UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL (2025)

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 21, 2023, the Government filed a criminal complaint against Defendant Kwahpreme Mitchell (“Defendant”) alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Dkt. No. 1. On March 21, 2024, Defendant was charged by indictment on seven counts, including two counts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime), one count pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(1) (possession of firearms by a prohibited person), one count pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (receipt and possession of stolen firearms), one count pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) (conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance), and two counts pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (distribution of a controlled substance). Dkt. No. 26. At the arraignment, Defendant entered a not guilty plea on all counts. Dkt. No. 31. On December 18, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements and physical evidence. Dkt. No. 43 (“Motion”). The Government filed a response on February 10, 2025. Dkt. No. 50.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court held a suppression hearing on April 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 62. At the hearing, the Government called as witnesses New York State Police (“NYSP”) Senior Investigator Justin Mootz (“Investigator Mootz”), retired NYSP Trooper Jason Miller (“Trooper Miller”), and ATF Special Agent Young Choi. Defendant called no witnesses. After considering the evidence offered at the hearing and submitted with the parties’ briefing, as well as the credibility of the witnesses, the Court makes the following findings of fact.

On October 21, 2022, Jonathan Combs and Martin Taft stole 31 firearms from Calamity Jane's Firearms and Fine Shoes (“Calamity Jane's”), a Federal Firearms Licensee (“FFL”) located in Hudson Falls, New York. See Dkt. Nos. 50-15, 50-16 (plea agreements). According to Investigator Mootz's testimony, an extensive joint investigation between the NYSP, multiple sheriffs’ offices, and federal agencies followed suit. Given the size of the investigation, law enforcement established a “lead desk” which served as a repository for all the investigative leads identified by the various law enforcement agencies involved. From this repository, a “lead sheet” was created to assist officers in the field. See also Dkt. No. 50-25 at ¶ 14 & n.1; Dkt. No. 50-18.

NYSP Senior Investigator Justin Mootz was assigned to the investigation and quickly identified an individual (“Individual-1”) who rented a U-Haul pickup that was used in the commission of the burglary. See Dkt. No. 50-25 at ¶ 6. In a sworn statement and recorded interview, Individual-1 attested to accompanying her fiancé, Jonathan Combs, to Calamity Jane's a week before the burglary, and that after leaving Calamity Jane's, Combs removed what appeared to be a short shotgun from his pants. See Dkt. No. 50-13 at 1.¹ Individual-1 also asserted that Combs then called an individual called “Dread,” who Individual-1 described as a large black male with dreadlocks, and that Dread told Combs to bring him the shotgun in exchange for “something.” Id.; Dkt. No. 50-12 at 02:32:44. Individual-1 also attested to the fact that “Dread” typically stayed at a specific Best Western Hotel in Lake George, New York (the “Best Western”), and that he liked to stay on the ground floor in the room closest to the vehicle exit of the hotel on the side that faced an outdoor pool. Id.; Dkt. No. 50-25 at ¶ 12. Individual-1 and Combs proceeded to meet Dread at the Best Western, and Dread gave Combs crack cocaine in exchange for the shotgun. Id. at 1-2. After this exchange, Combs expressed a desire to rob Calamity Jane's again. Id. at 2. On October 21, 2022, the day of the Calamity Jane's burglary, Individual-1 explained that Combs and Martin Taft left the residence she was staying at with Combs, that Combs later called Individual-1 and affirmed that “he got what he went for[,]” and that Combs asked her to drive him to Hudson Falls, New York. Id. While Individual-1 was later driving Combs to the requested location, Combs contacted Dread and told him to meet him at the Stewart's Shops parking lot near Dix Avenue in Hudson Falls because Combs “wanted some of them back.” Id. Upon arriving at the described location, Combs retrieved a bag from Dread, who had arrived in a silver sport utility vehicle. Id. Individual-1 suggested the bag contained firearms.

After interviewing Individual-1, law enforcement officers with the joint investigation went to Calamity Jane's, interviewed employees, and reviewed video surveillance from October 15, 2022, the day Individual-1 attested to visiting the store with Combs. See Dkt. No. 50-14 at ¶¶ 5-7. Video surveillance, exhibited during the suppression hearing, depicted Combs removing a shotgun from a display rack and hiding it in his pants, corroborating a portion of Individual-1's sworn statement. Id.

On the same day, Investigator Mootz went to the Best Western, spoke with a hotel clerk, and confirmed that an individual listed as “Kwah Mitchell” recently rented a room in the area described by Individual-1. Dkt. No. 50-25 at ¶ 12. The hotel clerk also stated that the man renting the room in question was a black male with dreadlocks, matching the description of Dread given by Individual-1. Id. at ¶ 12. The hotel clerk gave Investigator Mootz a guest list from around the time Dread stayed at the hotel. Id. at ¶ 13. Investigator Mootz then informed an NYSP officer on the investigation of his findings and told the officer to “[r]un all info on Kwah Mitchell.” See Dkt. No. 50-10. As a result, the lead sheet for the investigation was updated to include the following information: “Attempt to locate Kwahpreme Mitchell. His last known address is [redacted], in Watervliet.” See Dkt. No. 50-19.

Two days later, on October 24, 2022, the Best Western hotel clerk followed up with Investigator Mootz by sending a text message containing a photo taken from the hotel's surveillance footage. The footage depicted what the hotel clerk believed to be Kwah Mitchell's car, and the vehicle's license plate number was visible. See Dkt. Nos. 50-8, 50-9. Investigator Mootz forwarded the car's information to the lead desk, and the lead sheet was later updated to include the following information: “Information was developed from an employee at the Best Western ․ Lake George, NY ․ that Kwahpreme Mitchell had been operating a 2022 Ford Edge with CT registration BE10219. That vehicle was observed in the Home2Suites parking lot. Conduct surveillance and detain Kwahpreme Mitchell if he comes out to the vehicle.” See Dkt. No. 50-17.

At around 3:40 p.m. that same day, Investigator Mootz went to the vicinity of the Home2Suites described in the lead sheet along with other law enforcement officers involved in the investigation. See Dkt. No. 50-25 at ¶ 18. Investigator Mootz conducted surveillance and observed a black male with dreadlocks exit the Home2Suites and enter the car depicted in the Best Western surveillance footage. Id. Investigator Mootz then observed the car drive towards the parking lot's exit toward Aviation Road. Before exiting the parking lot, the car was stopped by New York State Trooper Jason Miller and Warren County Sheriff's Office Deputy Sheriff Christopher Perilli. Id.

According to his testimony, earlier that day, Trooper Miller was directed by either Senior Investigator Bill Shea or Investigator Mootz to locate the vehicle in question. Trooper Miller was told the vehicle was related to the Calamity Jane's burglary. In response to the directive, Trooper Miller began searching hotels in the Queensbury, New York area because, in his experience, he had made numerous arrests at such hotels. Eventually, either Investigator Mootz or Senior Investigator Shea informed Trooper Miller that the vehicle was in the parking lot of the Home2Suites in Queensbury, and Investigator Mootz directed Trooper Miller to pull the vehicle over. At approximately 3:41 p.m., Trooper Miller activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle with assistance from Deputy Sheriff Perilli, who was with him. After approaching with weapons drawn and handcuffing the driver, Trooper Miller confirmed the driver was Kwahpreme Mitchell by examining his identification card. See Dkt. No. 50-1 at 15:42:05-15:43:51. Shortly after Trooper Miller stopped the vehicle, Investigator Mootz and Investigator Mike Cote, who had been surveilling the vehicle, approached and joined Trooper Miller and Deputy Sheriff Perilli.

Upon arrival at the barracks after his arrest, Defendant was handcuffed to a bench and left alone for approximately 15 minutes. See Dkt. No. 50-2 at 16:15:33-16:31:29. At 4:31 p.m., approximately 50 minutes after Defendant was initially stopped while exiting the Home2Suites, Defendant was taken to an interview room and had his handcuffs removed. Id. at 16:31:30. Investigator Mootz read Defendant his Miranda rights, and Defendant confirmed that he understood those rights by saying “mm-hmm” and nodding his head up and down. See Dkt. No. 50-3 at 16:35:21-16:36:05. Defendant immediately began to answer questions posed by Investigator Mootz, and later, Investigator Cote, who was also in the room. Id. About an hour and a half later, Defendant expressed that he was talking to the police “willingly” and that he “could have just said give me my lawyer and this conversation would have been over.” Id. at 17:56:40-17:56:50. Approximately 10 minutes later, Defendant again reaffirmed his understanding that he could have requested a lawyer by stating that he “wouldn't be sitting [t]here talking to [Investigator Cote] if [he] knew something” and that if he knew something, he “would've said lawyer” but instead was “sitting here having a conversation with [Investigator Cote].” Id. at 18:09:16-18:09:36.

