UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MONTREECE KINDLE (2024)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant Montreece Kindle's (“Kindle”) Motion for Compassionate Release filed under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (Dkt. No. 433.) Kindle's sentence is reduced to time served.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Kindle has served about 14 years of a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence based on a law enforcement tactic frequently referred to as “stash house” sting schemes. The Court will not dive into the details of the operation because of the plethora of prior court opinions that offer highly detailed accounts of its history, including several from this Court. In sum, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) initiated the tactic in Chicago in the early 2000s by engaging confidential informants to recruit people to rob a fictitious stash house. The Government then brought charges against those who agreed and planned to help with the robbery. Eventually, the ATF discontinued the operation and offered favorable plea deals to 43 of the then-pending stash house defendants.

Kindle agreed to assist his co-defendants in robbing a made-up stash house after a confidential informant recruited Kindle's co-defendant, Leslie Mayfield (“Mayfield”). Mayfield recruited Kindle and Nathan Ward (“Ward”), and a third co-defendant joined at the last minute, Dwayne White (“White”), and in August 2009, the four planned and sought to carry out the robbery. The details of the circumstances leading up to the attempted robbery can be found in prior opinions from this Court granting Mr. White's and Mr. Ward's compassionate release motions. United States v. White, 2021 WL 3418854 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2021); United States v. Ward, 2023 WL 5004408 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 22, 2023). The co-defendants were arrested on August 10, 2009. This Court sentenced Kindle on November 2, 2010 to 300 months (25 years) imprisonment, which included 240 months on Counts One and Two (conspiring and attempting to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine) to be served concurrently with 120 months on Count Five (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); and 60 months on Count Three (possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime) to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on the other counts.

Kindle is the only one of the four total co-defendants who remains incarcerated for their 2009 stash house operation. In the past two years, this Court has granted both Mr. Ward's and Mr. White's Motions for Compassionate Release under the First Step Act, after they served 14 years and 12 years, respectively. And because Mayfield's sentence was vacated, he was able to take advantage of the ATF's change in policy surrounding stash house raids such that he was re-sentenced to only 9.5 years, despite being the most culpable of the four. See White, 2021 WL 3418854, at *4.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress abolished federal parole, meaning that “when a defendant is sentenced to prison he generally must serve the great bulk of his assigned term.” United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2019)). Instead of parole, the vehicle for early release of a federal prisoner is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See id. Until 2018, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) could seek to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 2020). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a defendant to request a reduced sentence and empowered courts to reduce a defendant's sentence after the Director is given 30 days to make a recommendation. Id. On such a motion, the court “may reduce the term of imprisonment ․ after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] if it finds that ․ extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Congress directed the Sentencing Commission, in policy statements, to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” 18 U.S.C. § 994(t). The Commission did so in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, but “Section 1B1.13 addresses motions and determinations of the Director, not motions by prisoners. In other words, the Sentencing Commission ha[d] not yet issued a policy statement ‘applicable’ to [a defendant's] request.” Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180. The Commission later amended § 1B1.13 to account for the fact that defendants can now move for reduced sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). When Congress did not act to prevent the amendment from becoming operative, the amended § 1B1.13 took effect on November 1, 2023 (the “Amended Policy Statement”). The Amended Policy Statement expanded the criteria that constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for reduced sentences under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Once a defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons, as required under the First Step Act, the Court's consideration of a motion for compassionate release proceeds in two steps. Peoples, 41 F.4th at 840. First, the defendant must identify an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction. Id. If this Court finds such reasons exist, it must then weigh any applicable sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether to reduce a sentence. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

The Government does not dispute that Kindle has exhausted all available administrative remedies. The Court turns to whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist that warrant a reduction in Kindle's sentence, and whether compassionate release comports with the sentencing factors under U.S.C § 3553(a).

A. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

1. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) – Other Reasons

The Amended Policy Statement retained the “Other Reasons” category of circumstances that constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a defendant's sentence but added the underlined words below. The category now states:

(5) Other Reasons. — The defendant presents any other circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5).

Over the last few years, several courts in this district including this one found many stash house cases to be examples of such a “combination of circumstances” that justified a sentence reduction. Under both the Amended Policy Statement and the prior version, Kindle's case would constitute an “other reason” justifying a reduction in sentence.

Kindle argues that his participation in the now discontinued stash house operations as the basis for his conviction on its own constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying his release. He cites to both this Court's decision in United States v. Ward, and Judge Kennelly's decision in United States v. Logan as support. In Logan, Judge Kennelly determined that continued imprisonment based on now discontinued stash house stings constituted on its own an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A), sentencing disparities aside. 2023 WL 2771165, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2023). In Ward, this Court agreed with Judge Kennelly on this point, but found that even if that weren't the case, the defendant's additional circumstances, including sentencing disparities, bolstered his case and justified early release.

Here, the Court finds the same. Even if continued incarceration based on stash house operations is not on its own enough to release Kindle, the resulting sentencing disparities along with Kindle's impressive rehabilitation during imprisonment establish an extraordinary and compelling reason. Tracking this Court's reasoning for releasing Kindle's co-defendants in White and Ward, the Court again emphasizes the sentencing disparities that exist between Kindle and his co-defendants, as well as between Kindle and the other individuals for whom the government's discontinued practice resulted in much lower sentences for the same or similar conduct. Mayfield, as the most culpable member of the group, served only 9.5 years – nearly five years less than Kindle has already served. White and Ward served 12 years and 14 years, respectively. And, as for other stash house defendants lucky enough to be charged after the ATF's changed policy in 2018, they served an average of just three years. (Dkt. No. 433-5.) See also, Ward, 2023 WL 5004408, at *2 (collecting cases on considering sentencing disparities in finding an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)).

While rehabilitation alone cannot justify early release, courts do take it under consideration as one factor among many that might contribute to the presence of an extraordinary and compelling reason. See Peoples, 41 F.4th at 842 (successful rehabilitation may be considered among other factors warranting a reduced sentence). The Government concedes that Kindle's rehabilitation has been “noteworthy and commendable,” though the Court finds that characterization an understatement (Gov. Br., Dkt. No. 436, at 31.) With seven letters of overwhelming support from mentees in the record, it is clear that Kindle has had a profoundly positive impact on other inmates who came to rely on him to lead Bible study, and for his enriching wisdom, positivity, and mentorship. (Dkt. No 433, Exhibits (“Exs.”) I-O). Kindle has consistently been employed during his term, and as of last June worked as a Clerk for the AM Yard Orderly work detail, with responsibilities including safety briefing and payroll duties of 22 inmates, for which he receives outstanding work reports from his supervisor. (Dkt. No. 433-2, Ex. A.) Such rehabilitation certainly contributes to the finding of an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce Kindle's sentence.

Kindle also requests the Court consider Government's decision to file a 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancement (doubling the drug mandatory minimum to 20 years based on a conviction sustained when Kindle was 19 years old) as a reason for early release. Yet even without considering the enhancement, the Court finds that Kindle's circumstances fall under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) of the Amended Policy Statement and constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason.

The Court will not consider the Government's citation to Seventh Circuit cases that this Court and others in the circuit have found to be off base in stash house compassionate release cases. See United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Walton, 2022 WL 2115302 (7th Cir. June 13, 2022); United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021). Unlike the cases cited, Kindle is not challenging an error in his original sentence or a change in sentencing law and thus the limitations posed in those cases do not constrain the Court here. See Ward, 2023 WL 5004408, at *3 (finding same or similar cases to not apply and collecting cases).

2. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) – Unusually Long Sentence

Kindle argues in the alternative that his situation constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason because § 1B1.13(b)(6) applies. The Sentencing Commission added the (b)(6) category of “Unusually Long Sentence” to the Amended Policy Statement that took effect in November 2023. This category permits non-retroactive changes in law to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, even though the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Thacker held the opposite. Thacker, 4 F.4th at 569. The newly added category states:

(6) Unusually Long Sentence. — If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant's individualized circumstances.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).

The Government argues that because Thacker’s express holding precludes nonretroactive changes in law from establishing extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce sentences under the First Step Act, the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority and § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid because the Commission was bound by Thacker. A Court in this district recently took this same position in finding § 1B1.13(b)(6) to be an impermissible reading of the statutory text in light of Thacker. United States v. Black, 2024 WL 449940, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2024). Because the Court finds that Kindle satisfies § 1B1.13(b)(5), it need not reach the issue of (b)(6) and anticipates the Seventh Circuit will resolve that open question.

B. Sentencing Factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

Because the Court found an extraordinary and compelling reason exists to reduce Kindle's sentence, the next inquiry is whether the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counsel a reduction in sentence. United States v. Sarno, 37 F.4th 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 2022).

Here, the factors counsel towards release. Requiring that Kindle serve the remainder of his sentence would not serve the goals of the sentencing guidelines. It would undermine the rule of law to keep Kindle incarcerated when less or equally culpable co-defendants served less time. It would not provide deterrence because the government no longer brings charges for participation in stash house stings. Nor would it reflect the seriousness of the crime, seeing as how Kindle has already served longer than more culpable co-defendants. Further, the lengthy ten years of supervised release will mitigate recidivism and public safety concerns by ensuring Kindle's safe reintegration into society. Kindle has organized a thorough release plan involving an employment opportunity at SMS Medical Solutions as a machine operator or warehouse selector (Dkt. No. 433-21, Ex. T), a home with his brother in Zion, IL (Dkt. No. 433-20, Ex. S), and a supportive network of family and friends, including his children and mother.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Montreece Kindle's Motion for Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C § 3582 and reduces his prison sentence to time served. This Order is stayed for fourteen (14) days for the verification of Kindle's residence, to finalize his release plan, to make appropriate travel arrangements, and to ensure Kindle's safe release. The ten-year term of supervised release and any previously ordered conditions of release shall remain in place.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court