance of his or her duties.” United States v. Walker, 835 F.2d 983, 987 (2d Cir. 1987).

“Congress therefore created the single crime of harming or threatening a federal official, and specified six ways by which the crime could be committed.” United States v. McIntosh, 753 F.3d 388, 393 (2d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (holding that jury unanimity is not required as to the theory of the offense); see also United States v. Easterday, 729 F. Supp. 3d 17, 27–28 (D.D.C. 2024) (collecting cases defining “bodily injury” broadly).

As one trial court has explained:

“In plain English, § 111(a) makes it a crime to ‘forcibly assault[ ]’ any federal officer while that officer is engaged in ‘the performance of official duties.’ And § 111(b) provides for heightened penalties if the attacker ‘uses a deadly or dangerous weapon’ or ‘inflicts bodily injury.’ ”

Purnell v. United States, 2015 WL 4503626, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015). In this case, the Government has charged defendant with the third category of conduct: “assault under Section 111(b) that result in bodily injury to the victim.” Dkt. No. 38 at 5.¹

Defendant seeks “an order directing the Government to disclose disciplinary records of Border Patrol agents involved in this case that are discoverable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, because they constitute Giglio material, and may even constitute Brady material.” Dkt. No. 21 at 2. Briefly stated, defendant believes that the USBP agents’ version of events in this case—both their allegedly “mistaken belief” that defendant's BIA appeal had concluded (as a pretext to justify his roadside arrest) and the events at the roadside (an assault with an object that was not recovered) are “incredible” (in the sense of being unworthy of belief). Id. at 2–8.

Consistent with that view of events, defendant sought from the Government information about the agent-witnesses’ disciplinary records. Dkt. No. 21 at 8. In response, the Government “informed defense counsel that he had sought disciplinary records but the response he received was that no impeachment or exculpatory information existed in those records.” Id.

However, in doing so, the Government “declined to disclose which agency made the determination that no impeachment or exculpatory information existed in those records.” Dkt. No. 21 at 8. As defendant explains, the Government “has advised that ‘proper procedures were followed’ but declined to specify what the procedures are.” Id.

Against that backdrop:

Defense counsel has serious concerns about which agency made the determination that no impeachment or exculpatory information exists in the disciplinary records of the Border Patrol agents involved int his case. Defense counsel has not received a clear answer about which agency made this determination, and the wording of [the Government's] response gives defense counsel concerns that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) decided on their own what material was or was not impeachment or exculpatory.

․

[i]f CBP itself decided that the records do not contain impeachment or exculpatory information, defense counsel has no reason to rely on that decision as an accurate or truthful one [based on recent public statements that ‘contradict truth and obvious facts’].

Dkt. No. 21 at 11–12.

Thereafter, the Government disclosed information to defendant related to several of its agent-witnesses. Dkt. Nos. 59, 65. Broadly speaking, these disclosures concerned potential impeachment information pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). See id.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs pre-trial discovery in criminal cases. As relevant here, Rule 16 entitles a defendant “to inspect and to copy or photograph” documents or items “within the government's possession, custody, or control” that are “material to preparing the defense.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i). Likewise, although it is not a pre-trial discovery rule, Brady and its progeny require the disclosure of “evidence favorable to an accused,” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which includes evidence that may be useful to impeach the credibility of a government witness, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).

Brady sets a constitutional baseline for “materiality.” See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324, 137 S.Ct. 1885, 198 L.Ed.2d 443 (2017); United States v. Hunter, 32 F.4th 22, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2022); United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 2008). But “materiality” within the meaning of Rule 16 is a less demanding standard. Under Rule 16, evidence is material “if it could be used to counter the government's case or to bolster a defense.” United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993).

“To obtain discovery under Rule 16, a defendant must make a prima facie showing of materiality.” United States v. Clarke, 979 F.3d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). And this is not a heavy burden: “evidence is material as long as there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal.” United States v. Wilson, 518 F. Supp. 3d 678, 686 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (cleaned up) (collecting cases).

Measured against this general legal standard, defendant's motion to compel discovery will be granted in part and denied in part. To the extent that defendant's motion seeks to “order the Government to provide the defense with the disciplinary records” of the agent-witnesses in this case or a “fact-finding hearing ․ to explore the diligence” of the prosecution's inquiry, the motion to compel will be denied. However, based on the particular nature of the recent Giglio disclosures made by the Government, the Court will order an in camera review of three of the Government's agent-witnesses’ personnel files for the reasons explained below.

Neither Brady nor the federal pre-trial discovery rules “require the prosecutor to ‘deliver his entire file to defense counsel.’ ” United States v. Preldakaj, 456 F. App'x 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Just the opposite: the Second Circuit has “articulated a procedure” that typically permits the Government to review its own file and make its own determination about “ ‘what evidence must be disclosed to the defense.’ ” Preldakaj, 456 F. App'x at 59 (quoting United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1994)).

“To the extent that there is a question as to the relevance or materiality of a given group of documents, the documents are normally submitted to the court for in camera review.” United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1995). “[T]he point of the court's in camera review is to ensure the disclosure of exculpatory evidence while ‘preserv[ing] the confidentiality of those documents that the court determines need not be disclosed.” Contreras v. Artus, 778 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Wolfson, 55 F.3d at 60).

To that end, the Second Circuit has cautioned that there will be situations in which “the trial court should not rely on the Government's representations as to the materiality of potential impeachment evidence, but should instead undertake an independent in camera review of relevant Government files to determine materiality.” Leung, 40 F.3d at 582.

For instance, in United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1989), the defense sought production of personnel files for federal agents who would be called to testify at trial. The prosecutor reviewed the agents’ files and reported to the trial court that one of the files contained multiple complaints about the agent, including a letter of reprimand. Id. at 215.

Despite this representation from the prosecution, the trial court refused to compel “either an in camera review of the personnel files, or disclosure of such files to the defense.” Kiszewski, 877 F.2d at 215. Thereafter, the agents testified and the defendant was convicted. Id. at 212.

The Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions to the trial court “to conduct an in camera examination of the file to determine whether information in the file should have been disclosed.” Kiszewski, 877 F.2d at 216. In the panel's view, the Government's description “of the allegations contained in [the agent's] file,” absent more, was insufficient to determine if the information should have been disclosed to the defense. See id.

First, the obvious: there is nothing in the available record to support the conclusion that “material” disciplinary records necessarily exist as to one or more of the agent-witnesses. Dkt. No. 21. Second, and relatedly, the Government's response strongly supports the conclusion that the prosecutor assigned to this case followed the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policy for identifying and disclosing material evidence related to its agent-witnesses. Dkt. No. 49 at 9–13.

The upshot of this DOJ policy is that prosecutors begin by making a formal request to the witness's agency, but they do not rely solely on what—if anything—comes back in response to that formal request (although CBP, a component of DHS, does maintain an appropriate written policy governing disclosure). Instead, the Government takes a second step: the prosecutor makes his own inquiry directly to each of his agent-witnesses about “any on-duty or off-duty potential impeachment information.” Dkt. No. 49 at 12. If this inquiry results in the disclosure of any potential impeachment information, the prosecutor is obligated to take appropriate action. Id.

The Government has represented that it understands its obligations under Brady and Giglio and has complied with DOJ policy. The Government has also represented that it has inquired directly of each agent-witness. These inquiries have recently led the Government to disclose Giglio materials to the defense. Dkt. Nos. 59, 65. Absent some good reason to think otherwise, these representations—made by an officer of the court—would be a sufficient basis on which to deny defendant's motion to compel discovery in its entirety.²

However, the precise nature of the Government's Giglio disclosures—which concern social media activity touching on the subject matter of this prosecution, including membership (and perhaps participation) in a Facebook group that later became the subject of a Congressional investigation—lead the Court to conclude that caution is warranted with respect to three of the Government's agent-witnesses. Cf. United States v. Bernal-Sanchez, 2023 WL 7179469, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023); see also Dkt. Nos. 56, 59, 65.

The need for caution is particularly acute in this case, which will hinge almost entirely on issues of credibility. Thus, based on the available record, including what has been disclosed so far, the Court directs the Government to submit for in camera review the personnel files of the agent-witnesses who are the subject of the Giglio disclosures. See, e.g., United States v. Frizzell, 2023 WL 4033292, at *1 (D. Vt. June 15, 2023) (requiring same disclosure for in camera review with respect to § 111 prosecution). The Court will review the material in camera to determine whether it might include any discoverable material. Cf. Leung, 40 F.3d at 583 (“[T]he purpose of in camera inspection is to supplement the Government's assessment of materiality with the impartial view provided by the trial judge.”). Accordingly, defendant's motion to compel will be granted in part and denied in part.

IV. CONCLUSION

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that

1. Defendant's motion to compel discovery (Dkt. No. 21) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and

2. The Government shall submit the above-referenced personnel files for in camera review no later than 12:00 p.m. on Friday, February 13, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF headers.

2.   In reply, defendant contends that CBP and/or DHS are no longer entitled to a presumption that these agencies followed policy in responding to the prosecutor's request. Dkt. No. 56. Defendant's reply does not mention the second step in the DOJ policy, i.e., that the prosecutor inquired directly of the agent-witnesses. See id.

Anthony Brindisi, United States District Judge: