UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ (2025)

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Isidro Martinez-Rodriguez (“Defendant”) is charged by indictment with one count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Dkt. No. 11 (“Indictment”). Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Dkt. No. 18 (“Motion”). The Government submitted responsive papers in opposition, Dkt. No. 22, and Defendant submitted reply papers in further support, Dkt. No. 23.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is granted.

II. BACKGROUND 1

Defendant is approximately twenty-seven years old, 5’7” tall, and 190 pounds. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 3 & n.1.² According to the Government, he is from Mexico. Dkt. No. 18-4 at 3. In August 2019, federal immigration authorities in Arizona arrested Defendant for illegal entry and removed him from the United States. Id. Sometime thereafter, Defendant allegedly reentered the country illegally. Dkt. No. 11.

On February 24, 2025, federal agents from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Homeland Security Investigations (“Authorities”) conducted a targeted enforcement operation. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 18-2. Body worn camera footage from the operation shows that at least five federal agents in four vehicles participated. See generally Dkt. Nos. 18-7, 18-8.

Authorities were searching for a man from Guatemala who was present illegally in the United States (“Suspect”). Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 3. Information available to Authorities indicated that the Suspect was approximately eighteen years old, 5’4” tall, and 145 pounds, and that he might be located at 183 North Lake Avenue in Albany. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2; Dkt. No. 18-2.

Agents took up various positions around 183 North Lake Avenue to conduct surveillance. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶¶ 3-4. The Government submits an affidavit from one of these agents, Deportation Officer Charles M. Miller (“Officer Miller”), who states that he was alone in a vehicle parked on a neighboring street “near the corner with North Lake Avenue” and was “approximately 150 feet” from the target address. Id. at ¶ 4. During surveillance, Officer Miller ran registration information on vehicles parked around the target address. Id. ¶ 5. One such vehicle was a Toyota Highlander (“Highlander”) with Connecticut license plates and registration. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7. Officer Miller determined that the Highlander was registered to a woman who was present illegally in the United States. Id. at ¶ 5.

Officer Miller subsequently “noticed a Hispanic male in the area of 183 North Lake Avenue,” although Officer Miller “did not notice from what address he had exited.”³ Id. at ¶ 6. From his vantage point approximately 150 feet away on a neighboring street, Officer Miller “was not able to clearly see the male's face” and “was not convinced it was” the Suspect. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6-7. “Because it was February in Albany, NY and people often wear layers of clothing, sweatshirts and thick coats, [Officer Miller] did not take note of the male's weight.”⁴ Id. at ¶ 6.

The Hispanic male entered the Highlander alone and began driving. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8, 10. Authorities followed the Highlander for more than twenty miles before conducting a “traffic stop” of the vehicle on the right shoulder of Interstate 87 (“Thruway”) in front of the New Baltimore service area at approximately 7:43 a.m. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9; see also Dkt. No. 18-7.

Once Officer Miller arrived at the side of the Highlander and began speaking with the Hispanic male driver, he “could see the driver was not [the Suspect].” Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 10. Officer Miller's body worn camera footage shows a Hispanic male clearly visible through the rolled down window as Officer Miller began speaking with him at approximately 7:43 a.m. Dkt. No. 18-7 at 0:45. Despite the fact that Officer Miller knew that the Hispanic male was not the Suspect, he nonetheless requested and received the driver's license. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 10; see also Dkt. No. 18-7 at 0:52. A second agent began asking the driver what language he spoke and what country he was from, while Officer Miller informed the driver “we're officers with immigration, so this is being recorded.” Dkt. No. 18-7 at 1:00.

In response to questioning by the second agent, the driver indicated that he did not want to answer any questions without a lawyer present. Dkt. No. 18-7 at 1:30. The second agent responded “okay, so you don't want to answer any questions without a lawyer, well, look, so, we need to know what country you're from.” Id. Gesturing at the driver's license, Officer Miller stated “I'm going to just, I'm going to run it.” Id. While the second agent and a third agent continued questioning the driver, Dkt. No. 18-8 at 0:50, Officer Miller took the license back to his vehicle and used it to run record checks, Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 10. Those checks revealed that the Hispanic male driver was Defendant and that Defendant had been previously removed from the United States and was in the country illegally. Id.