Investigators interviewed Defendant in the interview room from about 4:36 pm to 6:17 p.m., with two breaks lasting approximately seven and five minutes. Id. at 16:36:00-18:17:20. At 6:17 p.m., investigators moved the interview to the garage, in order to afford Defendant the opportunity to smoke. Id. at 18:16:45-18:17:20.² Defendant was handcuffed again. Id. The investigators continued to interview Defendant in the garage from 6:17 p.m. to 10:25 p.m. See generally Dkt. No. 50-4. Approximately thirty minutes after moving to the garage, at 6:54 p.m., Defendant stated that he knew where the stolen firearms were located. Id. at 18:54:52-18:56:00. However, Defendant did not immediately divulge their location, and instead, offered to retrieve the firearms for the officers. Id. at 19:00:06-19:08:16. The investigators refused this offer. Id. For approximately another hour, Defendant continued to make statements regarding the number of stolen firearms and his exchange of controlled substances for the stolen firearms, yet refused to disclose their exact whereabouts. Id. at 19:08:16 to 20:19:25. Eventually, Defendant and the investigators agreed to have Defendant call someone in a house where the firearms were purportedly located and ask them to place the firearms where law enforcement could retrieve them without risking harm to the people inside the house. See id. at 20:51:33 to 20:51:51. Over the course of the garage portion of the interview, Defendant was again offered a break, id. at 20:19:00-20:23:23. Defendant also reiterated his understanding that he had a right to a lawyer, stating first that he “could have just said I need my lawyer ․ and we wouldn't have had this talk[,]” id. at 20:16:04-20:16:18, and then, twenty minutes later, stating, “I almost said lawyer a couple of times, but [Investigator Mootz] kept it all the way above for me[,]” id. at 20:36:37 to 20:36:53. Throughout the interview, Defendant was offered water repeatedly. See Dkt. No. 50-3 at 16:36:55, 17:22:34, and 18:16:46. He was also given pizza and provided with access to the bathroom. See Dkt. No. 50-4 at 19:12:32-19:14:45, 19:38:26, 21:33:18, and 22:25:13.

After Defendant divulged the location of the firearms and formulated a plan to retrieve them, the investigators travelled to the home where the firearms were located and successfully retrieved them from outside the house. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 10-11. Defendant was then returned to the barracks and transported to a local jail to be arraigned on state charges. See Dkt. No. 50-6 at 3:07:55-3:27:51.

III. STANDARD

A defendant may move pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the suppression of evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h). “It is well established that the burden of production and persuasion generally rest upon the movant in a suppression hearing.” United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). In this district, a defendant can satisfy his or her burden by filing “moving papers accompanied by an affidavit, based upon personal knowledge, setting forth facts which, if proven true, would entitle him to relief.” United States v. Miller, 382 F. Supp. 2d 350, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted). “Once the movant establishes some basis for the suppression motion, for example a search or seizure conducted without a warrant, the burden of proof shifts to the Government.” United States v. Murphy, 778 F. Supp. 2d 237, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd, 703 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing, inter alia, Arboleda, 633 F.2d at 989). “The Government then carries the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to suppress “statements made to law enforcement officers, and to suppress physical evidence seized as a result of the statements[.]” Dkt. No. 43-3 at 4. In support of suppression, Defendant argues that the initial stop of his vehicle and arrest were conducted without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, thus tainting his subsequent inculpatory statements regarding the location of the firearms. Id. at 7-8, 10-11. Defendant also argues that the subsequent interrogation by police coerced him into admitting his knowledge of the location of the firearms because “the administration of Miranda [rights] was perfunctory, and so slipshod as to render the warnings meaningless.” Id. at 9. In response, the Government first argues that the initial stop and arrest of Defendant was conducted with at least reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause under the collective knowledge doctrine. Dkt. No. 50 at 20-25. The Government also argues that the administration of Defendant's Miranda rights was satisfactory, and that Defendant's inculpatory statements were not coerced. Id. at 27-34. Finally, the Government argues that even if the initial stop and arrest lacked legal justification, Defendant's inculpatory statements were sufficiently attenuated from the allegedly unlawful conduct to rid the statements of the taint of illegality. Id. at 25-26.

After a thorough review of the record and the evidence presented at the hearing, the Court denies Defendant's Motion and holds that the relevant inculpatory statements were voluntary, the initial stop and arrest were legal, and regardless, the inculpatory statements were sufficiently attenuated from the allegedly unlawful stop and arrest.

A. Voluntary Inculpatory Statements

As a preliminary step, the Court must assess whether Defendant's inculpatory statements were given voluntarily. “Challenges to the voluntariness of a confession are based on two overlapping constitutional provisions: (1) due process protections under the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment, and (2) the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” United States v. Mendonca, 88 F.4th 144, 163 (2d Cir. 2023) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000)). Courts do not distinguish between whether a statement is “compelled,” which implicates the self-incrimination clause, and whether a statement is “involuntary,” which arguably implicates the due process clause. Id. (citing United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 82-83 n.84 (2d Cir. 2017)). Instead, the terms are used “interchangeably[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Broadly, courts attempt to assess whether the disputed statements are “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception[.]” Id. (quoting United States v. Plugh, 648 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011)). Practically, courts “look at the totality of circumstances surrounding a Miranda waiver and any subsequent statements to determine knowledge and voluntariness.” United States v. Taylor, 745 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 2014). “Those circumstances generally fall into three categories: ‘(1) the characteristics of the accused, (2) the conditions of interrogation, and (3) the conduct of law enforcement officials.’ ” Mendonca, 88 F.4th at 164 (quoting United States v. Haak, 884 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2018)). Here, each of these factors, and subsequent statements made by Defendant, decisively weigh in favor of finding the statements were voluntary.

First, the characteristics of the accused strongly suggest that he comprehended and voluntarily waived his rights prior to making the disputed inculpatory statements. Specifically, the Court must consider Defendant's “experience and background, together with the suspect's youth and lack of education or intelligence.” U.S. v. Zuber, No. 2:12–cr–00045–wks, 2013 WL 3873178, at *7 (D. Vt. July 25, 2013) (quoting Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1988)). At the time of the incident in question, Defendant was 31 years old and was a high school graduate. Dkt. No. 9 at 1. There is no indication that Defendant lacked the education or intelligence necessary to comprehend his rights. Moreover, Defendant was not “a newcomer to the law.” United States v. Hall, 724 F.2d 1055, 1059 (2d Cir. 1983). The record reveals Defendant has been arrested seven times prior to the instant offense and has received one felony conviction and several misdemeanor convictions. See Dkt. No. 9 at 3-6. Therefore, Defendant's individual characteristics provide no basis for finding the statements were involuntary.

Second, the conditions of the interrogation provide no reason to find the statements were involuntary. Law enforcement provided Defendant with the opportunity to eat pizza, see Dkt. No. 50-4 at 19:38:26, 21:33:18, drink water, see Dkt. No. 50-3 at 16:36:55, 17:22:34, 18:16:46, take bathroom breaks, see Dkt. No. 50-4 at 19:12:32-19:14:45, 22:25:13, and smoke cigarettes, id. at 18:15:03, 18:34:28, 21:12:20. While Defendant spent roughly six and a half hours with the interviewers, the length of the interview alone is not inherently coercive where, as here, no claim of fatigue is made. See United States ex rel. Daniel v. Wilkins, 292 F.2d 348, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding a confession voluntary after approximately ten hours of almost continuous questioning where no claim of fatigue was made); United States v. Guzman, 11 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (absent an expressed desire to take a break or end the interview, the Court could not “conclude that continuing the interview until the morning offended due process or deprived [the defendant] of his free will.”). Moreover, despite Defendant's assertion that he made the inculpatory statements only after “hours of interrogation,” see Dkt. No. 43-3 at 9, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant admitted to knowing where several of the firearms were located about two hours into the interview. Dkt. No. 53-4 at 18:58:40 to 19:02:22. The majority of Defendant's interview took place after his first inculpatory statements. At that point, after Defendant provided law enforcement with confirmation that he held information that was crucial to the investigation, the officers continued to speak with him to obtain the location of the firearms on terms agreeable to Defendant.

Third, the Court finds that the law enforcement officers’ conduct does not provide a basis for finding the statements were involuntary. The Court assesses the officers’ conduct first in reading the Miranda rights, and second, in conducting the remainder of the interrogation. As to the reading of the Miranda rights, “the law does not require either an express or oral waiver [of Miranda rights], nor does it require police officers to ask a suspect if he understands his rights and wants to waive them.” United States v. McMullen, 5:13-CR-0472 (GTS), 2014 WL 12652129, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2014) (quoting United States v. Fields, 10-CR-0227, 2012 WL 3985161, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 2012)). Ultimately, courts “review the warnings not for whether they adhered to a certain form, but for their substance” and “must ascertain if [Defendant] had his Miranda rights brought home to him in an intelligible fashion.” United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1991). Defendant contends Investigator Mootz read his Miranda rights in a “perfunctory” manner and alleges he “raced through the words, hardly pausing between sentences, and did not give [Defendant] the chance to reflect or even to respond.” Dkt. No. 43-3 at 9. The Court acknowledges that the Miranda rights were delivered quickly. But Defendant's contention that he was not provided an opportunity to respond to the reading of his Miranda rights is directly contradicted by the video evidence, in which Defendant confirms his understanding both vocally and by nodding. Dkt. No. 50-3 at 16:35:42 to 16:36:07. Thus, the Court finds the initial reading of the Miranda rights fails to support a claim of involuntariness. See United States v. Green, 20-00110(FPG)(JJM), 2021 WL 2367047, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021) (“Notwithstanding the hurried fashion in which defendant's Miranda rights were administered, there is no claim that the rights read to defendant were incomplete, and there is nothing before [the Court] to suggest that they were not understood by defendant.”). Defendant also notes that the officers failed to remind him of his Miranda rights throughout the interview, but “[p]olice are not required to rewarn suspects from time to time.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); see also United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that valid Miranda warnings given earlier in the evening had dissipated by the time defendant made his statements).

As to the remainder of the interrogation, despite Defendant's contention to the contrary, see Dkt. No. 43-2 at ¶ 5, the Court finds that Defendant was not bullied or cajoled. Throughout the interview, law enforcement worked with Defendant to arrive at a plan to retrieve the firearms in question in a manner that was acceptable to Defendant. See Dkt. No. 50-4 at 19:08:16 to 20:19:25. Indeed, the evidence on the record reveals that Defendant expressed that he “appreciate[d]” Investigator Mootz at the end of the interview, and that the overall tenor of the interview was respectful. Dkt. No. 50-6 at 3:07:55-3:08:09. During the hearing, Defendant also pointed out that early in the interview, Investigator Mootz indicated he was offering a quid pro quo to Defendant, which, in his words, meant, “[y]ou help me and I'm willing to help you.” See Dkt. No. 50-3 at 16:52:51-16:53:23. Such an offer, Defendant contends, is inherently coercive. But the Second Circuit has repeatedly held that such a statement, in the absence of a more specific, unfulfillable promise, is not coercive. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 630 Fed. Appx. 56, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2015) (“it is well established that promises of leniency, without more, do not render a confession involuntary”); United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1995) (“a confession is not involuntary merely because the suspect was promised leniency if he cooperated with law enforcement officials” (citation omitted)); United States v. Bye, 919 F.2d 6, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding the “mere mention” of “the benefits derived from cooperation” does not “convert an otherwise proper encounter ․ into a coercive and overbearing experience”). Therefore, the Court finds that law enforcement's conduct during the interview weighs in favor of finding that Defendant's inculpatory statements and waiver of rights were voluntary.

Finally, the Court finds Defendant's own statements during the interview strongly weigh in favor of finding that his admissions were voluntary. Defendant avers that he “did not realize that [he] could have an attorney present.” Dkt. No. 43-2 at ¶ 5. But several points in the recorded interview confirm the opposite. Toward the beginning of the interview, Defendant told the officers, in sum and substance, that he “could have just said ‘give me my lawyer’ and this conversation would have been over[.]” Dkt. No. 50-3 at 17:56:40-17:56:49. Later, but before moving to the garage and making the disputed inculpatory statements, Defendant also told Investigator Cote that he had “been through this before” and that he “would have said ‘lawyer’ ” but instead he was “sitting here having a conversation with [Investigator Cote].” Id. at 18:09:22-18:09:35. After moving to the garage, Defendant stated that he “could have just said ‘I need my lawyer’ ․ and we wouldn't have had this talk[.]” Dkt. No. 50-4 at 20:16:04-20:16:18. Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, Defendant told the interviewing officers that “I almost said lawyer a couple of times, but [Investigator Mootz] kept it all the way above for me[.]” Id. at 20:36:44-20:36:53. The video evidence reveals that Defendant reaffirmed his awareness of his right to an attorney at least four times over the course of the interview.

In total, the characteristics of Defendant, the conditions of the interrogation, the conduct of the law enforcement officers present, and Defendant's statements throughout the interrogation all suggest that the inculpatory statements and the waiving of Defendant's rights were voluntary. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's statements were in fact voluntary.

B. Lawfulness of the Stop and Arrest

Having found that the statements were voluntary, the Court must move on to assess whether the statements should nevertheless be excluded under the exclusionary rule. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (“although a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found ‘voluntary’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, this type of ‘voluntariness’ is merely a ‘threshold requirement’ ” (citation omitted)). “To safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court created ‘an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.’ ” United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009)). Here, Defendant argues that the initial stop of his vehicle and his arrest were unlawful because Trooper Miller lacked reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop and probable cause to make the ultimate arrest. See Dkt. No. 43-3 at 4, 7-11.³ In response, the Government argues that the collective knowledge doctrine applies, and therefore, the knowledge of other law enforcement officers involved in the Calamity Jane's investigation should be imputed to Trooper Miller for purposes of assessing the lawfulness of the stop and arrest. See Dkt. No. 50 at 18-25. The Court agrees with the Government and finds that the stop and arrest were lawful.

The Government must demonstrate that probable cause existed to justify Defendant's arrest.⁴ “[P]robable cause for arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Cruz, 834 F.2d at 50 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “While probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion of wrongdoing, its focus is on probabilities, not hard certainties.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In light of Trooper Miller's apparently limited knowledge of the findings of the the Calamity Jane's investigation, to establish probable cause for Defendant's arrest, the Government points to the collective knowledge doctrine. The collective knowledge applies “where law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation” and permits the Court to find that “the knowledge of one [officer] is presumed shared by all.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 n.5, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983)). In order for the doctrine to apply, “at some point along the line, some law enforcement official—or perhaps some agglomeration of such officials—involved must possess sufficient information to permit the conclusion that a search or arrest is justified.” United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2001). Put differently, “an arrest or search is permissible where the actual arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but sufficient information to justify the arrest or search was known by other law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation.” Id. at 135; see also Crawford v. City of New York, 477 Fed. Appx. 777, 779 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (“If one officer in a police department has knowledge of facts that establish probable cause to arrest a suspect, the suspect suffers no constitutional deprivation if he is arrested by a different officer who lacks such knowledge.”).

Here, the Calamity Jane's investigation revealed several facts which establish probable cause prior to Defendant's stop and arrest. See generally Dkt. No. 50 at 22-23. First, law enforcement obtained an eyewitness account tying an individual matching Defendant's description to the exchange of a firearm burglarized from Calamity Jane's with controlled substances. The eyewitness provided not only a description of Defendant, but also his car and his preferred places to stay in the vicinity of the burglary. Second, various details in the eyewitness's story were corroborated by investigators’ review of surveillance footage from Calamity Jane's and investigators’ in-person observation of Defendant as he approached his vehicle on October 24, 2022. Third, law enforcement confirmed that an individual named “Kwah Mitchell,” who matched the eyewitness's description, had recently stayed in a hotel room identified by the eyewitness. Fourth, Defendant was arrested while driving a car which both aligned with the general description given by the eyewitness and matched the exact license plate number shown in surveillance footage provided by the hotel. See Dkt. Nos. 50-8, 50-9. Assessing these cumulative facts, the Court has no difficulty in determining that members of the Calamity Jane's investigation had probable cause to arrest Defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 25 F.4th 123, 137 (2d Cir. 2022) (finding that information from an eyewitness provides law enforcement with “not simply reasonable suspicion, but probable cause of commission”); United States ex rel. La Belle v. La Vallee, 517 F.2d 750, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding witness's description of assailant and car, including a license plate number, provided police with probable cause); Ward v. New York City Police Dep't, No. 99-7011, 1999 WL 710119, at *2 (2d Cir. Sep. 2, 1999) (finding probable cause based on eyewitness reports of similar car description and an “almost identical” license plate number); United States v. Zimmerman, 86 F. Supp. 3d 124, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding probable cause based on eyewitness's statement and corroboration); Peterson v. Saraceni, 95 Civ. 2624, 1997 WL 409527, at *4 (D. Conn. July 16, 1997) (probable cause established by witness attesting to car description and the first three numbers on a license plate).

The Court also finds that the collective knowledge doctrine imbues Trooper Miller's actions with probable cause. According to Trooper Miller and Investigator Mootz's testimony, prior to locating and stopping Defendant in his vehicle, Trooper Miller was given a description of Defendant's car and its license plate number and was told to stop the vehicle by Investigator Mootz. That Trooper Miller did not know the identity of the driver of the vehicle does not prevent a finding of probable cause. Investigator Mootz and other members of the Calamity Jane's investigation had probable cause to believe that the vehicle's driver was Defendant, and that he had committed a crime in relation to the burglary. Trooper Miller was acting at the direction of Investigator Mootz when he stopped Defendant. As a result, information known to other officers involved in the investigation “is presumed shared by” Trooper Miller, even if the totality of that information was not conveyed. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 772 n.5, 103 S.Ct. 3319; see also United States v. Santa, 180 F.3d 20, 28 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that knowledge is imputed so long as officers are “working on the same case”). Here, because many law enforcement officers “ha[d] knowledge of facts that establish[ed] probable cause to arrest [Defendant], [Defendant] suffer[ed] no constitutional deprivation [merely because] he [was] arrested by a different officer who lack[ed] such knowledge.” Crawford, 477 Fed. Appx. at 779 n.1. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's stop and arrest were lawful. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 342 F. Supp. 3d 247, 258-62 (D. Conn. 2018) (finding that where “the surveillance team had reasonable suspicion to stop [a car] ․ their knowledge is imputed to the officers who conducted the investigatory stop” even though the officers “were not aware of the reason for the stop or the identity of the driver”); United States v. Gomez, 199 F. Supp. 3d 728, 743 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding investigators’ knowledge could be imputed to an arresting officer who “had not been informed of the details” of an investigation).⁵

C. Attenuation of the Inculpatory Statements

Finally, even if Defendant's stop and arrest were unlawful, the Court finds that the inculpatory statements were sufficiently attenuated from the allegedly unconstitutional stop and arrest of Defendant to rid the voluntary statements of the taint of illegality. “While it is true that typically,” the exclusionary rule bars unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal trial, “that rule has exceptions.” See United States v. Walker, 965 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2020). The attenuation doctrine, one such exception, provides that “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” Id. (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As articulated by the Supreme Court and adopted by the Second Circuit, the attenuation doctrine turns on four factors where the defendant is in custody: “(1) the giving of Miranda warnings, (2) the ‘temporal proximity’ of the [unlawful conduct] and the alleged consent, (3) ‘the presence of intervening circumstances,’ and (4) ‘the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’ ” United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The first factor weighs in favor of admitting the inculpatory statements. Here, as discussed above, Investigator Mootz read Defendant his Miranda rights from a preprinted card at approximately 4:35 p.m., and Defendant confirmed that he understood those rights. See Dkt. No. 50-3 at 16:35:21-16:36:05. Indeed, Defendant repeatedly, and without prompting, confirmed that he understood he had a right to counsel and a right to remain silent throughout the duration of his interview. See id. at 17:56:40-17:56:50, 18:09:16-18:09:36; Dkt. No. 50-4 at 20:16:04-20:16:18, 20:36:37-20:36:53. However, the Court's inquiry does not end there. Miranda warnings, alone, are insufficient to break the causal chain between an illegal arrest and subsequent inculpatory statements. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); see also United States v. Marchese, 966 F. Supp. 2d 223, 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). Therefore, the Court assesses the remaining factors.

The second factor, temporal proximity, does not weigh decisively in either direction. Here, approximately three-and-a-half hours passed between Trooper Miller's allegedly unlawful stop and the first of Defendant's inculpatory statements. Dkt. No. 50-4 at 18:54:52.⁶ The Supreme Court has found that two hours between an unconstitutional arrest and an admission was not a sufficient time lapse to support attenuation. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254. It appears that the Second Circuit has yet to draw a fine line, though it has held that a lapse of five hours weighs in favor of attenuation. See Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 522 (2d Cir. 2006). Other courts in this Circuit have held that a gap of three hours between the unlawful conduct and the inculpatory evidence weighs in favor of attenuation, though such cases dealt with factors which are not present before this Court. See United States v. Ullah, No. 02 CR. 899(JKF), 2003 WL 1396300, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2003) (finding a period of three hours, along with the fact that the witness was no longer under arrest, weighed against suppression of inculpatory statements); United States v. Delgado, 797 F. Supp. 213, 222 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that “nearly three hours had passed between the beginning of the unlawful arrest and the time the defendant made and signed [an inculpatory statement]” in finding that the statement should not be suppressed but also explaining that “the nature of a written statement” was important to its determination). Courts in other circuits have similarly struggled to draw a bright line. See United States v. Thomas, CR No. 14-2209 JCH, 2015 WL 13667409, at *10 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 21, 2015) (finding a two-to-three hour window insufficient); United States v. Tuggles, 334 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Penn. 1971) (“A confession given three hours after an illegal arrest has been found to be sufficiently free of oppressive circumstances”). In light of this precedent, the Court finds that the period between Defendant's arrest and inculpatory statements alone is insufficient to establish attenuation, but that it does not preclude an ultimate finding of attenuation in light of other factors.

The third factor weighs more clearly in favor of suppression. Here, though Defendant voluntarily told law enforcement the location of firearms burglarized from Calamity Jane's, the Government points to no intervening circumstances which have been recognized to break the causal chain between the allegedly unlawful arrest and those statements. Defendant remained in custody from the moment he was arrested through the time of his initial admission.

However, the fourth and weightiest factor, the “purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,” weighs decisively against suppression. See Walker, 965 F.3d at 188 (calling this factor “particularly significant” (quoting Utah, 579 U.S. at 239, 136 S.Ct. 2056)); Blount v. Keane, No. CV-90-3050, 1991 WL 81930, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 1991) (asserting the fourth factor is the “[m]ost important”). The Second Circuit has noted that purposeful and flagrant misconduct occurs where “(1) the impropriety of the official's misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn up.” Murphy, 703 F.3d at 192 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the stop and arrest of Defendant were not the result of a “suspicionless fishing expedition ‘in the hope that something would turn up’ ” or a “dragnet search.” See Utah, 579 U.S. at 242-43, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982)). Instead, according to their hearing testimony, Trooper Miller's actions were based on information given to him by Investigator Mootz which indicated that the specific car driven by Defendant was involved in a burglary in which approximately 31 firearms were stolen. As discussed above, courts in this Circuit have found facts similar to those relayed to Trooper Miller sufficient to establish probable cause. See, e.g., Patterson, 25 F.4th at 136 (finding reasonable suspicion and probable cause based on witness's description of car, individual, and defendant's whereabouts even without an exact license plate); Ward, 189 F.3d at 462; Peterson, 1997 WL 409527, at *4. Moreover, other officers with independent knowledge of the findings of the Calamity Jane's investigation, including Investigator Mootz, arrived nearly immediately at the scene of the arrest. See Dkt. No. 50-1 at 15:42:22 (showing Investigator Mootz arriving within thirty seconds of the initial stop). Considering these facts, the Court finds that even if the stop and arrest were improper, they were far from “flagrant.”

Weighing each of these factors, the Court finds that Defendant's admissions were sufficiently attenuated from his initial stop and arrest, and therefore, the disputed evidence would be admissible even if the Court had found that the stop and arrest were unlawful.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendant's Motion, Dkt. No. 43, is DENIED; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court's electronic filing system, and not the documents’ internal pagination.

2.   Defendant did not realize he was being recorded during the garage portion of the interview when he made inculpatory statements. See Dkt. No. 50-4 at 19:29:36-19:30:04 (referring to being “off the camera”); see also id. at 22:19:24 to 22:19:38 (saying he did not make admissions earlier because he was previously “on camera”).

3.   At the suppression hearing on April 8, 2025, Defendant also argued that the arrest was unlawful because, despite having access to information which might have enabled officers to successfully obtain a warrant for Defendant's arrest, law enforcement did not seek a warrant prior to arresting Defendant. First, in making such an argument, Defendant has essentially recognized that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant prior to his arrest, undermining Defendant's other arguments on this issue. Second, the lack of a warrant does not, alone, transform a lawful arrest into an unlawful one. Indeed, in the absence of a warrant, the Court must evaluate whether law enforcement nevertheless had probable cause to arrest Defendant. See United States v. Rodriguez, 568 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A warrantless arrest is justified if there is ‘probable cause when the defendant is put under arrest to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.’ ” (quoting United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1987))).

4.   Because the Court finds that law enforcement had probable cause at the time of Defendant's stop and arrest, even before confirming Defendant's identity, the Court need not assess whether the stop was made with reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (“[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause”).

5.   The Court is aware that its determination conflicts with that of the state court which granted suppression in relation to state charges against Defendant. But collateral estoppel does not apply to the state court decision because there, the United States was not a party. See United States v. Jones, 43 F.4th 94, 103 n.7 (2d Cir. 2022).

6.   Defendant's later inculpatory statements, id. at 19:08:16-20:19:25, and the firearms ultimately obtained by police are likely the “fruit” of the first admission, and therefore, this Court assesses temporal proximity in relation to the first admission. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 615 n.7, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (concurrence).

Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge: