MARISSA RENEE RODRIGUEZ v. CLAYTON COUNTY GEORGIA (2026)

ORDER

On November 19, 2023, Charlie Zegarra-Arroyo was beaten to death by a violent and erratic cellmate. Both men suffered from mental illness, which was inadequately treated during their incarceration at the Clayton County Detention Center. Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo had spent the prior two years in jail on allegations that he had stolen luggage from an Atlanta airport terminal. For that infraction, he was killed in custody. Plaintiff Marissa Renee Rodriguez, who is Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's mother, brings charges against Clayton County, Sheriff Levon Allen, and a number of jail staff, who she alleges were deliberately indifferent to the substantial threat to her son's safety. Defendants have moved to dismiss the bulk of these claims. For the reasons below, the Court finds Plaintiff's suit appropriately well-plead to continue at this juncture.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Clayton County Detention Center

The Clayton County Detention Center (“CCDC”) is primarily a pre-trial facility — in other words, it is intended for short-term detention. Yet, as Plaintiff puts it, “[CCDC] is and was, during all relevant times, chronically overcrowded, understaffed, in disrepair, inhumane, and unconstitutionally dangerous.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 21). “From 2020 to February 2023, at least 17 people died while in custody at the Jail,” including multiple homicides and suicides. (Id. ¶ 24). At least three had serious mental illness. (Id. ¶ 26). In 2024, the year following Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's killing, another eight inmates died. (Id. ¶ 24).¹ And the flood of violence at CCDC has not abated since then.² Plaintiff alleges that “[s]tabbings are a daily event.” (Id. ¶ 56).

As recounted in Plaintiff's Complaint, infrastructure issues contribute to the violence and chaos at CCDC. For example, “[m]any of the cell doors could not securely close, allowing dangerous detainees to roam freely from cell to cell.” (Id. ¶ 58–62); see also Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, His Jail Cell Wouldn't Lock. Then He Was Assaulted., THE APPEAL (July 18, 2024), theappeal.org/clayton-county-jail-cell-locks-lawsuit-georgia/ (describing assault in Clayton County jail). Though the issue of malfunctioning jail locks at CCDC was set to be taken up by the Clayton County Board of Commissioners in September 2022, the agenda item was removed from consideration. (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 65). The jail also faces flooding, untenable temperatures, and unsanitary conditions, including standing water and mold. (Id. ¶ 43); see also Tyler Fingert, Inside the Clayton County Jail: Sheriff Allen Gives FOX 5 a Tour of ‘Deteriorating’ Facility, FOX 5 ATLANTA (Feb. 17, 2024), www.fox5atlanta.com/news/clayton-county-jail-sheriff-allen-overcrowding; Clayton County Jail Without AC During Heat Wave, FOX 5 ATLANTA (June 30, 2024), www.fox5atlanta.com/news/clayton-county-jail-no-ac-during-heat-wave.

The pervasive violence and abysmal conditions at CCDC appear to have led to a public blame game between Sheriff Levon Allen and the Clayton County Board of Commissioners. In January 2025, Sheriff Allen asked the Commissioners for an additional $6.5 million in funding “to expand the jail's capacity and to properly classify inmates.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 45). Sheriff Allen subsequently filed a verified petition in Clayton County Superior Court for equitable relief against the Commissioners, “alleging that the Board's failure to fund the Jail was causing unconstitutional, unsafe, and inhumane conditions.” (Id. ¶ 46; see also Doc. 39-1). The petition revealed, among many other concerns, that CCDC regularly housed roughly 2,000 detainees daily — despite a capacity of 1,535 and a staff of roughly 120 correctional officers. (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 47–48).

B. Factual Background

Carlos Alfredo (“Charlie”) Zegarra-Arroyo, whose tragic death is at the center of this case, is the Plaintiff's son. In December 2021, Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo was arrested for allegedly stealing luggage from the airport. (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 20). As a non-violent offender with a felony charge, he was assessed as a “medium” risk (i.e., no known propensity for violence) and was detained pretrial at CCDC, where he would stay until his untimely death in November 2023. (Id. ¶ 68).

Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo suffered from serious mental illness, including schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. (Id. ¶ 19). He was assessed as such when he entered CCDC. (Id. ¶ 69). According to Plaintiff, Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's mental health records “make clear that his housing unit was meant to be an isolation or segregation unit, for his own safety.” (Id. ¶ 72). “Charlie had a tendency to suffer from confusion and limited insight that made him susceptible to danger or [not] fully understand[ing] his situation.” (Id. ¶ 71). Yet, “as recently as August 2023, [he] was not taking his schizophrenia/bipolar medication as directed and was reflecting a reduced capacity for general awareness of his surroundings.” (Id. ¶ 70).

According to Plaintiff's allegations, on November 1, 2023, Officer Fullerton and Officer Blake, both CCDC officers and defendants, transferred Jaquez Jackson to Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's unit, “where they knew detainees could walk freely from cell to cell.” (Id. ¶ 78). According to Plaintiff, Jackson was required to be housed in a strictly controlled unit, and thus this decision was not merely ill-advised, but impermissible. (Id. ¶ 79). Plaintiff alleges that Jackson “was well known to Jail staff as an aggressive and unstable individual”; that he was “assessed as a ‘maximum’ or ‘high risk’ detainee who posed a real and continuous risk of danger to other detainees”; and that he was supposed to be housed in a unit with “strictly controlled access.” (Id. ¶ 75).

Jackson had a well-documented history of violence, including assaults on other detainees and jail staff.

Written incident reports indicate, for example, that: he was the aggressor in a detainee on detainee fight in July 2023; he was the aggressor in two detainee on detainee fights in August 2023; that after one of those fights, he tried to attack an officer; that he was the aggressor in a fight in September; and that on November 13, 2023, less than a week before Charlie's death, he attacked another detainee and then became aggressive towards officers who tried to stop the attack. Defendant Walker was one of the officers who witnessed the attack and who was attacked by Jackson. Jail records also indicate that on September 9, 2023, Jackson was “placed behind a closed door, because of safety reasons and harming other inmates.”

(Id. ¶ 76). According to Plaintiff, Officer Claiborne and Officer Broussard, both CCDC officers and defendants, “reviewed and approved of these reports and knew Jackson was a dangerous, ‘maximum’ risk detainee.” (Id. ¶ 77). Nevertheless, due to staffing shortages, “rounds in the unit [where Jackson and Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo were housed] were infrequent and inconsistent.” (Id. ¶ 83).

On November 19, 2023, less than three weeks after being transferred to Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's unit, Jackson began displaying erratic and dangerous behavior “in front of officers assigned to the unit, including Defendants Curry and Walker.” (Id. ¶ 84). “Among other things, Jackson climbed onto the upper-tier railing in the unit, threatened to jump, and otherwise acted in a manner that made clear he posed a serious risk to himself and others.” (Id.). The officers on duty, including Officer Curry, “left the housing unit without securing detainees in their cells” and with no further precautionary measures. (Id. ¶ 85). Minutes after the officers left, Jackson approached Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo and “launched a brutal, unprovoked attack[.]” (Id. ¶ 88). In cases of such extreme violence, mincing words does a disservice to the deceased: Jackson beat Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo to death.³ (Id.). Jackson was charged with Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's murder and, as of the filing of this suit, the prosecution remained pending. (Id. ¶ 93).

In Plaintiff's view, Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's death was not merely tragic, but indeed preventable. “Had the doors in the Jail been functioning properly, had Jackson been properly classified and housed, had officers secured the unit and maintained supervision after witnessing Jackson's erratic behavior, or had reasonable accommodations been made for Charlie's mental illness, Jackson would not have been able to reach and kill him.” (Id. ¶ 90).

C. Procedural History

In November 2025, Plaintiff, on her own behalf and as administrator of Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's estate, brought claims under the Eighth Amendment and Georgia law against Clayton County Sheriff Levon Allen; Officer Mikell Maurice Walker, Jr.; Officer Anwar Yuri Fullerton; Officer Mahkya Curry; Officer Harvey William Claiborne Jr.; Officer Courtland James Broussard; and Officer Ladonna Blake (the “Individual Defendants”), as well as Clayton County itself. In January 2026, Plaintiff amended her Complaint. (FAC, Doc. 22). As amended, Plaintiff brings the following claims: a state law claim for negligent breach of ministerial duty against the Individual Defendants (Count One); federal constitutional claims of deliberate indifference against the Individual Defendants and Clayton County (Counts Two, Three); and state law claims for attorneys' fees and punitive damages against all Defendants (Counts Four, Five). All Defendants have moved to dismiss the case, though in piecemeal fashion due to delays in service.⁴ [Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 27; Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33; Walker MTD, Doc. 44; Blake MTD, Doc. 51]. Those Motions are fully briefed and ready for the Court's review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must include “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In assessing such a motion, a court accepts the complaint's factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions, as true. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

A claim is plausible where the plaintiff alleges factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A plaintiff need not provide “detailed factual allegations” to survive dismissal, but the “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to allege sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 556.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I: Negligent Breach of Ministerial Duties

Plaintiff's first claim alleges that the Individual Defendants “failed to discharge their duty to protect [Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's] health and safety” by violating ministerial duties of their “special relationship” as Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's jailers and guards. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that:

• “Defendant Allen failed to maintain a jail with functioning locks”;

• “Defendants Curry and Walker witnessed Jackson behaving erratically [and] knew he presented an immediate danger to other detainees,” but “failed to secure Jackson [or] report his behavior,” “[i]n violation of written policies governing the Jail”;

• “Defendants Fullerton and Blake were classification officers who were aware of Jackson's history and ‘maximum’ classification, and therefore knew that he posed a danger to other detainees,” but nevertheless “placed Jackson in a unit where he was able to walk freely from cell to cell without adequate supervision”; and

• “Defendants Claiborne and Broussard were supervisory officials who knew of Jackson's conduct and propensity for violence, and who had the authority and ministerial duty to ensure Jackson was properly housed ․ but failed to take action.”

(FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 94–105). In Plaintiff's view, these alleged failures are the cause of Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's death.

In response, the Individual Defendants assert their official immunity from tort liability here. “Under Georgia law, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for [1] ministerial acts negligently performed or [2] acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.” Arries v. Hill, 686 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (Totenberg, J.) (quoting Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 619 (Ga. 2010)); see also Ga. Const. art. 1, § 2, ¶ IX(d). Plaintiff does not appear to assert that the Individual Defendants' conduct was undertaken with malice.

Rather, the parties' dispute centers on whether the Individual Defendants' actions in maintaining the jail, classifying inmates, and protecting inmates were ministerial functions or discretionary functions. In Defendants' portrayal, “establishing policies and the operation of a law enforcement department, including supervision [of] officers” and “making decisions about where an inmate should be housed,” are entirely discretionary functions and, thus, invoke the Individual Defendants' official immunity. (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 23–24; see also Walker MTD, Doc. 44-1 at 3; Blake MTD, Doc. 51-1 at 3). Plaintiff, of course, disagrees. (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 20–25).

“A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite ․ requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.” Golden v. Vickery, 285 Ga. App. 216, 217–18 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). In contrast, “[a] discretionary act calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” Id. at 218. “A ministerial duty may be established in a variety of ways, including by written or unwritten policy, a supervisor's directive, or by statute.” Patel v. Lanier County, 969 F.3d 1173, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hill v. Jackson, 336 Ga. App. 679, 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)). “Determination of whether the act is ministerial or discretionary thus turns upon the facts of each case.” Golden, 285 Ga. App. at 218.

