WEEMS INDUSTRIES INC v. TEKNOR APEX COMPANY (2025)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on a motion (Doc. 297) for attorney fees and nontaxable fees and expenses filed by defendant Teknor Apex Company (Teknor). Defendant Weems Industry, Inc., doing business as Legacy Manufacturing Company (Weems), filed a resistance (Doc. 301) and Teknor filed a reply (Doc. 306) and a supplement (Doc. 307). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).

II. BACKGROUND

Weems filed its complaint (Doc. 1) on November 13, 2020, and filed an amended complaint (Doc. 21) on February 9, 2021. The amended complaint asserted the following counts against Teknor:

I.  trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1);

II.  common law trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a);

III. unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a);

IV.  unfair competition under Iowa common law; and

V.   unjust enrichment.

Doc. 21. Teknor filed an answer and counterclaim (Doc. 39) on June 1, 2021, asserting nine affirmative defenses and 11 counterclaims, with many of the counterclaims overlapping the affirmative defenses. Teknor's counterclaims sought declaratory relief as follows:

I.    Non-Infringement

II.   No Unfair Competition

III.   Cancellation of Registration (as not a source indicator)

IV.  Cancellation of Registration (as being functional)

V.   Cancellation of Registration (due to abandonment)

VI.  Cancellation of Registration (based on prior use or non-exclusion use)

VII.  Cancellation of Registration (based on lack of secondary meaning)

VIII. Cancellation of Registration (based on registration obtained by fraud)

IX.  Cancellation of Registration (based on generic mark)

X.   Cancellation of Registration (based on phantom mark)

XI.  Rectification of Registration

Doc. 39.

After I ruled on the parties' summary judgment motions, see Doc. 197, Teknor filed an unresisted motion (Doc. 213) to strike Weems' jury demand because Weems' only remaining remedies were equitable. I granted that motion on June 2, 2023, confirming that the case would be tried to the court rather than to a jury. Doc. 215. A bench trial was held from August 28, 2023, to September 8, 2023. Docs. 229-39.

On November 20, 2024, I filed a memorandum opinion and order (Doc. 275) addressing the merits of the parties' claims and counterclaims. Among other things, I dismissed all claims Weems asserted in the amended complaint (Doc. 21) and canceled Registration No. 5,293,921 on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) pursuant to Counts III, IV and VII of Teknor's counterclaim (Doc. 39). Doc. 275 at 121-22. I dismissed all other counts of the counterclaim (Doc. 39) and dismissed all motions for judgment as matter of law, as well as a motion (Doc. 236) for judgment on partial findings. Id. at 122.

On January 6, 2025, the Clerk entered taxable costs in the amount of $65,584.41. Doc. 292. On December 2, 2024, I granted Teknor's unopposed motion (Doc. 278) to bifurcate the issue of Weems' liability for Teknor's attorney fees and nontaxable expenses from the issue of the amount of such fees and expenses. Doc. 279. On April 24, 2025, I issued an order in which I found this case exceptional so as to merit an award of attorney fees to Teknor under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and ordered the parties to brief the issue of the specific award. Doc. 296.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Reasonable Attorney Fees

The starting point in determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees is the lodestar figure, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate. Jet Midwest Int'l Co. v. Jet Midwest Grp., LLC, 93 F.4th 408, 420 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2002)). “A reasonable hourly rate is usually the ordinary rate for similar work in the community where the case has been litigated.” Fish, 295 F.3d at 851 (citing Emery v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2001)). The party seeking the award must provide evidence supporting the hours worked and rate claimed. Grain Processing Corp. v. Virgin Scent, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00019, 2022 WL 19000603, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 5, 2022) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).

