UNITED STATES v. BROOKS (2026)

OPINION AND ORDER

Shaun Brooks, Jr. faces alleged violations of his supervised release conditions. On September 3, 2025, the court held a hearing to assess whether he was suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him incompetent after a psychological examination report. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)-(c). Considering the relevant factors and consistent with this early report, the court found Mr. Brooks was not competent to assist in his defense. The court ordered him committed to the custody of the Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).

Mr. Brooks was evaluated again at the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina. The acting warden submitted a forensic report after an initial period of hospitalization and treatment. The report concludes that Mr. Brooks remains incompetent because he is suffering from a mental disease or defect that interferes with his ability to understand these proceedings, communicate effectively with counsel, assist in his defense, rationally evaluate evidence, and testify relevantly, should he choose or understand that choice. The report also finds that there is a substantial probability that his competency to proceed in revocation proceedings could be restored with appropriate antipsychotic medication. The report states, however, that Mr. Brooks has refused medication to date, and thus requests, if the court determines that additional restoration efforts are appropriate, authorization to administer medication involuntarily.¹

The government requests leave to involuntarily medicate Mr. Brooks. A person has a “significant constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.” Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003) (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 221) (quotations omitted). “[F]orcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. This is particularly true when antipsychotic drugs are intended to alter one's brain chemistry. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992). One's liberty interest may only be overcome by an “essential” or “overriding” state interest, appreciating that it will be the “rare” case when it is appropriate to authorize involuntary administration of drugs. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-180.

The law permits involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to a mentally ill detainee to render him competent to stand trial if the United States shows, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) the existence of “important governmental interests,” (2) the “involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests,” (3) the involuntary medication is “necessary” to further important interests, and (4) the administration of medication is “medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition.” Id. at 180-81 (emphases removed); see also United States v. Fieste, 84 F.4th 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2023). After a July 8, 2026 status hearing, the court directed the parties to brief the first factor because it presents a “purely legal issue,” Fieste, 84 F.4th at 720, and often the “most contentious” one, United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2014). Though the defendant in Sell was pending trial for criminal offenses (and not facing supervised release revocation), other courts have found the Sell principles applicable to revocation. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 281 F. Supp.3d 1284, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2017). The parties likewise agree that Sell provides the proper framework today.

The court “must find that important governmental interests are at stake.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (emphasis original). In the context of a new charge, the “government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important.” Id.; see, e.g., Fieste, 84 F.4th at 720 (serious charges of threatening to assault and murder two federal judges, three former presidents, and the current president, that carried penalties of ten and five years). The seriousness of a crime is evaluated “by looking to its maximum statutory penalty.” Fieste, 84 F.4th at 720; see Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1041 (“there is logic in this approach, as the maximum statutory penalty reflects at least some measure of legislative judgment regarding the seriousness of a crime”).

Mr. Brooks was originally convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (count 1), see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possessing a firearm as a felon (count 3), see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).² These offenses were classified as a Class A felony and Class C felony, respectively. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a). Their statutory maximum sentence at the time of sentencing varied—from a life term on count 1, for instance, to 10 years on count 3—to understand their differential in seriousness, as viewed by Congress at that time.

Though the revocation setting requires perhaps a slightly nuanced assessment, the government emphasizes the seriousness of these underlying convictions, noting that supervised release constitutes part of the original sentence, with any sentence on revocation addressing the defendant's breach of the court's trust rather than punishing a defendant's violation as though it were a new crime. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700-01 (2000); United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1162 (7th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Villasenor, 256 F. Appx. 842, 844 (7th Cir. 2007). For sentencing purposes, “[i]n the context of a revocation hearing, the ‘offense’ is the underlying crime of conviction, not the violation of the supervised release conditions.” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 193-94 (2025) (cleaned up).