At approximately 7:50 a.m., Authorities took Defendant's phone, handcuffed him, and subsequently transported him to a federal facility. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 18-7 at 7:06. In addition to Officer Miller, J. Lyons, Will Torres, Youstina Aziz, and R. Duesler are listed as the arresting agents. Dkt. No. 18-4 at 2.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may move pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the suppression of evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h). “It is well established that the burden of production and persuasion generally rest upon the movant in a suppression hearing.” United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). In this district, a defendant can satisfy his or her burden by filing “moving papers accompanied by an affidavit, based upon personal knowledge, setting forth facts which, if proven true, would entitle him to relief.” United States v. Miller, 382 F. Supp. 2d 350, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted). “Once the movant establishes some basis for the suppression motion, for example a search or seizure conducted without a warrant, the burden of proof shifts to the Government.” United States v. Murphy, 778 F. Supp. 2d 237, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd, 703 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing, inter alia, Arboleda, 633 F.2d at 989). “The Government then carries the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Authorities violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they stopped the vehicle he was driving and then violated his Fifth Amendment rights when they proceeded to question him. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 5-11. As a result, Defendant seeks suppression of “all evidence and statements obtained through the officer's unconstitutional actions (including any post-arrest prints and pedigree information, as well as [Defendant]’s Alien File).” Id. at 2.

A. Fourth Amendment

The parties characterize the investigative stop of Defendant as a “traffic stop.” See, e.g., Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2; Dkt. No. 22 at 9; Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 9.

It is well-established that “[w]hen a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). “Therefore, traffic stops must satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness limitation, which ‘requires that an officer making a traffic stop have probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation or is otherwise engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity.’ ” United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2009)). The reasonable suspicion standard is “not high” and is “less demanding than probable cause.”⁵ United States v. Santillan, 902 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Singletary, 798 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 2015)). That said, “[r]easonable suspicion requires more than an ‘inchoate suspicion or mere hunch.’ ” Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000)). “Reasonable suspicion ‘demands specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, provide detaining officers with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’ ” United States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Singletary, 798 F.3d at 59). “In deciding whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the intrusion, [courts] consider the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Hawkins, 37 F.4th 854, 858 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014)).

The parties further agree that the traffic stop conducted by Authorities was unrelated to any traffic violation. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 8; Dkt. No. 22 at 7. With respect to criminal activity more generally, the parties also largely agree on the information available to Authorities. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 7-8; Dkt. No. 22 at 3-4, 8. For purposes of analyzing reasonable suspicion, the Court accepts the Government's position that “[t]he relevant facts of this case are undisputed.” Dkt. No. 22 at 3. According to the Government:

[Authorities] were seeking a Hispanic male illegally present in the United States at 183 North Lake Avenue and observed the defendant, a Hispanic male, in the area near 183 North Lake Avenue. The defendant then drove away in a vehicle registered in another state to someone who was illegally present in the United States. Thus, there existed reasonable cause to believe the Highlander's driver was either the individual police were seeking or another individual illegally present in the United States.

Id. at 8.

Taking the Government's arguments in reverse order, the second fails as both a factual and legal matter. During surveillance of 183 North Lake Street, Officer Miller determined that “the Highlander was registered to a female who was illegally present in the United States.” Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 5. Officer Miller then observed “a Hispanic male” enter and drive the Highlander. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Simply put, Authorities did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a man if they were looking for a woman.

This straightforward factual analysis is confirmed by the recent Supreme Court authority upon which the Government relies. Dkt. No. 22 at 8. Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 378, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020), “present[ed] the question whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle's license plate and learning that the registered owner ha[d] a revoked driver's license.” As the Court held, “when the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.” Id. Here, Authorities had information negating such an inference. Officer Miller determined that the registered owner of the vehicle was a woman, but observed that the driver of the vehicle was a man. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶¶ 5, 7. The Court thus finds that Authorities did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant based on any potentially unlawful activity by the registered owner. Kansas, 589 U.S. at 386, 140 S.Ct. 1183 (“For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not ‘raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

The Government's first argument—that Authorities were looking for a Hispanic male in the vicinity—fares no better. Dkt. No. 22 at 8. As an initial matter, such an argument is contrary to substantial Second Circuit authority. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 965 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 2020) (“As we have repeatedly said, ‘race, when considered by itself and sometimes even in tandem with other factors, does not generate reasonable suspicion for a stop.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 569-70 (2d Cir. 2005)); Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2018) (“As the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear, stopping and interrogating people based solely on race or ethnicity violates the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975) (because ‘Mexican ancestry ․ alone [does not] justify ․ a reasonable belief that [petitioners] were aliens,’ stopping and detaining a person based solely on Mexican ancestry violates the Fourth Amendment.”)) (alterations in original); Swindle, 407 F.3d at 570 (“Hispanic appearance is, in general, of such little probative value that it may not considered as a relevant factor where particularized or individualized suspicion is required.”) (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); accord United States v. Weaver, 9 F.4th 129, 155 (2d Cir. 2021) (Lohier, J., concurring) (noting that Second Circuit precedent “suggests a simple but important analysis that district courts should undertake when faced with [ ] Fourth Amendment challenges. A court should ask, holding all else equal: ‘Would an officer have reasonable suspicion if the defendant were of a different race?’ If the answer is ‘no,’ the fact that the defendant is, say, African American does not tip the balance of the totality of the circumstances”) (citing United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2016)).

The Court also agrees with Defendant that the Government has “failed to demonstrate articulable facts specific to [him] that establish reasonable suspicion[.]” Dkt. No. 23 at 3. The Second Circuit's analysis of reasonable suspicion in Dancy v. McGinley provides a useful comparison. There, law enforcement officers received a description of a robbery suspect as simply “[t]hin black male, brown jacket.” 843 F.3d at 99. Minutes later, police stopped, and ultimately arrested, two teenagers near the crime scene. Id. at 109 & n.13. As relevant here, the panel observed that one of the teenagers was wearing a jacket with only some “brown patches,” id. at 100, and found that “the remaining description—thin, black, and male—is too vague ․ to justify a stop of anyone meeting it,” id. at 109 (collecting cases).

The Government relies on an even more abbreviated description here—“Hispanic male”—given that Officer Miller “did not take note of the male's weight” from his vantage point approximately 150 feet away on a neighboring street. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶¶ 4, 6; see also Walker, 965 F.3d at 187 (“The use of ‘black male’ and ‘medium-to-dark’ skin tone alone captures a wide swath of individuals. Nor are the other traits, such as glasses, long hair, or facial hair, of which there are numerous types, any more particularized. Even with the combination of these characteristics, we are simply not convinced that the description fits a narrow enough subset of individuals to constitute a specific, articulable fact upon which reasonable suspicion may be based.”) (citation omitted). As for Defendant's presence “in the area near” the specific address where Authorities expected to find another “Hispanic male,” Dkt. No. 22 at 8, “mere presence near someone who somewhat matches a vague description is not a reasonable basis for suspicion,” Dancy, 843 F.3d at 109. See also Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)).

Defendant is thus correct that the Government identifies no specific facts—such as his build, height, hair, clothing, conduct, etc.—that could support of a finding of reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances.⁶ Compare United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 335 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Police did not here stop men simply because they were black, or even because they were coincidentally seen at a location of suspected criminal activity․ Rather, police here stopped the two persons whose race, sex, build, and hair were consistent with an informant's description of the man who had sold him drugs, and who were seen leaving the very premises where the reported drug sale took place and where police had probable cause to think that an easily transportable firearm used in drug trafficking was then located. It is the combination of these circumstances that provided the reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity[.]”) (citations omitted); Walker, 965 F.3d at 185-87 (finding a stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion and reversing district court's denial of motion to suppress where the defendant and “the shooting suspect were medium-to-dark skinned Black males, had similar builds, wore glasses, [ ] had facial hair[,]” “both had long hair[,]” and the defendant was stopped a few blocks away from the crime scene with fifty grams of crack cocaine). Indeed, such “specific facts and articulable facts,” Wallace, 937 F.3d at 138 (quoting Singletary, 798 F.3d at 59), are conspicuously absent from the “relevant facts” upon which the Government relies, Dkt. No. 22 at 3-4, 8.