1. Hourly Rate

Teknor requests attorney fees for 10,352.85 hours ¹ of work at rates ranging from $75 to $250 per hour for work performed by paralegals and $250 to $555 per hour for work performed by attorneys. Doc. 297-1 at 12-13; Doc. 307. Teknor asserts such rates are reasonable because they are commensurate with, or lower than, rates of attorneys with comparable skill, experience and reputation. Doc. 297-1 at 6. Teknor further argues that these rates are in line with rates awarded in the relevant legal market, which should encompass Des Moines, Iowa, for cases of similar complexity. Id. at 6-7. Finally, Teknor argues that Teknor's payment of the rates is evidence of their reasonableness. Id. at 6. Teknor has submitted four declarations in support of the hourly rates. Docs. 297-3-297-6.

Weems argues that some of Teknor's hourly rates are too high, especially considering its contention that the relevant legal market should be Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Doc. 301 at 4-7.

a. The Relevant Legal Market

Before discussing the rates of specific attorneys and paralegals, I will discuss the relevant legal market in this case. Teknor argues that the relevant legal market in this case should encompass Des Moines, Iowa, because of the specialized nature of trademark litigation and the fact that 10 of the 15 attorneys who appeared in this case are based in Des Moines. Doc. 297-1 at 7 n. 4. Weems argues that Cedar Rapids, Iowa, should be the relevant legal market because the case was brought and tried in Cedar Rapids and “there is no indication that the Cedar Rapids legal market lacked the skill or expertise necessary to handle this case—the parties simply chose to select counsel from outside of Cedar Rapids.” Doc. 301 at 6-7.

I have analyzed the relevant legal market in two prior cases. In 2019, in a somewhat complex case involving the breach of commercial financing agreements, I found that the relevant legal market “can fairly be said to encompass Omaha, Nebraska, when considering the specialized nature of representation provided and that many attorneys from Omaha are admitted to this court and frequently practice in this district.” Americredit Fin. Servs. v. Adams Motor Co., No. C18-4067, 2019 WL 13164197, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 27, 2019). In Adams, I noted that I could consider a legal market other than where the case was tried when the attorneys are experienced leaders in their field and able to handle the case in a shorter length of time than a local lawyer who does not have comparable experience. Id.

In Souza v. Charmed LLC, 745 F. Supp. 3d 758 (N.D. Iowa 2024), a case involving claims under the Lanham Act, I found the relevant legal market to be “Cedar Rapids, Iowa, where this case was brought and tried.” Id. at 768. I found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that I should apply hourly rates charged in Michigan, where their lead counsel was based, or in Des Moines, Iowa, where none of the attorneys of record were based. Id. at 767-68.

After considering Adams and Souza, I find that the relevant legal market encompasses Des Moines, Iowa. While this case bears some similarities to Souza, it is distinguishable in one key respect: both parties elected to hire attorneys from the Des Moines legal market (with Weems hiring its entire legal team from Des Moines). Further, Teknor's attorneys specialize in the complex field of intellectual property. Doc. 297-1 at 7-8. Finally, with the significant damages at stake, Teknor was justified in looking beyond where the case was brought for experienced and sophisticated counsel. Id. As such, the relevant legal market in this case encompasses Des Moines, Iowa.

b. The Hourly Rates for Paralegal Angela Pontano

Weems argues that the requested rate of $250 per hour for paralegal Angela Pontano is too high. Doc. 301 at 4-5. Weems points to two decisions from this court in which rates of $150 and $155 per hour were found to be reasonable for the Cedar Rapids legal market and argues that Pontano's rate should be reduced to $170 per hour, in line with Teknor's rate for another paralegal in this case, Monica Schultz. Id. at 5 (citing InterCon Construction, Inc. v. Team Industrial Services, Inc., No. 18-CV-2081, 2023 WL 2403149 (N.D. Iowa March 8, 2023) and Liquid Capital Exchange, Inc. v. BDC Group, Inc., No. 20-CV-89, 2022 WL 15045058 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 26, 2022)).

Teknor argues that Pontano's fee is reasonable when considering her decades of experience in intellectual property matters. Doc. 306 at 3; see also Doc. 297-6 at 4 ¶ 15 (detailing Pontano's experience in complex civil litigation). Teknor further points to the Southern District of Iowa's approval of a $206.00 per hour paralegal rate in 2021. Doc. 306 at 3 (citing Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. University of Iowa, No. 3:18-cv-00080, 2021 WL 12096987 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 18, 2021)).

I find that Pontano's rate is reasonable given the unique circumstances of this case. This was a complex intellectual property dispute that spanned years and included a two-week bench trial. While $250.00 per hour is a higher rate than usual for paralegals in Iowa, it is in line with the $206.00 per hour rate that the Southern District of Iowa found reasonable four years ago ² in a case that also involved complex litigation spanning years. Fellowship/USA, 2021 WL 12096987, at *1 n.1. Pontano's decades of specialized experience justify her higher rate.

c. The Hourly Rates for Attorneys Jeffrey Harty, Salvatore Guerriero and Frederick Tecce

Weems argues that the requested hourly rates between $490 and $555 per hour for attorneys Jeffrey Harty, Salvatore Guerriero and Frederick Tecce are too high. Doc. 301 at 6. Weems points to Souza, in which I declined to award a $500 per hour rate in the Cedar Rapids legal market for an attorney who also “brought specialized knowledge, experience and efficiency” to the case. Doc. 301 at 6. Teknor counters that the legal work in this case was more complex and specialized than in Souza and that the Southern District of Iowa recently held that Harty's $530 per hour rate was reasonable. Doc. 297-1 at 7-8 (citing Wittern Grp., Inc. v. Palliparamban, No. 4:24-cv-00151, 2024 WL 4649393 (S.D. Iowa Sep. 23, 2024)); Doc. 306 at 3.

As noted above, the relevant legal market encompasses Des Moines, Iowa. With this in mind, I find that the requested hourly rates for attorneys Harty, Guerriero and Tecce are reasonable for the Des Moines legal market. I agree with Teknor that this case was substantially more complicated than Souza. While that case required specialized knowledge of relevant law, it did not involve the complex issues of trademark validity, registrability and infringement that this case required. Further, while some of the fees ³ requested for Harty are slightly higher than those approved for Harty's fees in Wittern, the complexity of this case merits a higher hourly rate, and the additional $25 per hour reflects this. See Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. A Royal Touch Hospitality, LLC (NC), No. 7:17-cv-381, 2019 WL 4781879, at *5 (W.D. Va. Sep. 30, 2019) (“Trademark litigation is a particularly difficult field of specialization and is recognized as meriting greater than average rate of pay.”).

2. Hours Charged

Teknor seeks attorney fees for 10,352.85 hours of work. See supra note 1; Doc. 297-1 at 12-13; Doc. 307. Weems argues that Teknor's requested hours include inappropriate charges for block billing and purely clerical tasks. Doc. 301 at 7-8. I will address each in turn.

Weems argues that I should apply a 30 percent reduction for block billing. Id. at 8. In support of its argument, Weems attached Exhibits 1 and 2, in which it labels what it describes as block billing. Doc. 301-1-301-2. Block billing occurs when an attorney records “billing entries that specify only the daily activities, but that do not specifically indicate how much time was spent on each individual task.” Dorr v. Weber, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1036 (N.D. Iowa 2010). “The Eighth Circuit does not ban the use of block billing. However, if ‘a block entry is confusing or makes it difficult to allocate reasonable time to a specific task, the blame lies on the party seeking fees because they were in the best position to mitigate any confusion.’ ” Osseo Area Schs. v. A.J.T., No. 21-01453, 2025 WL 904492, at *11 (D. Minn. March 25, 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Nali v. MaxPro Flooring, LLC, No. CIV. 09-3625, 2013 WL 1899925, at *2 (D. Minn. May 7, 2013)). In Nassar v. Jackson, 779 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 2015), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals described the issue of block billing as “minutia” in rejecting a block billing challenge. Id. at 554.

I have reviewed Weems' Exhibits 1 and 2 and do not find that Teknor's billing is “confusing or makes it difficult to allocate reasonable time to a specific task[.]” Osseo, 2025 WL 904492, at *11. Unlike Dorr, where this court expressed frustration with the plaintiff's “wildly over-inflated fee request” and “poor record-keeping”, I find that Teknor's record-keeping “allocate[s] reasonable time” to specific tasks, even if some of its time entries include multiple tasks. Id.; Dorr, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. To require Teknor to break down its time entries into even greater detail would amount to “minutia.” See Nassar, 779 F.3d at 554. As such, I decline to apply a percentage reduction for Teknor's alleged block billing.

Next, Weems contends that Teknor inappropriately billed for purely clerical tasks, as it details in Exhibit 3. Doc. 301 at 8; Doc. 301-3. Specifically, Weems argues that Teknor billed $95,432.22 for purely clerical tasks performed by Pontano and $1,172.50 for purely clerical tasks performed by attorney Cheryl Farine. Doc. 301 at 8. Teknor concedes that it is not entitled to fees for clerical work but argues that it “is not seeking fees for purely clerical tasks.” Doc. 306 at 3 n. 4, 9.

“The work of paralegals and law clerks is compensable under an award of attorney fees.” Northeast Iowa Citizens for Clean Water v. Agriprocessors, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 881, 901 n.22 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284–89, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989)). However, “purely clerical tasks should not be billed at paralegal or attorney rates, regardless of who performed such tasks.” Gruttemeyer v. Transit Authority, 31 F.4th 638, 651 (8th Cir. 2022). In the context of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), another court found clerical tasks to include “filing documents, preparing and serving summons, preparing and serving a civil cover sheet, mailing items to the court or other parties, downloading and emailing documents, and scanning documents as well as preparing an itemized invoice for legal services[.]” Jean P. R. E. v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-1988, 2019 WL 2151691, at *4 (D. Minn. May 17, 2019) (quoting Semler v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-2445, 2018 WL 1512056, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2018)). Further examples of purely clerical tasks include review of whether the appropriate document was filed in a case, hyperlinking documents and internal emails to administrative assistants. Benson v. City of Lincoln, 774 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1090 (D. Neb. 2024).

After reviewing Exhibits 1 and 3, it is clear that Teknor has submitted bills that include some purely clerical tasks. For example, on November 22, 2022, Farine's time entry includes charges for “download[ing] briefs and appendices” and “[a]ttention to transport of documents for filing using Drop Box.” Doc. 301-1 at 11. I agree with Weems that the fee award should be reduced by $1,172.50 for clerical work performed by Farine at attorney rates.

Pontano's time entries also show numerous charges for clerical work. For example, on June 17, 2022, she billed $625 for “[f]ile management and organization including cataloging and storing emails/communications. Printed various documents for Nick Otte's witness binder.” Doc. 301-3 at 9. Her time entries further include charges for booking travel arrangements and amending Amtrak tickets. See id. On the other hand, many of her time entries cannot be said to be purely clerical, including drafting legal documents, preparing for depositions and trial and transcribing notes from meetings. See id. at 11-12. Overall, I find it is appropriate to apply a 50 percent reduction to the hours billed by Pontano that Weems challenges. Osseo, 2025 WL 904492, at *11 (applying a reduction to fees rather than calculating specific hours for efficiency purposes). This accounts for the significant amount of purely clerical tasks that Pontano billed, while still allowing recovery for the appropriately billed work that she performed. As such, I will apply a reduction of $47,716.11 to the lodestar as a reduction in Pontano's time, along with the $1,172.50 reduction for Farine's purely clerical work.

Applying these reductions to the proposed lodestar amount for attorney fees of $3,885,198.00, the new lodestar figure for Teknor's attorney fees is $3,836,309.39.

3. Reasonableness of the Award

The Eighth Circuit has explained the second step of evaluating an award of attorney fees as follows:

“After calculating a fee award using either the lodestar method ․, district courts generally evaluate ‘the ultimate reasonableness of the award ․ by considering relevant factors ․’ ” League of Women Voters of Mo. v. Ashcroft, 5 F. 4th 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2021) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 892 F.3d 968, 977 (8th Cir. 2018)). “Although there is no one methodology for calculating an award of fees, it is important ‘for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.’ ” Marez v. Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc., 688 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933).

Jet Midwest International Co., Ltd. v. Jet Midwest Group, LLC, 93 F.4th 408, 420-21 (8th Cir. 2024). As to the relevant factors, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the factors laid out by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), which include:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19).

Weems argues that the lodestar amount should be reduced because Teknor was strongly criticized and sanctioned for its discovery conduct, Teknor engaged in some of the same conduct that the court found exceptional and Teknor failed to move for summary judgment based on functionality and acquired distinctiveness. Doc. 301 at 10-17.

Beginning with its argument that the lodestar should be reduced because of Teknor's conduct in discovery, Weems points to multiple instances of the court admonishing Teknor for its behavior in discovery, including being sanctioned for advancing “completely frivolous” arguments that were “contradicted by clear law.” Doc. 143 at 2-3. Weems is correct that Teknor engaged in poor conduct during discovery. Without relitigating the discovery disputes in this case, it is fair to say that the relationship between the parties completely deteriorated in discovery and Teknor's conduct was partially responsible for that deterioration. While both parties engaged in unacceptable discovery behavior, Weems is correct that only Teknor was sanctioned for this behavior. See Doc. 143. As such, I agree with Weems that Teknor's conduct in discovery weighs in favor of a reduction of the lodestar amount.

Next, Weems argues that the lodestar figure should be reduced because Teknor engaged in some of the same conduct that caused me to find that this is an exceptional case, namely misstating the functionality standard. Doc. 301 at 13-15. Weems' argument misses the point. While Teknor may have also been imprecise in its arguments at times, Weems was the plaintiff in this case and forced Teknor to expend significant money and resources based on Weems' continuous misunderstanding of the functionality standards. As explained in my previous order, it is especially aggravating that Weems continued to incorrectly state the functionality standard even after losing on the merits, largely based on the second prong of the Inwood test that Weems ignored. Doc. 275 at 111-12; Doc. 296 at 5. As to the evidentiary objections, Weems is correct that I expressed frustration with both parties, however I found Weems' evidentiary objections to especially lack merit. See Doc. 275 at 3 n.1. With this in mind, I cannot find that Teknor's conduct surrounding the legal standards and evidentiary objections weighs in favor of a reduction of the lodestar figure.

Weems next argues that Teknor failed to move for summary judgment on functionality and acquired distinctiveness, which shows that Weems' position was not unreasonably weak. Doc. 301 at 15. Weems thus contends that I should not award Teknor any fees incurred after the March 2, 2023, summary judgment order. Id. I disagree. First, I already found in my order regarding the exceptionality of this case that Weems' distinctiveness claim was “incredibly weak.” Doc. 296 at 6. I will not revisit that finding in this order. More importantly, Weems' argument that I would have necessarily granted summary judgment to Teknor if it had so moved is too speculative to credit. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “[b]ecause of the intensely factual nature of trademark disputes, summary judgment is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.”. See Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1999). I cannot reverse engineer how I would have ruled in a theoretical summary judgment order on the issues of functionality and acquired distinctiveness. It was not imprudent for Teknor to marshal its resources towards trial preparation on these issues rather than pursuing a potentially futile summary judgment motion. As such, this decision does not weigh in favor of a reduction of the lodestar figure.

Finally, I have considered the Johnson factors and find that these factors weigh against a reduction of the lodestar figure. Several factors are particularly relevant.⁴ For example, the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience, reputation and ability of Teknor's attorneys each weigh strongly against reducing the lodestar figure. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430, 103 S.Ct. 1933. As noted above, this was a years-long case that presented complex issues of trademark law which required skilled counsel to tackle. The eighth Johnson factor, the amount involved and the results obtained, also weighs strongly against a reduction. Id. Weems sought almost $31 million in damages and Teknor's counsel obtained a total defense verdict. Doc. 306 at 7. As such, the Johnson factors weigh against a reduction in the lodestar figure.

In sum, the only consideration weighing in favor of a reduction in the lodestar figure is Teknor's conduct during discovery. I find that a 20 percent reduction to the lodestar figure properly captures this conduct. Any further reduction would be unwarranted. Unlike Pocket Plus, L.L.C. v. Runner's High, LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1082 (N.D. Iowa 2022), in which the court found that the “exceptional” behavior was limited to a small part of the litigation, Weems' conduct that led to a finding of exceptionality was central to this case. Id. at 1093 (granting a 75 percent reduction to the requested attorney fees). I found three grounds for exceptionality: “Weems' (1) continued misapplication of the functionality legal standard, (2) trial-related conduct and (3) conduct before the USPTO.” Doc. 296 at 10. These grounds apply to this entire case, not a small portion. This is especially true of Weems' conduct before the USPTO, which allowed Weems to drag Teknor into this case in the first place. Applying a 20 percent reduction to the adjusted attorney fee lodestar figure of $3,836,309.39, the new lodestar figure becomes $3,069,047.51.

B. Non-taxable Litigation Expenses

Absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization, “federal courts are bound by the limitations [on expenses] set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920.” Jet Midwest, 93 F.4th at 422 (quoting Johnson Tr. of Operating Eng'rs Loc. #49 Health & Welfare Fund v. Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., 950 F.3d 510, 527 (8th Cir. 2020)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that absent statute, rule or court order, “costs -- other than attorney's fees – should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The Lanham Act provides for the recovery of costs and, in exceptional cases, attorney fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). A prevailing party is presumptively entitled to recover all of its costs under Rule 54(d). Jet Midwest, 93 F.4th at 422 (citing In re Derailment Cases, 417 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2005)). “However, such costs must be set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 or some other statutory authorization.” Jet Midwest, 93 F.4th at 422 (quoting Smith v. Tenet Healthsystem SL, Inc., 436 F.3d 879, 889 (8th Cir. 2006)).

Teknor requests non-taxable expenses in the amount of $145,161.02. See Doc. 307 at 2. Weems agrees that Teknor is entitled to recover non-taxable litigation expenses. Doc. 301 at 19-20. However, Weems objects to awarding Teknor any litigation expenses after the court's summary judgment order and to awarding Teknor $1,419.34 for its hotel stay before trial. Id. at 20.

Weems argues that Teknor should not recover litigation expenses incurred after the court's summary judgment order for the same reasons it argued Teknor should not recover attorney fees for that time period. Id. at 19. As discussed above, this argument is without merit. Teknor is entitled to recover expenses incurred after the court's summary judgment order.

Weems further argues that $1,419.34 is an unreasonable charge for Teknor's hotel and room service charges before trial. Id. Weems argues that “[t]his is excessive for two nights in a Des Moines hotel.” Id. Teknor has clarified that this hotel stay was actually for four nights. See Doc. 306-1. After reviewing the invoice for that hotel stay and room service, I do not find any of the expenses incurred to be unreasonable. As such, Teknor's hotel and room service charges will not be excluded from the lodestar figure.

In sum, Teknor is entitled to $145,161.02 in non-taxable litigation expenses. When combined with the reduced lodestar amount of $3,069,047.51, the total award will be $3,214,208.53.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Teknor's motion (Doc. 297) for attorney fees and nontaxable fees and expenses is granted in part. Teknor is hereby awarded attorney fees and nontaxable expenses pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) in the total amount of $3,214,208.53.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of August, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   I arrived at this figure by adding the hours supplied by Teknor in its initial request for a specific award to the supplemental hours it submitted, which included hours spent preparing the request for attorney fees. See Doc. 297-1 at 12-13; Doc. 307 at 2.

2.   The $206.00 rate in 2021 equates to about $239.00 in 2025. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.

3.   Harty's rates range from $515 to $555 per hour. Doc. 297-1 at 13.

4.   Many of the Johnson factors do not neatly apply to this case, however it is notable that none of the 12 factors weigh in favor of a reduction of the lodestar figure.

Leonard T. Strand, United States District Judge