UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LEXUS WEAVER (2025)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Lexus Weaver's Motion to Suppress [19] all physical evidence and statements as they were obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Government has responded in opposition to the motion [21]. The Court, having carefully considered the applicable law and the proof and arguments presented at the suppression hearing, is now prepared to rule.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case raises critical issues concerning an individual's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In light of noticeable erosions of constitutional safeguards, the Court finds it imperative to remind the State and its agencies of the importance of adhering to the rule of law.

On March 7, 2024, Starkville Police Officer Garrett Mittan requested a search warrant from Municipal Court Judge Brian Kelley to search Mr. Weaver's residence for evidence of crack cocaine, other controlled substances, fraud and money laundering. In the Underlying Facts and Circumstances supporting his application for the search warrant, Officer Mittan described three controlled purchases made by an unnamed confidential informant (CI):

CI at the direction and surveillance of myself and other law enforcement personnel purchased an undisclosed amount of crack cocaine from Lexus Weaver at [redacted]. Prior to and after each purchase, CI was searched for money and contraband with none being found. CI was under continuous surveillance by law enforcement prior to each purchase, during each purchase, and after each purchase until CI was again searched for money and contraband with none being found.

The reliability of the informant in Officer Mittan's statement is established as follows:

The CI is reliable in that I have previously received information from this informant that has been found factual and accurate. The CI is assisting law enforcement with criminal investigations in return for case consideration for pending criminal charge(s). CI is familiar with the appearance of controlled substances, the way they are sold, transported, and used in that the CI has sold, transported, and used controlled substances in the past.

The remaining portions of Officer Mittan's statement contain more than a page of boilerplate recitations of an officer's general knowledge. They contain no facts otherwise related to Mr. Weaver or the need to search his residence for evidence of fraud or money laundering.

Officer Mittan emailed a copy of the Affidavit for Search Warrant, which included the Underlying Facts and Circumstances, to Judge Kelley for his review. Judge Kelley then initiated a videoconference, apparently not under oath, with Officer Mittan via FaceTime during which he approved the search warrant and instructed Officer Mittan to print “Judge Brian Kelley via FaceTime” on the signature line of the search warrant. This Officer Mittan did.

In the early morning hours of March 8, 2024, nine Starkville Police officers armed with assault rifles announced their presence at Mr. Weaver's residence by deploying a “flash bang” at his front door. They then used a battering ram to burst their way into his home. Following entry, the officers searched the residence and confiscated drugs, firearms, money, and two cell phones. They arrested Mr. Weaver and took him to the Starkville Police Department where he was interviewed by Officer Mittan who read Mr. Weaver his Miranda rights. Skipping the section labeled “Waiver of Rights,” Officer Mittan pointed to the signature line beneath that section and instructed Mr. Weaver, “If you would just sign right there. That's just saying that I read that to you.” The Waiver of Rights paragraph stated:

I (have read) or (had read to me) this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Mr. Weaver signed the form; however, Officer Mittan did not advise Mr. Weaver that his signature constituted a waiver of his Miranda rights.

On September 25, 2024, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Weaver for drug trafficking, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and felon in possession based on the evidence found at his residence. On February 25, 2025, Mr. Weaver moved to suppress the evidence and any statements provided to law enforcement asserting that the evidence was obtained through an illegal search and that he involuntarily waived his Miranda rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When evaluating a motion to suppress evidence, the “defendant normally bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged search or seizure was unconstitutional.” United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005). The court conducts a two-step inquiry when assessing a motion to suppress evidence secured pursuant to a search warrant: “(1) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and (2) whether the warrant was supported by probable cause.” United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1997). If the good-faith exception applies, the court need not address the probable cause inquiry. Id.

The good-faith exception allows the admission of evidence obtained by officers in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on a search warrant, even though the affidavit supporting the warrant lacked probable cause. Cisneros, 112 F.3d at 1278. However, officers may not rely on a warrant that was supported only by a “bare bones affidavit,” or one that is “so deficient in demonstrating probable cause that it renders an officer's belief in its existence completely unreasonable.” Id.

To obtain a search warrant, an officer must present to the magistrate an affidavit supported by underlying facts and circumstances detailing “a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). The issuing magistrate is then tasked with making “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ․ there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238. Conclusory statements that provide the magistrate with virtually no basis for making a judgment regarding probable cause are insufficient. Id. at 239. In other words, a well-written affidavit will contain facts known to the affiant which indicate truthfulness and trustworthiness. An affidavit should tell a story under oath which is believable.

When an affidavit is supported by information provided by a confidential informant, the Fifth Circuit has identified several “indicia of probable cause” which prevent the affidavit from being a bare bones affidavit. These indicators have long since been memorialized in the Fifth Circuit:

[1] whether the informant's statements are against his or her own penal interests, United States v. McWaine, 243 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. McKeever, 5 F.3d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1993),

[2] whether the information has been corroborated by independent investigation or contemporary observations of police, McWaine, 243 F.3d at 874; United States v. Pena–Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 1120, 1130–31 (5th Cir. 1997),

[3] the degree of detail [in] the information provided by the informant, Cisneros, 112 F.3d at 1278–79, and

[4] whether the informant's reliability is corroborated by something other than unsupported conclusions of the affiant. See Barrington, 806 F.2d at 531; accord United States v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 1276, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that an officer's statement in an affidavit that the informant provided reliable information in the past, without more, is an unsupported conclusion which does not demonstrate probable cause).

United States v. Fields, 182 F. Supp. 2d 575, 579 (E.D. Tex. 2002).

ANALYSIS

Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declares the right of every person to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. General searches, or searches that are unsupported by probable cause, are clearly prohibited under the Fourth Amendment:

[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has emphasized not only the right of every person to be free from unreasonable searches, but also the duty entrusted to all United States courts and federal officials to uphold and enforce these rights:

The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.

Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1318 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914)). These minimum standards of due process are guaranteed to even the most egregious among us.

In evaluating Mr. Weaver's motion to suppress, the Court must first consider whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Fifth Circuit precedent has routinely established that evidence obtained by officers in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on a search warrant is admissible, even though the affidavit lacked probable cause. Cisneros, 112 F.3d at 1278. “An officer may rely in good faith on the validity of a warrant so long as the warrant is supported by more than a ‘bare bones affidavit.’ An affidavit is ‘bare bones’ if it so deficient in demonstrating probable cause that it renders an officer's belief in its existence completely unreasonable.” Id. (quoting United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1474 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1996), United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Huerra, 884 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2018).

The inherent juxtaposition between the two above pronouncements confounds this Court. The good-faith exception appears to serve as a catch-all loophole for an officer's failure to consider the contents of the affidavit supporting the warrant when conducting a search. Taken to its outer limits, this exception would excuse an officer's attempt, or lack thereof, to establish sufficient probable cause when that officer himself drafted the affidavit in support of the search warrant and then relied “in good faith” on such warrant. This Court finds it paramount to emphasize the Supreme Court's warning that an officer may not obtain a search warrant based on a bare bones affidavit “and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search,” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.24 (1984), or conduct the search himself based on his own bare bones affidavit. United States v. Barrington, 806 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1986).

That is precisely what occurred in the instant case. Officer Mittan drafted the affidavit which contained the Underlying Facts and Circumstances describing the three controlled purchases of crack cocaine and a boilerplate recitation of his knowledge based on training and experience in narcotics investigations. The affiant's statements of the three controlled purchases made by the informant did not specify the amount of crack cocaine purchased, nor did they indicate that the substances were authenticated through any form of drug testing. Furthermore, Officer Mittan testified at the suppression hearing that he was uncertain whether the substances had been tested at all. Tellingly, the affiant's statements indicated that the “CI was searched for money and contraband with none being found.” The government argues that the purpose of this statement was to show that the informant was searched before and after the controlled purchases to ensure he did not arrive with or leave with crack cocaine on his person. Officer Mittan testified that the confusion surrounding his sworn statements was an oversight on his part. The Court will accept Officer Mittan's excusable neglect. Nevertheless, the affidavit also failed to include any specific facts regarding the request to search for evidence of fraud or money laundering.

Since the affidavit relies on information provided by a confidential informant, the Court must consider whether the affidavit contains sufficient “indicia of probable cause” to make it reliable. The affidavit in this case struggles to bear any indicia of probable cause. First, the informant's statements are not against his or her own penal interests; in fact, it is quite the opposite. The affidavit indicates that the informant is “assisting law enforcement with criminal investigations in return for case consideration for pending criminal charge(s).” Second, nothing in the affidavit corroborates the informant's tip. Officer Mittan does not indicate that he has performed an independent investigation, that he has also observed narcotics at Mr. Weaver's residence, or that the informant's information is consistent with other information received from corroborating sources. The only supporting information heard by this Court is the testimony of Judge Kelley that he is familiar with Mr. Weaver who has appeared before him numerous times in municipal court. Unfortunately, a neutral and detached magistrate would not allow his prior “around the courthouse” knowledge of the defendant to come into his consideration of probable cause. Third, the affidavit indicates that the informant purchased “an undisclosed amount of crack cocaine” which Mr. Weaver's neighbor “had to cook” before giving it to the informant. The affidavit does not describe the amount of crack cocaine purchased or whether it was authenticated as crack cocaine. For all the Court can determine, the “drugs” may have been sugar pills. And lastly, there is nothing in the affidavit to corroborate the informant's reliability other than Officer Mittan's blanket statement that he has “previously received information from this informant that has been found factual and accurate.” This is exactly the kind of bare-bones, unsubstantiated conclusion that fails to establish probable cause. See Barrington, 806 F.2d at 531.

The series of unfortunate events continues. Officer Mittan emailed the affidavit to Judge Kelley for his review. Judge Kelley then initiated a videoconference via FaceTime where he instructed Officer Mittan to approve the search warrant by signing Judge Kelley's name “via FaceTime” on the signature line. Officer Mittan testified he could not recall if he was put under oath by Judge Kelley during this particular FaceTime call, but generally, Judge Kelley does not put him under oath during these types of calls. The FaceTime call was not recorded. The government asserts that telephonic conferences are approved practices pursuant to the Mississippi Supreme Court's Emergency Administrative Order-21, adopted in August of 2021 in response to the spread of the Delta variant of COVID-19. Notably, the COVID emergency had long receded at the time the warrant was signed. However, according to Officer Mittan's testimony, Judge Kelley is the only state court judge known to him who conducts search warrant hearings via FaceTime. Other judges apparently require officers to personally present themselves to request a search warrant.

The Court does not wish to highlight the shortcomings of Officer Mittan or Judge Kelley; in fact, the Court commends each of them for their honesty, sincerity and candor in testimony. However, it is imperative that the State be reminded of the inherent constitutional rights afforded to every defendant and the necessary practices and protocols protecting these rights. A lackadaisical approach to constitutional safeguards demonstrates a disregard for the judicial system. The Court cannot, in good faith, allow the admission of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant. The affiant in this case did not provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause as to any of the requested items to be seized. Furthermore, the affidavit bears none of the indicia of probable cause identified by the Fifth Circuit, rendering it a bare bones affidavit. Consequently, Officer Mittan's reliance on the invalid search warrant cannot be excused, and this Court must grant Mr. Weaver's motion to suppress as to the physical evidence seized.

Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the accused from self-incrimination: “No person ․ shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). These procedural safeguards require that the accused “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. The defendant may waive those rights “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. This inquiry has two distinct dimensions:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).

Here, it is undisputed that Officer Mittan informed Mr. Weaver of his Miranda rights. However, confusion arises over whether Mr. Weaver “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” waived those rights after having them read to him. The government maintains that Mr. Weaver had full knowledge of his right to remain silent and his right to appointed counsel and that his continued participation with the interview constituted a valid waiver of those rights. It further asserts that the lack of clarity surrounding the document he signed is of no legal consequence. This reasoning is deeply flawed.

“[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. “The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” Id. (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (internal citations omitted)). The record clearly reflects that Officer Mittan informed Mr. Weaver of his Miranda rights, pointed to the signature line beneath the “Waiver of Rights” paragraph, and advised Mr. Weaver that his signature confirmed those rights had been read to him. Specifically, Officer Mittan said, “If you would just sign right there. That's just saying that I read that to you.” Yet, it is equally evident that Mr. Weaver's signature also operated as a waiver of those rights – something Mr. Weaver was not informed of.

This Court adheres to a literal interpretation of the Supreme Court's requirement that a waiver be made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” With that in mind, Officer Mittan's actions, or rather inactions, were deceptive. He did not inform Mr. Weaver that his signature constituted more than a mere acknowledgement of the reading of his Fifth Amendment rights. And secondly, a valid waiver requires full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of doing so. The Court finds it difficult to reconcile that standard with the facts before it, as Mr. Weaver was never informed of the legal implications of waiving his rights and thus could not have made an informed decision.

Absent conscientious oversight, casual practices and protocols falling short of the constitutional minimum may become normalized. It is this Court's duty to re-establish minimum constitutional norms with the goal of preserving the rule of law and protecting the rights of individuals in a free society. Because Mr. Weaver was unaware that he was waiving his rights, any such waiver cannot be deemed voluntary or intelligent. Accordingly, the Court must grant Mr. Weaver's request to suppress the statements made during the custodial interrogation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress [19] is GRANTED as the evidence seized and statements given were obtained in violation of Defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of April, 2025.

Michael P. Mills UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI