ZAMORA v. JADDOU (2024)

Order

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda addressing whether joinder of all Plaintiffs in this action is proper. [Dkt. 22, 24.] For the reasons stated below, the Court holds that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) does not permit joinder of all Plaintiffs. In the alternative, if joinder is legally permissible, the Court exercises its discretion to limit joinder to those Plaintiffs whose U-visa applications are pending before an office within this district.

I. Background

Plaintiffs, dozens of applicants for U visas, filed this action against Ur Jaddou, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). [Dkt. 1.] The Court sua sponte questioned the propriety of joining all Plaintiffs in a single action because the Complaint subtly misstated the joinder standard—alleging that Plaintiffs’ claims involve “identical transactions or occurrences,” not “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”—and because the numerous Plaintiffs had been victims of crimes in, resided in, and likely applied for U visas in various states. [Dkt. 12.] At the Court's direction, Plaintiffs proposed to amend their Complaint's joinder allegations and submitted a memorandum arguing that joinder was proper. [Dkt. 22, 22-1.] Defendant received permission to file a response. [Dkt. 24.]

II. Legal Standard

Rule 20(a)(1) governs permissive joinder of plaintiffs. The Rule provides:

Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:

(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.

Both requirements must be met for joinder to be proper. Cf. Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1102–04 (7th Cir. 2022) (applying the analogous provisions of Rule 20(a)(2) that govern permissive joinder of defendants). Whether plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series thereof and raise a common question of law or fact—and thus whether joinder is allowable—is a question of law. Id. at 1103. But assuming that joinder is allowable, district courts have discretion to deny joinder if, for example, joinder will cause prejudice, expense, or delay. Id. (citing UWM Student Ass'n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2018)).

III. Analysis

The Court first analyzes whether joinder is legally proper—that is, whether Plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy both requirements of Rule 20(a)(1). Then the Court considers whether it should exercise its discretion to permit joinder.

A. Same Transaction, Occurrence, or Series Thereof

First, the Court asks whether Plaintiffs seek relief “arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A). At the outset, the parties disagree at least somewhat about the test that governs this question. Plaintiffs submit that Rule 13's “logical relationship” test to determine whether a counterclaim “arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A), also applies to Rule 20(a)(1)(A). [Dkt. 22 at 3.] See In re Price, 42 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1994); Burlington N. R.R. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707, 710–11 (7th Cir. 1990). But, as Defendants observe, the Seventh Circuit has not adopted this test in the Rule 20 context. [Dkt. 24 at 9.]

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the logical relationship test applies to Rule 20. Reading Rule 13(a)(1)(A)’s “same transaction or occurrence” to have the same meaning as Rule 20(a)(1)(A)’s use of the identical phrase accords with the canon of consistent usage. Cf., e.g., White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2021) (“In general, we presume that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’ ” (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990))). Many circuits employ the test, and there does not appear to be a competing alternative. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v. Schaefer, 2 F.4th 318, 325 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[T]wo claims arise from the same transaction — and therefore can be joined in the same action — when there is a ‘logical relationship’ between them.” (citing In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2010))); 7 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1653 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 update) (“The approach taken by many courts is reminiscent of the logical-relationship test, which has been judicially developed as a gloss on the words ‘transaction or occurrence’ used in the compulsory-counterclaim provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a).” (footnote omitted)). Defendant notes that in Dorsey, the Seventh Circuit applied Rule 20 without invoking the logical relationship text [Dkt. 124 at 9], but Dorsey devoted just one paragraph to the “same transaction or occurrence” prong and did not articulate an alternative test. 55 F.4th at 1103–04. At most, Dorsey suggests that some straightforward joinder issues can be resolved without resort to a formal test, but this notion is not incompatible with the logical relationship test being the proper standard if joinder is a closer call.

The Seventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he purpose behind the [logical relationship] rule is judicial economy; to avoid a multiplicity of actions by resolving in a single lawsuit all disputes that ensue from a common factual background.” In re Price, 42 F.3d at 1073 (citation omitted); accord Burlington, 907 F.2d at 711 (“[W]e must examine carefully the factual allegations underlying each claim to determine if the logical relationship test is met.”); 7 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1653 (“[L]anguage in a number of decisions suggests that the courts are inclined to find that claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence when the likelihood of overlapping proof and duplication in testimony indicates that separate trials would result in delay, inconvenience, and added expense to the parties and to the court.” (footnote omitted)).

Plaintiffs argue that “the ‘same transaction’ common to all Plaintiffs is that of having filed a U visa application with USCIS,” a “series of ‘many occurrences’ [that] has an undeniably strong logical relationship.” [Dkt. 122 at 4.] They add that “the heart of their claims is the delay in adjudication by USCIS,” harm caused “by USCIS's failure to act on [their] Petitions ․ Even when different officers review or have reviewed the Plaintiffs’ petitions, they are doing so under the same policies and procedures because they are employed by the same agency, directed by the Defendant.” [Id.] The Court disagrees. These claims do not share a single “common factual background,” In re Price, 42 F.3d at 1073, even under a “liberal construction” of “common transaction or occurrence,” see Burlington, 907 F.2d at 711. On Plaintiffs’ understanding of joinder, submitting an identical type of application or petition to an agency meets the “same transaction or occurrence” requirement because the agency will review the same form through the same process. But there is no guarantee that the applications will share the same factual or evidentiary basis that the logical relationship test requires. Compare, e.g., In re Price, 42 F.3d at 1074 (finding a logical relationship where “[b]oth claims ․ ar[o]se out of the debtors’ tax liability”), with, e.g., Estée Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. v. Schedule A, 334 F.R.D. 182, 187 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (finding that infringement by multiple defendants of the same patent or trademark did not share a logical relationship because “one defendant's alleged infringement does not ‘arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions of occurrences’ as another defendant's unrelated infringement” and “[w]hen defendants are not connected to one another, there is no evidentiary overlap in proving what one defendant did and what another did”).

To be sure, in some situations, a series of applications might share a logical relationship. The same person or office might process the applications, creating a factual and evidentiary nexus that supports joinder. Or a nationwide policy that all offices or employees follow might create such a nexus. It might even be possible that Plaintiffs (or some subset of them) can allege that USCIS's overall delay in processing their U-visa applications shares a common factual background, but the “facts common to all Plaintiffs” currently alleged do not suggest such a nexus. [See Dkt. 122 at 2–3; Dkt. 122-1 ¶ 18.] The factors they list indicate identical but unrelated applications, not a common series of transactions or occurrences that would share overlapping facts and evidence. See In re EMC, 677 F.3d at 1359 (“To be part of the ‘same transaction’ requires shared, overlapping facts that give rise to each cause of action, and not just distinct, albeit coincidentally identical, facts.”). [Dkt. 124 at 4–5 (emphasizing the differences between Plaintiffs, including where they live, the types of crimes they suffered, the length of time their applications have been pending, and when they filed their petitions).]

The Court holds that Plaintiffs’ claims do not satisfy Rule 20(a)(1)(A), making joinder improper. See Dorsey, 55 F.4th at 1103.

B. Common Question of Law or Fact

Turning to the second requirement for joinder, that “any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(B), the Court holds that to the extent that Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 20(a)(1)(A), they will also satisfy Rule 20(a)(1)(B) given their allegations. If Plaintiffs’ claims are logically related for purposes of Rule 20(a)(1)(A), it means they share a common core of facts, for example, because the same officer or office processed their applications. See In re Price, 42 F.3d at 1073. In that context, the Court is confident that common questions of law or fact will arise because Plaintiffs claim that USCIS acts in a systematic way toward U-visa applicants that is unreasonable as a matter of law. [See Dkt. 22 at 5.] This is enough, at least at the pleading stage.

C. Exercise of Discretion

Even if the Court is mistaken about the scope of Rule 20(a)(1)(A) and Plaintiffs’ allegation that they submitted the same type of application to USCIS constitutes the same series of transactions or occurrences, the Court will exercise its discretion not to permit all Plaintiffs to join together in this case. See Dorsey, 55 F.4th at 1103.

To the extent that adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims requires an inquiry into the individualized facts of their cases, the individuals who join in this action should have at least some connection to this district. This is not the sort of case where a single, consolidated proceeding will promote efficiency. See 7 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1652 (“The purpose of the rule is to promote trial convenience ․”). To the contrary, taking discovery from parties and witnesses who live around the country will cause inconvenience and, likely, delay and expense. Cf. UWM, 888 F.3d at 863. This concern militates against permitting joinder of all Plaintiffs currently named.

If it is unnecessary to consider the individualized facts underlying Plaintiffs’ applications, that is, the legality or reasonableness of USCIS's policies or practices can be assessed as to U-visa applicants generally, then the proper vehicle is a class action. Under those circumstances, one or a few class representatives will likely have claims that are common and typical of the class and be adequate representatives of the absent U-visa applicants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)–(4). And USCIS will have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The last requirement, that the class be so large that joinder of all members is impractical, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), appears to be satisfied for the reasons discussed above.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Rule 20(a)(1) prohibits or, alternatively, the Court will not allow all Plaintiffs to join in a single action. Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss all Plaintiffs except lead Plaintiff Montoya Zamora and her immediate family member Pedro Garcia Malagon. [Dkt. 24 at 14–15.] The Court declines to take that step for two reasons. First, the Court must not dismiss claims for misjoinder when it could have statute of limitations consequences, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000), and no party addresses this issue. Second, Defendant's view of the proper scope of joinder may be too narrow. The Court has not ruled out the possibility that larger groups than direct family members may join in a single action, and Plaintiffs are entitled to try to show that somewhat more expansive joinder is proper here. The Court cautions Plaintiffs that they must allege the common factual basis for joinder in accordance with this Order; if they fail to do so, the Court will take Defendant's suggestion and sever or dismiss Plaintiffs besides Zamora and Malagon.

A proposed second amended complaint must be filed by April 12, 2024. Along with that filing, Plaintiffs must provide a redline of that complaint compared to the initial complaint. They must also file a statement stating whether, if the Court finds that joinder is not completely proper, they prefer improperly joined Plaintiffs to have their claims severed or dismissed without prejudice.

Lindsay C. Jenkins, United States District Judge