The Second Circuit's analysis of reasonable suspicion in United States v. Spencer, 646 F. App'x 6 (2d Cir. 2016), is also instructive. The defendant in that case was convicted of, inter alia, illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Id. at 8. As relevant here, the panel agreed with the district court that federal agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle being driven by the defendant. Id. at 8-9. More specifically, the panel found that agents had reasonable suspicion that the defendant “was illegally in the United States,” because of “firsthand review of immigration databases and [the defendant]’s immigration file, which included a picture of [him].” Id. at 8. The panel also found that the agents had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving the gold sedan at issue because agents corroborated a tip that the defendant drove such a vehicle and resided on a particular street. Id. at 8-9. On the day of the stop, agents observed a gold sedan parked in the driveway of a house on that street, saw a man matching the defendant's description exit that house, and saw that man enter the gold sedan and begin driving. Id. at 9. Agents then stopped the sedan. Id. Based on this record, the panel concluded that “agents had a reasonable suspicion both that [the defendant] was driving the [vehicle] at issue, and that he was then engaged in criminal activity[.]” Id. at 8.

Here, in contrast, Authorities had neither reasonable suspicion that Defendant was the Hispanic male driving the Highlander, nor that he was engaged in any criminal activity. As Defendant argues, “[A]uthorities had no idea who he was and admittedly were targeting another individual known to them.” Dkt. No. 23 at 1. Further, from his location approximately 150 feet away on a neighboring street, Officer Miller “did not notice from what address [the Hispanic male] had exited,” “was not able to clearly see the male's face,” “was not convinced it was” the Suspect, and simply observed the male enter a vehicle registered to a woman “around” the target address. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶¶ 4, 6-7; see also Swindle, 407 F.3d at 570 (“[W]e have no difficulty concluding that the officers acted unreasonably in ordering [the defendant] to pull over. [The defendant] was simply a black man in a high-crime area driving a car that the wanted fugitive had previously been seen ‘near.’ As the officers conceded, [the defendant] had not been observed to break any law or do anything else to warrant a stop.”).

Even if Authorities had reasonable suspicion to stop the Highlander, any such suspicion evaporated almost immediately. The parties agree that the stop was not related to any traffic violation. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 8; Dkt. No. 22 at 7. The purpose of the stop was thus, at best, what the Government contends: to determine whether “the Highlander's driver was [ ] the individual police were seeking[.]” Dkt. No. 22 at 8. But Officer Miller's sworn testimony is that once he arrived at the side of the Highlander and began speaking with the Hispanic male driver—and without needing any further investigation—he “could see the driver was not [the Suspect].” Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 10; see also Dkt. No. 18-7 at 0:45. Less than a minute into the stop, then, Authorities no longer had a basis to prolong the seizure of a different Hispanic male. See, e.g., United States v. Lefebvre, 117 F.4th 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2024) (“For an investigatory stop to be conducted in an ‘appropriate manner,’ the stop must be ‘limited to the degree of intrusion necessary to confirm or dispel the reasonable suspicion that justifies the stop in the first place[.]’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Patterson, 25 F.4th 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2022)); Soukaneh v. Andrzejewski, 112 F.4th 107, 124 (2d Cir. 2024) (“It ‘has long been the law than “an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” ’ ”) (quoting Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Having considered the totality of the circumstances, and for of all the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the Government has not carried its burden to establish that reasonable suspicion supported Defendant's seizure, nor that reasonable suspicion supported the extension of that seizure. Hawkins, 37 F.4th at 858; Murphy, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 240.

B. Exclusionary Rule

i. Applicability

“The Fourth Amendment itself contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands; rather, the Supreme Court has establish[ed] an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” United States v. Lauria, 70 F.4th 106, 120 (2d Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009)). “[T]he rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 81 n.75 (2d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). “For this reason, the exclusionary rule applies only if the police have violated the Constitution deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence, or if a constitutional violation is the product of recurring or systemic negligence.” United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198, 211 (2d Cir. 2020) (first citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-40, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011); and then citing Herring, 555 U.S. at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695).

Thus, “[a] determination that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred ․ does not automatically require the suppression of all physical evidence seized or statements derived from that illegal [conduct].” United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2015). Because the rule exacts “substantial social costs” and “almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence,” Lauria, 70 F.4th at 121 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 237, 131 S.Ct. 2419), “exclusion of evidence is properly a court's ‘last resort, not [its] first impulse,’ ” United States v. Maher, 120 F.4th 297, 320 (2d Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 140, 129 S.Ct. 695). As a result, “[p]olice conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” United States v. Jones, 43 F.4th 94, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2022) (first quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695; and then citing In re 650 Fifth Ave., 934 F.3d 147, 162 (2d Cir. 2019)).

Defendant contends that the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights should trigger the exclusionary rule because Authorities’ conduct “was [i] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, and [ii] appears to be part of a nationwide trend or systemic approach by ICE and law enforcement operating with ICE.” Dkt. No. 18-1 at 9. The second argument is unsupported by the current record. Defendant relies exclusively on selected media coverage regarding a handful of “alleged” Fourth Amendment violations nationwide, seemingly in other Districts. Id. at 9. That is too thin a reed for this Court to find that exclusion is appropriate. Smith, 967 F.3d at 212 (finding application of the exclusionary rule unwarranted because, inter alia, the record did not “show systemic or recurring negligence by [the officer] or any of the investigative agencies involved in this case”). Nor has Defendant established that any federal agent involved in the traffic stop had previously been associated with a constitutional violation. Compare Bershchansky, 788 F.3d at 114 (affirming exclusion of evidence following Fourth Amendment violation where, inter alia, the lead agent had also been the lead agent in a prior case in which there had been a Fourth Amendment violation) (citing United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 2012)).

Defendant's first argument, however, is well-supported and compelling. According to Officer Miller, numerous agents were conducting surveillance “in various locations around 183 North Lake Avenue,” on February 24, 2025. Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶¶ 3-4. Yet, as Defendant observes:

[D]espite the amount of personnel involved in this targeted operation, despite being situated from different vantage points, and with Officer Miller [approximately] 150 feet from 183 North Lake [Avenue], no officer observed the location from which [Defendant] exited. No such observations were made despite this being an operation focused on a specific address. Moreover, no one could visually assess whether the person observed met any part of the features known to them about [the Suspect.]

Dkt. No. 23 at 5. Indeed, from his vantage point approximately 150 away, Officer Miller “did not notice from what address [the Hispanic male] had exited,” “was not able to clearly see the male's face,” “was not convinced it was [the Suspect],” and “did not take note of the male's weight.” Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶¶ 4, 6-7. Authorities nonetheless proceeded to follow—for more than twenty miles—and then stop, without reasonable suspicion, a Hispanic male who was approximately forty-five pounds heavier, several inches taller, and nearly a decade older than the Suspect for whom they were searching. Even once they stopped Defendant and “could see” he was not the Suspect, Authorities nonetheless prolonged the seizure. Id. at ¶ 10. The Court finds that this is “the type of ‘conduct that is sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the [price] paid by the justice system.’ ” Bershchansky, 788 F.3d at 114 (quoting United States v. Bershchansky, 958 F. Supp. 2d 354, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).

On the other side of the ledger from the conduct at issue, the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule in this case appear minimal. For one, the Government has not challenged Defendant's estimate that, if convicted, his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines is zero to six months. Dkt. No. 19. And because Defendant has been detained since February 24, 2025, he is already about to enter his sixth month of incarceration. Dkt. No. 4. Further, Defendant is presently subject to an immigration detainer as a removable alien. Dkt. No. 23-1. Whenever his time in federal criminal custody concludes, in all likelihood the Government will seek to deport him. Cf. United States v. Macias, 740 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Although [the defendant] undeniably broke the laws of the United States at some point after his 2000 deportation, he is not guilty of the crime of which he was convicted. We are not too troubled by this seeming oddity. Even though we reverse his criminal conviction, [the defendant] will (again) be subject to deportation.”). Finally, there is no indication that Defendant is dangerous from the nature of the offense charged, the circumstances of his detention (to which he consented), or the Government's submissions to date. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4, 11, 22. For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the “substantial social costs” of suppressing evidence carry little weight in this particular case. Lauria, 70 F.4th at 121 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 237, 131 S.Ct. 2419).

The Government nonetheless argues that, in the final analysis, the deterrent effect of suppression here would be minimal because “employing the exclusionary rule would ‘not affect the ultimate outcome of the charge against’ the defendant.” Dkt. No. 22 at 11 (discussing United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2005)). The Court is unpersuaded. For one, Defendant is correct that the non-binding authority on which the Government relies is based on an interpretation of language from a Supreme Court decision that the Second Circuit has since considered and rejected. Dkt. No. 23 at 8; see also infra Section IV.B.ii. Defendant is also correct that the facts of Navarro-Diaz are quite different than those at bar. Dkt. No. 23 at 9-10.

Ultimately, however, this Court does not understand the relevant deterrence considerations to rise and fall on the prosecution of a single criminal defendant. Allen, 864 F.3d at 81 n.75 (“As the Supreme Court has explained, the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule ‘is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ ”) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. 613); Lauria, 70 F.4th at 121 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in appreciable deterrence.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 141, 129 S.Ct. 695); but see United States v. Nelson, No. 20-cr-353, 2022 WL 18636591, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022). And, even if accepted, the Government's position that suppression will not affect the ultimate outcome of Defendant's prosecution,⁷ suggests a significant reduction of the “substantial social costs” that frequently result from application of the exclusionary rule. Lauria, 70 F.4th at 121 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 237, 131 S.Ct. 2419). Indeed, if a prosecution could successfully continue even after evidence is suppressed, that would eliminate “the serious cost of ‘letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.’ ” United States v. Elder, 805 F. App'x 19, 23 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2010)). And less deterrent benefit is needed to “appreciably outweigh the costs of suppression,” when such costs are reduced or absent. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d at 114. The Government's position thus strengthens the Court's conclusion above regarding the costs of applying the exclusionary rule here.

More significantly, the Court agrees with Defendant that the future deterrent effect of suppression is substantial, given the conduct at issue. See Dkt. No. 23 at 11. “When the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs’ of suppression.” United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419). Given the Court's finding with respect to the Authorities’ violation of the Fourth Amendment, it further finds that “[e]xclusion is proper here ‘to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.’ ” Bershchansky, 788 F.3d at 114 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)).

ii. Suppressibility

“The [exclusionary] rule encompasses both the ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure’ and secondary ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.’ ” United States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223, 231 n.5 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); see also Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The exclusionary rule applies not only to the ‘direct products’ of unconstitutional invasions of defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, but also to the indirect or derivative ‘fruits’ of those invasions.”) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980)).

Defendant argues that “all evidence and statements obtained through the officers’ unconstitutional actions (including any post-arrest prints and pedigree information, as well as [Defendant]’s Alien File)” should be suppressed. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2. The Government responds that identity evidence is simply not suppressible. Dkt. No. 22 at 5-6. As it has done elsewhere, “the Government relies on the Supreme Court's statement in Lopez-Mendoza that the ‘ “body” or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search or interrogation occurred.’ ” Nelson, 2022 WL 18636591, at *9 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984)). Defendant replies that the Second Circuit, as well as other appellate courts, have rejected the Government's interpretation of Lopez-Mendoza. Dkt. No. 23 at 6-8.

As indicated above, the Court agrees. The authority the Government cites, Dkt. No. 22 at 6, makes clear that “[t]he Second Circuit has rejected the Government's line of reasoning,” Nelson, 2022 WL 18636591, at *9. Indeed, there is controlling appellate authority that identity evidence can be suppressed, as well as significant persuasive authority reaching the same conclusion. See Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 646-47 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For the reasons that follow, we join the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in finding that Lopez-Mendoza reaffirmed a long-standing rule of personal jurisdiction; it did not create an evidentiary rule insulating specific pieces of identity evidence from suppression.”); United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Close examination of Lopez-Mendoza itself, as well as other Supreme Court precedent, persuades us that Lopez-Mendoza does not prohibit suppression of evidence of a defendant's identity.”); United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We conclude that Lopez-Mendoza does not prevent the suppression of all identity-related evidence. Rather, Lopez-Mendoza merely reiterates the long-standing rule that a defendant may not challenge a court's jurisdiction over him or her based on an illegal arrest.”); United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We conclude the Lopez-Mendoza’s statements about the suppression of identity only refers to jurisdictional challenges, not to fingerprint evidence challenged in a criminal proceeding.”).

To the extent that the Government's additional arguments regarding particular identity evidence are not foreclosed by such authority, they are unpersuasive. Dkt. No. 22 at 5-6. The relevant inquiry with fingerprints, for example, is not whether police can ever obtain fingerprints without violating the Constitution. Id. Certainly they can. The question is whether fingerprints can be suppressed when they are the fruit of a constitutional violation. And in this particular case, the answer is yes. See, e.g., Crews, 445 U.S. at 476, 100 S.Ct. 1244 (discussing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), wherein “the defendant's identity and connection to the illicit activity were only first discovered through an illegal arrest or search. In that case, the defendant's fingerprints were ordered suppressed as the fruits of an unlawful detention․ Had it not been for [the defendant]’s illegal detention, however, his prints would not have been obtained and he would never have become a suspect”); Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 650 (collecting Supreme Court cases finding fingerprints to be the suppressible fruit of Fourth Amendment violations).

The Government's argument that certain identity records cannot be suppressed is similarly unavailing. Compare Dkt. No. 22 at 6, with United States v. Achana-Suaso, 568 F. App'x 627, 632 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding that defendant's “fingerprints and A-File must be suppressed” as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation, reversing district court's denial of suppression motion, and vacating defendant's illegal reentry conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326); Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1119 (“If the fingerprints are determined to be suppressible it will be because of a determination that the fingerprints were illegally obtained ․ Under such circumstances it seems to us that the A-file is inextricably linked to the fingerprints and if one is a fruit of the poisonous tree (the unconstitutional arrest), then the other is as well.”) (citing, inter alia, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)); United States v. Hernandez-Lopez, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1209-10 (D.N.M. 2010) (finding that Border Patrol agent did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop and granting motion to suppress “all evidence” from the stop, “including [the defendant's] fingerprints, identifying information, and immigration A-file as the fruit of the illegal seizure”).

The Government also has not explained how Authorities obtained any identity evidence independent of their unlawful seizure of Defendant. Dkt. No. 22 at 6.⁸ As discussed earlier, Authorities had no basis separate from the unlawful seizure to suspect Defendant of any wrongdoing. See supra Section IV.A; Crews, 445 U.S. at 476, 100 S.Ct. 1244. The Court finds that the challenged evidence in this case is thus derivative of the unlawful seizure. McKenzie, 13 F.4th at 231 n.5. And such derivative evidence is suppressible. Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 646 (“[T]he exclusionary sanction applies to any ‘fruits’ of a constitutional violation—whether such evidence be tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal search, items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful activity, or confessions or statements of the accused obtained during an illegal arrest and detention.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Crews, 445 U.S. at 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244).

In sum, the Court finds that Authorities violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; that the exclusionary rule applies; and that the challenged evidence is suppressible.⁹ The Motion is granted as a result. United States v. Cabrera, No. 24-cr-02180, 2025 WL 1564872, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025) (“Accordingly, all evidence derived from the illegal stop, including Defendant's statements, agents’ observations, fingerprints, photographs, immigration documents created as a result of information derived by the stop, including the probable cause statement attached to the complaint, the Form I-213, along with Defendant's statements[ ], Agent Perez's memorandum, and immigration documents and files, are suppressed.”).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendant's Motion, Dkt. No. 18, is GRANTED; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court's electronic filing system, and not the documents’ internal pagination.

3.   In his affidavit, Defendant contends that he emerged from a building separated by a small alley from 183 North Lake Avenue sometime after 7:00 a.m. Dkt. No. 18-3 at 1; Dkt. No. 18-6 at ¶ 4.

4.   Body worn camera footage shows Defendant wearing only a hooded sweatshirt, through which his build is apparent. See, e.g., Dkt. No 18-7 at 8:43.

5.   The Government does not argue that it had probable cause to stop Defendant. See generally Dkt. No. 22; see also Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2, 5; Dkt. No. 23 at 3.

6.   Notably, the Government does not challenge Defendant's contention that he is approximately forty-five pounds heavier, several inches taller, nearly a decade older, and has noticeably different hair than the Suspect. Compare Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2-3, with Dkt. No. 22 & Dkt. No. 22-1; see also Swindle, 407 F.3d at 569 (“[W]e are puzzled by the government's assertion that [the defendant] was a man ‘meeting the description of [the suspect].’ On the day in question, as already indicated, [the defendant] was five inches taller—and 70 pounds heavier—than [the suspect]. It appears that the only obvious physical characteristic the men shared was the color of their skin. But courts agree that race ․ does not generate reasonable suspicion for a stop.”) (collecting cases).

7.   Defendant contests this position, Dkt. No. 23 at 10-11, and the Court need not—and does not—resolve the issue in ruling on the Motion.

8.   Besides making a passing reference to a possible independent source, the Government has not argued that any exception to the exclusionary rule applies. United States v. Fiseku, 915 F.3d 863, 869 n.4 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988).

9.   Because the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule can—and in this case does—apply to verbal evidence, see, e.g., Bershchansky, 788 F.3d at 112; Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 646, the Court does not reach the parties’ Fifth Amendment arguments. See also Pretzantzin, 736 F.3d at 649 n.8.

Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge: