LUXOTTICA GROUP v. ROYJAN LLC II (2026)

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Royjan, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint [Dkt. 21 – Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss]. Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefing, the Court enters the following Order.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

This trademark infringement action arises from the alleged sale of counterfeit sunglasses at an outlet store. Plaintiff Luxottica Group, S.p.A. owns the luxury eyewear brand Ray-Ban and holds various federally registered trademarks associated with that brand (the “Ray-Ban Trademarks”).¹ [Dkt. 18 – Amended Compl., at ¶¶ 9, 14]. Plaintiff Costa del Mar, Inc. owns the Costa eyewear brand and holds various federally registered trademarks associated with that brand (the “Costa Trademarks”). [Id. at ¶¶ 20, 24].

In September 2025, Plaintiffs sent an investigator to the Blairsville Mountain Outlet (“BMO”), a retail outlet store located in Blairsville, GA. [Id. at ¶ 30]. While there, the investigator allegedly observed dozens of sunglasses bearing reproductions of various Ray-Ban Trademarks. [Id.]. The investigator bought two pairs of these Ray-Ban branded sunglasses from BMO for $30 each. [Id. at ¶ 31].

Two months later, the investigator returned to BMO. During this second visit, the investigator observed several pairs of Ray-Ban branded and Costa branded sunglasses being offered for sale as “Costa Dupes” and “Ray Ban Dupes.” [Id. at ¶ 32]. Like before, the investigator purchased one pair each of Ray-Ban and Costa branded sunglasses from BMO for a total of $60. [Id. at ¶ 33].

Plaintiffs inspected the sunglasses purchased at BMO and determined that they were counterfeit. [Id. at ¶¶ 34–36]. Plaintiffs further determined that these sunglasses infringed one or more of the Ray-Ban Trademarks and the Costa Trademarks. [Id. at ¶ 35]. Plaintiffs did not authorize anyone to manufacture or sell the counterfeit sunglasses at BMO, nor did Plaintiffs authorize the use of their trademarks in connection with the same. [Id. at ¶¶ 36–37].

Each of the three Defendants in this action plays a different alleged role related to the operation of BMO. Defendant Rose Auto Accessories, Inc. (“Rose Auto”) operates BMO, and it directly advertised and sold the counterfeited sunglasses. [Id. at ¶ 6]. Defendant Royjan, LLC (“Royjan”) owns the land that BMO sits on, which it leases to Rose Auto. [See id. at ¶ 7]. And Defendant Roy M. Rose II (“Rose”) is a principal owner, officer, and manager of both Rose Auto and Royjan. [Id. at ¶ 8]. Rose also allegedly serves as a “conscious moving force” behind both of those companies. [Id. at ¶ 8].

Plaintiffs allege that Rose was “directly involved” in purchasing and selling the counterfeit sunglasses at BMO. [Id. at ¶ 39]. They further allege that in February 2026, after this lawsuit began, Rose contacted Plaintiffs' counsel by telephone regarding their allegations against him. [Id. at ¶ 44]. During the call, Rose stated: “They put ‘dupes.’ We didn't know whether it's real of fake, so we thought it was cute.” [Id.].

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs brought this action for trademark infringement in February 2026. [Dkt. 1]. After the Court granted multiple extensions of time, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, asserting claims under the Lanham Act for (1) direct trademark infringement against both Rose Auto and Rose and (2) contributory trademark infringement against Royjan. [Dkt. 18].

Rose Auto and Rose both filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. [Dkt. 20]. But Royjan moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. [Dkt. 21]. Plaintiffs filed a response to Royjan's motion, and Royjan filed a reply. [See Dkts. 22, 23]. Accordingly, Royjan's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is now ripe for the Court's review.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8. To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ․ to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is “plausible on its face” when the facts support a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018).

To make this determination, the Court “accept[s] the facts alleged in the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. By contrast, the Court ignores legal conclusions or factual contentions masquerading as legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

II. Analysis

Defendants do not seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim that direct trademark infringement occurred at BMO.² Rather, Royjan, BMO's alleged landlord, seeks dismissal only of the claim against it for contributory trademark infringement. Royjan generally argues that the Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations as to its knowledge of any ongoing infringement at BMO, which is required to create contributory liability. The Court addresses this argument below.

Under the Lanham Act, a trademark owner may hold someone contributorily liable for the direct trademark infringement of another. Such claims require a plaintiff to show that the contributory infringer induced or knowingly facilitated the direct infringement:

A claim for contributory trademark infringement thus has two elements: (1) a person or entity commits direct trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; and (2) the defendant (a) “intentionally induces” the direct infringer to commit infringement, (b) supplies a “product” to the direct infringer whom it “knows” is directly infringing (actual knowledge), or (c) supplies a “product” to the direct infringer whom it “has reason to know” is directly infringing (constructive knowledge).

Luxottica Grp., S.p.A. v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC, 932 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Inwood Lab'ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab'ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 2188, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982)). “[W]illful blindness is a form of constructive knowledge for contributory trademark infringement.” Id. at 1313. “Willful blindness occurs when a person ‘suspects wrongdoing and deliberately fails to investigate.’ ” Id. (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992)). The Eleventh Circuit has suggested that “a landlord may be contributorily liable for its (sub)tenants' direct trademark infringement if the landlord ․ has reason to know of the infringement while supplying a service (such as space, utilities, or maintenance) that facilitates it.” Id.

As mentioned, Royjan does not challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' allegations that Rose Auto and Rose directly infringed the Ray-Ban Trademarks and the Costa Trademarks by selling counterfeit sunglasses at BMO. Royjan also concedes that Plaintiffs properly allege that Royjan supplied and controlled a space at which the other Defendants committed the purported infringement. [See Dkt. 23, at 3]. But Royjan attacks the sufficiency of the allegations regarding its knowledge. Royjan avers that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts as to whether Royjan actually knew or had reason to know of the purported infringement at BMO.

After careful review, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint contains enough allegations to plausibly infer that Royjan possessed at least constructive knowledge of the direct infringement at BMO. The Court specifically finds it plausible that Defendant Rose had reason to know of or was willfully blind to the alleged direct infringement. And the Court finds it plausible that Rose's knowledge can be imputed to Royjan at least under an agency theory.³

The Court begins with the allegations regarding Rose's knowledge of the infringement. Plaintiffs allege that Rose was “directly involved” in approving the purchase and sale of the counterfeit sunglasses at BMO. [Dkt. 18, at ¶ 39]. Rose's company, Rose Auto, openly advertised and offered the sunglasses for sale as “Costa Dupes” and “Ray-Ban Dupes.” [See id. at ¶¶ 8, 32]. And Rose personally acknowledged during a phone call with Plaintiffs' counsel regarding the counterfeit sunglasses that “they put dupes” and that he “didn't know whether it's real or fake.” [Id. at ¶ 44 (cleaned up)]. Taken together, these allegations plausibly suggest that Rose was willfully blind to the direct infringement because he “suspect[ed] wrongdoing and deliberately fail[ed] to investigate.” Luxottica Grp., S.p.A., 932 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149).

The Court further finds that Rose's willful blindness can plausibly be imputed to Royjan under principles of agency law. “Corporations act only through their officers and agents. Under the traditional law of agency, the acts and intentions of those agents are therefore imputed to the corporation itself.” Trust v. O'Connor, 2012 WL 12836517, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2012) (citing Beck v. Deloitte & Touche, 144 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998)). “An agent's knowledge is ‘imputed to the principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the agent's duties to the principal.’ ” Fuss v. Bensch, 2026 WL 777200, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2026) (quoting Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 5.03 (A.L.I. 2006)) (applying agency theory in context of claim for contributory copyright infringement).

At this stage, the Court finds it plausible that Rose acted as an agent for Royjan as its principal owner, officer and manager. [Dkt. 18, at ¶ 8]. As an agent, Rose's knowledge of any direct infringement would certainly be material to his duties to Royjan given that the infringement occurred on Royjan's property. Thus, Rose's knowledge can plausibly be imputed to Royjan as its agent, and Plaintiffs have therefore stated a claim for contributory infringement as to Royjan.

Royjan's remaining arguments for dismissal are unavailing. First, Royjan suggests that under Luxottica Group, S.p.A. v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC, knowledge of direct infringement cannot arise until a plaintiff notifies a defendant that its merchandise is counterfeit. 932 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2019); [See Dkt. 21-1, at 7–8 (“There are no factual allegations that Royjan ․ continued to sell Plaintiffs' sunglasses after being informed of their allegedly counterfeit status.”)].

That is not the holding of Luxottica. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the defendant-landlord had knowledge of its tenants' infringement because it failed to investigate the infringement after receiving notice letters from the plaintiff. Luxottica, 932 F.3d at 1314. But the Eleventh Circuit also stated that a defendant's knowledge “could arise from many sources.” Id. Here, even without notice letters, the Court can plausibly infer that Royjan had knowledge of the infringement through Rose's knowledge of and involvement in purchasing and advertising the allegedly counterfeit sunglasses.

Next, Royjan says that the Amended Complaint does not accuse Defendants of long-term marketing of the infringing sunglasses. [Dkt. 23, at 4]. Royjan argues that Plaintiffs failed to specifically allege when the direct infringement began or whether it continued after the investigator visited BMO. While Royjan may be correct on this point, the federal pleading standard allows the Court to draw “reasonable inferences” from the facts pled. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Here, although the investigator purchased the “dupe” sunglasses on only two occasions months apart, the Court can reasonably infer that Defendants sold the sunglasses before, between, or after these two occasions. [Dkt. 18, at ¶¶ 30, 32].

Finally, Royjan insists that Plaintiffs' allegations do not tell the full story. Royjan makes several factual assertions regarding BMO's operation and its relationship with Defendants, and Royjan argues that these assertions undermine the allegations of contributory infringement. [See, e.g., Dkt. 21, at 1 (“BMO does not even know the specific overstock and closeout merchandise it is purchasing until such merchandise is delivered ․”); id. (“BMO and Rose Auto are no longer operated by Rose.”); id. (“Royjan does not have ․ any involvement with the purchase, sale, pricing, or labeling of the bulk overstock and closeout merchandise found at BMO.”)].

This argument is premature because none of the assertions that Royjan relies on appear in the Amended Complaint. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) ․ matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment ․”). While discovery may ultimately reveal that Royjan was right all along and that no liability should be imposed against it, for now, the Court must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. Accordingly, the Court will deny Royjan's motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Royjan's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint [Dkt. 21] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 29th day of June, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court accepts Plaintiffs' well-pled allegations as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018).

2.   Rose Auto and Rose generally deny all allegations of direct trademark infringement. [See Dkt. 20 – Answer, at ¶¶ 45–50].

3.   Plaintiffs also allege that Royjan can be held liable for infringement under an alter ego theory. See Cobra 4 Enters. v. Powell-Newman, 336 Ga.App. 609, 785 S.E.2d 556, 560 (2016) (“Under the alter ego doctrine, equitable principles are used to disregard the separate and distinct legal existence possessed by a corporation where it is established that the corporation served as a mere alter ego or business conduit of another.” (quoting Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 267 Ga. 419, 479 S.E.2d 751, 752 (1997))).

RICHARD W. STORY, United States District Judge