The court treads carefully here. Esteras held that the offense's seriousness under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) refers, in the revocation context, to the original crime of conviction, and § 3583(e) prohibits a court from considering this factor (as well as § 3553(a)(3)) when deciding a defendant's sentence on revocation. Esteras, 606 U.S. at 195; see also United States v. Harbin, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 4344, 8 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 2026). The original offenses may still provide context insofar as their nature and circumstances bear on permissible forward-looking considerations like deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation. Esteras, 606 U.S. at 196, 200; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D). The court emphasizes that any evaluation of the government's interest today, or seriousness as the parties sometimes present it, concerns whether the government has met its burden under Sell, not what sentence, if any, would be appropriate if revocation even occurred, for naturally the court isn't at that stage yet, and may never be.

But relatedly, and perhaps here is where the circumstances from Sell must be tailored to the revocation context, the government will be hard pressed to argue, clearly or convincingly as its important interest, a trial for older, even if serious, criminal offenses, for Mr. Brooks has already been convicted of his original crimes, sentenced, confined to serve 180 months, and placed on supervision. That interest, important as it was back in 2011, has already been promoted. No one need decide his guilt as to his original offenses. And the court cannot resentence an offender for his original crimes, nor is revocation a way to do so. Should an offender be revoked for a violation, he is executing (serving) his original sentence now in a manner prescribed by the court—sometimes continued on release, sometimes subject to additional conditions, and sometimes returned to prison, as examples. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700; United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996). But, for any number of sound constitutional reasons, a pronouncement on revocation is (and can be) neither an additional sentence nor retributive punishment. The government must identify something else by way of an interest.

Accordingly, the government returns to argue its interest in sanctioning the breach of judicial trust reposed in Mr. Brooks through supervision and promoting deterrence and public protection. The first half of this argument is somewhat a shared interest. With a new criminal offense, the government retains its sole prosecutorial discretion to decide what charge to bring, and then pursues any such charge at trial. With revocation, often the probation office makes a recommendation or files a petition, with the court acting on the petition to initiate the proceeding, but the government always has that same option to request revocation too, 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b), and ultimately bears the burden of proving any violation, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Patlan, 31 F.4th 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2022). It isn't lost on the court that, no matter the government's view of its interests today, the government never saw any of the alleged violations important enough to commence this revocation proceeding all its own. It deferred to probation, and the proceeding began at the court's prompting.

These interests of the government—promoting deterrence and public protection because an offender breached the terms of his conditional liberty—presuppose just that, an alleged violation of his supervised release conditions. This is what must exist before the government could be said to have an important interest in a revocation proceeding under Sell, and ultimately this is what the government must prove before such interests can be promoted. There is a great swath of potential violations, and some need not even be criminal to be deemed as much. See Esteras, 606 U.S. at 194; Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700. Revocation isn't a trial, nor offers the same rights as a criminal trial. See United States v. Phillips, 914 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700. As important a proceeding as it is, at the start of this analysis it lacks the same degree of seriousness that a full-blown criminal trial has.

A statutory maximum still plays an objective role. Though merely looking to his original offenses offers no real perspective as to whether the government has an important interest today, come revocation, there is still some tie-in to be sure. Should the government ever prove any violation of supervision, and should supervision even be revoked, the permissible terms on revocation likewise vary. Classifications of original convictions determine the statutory terms of imprisonment available on revocation. Originally convicted of a Class A felony and a Class C felony, Mr. Brooks faces on revocation a maximum prison term of five years on count 1 and two years on count 3. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The court could also impose additional terms of supervised release, subject to a maximum of five years on count 1 and three years on count 3 (less any term in prison). 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(b)(1)-(2), (h).

These maximum penalties offer a lens into Congress's judgment about the seriousness of the original offenses and correspondingly the potential seriousness of revocation after prior convictions for such felonies, see Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1041; but these maximums can be somewhat less informative in this setting when they are calibrated to old crimes, and not calibrated to the new conduct alleged in a petition to revoke that the government now has an interest in prosecuting. No longer is it the government's interest to secure a judgment that reflects the seriousness of the original offenses—it cannot be by law—and instead the government's interest is to secure a judgment on revocation that promotes deterrence and public protection, in the backdrop of the defendant's history certainly, but with an eye toward the seriousness of the supervised release violations, as sanction for the breach of judicial trust. See United States v. Bradford, 170 F.4th 618, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2026); see also Esteras, 606 U.S. at 194 n.5 (reserving the question). After all, “a more serious violation likely reflects a more serious breach of trust.” Dawson, 980 F.3d at 1162. Weighing the seriousness of a defendant's supervised release violation “comports with Congress's design for revocation sentences,” and “a court should consider the nature of a violation when choosing its revocation sentence.” Id. at 1164.

Think on it a moment. Missing one appointment with a probation officer is altogether different than strangling a victim, though both may occur on supervision after the very same felony conviction. The government has an interest in ensuring compliance with all conditions, but the importance of pursuing that interest would vary depending on the need for deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation in light of the alleged supervisory violation. See Esteras, 606 U.S. at 198, 200; Bradford, 170 F.4th at 622-23. If generalized interests in enforcing supervision or assisting reintegration were alone sufficient, nearly every alleged violation, no matter how superficial, after a serious Class A felony would satisfy this first Sell factor merely because the maximum sentence was five years, and involuntary medication would cease to be rare for an incompetent person on supervised release—a result difficult to square with the law's direction that the court “consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the government's interest in prosecution.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Debenedetto, 757 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). At the same time, failing to report to a probation officer during supervision after a violent felony, say, for armed carjacking, see 18 U.S.C. § 2119, appreciating its applicable maximum sentence on revocation, would objectively be different than doing the same after exporting more than $5.00 in pennies out of the United States without a special license, see 31 U.S.C. § 5111(d)(2), with its altogether different maximum sentence on revocation—so the objective measure of importance represented by the statutory maximum on revocation cannot be disregarded, no less than if the court considered the nature and circumstances of the original offenses as part of the defendant's history in assessing the need for deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation. See Esteras, 606 U.S. at 198, 200.

Unlike cases in which supervision as a whole has been subverted, see, e.g., United States v. Zohlman, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, 12-17 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2025); United States v. Evans, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172838, 15-17 (W.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2018), Mr. Brooks reported and began supervision on October 2, 2024. The petition (dated February 24, 2025) alleges that he failed to obtain lawful employment, failed to notify probation of one change in residence, and missed three substance abuse assessments—all notable in their design for his rehabilitation, but none criminal. If proven, they would be classified as the lowest grade of violation. Mr. Brooks participated before in drug treatment even though he missed these assessments. Rarely, if ever, would an offender under supervision even be revoked for not getting a job in four months, or for not reporting a change in residence one time. Nor could the government contend, clearly and convincingly, that it had weighty government interests to promote by involuntarily medicating the offender to answer for such violations. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.

More concerning—with an eye toward deterrence and public protection—is the allegation that Mr. Brooks tested positive for drugs twice (marijuana twice and the second time also for methamphetamine), while ostensibly not attending more assessments for treatment. He reportedly admitted the first marijuana use on October 17, 2024, and denied drug use on the second occasion on December 13, 2024. Probation often would push treatment concertedly with two positive drug tests early in a supervision term rather than petition for revocation, but someone not attending treatment makes that aim more difficult to accomplish as an alternative. Still, this would not be a situation in which revocation would be mandatory—only four or more positive test results in a year would get the government there and the court would be statutorily required to consider alternatives to revocation nonetheless—unless the government proved Mr. Brooks possessed an illegal narcotic. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), (g). With marijuana, that would not be a sure thing, see United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001), and even a signed form admitting to smoking one joint would hinge on whether Mr. Brooks, declared incompetent here, was competent enough to understand what he was signing then. With methamphetamine, the government's task might be easier, save perhaps some evidence that any alleged ingestion was accidental, inadvertent, or somehow out of his control. See Patlan, 31 F.4th at 558; United States v. Shockey, 941 F.3d 282, 283-84 (7th Cir. 2019).

This is all to say, though these allegations might reflect noncompliance and raise concerns about substance use and treatment participation, and though they might justify some measure of deterrence and public protection if ever proven, not least given his history to include a rather deep-seated criminal record, there is a possibility that any proven violation would be classified least among them as Grade C infractions, but at most Grade B. This is not a situation in which Mr. Brooks categorically refused to submit to supervision or rendered the probation officer unable to supervise him. Nor does the petition allege violence, threats, firearm possession, harm to an identifiable victim, or other such serious crime. Without prejudging things, but just out of the gate, this would not reasonably be the type of case that would cry out for the statutory maximum by any measure, something typically reserved for the worst offender.

The government certainly has an interest in enforcing compliance to ensure that Mr. Brooks serves out his sentence to help prevent future offenses and to protect the community, but the weight of that interest is measured in part by the alleged violations, rather than others that would recast it as critically important. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180; see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95126, 1, 5-7 (D. Conn. July 21, 2016) (alleged violations for misdemeanor disorderly conduct for sleeping at a train station, refusing to meet with a probation officer, failing to notify a probation officer of changes in residence and employment, and failing to continue mental health treatment “not of sufficient importance” to justify forced medication because it “is not proportional to offenses with which he is charged”); United States v. Kourey, 276 F. Supp.2d 580, 581, 585 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (defendant alleged to have violated supervised release by failing to report change of address, failing to participate in mental health counseling, and failing to continue taking his medication regularly not facing “serious criminal charges”).

“Even when a defendant is charged with a serious crime,” or faces allegations that he significantly violated his supervisory terms, “special circumstances may lessen the importance of the government's interest.” Fieste, 84 F.4th at 720; see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. This inquiry into special circumstances is “fact-intensive.” Fieste, 84 F.4th at 720. As examples, the government's interest may be affected by “the defendant's lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill, the potential for future confinement if the defendant regains competency, and the amount of time a defendant has already been confined while the charges have been pending.” Id.; see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (government's interest lessened when “the defendant has already been confined for a significant amount of time”). The possibility that a defendant will be civilly committed is relevant too, Fieste, 84 F.4th at 721-22, though both sides say there is no likelihood of that here, see 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The ultimate burden remains on the government, but Mr. Brooks must come forward with evidence of mitigating special circumstances. Fieste, 84 F.4th at 722 (the offender has the “duty to bring those facts to light in the first place”).

Mr. Brooks presents the length of his confinement thus far in comparison to any likely decision on revocation, with reference to a possible guideline range. The law has not settled whether the court may consider the likely guideline range in assessing special circumstances vis-à-vis this first factor, id. at 724 (declining to “wade into that debate”), though this circuit has held that this would not constitute plain error, see id., and once mentioned a district court's failure to consult a possible guideline range with the statutory maximum as error in weighing special circumstances, Debenedetto, 757 F.3d at 553. In the court's understanding of the law, and both sides seem to acknowledge this, a statutory maximum serves as an objective proxy for threshold seriousness, but it alone does not control the court's assessment of special circumstances.

Other circuits take varied approaches to measuring this confinement. See id.; compare, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442, 450-51 (5th Cir. 2013) (considering time in custody relative to statutory penalties), with United States v. Grigsby, 712 F.3d 964, 972-73 (6th Cir. 2013) (considering time in custody relative to estimated advisory guideline range and statutory maximum penalty). The concerns underlying the disagreement among the circuits carry somewhat different weight here because Mr. Brooks faces revocation of supervised release rather than unresolved criminal charges. In an original prosecution, estimating an advisory guideline range before trial may require certain predictions or assumptions about the crime's offense level and characteristics, adjustments, enhancements, grouping, acceptance of responsibility, and other factors that are ordinarily resolved only after conviction, preparation of a presentence investigation report, and the court's analysis and ruling. See, e.g., United States v. Nicklas, 623 F.3d 1175, 1179 n.5 (8th Cir. 2010); compare Gutierrez, 704 F.3d at 451 (declining to conduct a “mock sentencing hearing” when defendant projected guideline range of 15 to 21 months while government projected at least 78 to 97 months, and as much as 235 to 293 months), with Grigsby, 712 F.3d at 972-74 (government's projected guideline range instructive because government was “in the best position to elucidate its prosecutorial interests” and relying solely on the statutory maximum could materially overstate the likely sentence).

A revocation calculation includes fewer variables. Once the court determines the grade of violation, that grade and the original criminal history category drive the advisory range. See U.S.S.G. § 7C1.5. Only one of those is a variable here, and that variable is a known either-or. Taking the government's position as an expression of its prosecutorial interests to heart for the moment, at most the advisory range would be 21-27 months (if Grade B violations), and possibly 8-14 months (if only Grade C violations). Based on years of experience, it would be a rare case in which the government argued for a sentence outside an advisory range during a revocation proceeding, much less higher than an advisory range, and the government inkles no such thing here. The court won't deliberate under Sell as though these two possibilities have been resolved, but the law requires the court to consider the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Any guideline range would be advisory only, but the court remains duty bound to calculate it accurately, United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 2008), and it would not sentence Mr. Brooks in a vacuum without considering the applicable range together with the other factors applicable to revocation, see Esteras, 606 U.S. at 188. Without losing sight of the statutory maximums, it would be an odd thing to tell the court that it must work within a statutory maximum and must calculate the guideline range accurately for sentencing, but withhold from its consideration, as so much of Sell is predictive anyway, a considerably narrower advisory range (or ranges) as potential benchmarks in assessing special circumstances. And here, the only two possibilities reasonably inform the court's decision the same way.

In short, whether with reference to the statutory maximum or potential guideline ranges, Mr. Brooks unlikely would receive any meaningful additional time in prison, particularly given the nature of these violations, even if proved in full by the government, and given the time it would take for involuntary treatment to restore his competence, if even it does, and a hearing on the revocation petition held. See Fieste, 84 F.4th at 724 (assessing length of confinement the defendant would face “by the time involuntary treatment restores her competence and trial concludes”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (credit time). Mr. Brooks already has been in custody for more than 17 months (528 days, since March 18, 2025). Were the court to order involuntary medication, he would need to be transported to the proper facility, a treatment plan formulated, that plan implemented long enough to attain competency, time given for him to be reevaluated and confirmed competent to proceed, transported back to this district, and permitted to consult with counsel to prepare and then to participate in a hearing.

No one gives the court a firm prediction on how much time this process might take. The record doesn't contain a treatment plan estimating how long either. The court certainly doesn't presume that Mr. Brooks would require the same regimen or length of treatment as offenders in other cases—all treatment plans are unique—but other cases show that competency restoration through involuntary medication ordinarily is measured in months, not days. See Fieste, 84 F.4th at 725 (parties agreed medicating defendant to the point of competency “would consume at least four more months”); United States v. Berry, 911 F.3d 354, 363 (6th Cir. 2018) (government sought an order for four months of medication, which would take the defendant to “at least” forty months of pretrial confinement); Grigsby, 712 F.3d at 974 (estimating competency restoration within four to twelve months). On this record, even with a low estimate of time, the court isn't convinced that competency could be restored and Mr. Brooks brought before the court quickly enough that the court, in exchange for all that involuntary medication means, likely would be saying anything more than “time served.” See Berry, 911 F.3d at 362-63 (“The fact that [the defendant] will likely not receive additional time significantly undercuts the government's interest in prosecuting him.”); Grigsby, 712 F.3d at 974 (government's interest diminished when defendant could remain confined for a period roughly equivalent to his ultimate sentence). Indeed, his continued confinement at that point would likely exceed the lowest reasonable sentence, even assuming the government's best case. Perhaps the government would get some added pound of flesh from him in the meantime, but at what cost.

To be clear, pretrial confinement “affects, but does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution,” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180, and a likely sentence of time served “alone does not defeat the government's interest,” Fieste, 84 F.4th at 725 (quoting United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 815 (4th Cir. 2009)) (quotations omitted). But, being “significant,” see id., the strong likelihood of a time served sentence materially diminishes the government's interest in further prosecuting these types of alleged supervised release violations. The government prevailed in Fieste and other cases, despite the offender being in custody longer than an advisory range, only because its remaining interests proved notably strong—in Fieste, based on charges of violent threats that targeted presidents and federal judges, implicating institutional security, and because he presented an acute need for future monitoring and firearm restrictions, along with the boon of general deterrence. Id. at 725-27.

But, on this record, when the government's showing begins more modestly, when it concerns a revocation proceeding based on the nature of these alleged violations, and when the interests in deterrence and public protection have been measurably promoted already through a substantial period of confinement, it becomes difficult to call what is left of the government's interests “essential” or “overriding.” Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.

For over 17 months, Mr. Brooks has been prevented from using any illegal narcotic, and during that time the public has been protected and any risk of criminality locked down; all the while he has received appropriate treatment and care. One must not forget, too, that Mr. Brooks will remain on concerted supervision for more than a year still (not concluding until October 2027). The forensic report concludes that, despite his untreated psychotic symptoms and difficulty maintaining stability in a mental health unit—likely from overstimulation in that setting—he is not aggressive or threatening toward others and has complied with security protocols. He manages his daily living needs. Per the expert, who has a doctorate in psychology (PsyD), Mr. Brooks is not gravely disabled or likely to present a risk of serious harm to himself or others [239]. Even the government agrees there is no evidence that he currently suffers from a mental health condition that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person.

There is always risk that an offender placed on or returned to supervision could violate his conditions, and the court does not minimize that risk with Mr. Brooks, not least given his circumstances, the alleged violations, and his prior troublesome criminal history and past substance abuse, but this is often the business of supervision. No one should look at continued supervision of over 13 months as an insignificant contributor to ensuring ongoing deterrence and public protection, particularly after another 17 months in custody already. See United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 960 (7th Cir. 2015) (supervised release is “realistically [ ] a form of custody, like parole, because [it] impose[s] significant limitations on a person's freedom”); see also United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2018) (“supervised release is itself a serious sanction that imposes significant limitations on a defendant's liberty”).

Circumstances may change. Any future violations may cause the record to look differently. And the government will then have options—a different petition to revoke, a different record, and should his risk profile change, even the option to pursue civil commitment. 18 U.S.C. § 4246. But the court must decide today's motion on today's record, for the question under Sell is not whether the government has an important interest in the abstract, but whether the government has an important interest today in forcibly rendering Mr. Brooks competent to answer for these violations of his release conditions, despite his substantial liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 178; Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. Sell requires the government to satisfy a demanding burden explicitly reserved for rare circumstances, and today's record does not meet that standard.

Accordingly, the court DENIES the government's request to involuntarily medicate Mr. Brooks for purposes of restoring competency to answer for the alleged violations of his conditions of supervised release [202], and ORDERS the government to file a notice of how it intends to proceed by September 9, 2026. The court GRANTS the government's and Mr. Brooks's motions to file their documents under seal [246, 248].

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Bureau of Prisons didn't conduct separate proceedings to determine whether involuntary medication was warranted on another ground, for example if Mr. Brooks presents a danger to himself or others while in custody. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 (1990); 28 C.F.R. § 549.46.

2.   His separate conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a drug user (count 4) was later dismissed. United States v. Brooks, 513 Fed. Appx. 612, 615 (7th Cir. 2013).

Damon R. Leichty, Judge