1. Sheriff Allen — Malfunctioning Doors and Locks

The Court turns first to Plaintiff's allegations against Sheriff Allen, specifically that the Sheriff negligently breached his ministerial duty when he “failed to maintain a jail with functioning locks.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 96). Defendants raise official immunity on the broad proposition that “establishing policies and the operation of a law enforcement department ․ are discretionary functions.” (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 23 (quoting Carter v. Glenn, 249 Ga. App. 414, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001))). Plaintiff, however, points to a specific Georgia statute that, in her view, imposes a ministerial duty upon Sheriff Allen to maintain the locks at CCDC and makes the “conclusion ․ obvious for Sheriff Allen.” (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 20). Under the Georgia law governing detention facilities, “[r]egular locking and unlocking of door and fire escape locks shall be made to determine if they are in good working order. Any damaged or nonfunctioning security equipment shall be promptly repaired.” O.C.G.A. § 42-4-31(d). As a reminder, “[a] ministerial duty may be established in a variety of ways, including ․ by statute.” Patel, 969 F.3d at 1192. At this juncture, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that maintenance of the jail's locks such that the they are “in good working order” and the “prompt[ ] repair[ ]” of “[a]ny damaged or nonfunctioning security equipment” is a ministerial task because it is an absolute and definite obligation imposed by statute. Thus, Sheriff Allen's official immunity defense fails at this juncture.

2. Officers Blake, Fullerton, Claiborne, and Broussard — Inmate Classification

As Plaintiff points out, “[t]he analysis is more nuanced for [the] subordinate jailers.” (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 21). Each jailer's conduct at issue is slightly different. “Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Fullerton, Claiborne, and Broussard,” as well as Defendant Blake, “breached their ministerial duties to secure Jackson, a person already classified as a maximum-security detainee, in an appropriate unit.” (Id. at 24; Pls. Opp. to Blake MTD, Doc. 52 at 2; see also FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 77–78). In Plaintiff's view, then, “[a]ny discretion involved in assigning ‘maximum’ status to Jackson had already been exercised.” (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 24). Rather, Plaintiff alleges, the officers breached their ministerial duty as established by the Georgia Sheriffs' Association model classification policy, to house maximum-security detainees in “single-bunked cells with slider doors and strictly controlled access.” (See id. at 21; FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 75). Defendants dismiss this contention on the grounds that (1) “decisions about where an inmate should be housed [are] also a discretionary function” and (2) the model classification policy, which Plaintiff relies upon, does not govern CCDC. (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 12, 23–24).

Indeed, courts have deemed inmate classification decisions as discretionary. See Birts v. Clayton County, 2026 WL 1196706, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2026), appeal docketed No. 26-11223 (11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) (holding officers' “decisions relating to cell placement” were discretionary); Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187, 192 (Ga Ct. App 2003) (holding jail manager's decision regarding cell placement was discretionary because it was based on “his examination of the facts, his experience, and the exercise of his best judgment”), disapproved of on different grounds by City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 301 Ga. 257 (Ga. 2017); Hill v. Jackson, 336 Ga. App. 679, 686–687 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (holding inmate classification decisions were discretionary where policy required “medical and custody staff [to] communicate about inmates with special needs that may impact” decisions).

Defendants' second argument, that the Georgia Sheriffs' Association model classification policy carries no force and thus creates no ministerial obligations for CCDC staff, is less clear cut. The Court takes at face value Defendants' contention that “CCSO has not adopted the policies discussed in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.” (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 24). But the Court does not read Plaintiff's Amended Complaint or Opposition Brief to infer that the model policy is binding. Rather, in the Court's view, Plaintiff suggests the possibility that CCDC has analogous policies governing the classification of inmates. Plaintiff argues that, “[b]etween Clayton County's scant written policy and the fact that the Georgia Sheriffs' Association has far more specific, detailed rules for classification and housing, it is certainly plausible that the CCSO operates under additional unwritten policies or supervisor directives than are presently known.” (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 22).

In Defendants' view, that contention is unduly speculative even at the Motion to Dismiss stage. (Reply ISO Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 40 at 13–14). But it is easy to cast Plaintiff's allegations as speculative after denying Plaintiff access to documents that would have helped substantiate (or disprove) those allegations. (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 21 n.5 (“Defendants did not mention that prior to litigation, Plaintiff[ ] submitted Open Records Act requests to Clayton County for its full Standard Operating Procedures, and were rebuffed. Or that during the briefing of this motion, Plaintiff[ ] [was] refused the full SOPs by counsel opposite.”)). And, at this juncture, the burden of proof falls in Plaintiff's favor.

Ultimately, this Court returns to a first guiding principle: This matter comes before it on a Motion to Dismiss. The Court must, at this stage, take as true Plaintiff's allegations as to the significance of the model classification policy. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And, indeed, for this reason, decisions as to whether duties are ministerial or discretionary are not well-suited to the motion to dismiss stage of litigation proceedings. See Wingo v. Harris, 2024 WL 1478030, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2024) (Calvert, J.), aff'd 160 F.4th 1184 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Georgia courts are clear that a determination of whether a public agent's acts are ministerial or discretionary ‘is dependent upon the facts of the individual case, particularly such fact or facts as specifically relevant to the official act or omission from which liability arises.’ ” (quoting Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga. App. 235, 237–238 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006))); Hyers v. Bacon County, 2025 WL 3270206, at *14 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2025) (finding that “the ministerial versus discretionary function inquiry is better suited for a later stage in the litigation process—not a motion to dismiss”); Patel, 969 F.3d at 1192 (“[W]here the relevant facts pertaining to immunity are in dispute, the trial court is without authority to resolve those factual issue [even] on a motion for summary judgment.” (quoting Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga. App. 563, 575 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011))). For these reasons, the Court declines at this early stage to sustain Defendants' official immunity defense as to Officers Blake, Fullerton, Claiborne, and Broussard.

3. Officers Curry, Walker — Prevention of Attack

The final part of Plaintiff's first claim alleges that “Defendants Curry and Walker witnessed Jackson behaving erratically [and] knew he presented an immediate danger to other detainees,” but “failed to secure Jackson [or] report his behavior,” “[i]n violation of written policies governing the Jail[.]” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 98). Defendants again raise a defense of official immunity, arguing anemically that “establishing policies and the operation of a law enforcement department, including supervision to officers, are discretionary functions.” (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 23; Walker MTD, Doc. 44-1 at 3). This appears to overstate the law. Indeed, in many cases, duties related to the “operation of a law enforcement department” are ministerial. See, e.g., Lundy v. Hancock County, 368 Ga. App. 772, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023) (holding jail policies “clearly establish ministerial duties for detention officers” to observe suicidal inmates at particular time intervals); Brantley v. Jones, 363 Ga. App. 466, 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) (reaffirming “in the context of detention officers, that the acts of following established policies of inspecting and monitoring detainees are ministerial tasks,” including “the 15-minute watch procedure at issue in this case,” which “involves no exercise of discretion” (cleaned up)).

It is thus plausible — though not certain — that Officers Curry and Walker breached ministerial duties in their failure to respond to Jackson's erratic behavior or otherwise prevent the attack on Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo. Because CCDC has not, to this point, provided Plaintiff with its full policies governing officers' duties, it is impossible at this juncture to determine whether any policy imposed an obligatory duty that was breached by their inaction. See Wingo, 2024 WL 1478030, at *12 (finding breach of ministerial duties where officers failed to comply with a “clear, absolute, and definite ministerial duty to conduct 12-to-15-minute increment security rounds” of isolated cell); Brantley, 363 Ga. App. at 475 (finding “jury question as to what the procedure in fact required” where officers failed to comply with 15-minute watch requirement).

Certainly, courts have found that officers' conduct related to the prevention of attacks can be discretionary. Those decisions, however, are often made at summary judgment. See Davis v. Pringle, 642 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (summary judgment) (“[T]he decision not to take further precautions with respect to plaintiff's safety ․ stem from an exercise in discretionary judgment․ The same cannot be said for the conduct of defendants in responding to plaintiff's attack.”); Melton v. McCarthan, 356 Ga. App. 676 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (summary judgment) (finding sergeant's failure to investigate previous fight between inmates, which precipitated assault at issue, was not a breach of ministerial duty because previous shift sergeant failed to file incident report). But see Riley v. Clayton County, 2026 WL 61369 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2026) (motion to dismiss) (finding policy that did not instruct “how often the officers ․ must visually monitor inmates, the manner in which they must do so, or which inmate movements must be monitored” created discretionary duties). Thus, the Court finds at this initial juncture that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Officer Curry and Walker breached a ministerial duty in their failure to take any action after witnessing a dangerous situation.

B. Count II: Deliberate Indifference of Jail Officers

Having addressed Plaintiff's first state law claim, the Court now turns to the federal constitutional claims against the six CCDC officers. The Court first lays out the two rigorous legal standards Plaintiff must meet: first, to plead a claim under the Eleventh Circuit's deliberate indifference case law, and, second to overcome the Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity. The Court then applies these two standards to the allegations as plead against each officer.⁵

1. Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment forbids the “inflict[ion]” of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “Pretrial detainees like [Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo] are protected to the same extent as prisoners by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.” Taylor v. Hughes, 920 F.3d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Although the plaintiffs' claim technically arises under the Fourteenth Amendment because they are pretrial detainees rather than convicted prisoners, it is ‘evaluated under the same standard as a prisoner's claim of inadequate care under the Eighth Amendment.’ ” (quoting Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole County, 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017))); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause affords respondent no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”). Thus, the analysis is equivalent.

The protections of the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated herein by the Fourteenth Amendment, require prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (cleaned up). That requirement includes “protect[ing] prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833. However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another ․ translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Id. “Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under section 1983.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990). Rather, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment “if he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). The Eleventh Circuit has articulated the deliberate indifference standard as having both objective and subjective elements:

[f]irst, of course, the plaintiff must demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’ ”

Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” and to do so he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.”

Wade v. McDade (“Wade I”), 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).⁶

Though questions of deliberate indifference and subsequent immunity issues can certainly be adjudicated at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court notes the highly factual nature of these questions. “In deliberate-indifference cases, as in life, context matters.” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that “the threshold of deliberate indifference is connected to combinations of diverse interdependent factual elements”); Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994) (determining that “[t]he objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is ․ contextual” (cleaned up))). “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence ․ and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; see also Wade, 106 F.4th at 1263 (Jordan, J., concurring).

2. Officers' Subjective Knowledge

The Individual Defendants primarily take issue with Plaintiff's allegations as to whether they were “subjectively aware that [their] own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. First, they argue that Jackson's conduct did not establish a “strong likelihood” of violence toward Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo. Plaintiff contends that the defense misconstrues the legal standard. Both parties are partially correct and partially in error.

Plaintiff suggests that “the ‘strong likelihood’ standard is not good law” and that “[t]he term is a vestigial, pre-1994 standard that did not survive the Supreme Court's decision in [Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)].” (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 13 n.1). It is true, as Plaintiff notes, that the phrase does not appear in either Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825, or Wade, 106 F.4th at 1251. But the Eleventh Circuit has held as recently as 2025 — post-dating its revised “deliberate indifference” framework in Wade — “that officials must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a ‘strong likelihood’ of injury, not a ‘mere possibility.’ ” Oliver v. Warden, Wilcox State Prison, 2025 WL 1178369, at *5 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025); see also Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019). Moreover, the Wade court indicated that prior Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases “should continue to be cited as binding precedent” if they are not inconsistent with that decision. 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring). The Court does not see the Marbury framing of “a strong likelihood of injury” as materially different from the Wade framing of “a substantial risk of serious harm.”

However, Plaintiff is correct that she need not prove a strong likelihood or substantial risk of injury to Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo specifically in order to sufficiently plead an Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Eleventh Circuit has said as such: “[I]t does not matter ‘whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.’ ” Bugge v. Roberts, 430 F. App'x 753 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843); see also Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n official may not escape liability merely by showing that he did not know the claimant was likely to be assaulted or that an assault would be committed by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.”).

The Individual Defendants also contend that Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege their individual subjective knowledge. Broadly speaking, Plaintiff alleges that the officers were familiar with Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's vulnerability; Jackson's violent nature; and the infrastructural weaknesses that made violence more likely.

Lower-level Jail officers [ ] knew that Charlie was mentally ill and vulnerable. They also knew that the man who killed him, Jaquez Jackson, had a lengthy history of fights and aggressive behavior, had been involved in prior violent incidents inside the jail, and had recently been acting in an especially erratic and dangerous manner inside Charlie's housing unit. Despite this knowledge, Defendants placed Jackson and Charlie [together] in a unit where cell doors did not reliably lock, where men could roam from cell to cell, and where officers were frequently unable or unwilling to conduct adequate rounds and control the behavior of dangerous detainees.

(FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 4).

Plaintiff alleges Jackson “was well known to Jail staff as an aggressive and unstable individual. Based on his criminal history and pending charges, Jackson was assessed as a ‘maximum’ or ‘high risk’ detainee who posed a real and continuous risk of danger to other detainees.” (Id. ¶ 75). Most probative of the jail staff's putative knowledge is the documentation of Jackson's violent history:

Incident reports and other jail records reflect that Jackson had been involved in multiple fights or assaults on other detainees prior to November 19, 2023, and that he had often been the aggressor in those incidents. Written incident reports indicate, for example, that: he was the aggressor in an detainee on detainee fight in July 2023; he was the aggressor in two detainee on detainee fights in August 2023; that after one of those fights, he tried to attack an officer; that he was the aggressor in a fight in September; and that on November 13, 2023, less than a week before Charlie's death, he attacked another detainee and then became aggressive towards officers who tried to stop the attack․ Jail records also indicate that on September 9, 2023, Jackson was “placed behind a closed door, because of safety reasons and harming other inmates.”

(Id. ¶ 76).

To establish deliberate indifference in the failure-to-protect context, “a plaintiff must show ‘more than a generalized awareness of risk.’ ” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1234. “While ‘occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment ․ confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign is actionable.’ ” Id. (quoting Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added). Thus, “the plaintiff must show ‘that serious inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something close to it.’ ” Id.

Eleventh Circuit precedent as to how plaintiffs may establish deliberate indifference is less than perfectly clear. Courts often sustain failure-to-protect claims when the plaintiff has previously communicated to the jail staff threats by the would-be perpetrator. Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2024), cert denied 145 S. Ct. 178 (2024) (precluding summary judgment where perpetrator who had been convicted of racial attack assaulted white inmate “[a]nd the classification officers stated that they would have taken steps to isolate [the perpetrator] from white inmates had the officers known of his racial motive”); Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1103 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying summary judgment to officers where the attacker was “housed in a separate unit for violent and disruptive inmates and [ ] had already threatened his cellmate's [ ] safety through the intentional and dangerous act of setting their shared, locked cell on fire” and where “almost immediately after [plaintiff] was rescued from that fiery cell, [he] specifically told the defendants that he feared that his life was in danger if he was returned to the locked cell”); Jackson v. Stevens, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338 (M.D. Ga. 2010) (precluding summary judgment where correctional officer “heard [attacker] specifically say that he would try to kill or harm Plaintiff and not to put them in a cell together”).⁷

Similarly, in successful failure-to-protect claims, “the plaintiff has [often] pointed to specific features of a facility or its population rendering it particularly violent,” such as “pervasive staffing and logistical issues rendering prison officials unable to address near-constant violence, tensions between different subsets of a prison population, [or] unique risks posed by individual prisoners or groups of prisoners due to characteristics like mental illness.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235 (emphasis added); see also Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584–1585 (reviving deliberate indifference claim where plaintiff presented evidence that “the excessive risk of violence flowed from an atmosphere of deliberate indifference reflected in [the sheriff's] failure to classify or segregate violent from non-violent inmates, assign inmates to cells or beds, adequately train the jailers, and adequately supervise and monitor the inmates”); Brooks v. Toby, 2025 WL 888554, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2025) (sustaining deliberate indifference claims at motion to dismiss stage where plaintiff who was assaulted plausibly alleged “an environment of extreme violence” based on at least 10 deaths in the prior year and numerous assaults) (alleging that there was “no segregation of inmates based on histories of violence or mental illness; that [jail] staff failed to detect weapons and cell phone usage; and that [the jail] was ‘routinely understaffed’ ”).

The Court notes that several similar factors are present in the instant proceeding, including the pervasively malfunctioning locks, which were well-known within the jail and highly publicized even to the general public; the serious inadequacy of measures both to treat mental illness and to keep safe mentally ill inmates; and the pervasive understaffing. (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 2, 46–49, 58–61). It is also worth noting that evaluating an officer's subjective awareness regarding the risk of harm and the effects of their own conduct is a fact-intensive issue not well elucidated at the motion to dismiss stage, given the type of evidence that such claims may reveal during discovery. See, e.g., Boykins v. Dunn, 696 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1083 (N.D. Ala. 2023) (finding fact dispute as to officer's subjective knowledge based on officer testimony tending to prove that he “knew that failure to enforce safety measures at [the prison] could result in serious harm to himself or other inmates”). See also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (requiring plausible allegations “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” in support); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways[.]”).

The district court in Wells v. McCovery, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1236 (M.D. Ala. 2025), identified astutely the important function of the plausibility standard in evaluating the subjective element of deliberate indifference.

Admittedly, the[ ] allegations regarding the defendants' knowledge of a particular threat to [the inmate] are sparse and make the particularized-risk claim a close call. However, the standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage is one of plausibility, not probability. The amended complaint asserts obvious dereliction of duty by the defendants, as well as a lack of transparency from the defendants to the decedent Wells's family regarding the circumstances of Wells's death and any subsequent investigation. Thus, the scant detail in the allegations reflects the information asymmetry that generally exists between plaintiff and defendant pre-discovery and justifies why the motion-to-dismiss standard draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.

Wells, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1243. Ultimately, the court there held that the plaintiff “plausibly allege[d] that the [prison officers] actually knew about the particularized threat that [a fellow inmate] posed to [the] decedent” because the attacker had also assaulted the decedent earlier in the day. Id. Key to the court's finding was “Plaintiff['s] assert[ion] that the initial fight would have prompted an incident report of which [the officers] would have been informed, if indeed they did not actually receive or see copies of the report itself.” Id. That alleged fact established, in the district court's view, constructive knowledge.

In short, the Eleventh Circuit's precedent in failure-to-protect cases is highly variable and in a moment of particular flux, as district courts attempt to properly apply the new paradigm set forth in Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th Cir. 2024). The factual contours that necessarily define a failure-to-protect claim make application, especially at this early juncture, all the more difficult. Nevertheless, Eleventh Circuit case law — even that pre-dating Wade — remains highly valuable.

Indeed, the facts herein are close at hand to Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2016). There, after an inmate was beaten to death by his severely mentally ill cellmate, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged an officer and deputy warden's deliberate indifference where they were aware of the following:

1) that Merkerson [the cellmate] had been convicted of murder;

(2) that Merkerson was a severe paranoid schizophrenic who suffered from auditory hallucinations and violent delusions involving his cellmates;

(3) that Merkerson could become impulsive and dangerous if his mental condition decompensated;

(4) that Merkerson was designated by the prison as a Level III mental health inmate, meaning he exhibited “a tenuous mental status that is easily overwhelmed by everyday pressures, demands and frustrations resulting in ․ impulsive behavior, poor judgment, a deterioration of emotional controls, loosening of associations, delusional thinking and/or hallucinations”;

(5) that, according to the population chart and the cell checklist, Merkerson had been transferred from Unit H–2 to Unit K–3, the segregation unit, for assaulting his previous cellmate;

(6) that the prison's “Placement Guideline[s]” required mental health inmates who had committed an assault to be housed alone;

(7) that Mr. Bowen was being housed in the cell with Merkerson in contradiction to the Guidelines' requirement;

(8) that Merkerson was significantly larger than Mr. Bowen; and

(9) that the cell that the two inmates shared was small, not observable from the outside unless the window flap was lifted, and not equipped with an alarm.

Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1321. Given the concerns regarding a violently mentally ill cellmate, and his improper classification, the facts in Bowen mirror the tragic circumstances herein.

2. Qualified Immunity

In addition to the merits of each claim, the Court must address the applicability of qualified immunity for each officer. “[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andre v. Clayton County, 148 F.4th 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010)).

“First, a government official raising a defense of qualified immunity must ‘prove that [s]he acted within the scope of h[er] discretionary authority’ ” or, in other words, “(1) in accordance with her job-related duties, and (2) within the scope of her authority.” Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1278 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021)). “It is the burden of the governmental official to make this showing.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). “Put another way, to pass the first step of the discretionary function test for qualified immunity, the defendant must have been performing a function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen within his legitimate job description.” Id. at 1266. Finally, “[i]f the defendant makes her discretionary-authority showing, the burden shifts” to the plaintiff to establish a violation of his clearly established rights. Huggins, 151 F.4th at 1278.

3. Application

Having set forth the challenging legal framework that Plaintiff faces both on the merits and on immunity, the Court reviews the sufficiency of the allegations against each officer below, and the attendant qualified immunity analysis.

Walker. Plaintiff alleges that, less than a week before Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's death, Jackson “attacked another detainee and then became aggressive towards officers who tried to stop the attack,” including Officer Walker. (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 76). Plaintiff also alleges that, on the evening of Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's death, “Jackson displayed obvious, acute signs of instability and dangerousness in front of officers assigned to the unit,” including Officer Walker. (Id. ¶ 84). In sum, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Walker “knew that [Jackson] was acting dangerously and that the unit was not secure because cell doors did not reliably lock,” but nevertheless took no action. (Id. ¶¶ 86–87).

Plaintiff most robustly alleges Officer Walker's subjective knowledge of the risk to Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo, given the allegation that Officer Walker had previously witnessed Jackson attack both a fellow inmate and an officer. The fact that Officer Walker was aware of Jackson's violent and unstable tendencies, and nevertheless failed to act to protect Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo in any way, makes Plaintiff's allegations plausible at this early, pre-discovery stage. See Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1090; Wells, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1243.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' deliberate indifference claim against Officer Walker fails because Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged his subjective knowledge of the danger to Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo. Specifically, Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs present no concrete allegations suggesting that Defendant Walker was subjectively aware of Jackson's prior history.” (Walker MTD, Doc. 44-1 at 2). This notion is questionable, given Plaintiff's specific and concrete allegation that Jackson was an aggressor in at least four different fights in the four months preceding Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's death, and that “Defendant Walker was one of the officers who witnessed the attack and who was attacked by Jackson.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 76). Notably, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court construes these allegations as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Defendants respond that “witnessing a single incident involving Jackson is inadequate to support an inference that Defendant Walker was subjectively aware of a ‘strong likelihood’ ” of danger. (Walker MTD, Doc. 44-1 at 2 n.1). But this contention seeks to hold Plaintiff to a burden of proof not applicable at this juncture. “[T]he standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage is one of plausibility, not probability,” and the level of detail herein — though, frankly, significant at this early juncture — “reflects the information asymmetry that generally exists between plaintiff and defendant pre-discovery[.]” Wells, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1243.

The remaining question, then, is whether Officer Walker's conduct is contrary to clearly established law — i.e., his deliberate indifference in leaving Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo in the unit with Jackson on the night of the attack, despite the officer's alleged knowledge regarding Jackson's violent tendencies and the malfunctioning locks in the unit. And, indeed, the combination of factors present here — specifically, Jackson's known history of violence, which Officer Walker is alleged to have personally witnessed and experienced, along with the officer's inaction in the face of a violent inmate's erratic behavior in a unit without secured cells — violate clearly established law.

In Bowen, for example, the Eleventh Circuit found the plaintiff had plausibly alleged an officer's deliberate indifference given his inaction in the face of a an “impulsive and dangerous” cellmate with severe mental illness who was improperly housed with his eventual victim despite a history of violence — not dissimilar to Jackson here. Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1322 (sustaining deliberate indifference claim where officers “allegedly understood the volatile and dangerous nature of Merkerson's mental condition”). Given the analogous precedent and the fact that the parties have not yet fully developed the factual record, the Court finds that qualified immunity is not appropriate for Officer Walker at this juncture.

Curry, Fullerton & Blake. As with Officer Walker, Officer Curry appears to have been most closely involved with the events at issue in this litigation. Plaintiff alleges that, on the evening of Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's death, “Jackson displayed obvious, acute signs of instability and dangerousness in front of officers assigned to the unit,” including Officer Curry. (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 84). “Despite witnessing Jackson's erratic and dangerous behavior in real time, [Officer Curry] left the housing unit without securing detainees in their cells, without removing Jackson from the unit, and without taking reasonable steps to protect vulnerable detainees,” according to Plaintiff's allegations. (Id. ¶ 85). As above, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Curry “knew that [Jackson] was acting dangerously and that the unit was not secure because cell doors did not reliably lock,” but nevertheless left the housing unit without taking action. (Id. ¶¶ 86–87).

These contentions are certainly less robust than those against Officer Walker — who is alleged to have both witnessed and directly experienced Jackson's history of violence. But Plaintiff alleges facts including: the severe mental illness of both victim and attacker; the erratic, violent behavior displayed by Jackson in the hours and minutes leading up to the attack; and the routine and well-known malfunctioning of the locks throughout the jail. Given these factual allegations, Plaintiff's assertions are sufficient at this early juncture to plausibly allege that Officer Curry was aware of Jackson's dangerous nature and the risk he posed to Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo. (See id. ¶¶ 84–88); Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1321 (sustaining deliberate indifference claim given inaction regarding violent and erratic cellmate); Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235 (noting successful failure-to-protect claims often identify “specific features of a facility or its population rendering it particularly violent,” such as “pervasive staffing and logistical issues).

Plaintiff also maintains that Officers Fullerton and Blake “without explanation, initiated or approved of [Jackson's] transfer and housing assignment to the unit where Charlie was housed, where they knew detainees could walk freely from cell to cell.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 78). Plaintiff alleges this transfer contravened the express policy of the jail to house maximum-risk detainees in single cells with highly controlled access. (Id. ¶ 79). As discussed supra at 13, Defendants seriously contest the applicability of this policy at CCDC. But at the motion to dismiss juncture, the Court must take the Plaintiff's allegations as true for now.

Nevertheless, putting aside the applicability of the Georgia Sheriffs' Association model policy, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Officers Fullerton and Blake were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm, based on (1) the atmosphere of pervasive violence at CCDC and (2) the problematic decision to transfer Jackson into the unit where Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo resided, i.e., where movement between cells and interactions between inmates was possible. Again, the core of Plaintiff's allegations against Officers Fullerton and Blake is that they “without explanation, initiated or approved of [Jackson's] transfer and housing assignment to the unit where Charlie was housed, where they knew detainees could walk freely from cell to cell.” (Id. ¶ 78).

Courts in this circuit have sustained deliberate indifference claims on this very premise — the failure to properly classify and/or separate inmates “based on histories of violence or mental illness.” Brooks, 2025 WL 888554, at *6 (denying motion to dismiss given “environment of extreme violence” and “no segregation of inmates” based on risk level); see also Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584–1585 (denying summary judgment given “excessive risk of violence” in part due to “failure to classify or segregate violent from non-violent inmates”).

As to Officers Curry, Fullerton and Blake, Defendants contend that “Plaintiff does not allege [they] actually knew about Jackson's prior history of violence,” specifically that they “observed any of Jackson's five prior altercations”; “read or approved of any of the incident reports describing Jackson's prior altercations”; or “learned of these altercations at any point prior to the day that Jackson attacked Plaintiff.” (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 9–10; Blake MTD, Doc. 51-1 at 2 (“Defendant Blake asserts that the arguments advanced on behalf of Defendant Fullerton apply with equal force to the claims against Defendant Blake”)).

Indeed, it is true that Plaintiff's allegations as to Officers Curry, Fullerton, and Blake are more general. But, importantly, Plaintiff alleges facts regarding both the atmosphere of extreme violence at CCDC and the dangerousness of Jackson specifically. Plaintiff describes in detail how CCDC is “chronically overcrowded, understaffed, in disrepair, inhumane, and unconstitutionally dangerous” and alleges that “[f]rom 2020 to February 2023, at least 17 people died while in custody at the Jail.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 21, 24). Plaintiff also alleges that Jackson “was well known to Jail staff as an aggressive and unstable individual,” including based on “[i]ncident reports and other jail records.” (Id. ¶¶ 75–76; see also id. ¶ 4 (“Lower-level Jail officers [knew that] Jaquez Jackson[ ] had a lengthy history of fights and aggressive behavior, had been involved in prior violent incidents inside the jail, and had recently been acting in an especially erratic and dangerous manner inside Charlie's housing unit.”)).

While the Court recognizes Defendants' views regarding the generality of these allegations, this shortcoming is not disqualifying at this preliminary juncture. Rather, it “reflects the information asymmetry that generally exists between plaintiff and defendant pre-discovery[.]” Wells, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1243. The Court is thus reluctant to halt Plaintiff's litigation against these three officers at this early stage given the gravity of the factual and legal issues raised in the Complaint as well as the nature of the evidence already identified.

The question, then, is again whether Officers Curry, Fullerton, and Blake acted in such a way that violated clearly established law. As to Officer Curry, for the reasons explained supra at 30–31, the Court finds that Bowen establishes with sufficient clarity that the Eighth Amendment bars jailers from responding with complete inaction in the face of inmates whose severe mental illness causes erratic violence that poses a safety risk to those inmates around him.

As to Officers Fullerton and Blake, the Eleventh Circuit has clearly established that a failure to adequately classify and properly separate violent and mentally ill inmates can sustain a deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584–1585 (finding “atmosphere of deliberate indifference reflected in Smith's failure to classify or segregate violent from non-violent inmates”); Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235 (noting deliberate indifference claims can be supported by specifically dangerous features such as “unique risks posed by individual prisoners or groups of prisoners due to characteristics like mental illness”); Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1321 (sustaining deliberate indifference claim where officers knew of attacker's “designation as a Level III mental health inmate,” requiring his segregation); Smith v. Owens, 625 F. App'x 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2015) (sustaining deliberate indifference claim where “Plaintiff alleged that his cellmate was ‘known for stabbing incidents,’ and that [defendant] knew or should have known of this fact” and “assert[ed] that [defendant] controlled cell assignment”). The Court thus does not find that Officers Curry, Fullerton, and Blake can successfully invoke qualified immunity at this initial juncture.

Claiborne & Broussard. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Officers Claiborne and Broussard “reviewed and approved of” the incident reports documenting Jackson's history of violence against other inmates and jail officials, and thus “knew Jackson was a dangerous, ‘maximum’ risk detainee. They also knew that Jackson was being housed in an area where the doors could not close and Jackson could freely access more vulnerable detainees[.]” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 77). Plaintiff's conclusion is that Officers Claiborne and Broussard were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm when, “[d]espite this subjective awareness of the danger that Jackson posed [ ], these defendants took no steps to rectify the situation.” (Id.). Furthermore, per Plaintiff's assertions, Officers Claiborne and Broussard “were supervisory officials who knew of Jackson's conduct and propensity for violence, and who had the authority and ministerial duty to ensure Jackson was properly housed.” (Id. ¶ 100).

The allegations against Officers Claiborne and Broussard are less precise than in the cases of the other officers. Nevertheless, the crux of the allegations is the same. Plaintiff alleges the extreme risks of violence presented both by the conditions at CCDC and by Jackson; that both Officers Claiborne and Broussard had knowledge of these conditions and the violent threats posed by Jackson; that both officers knew Jackson was housed in an insufficiently secure unit; and that neither officer acted to intervene. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 21, 24, 75–77, 100). In Plaintiff's theory of the case, then, Officers Claiborne and Broussard had — and abdicated — their responsibility to intervene based on their awareness that Jackson presented a salient risk to the safety of the other inmates in his unsecured unit.

These allegations present a closer call than above, in particular because Officers Claiborne and Broussard's full range of inmate monitoring and inmate protection obligations are not entirely clear. That said, the Court finds that the dearth of detail again “reflects the information asymmetry that generally exists between plaintiff and defendant pre-discovery[.]” Wells, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1243. Requiring plaintiffs to provide in-depth accounting of each officer's role and responsibility prior to the benefit of discovery would preclude broad swaths of important civil rights litigation. The Court will allow the claims against Officers Claiborne and Broussard to proceed, given the posture of this proceeding at this initial litigation stage. However, the Court cautions that the claims may not survive down the line without Plaintiff providing greater factual context as to what duty to intervene these two officers bore and evidence regarding how or whether they executed their duty to protect inmates in the jail. As to the qualified immunity issue, the Court finds that the analysis supra at 34–35 applies to clearly establish that Defendants' failure to act constitutes deliberate indifference as plead at this juncture. See, e.g., Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584–1585; Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1321; Owens, 625 F. App'x at 928.

C. Count III: Deliberate Indifference of Sheriff, Clayton County

1. Sheriff Allen

Plaintiff next alleges that Sheriff Levon Allen has incurred supervisory liability for the deliberate indifference of CCDC jailers. The Eleventh Circuit imposes an “extremely rigorous standard for supervisory liability.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013). “[T]o hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff must show that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor's actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb County, 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit has outlined three paths to establishing such a causal connection:

A causal connection may be established when: 1) a ‘history of widespread abuse’ puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he or she fails to do so; 2) a supervisor's custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or 3) facts support an inference that the supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.

Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff's allegations appear to support two theories of supervisory liability. The Court takes each in turn.

History of Widespread Abuse. First, “Plaintiff[ ] allege[s] that Charlie's death was the direct, foreseeable result of Clayton County and Sheriff Allen's deliberate indifference to the [malfunctioning] cell doors and locks, classification failures, overcrowding-while-understaffing, and inadequate supervision,” and “the officers' failure to properly classify and secure violent detainees like Jackson[.]” (Pls. Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 36 at 7). In this way, Plaintiff contends that Sheriff Allen has incurred supervisory liability arising out of Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's death because “a ‘history of widespread abuse’ [has] put[ ] [Sheriff Allen] on notice of the need to correct” the conditions of violence and insecurity within CCDC “and he [has] fail[ed] to do so.” See Valdes, 450 F.3d at 1237.

Unsurprisingly, the precedent as to establishing supervisory liability by identifying “a history of widespread abuse” is muddled and fact-intensive.⁸ But Plaintiff's allegations as to the violent and inhumane conditions within CCDC are extensive. Broadly speaking, she alleges that CCDC has suffered from “manifest understaffing, budgeting problems, chronic failures to have functional locks on cell doors, well-documented failures to provide any mental health treatment ․, rampant and persistent failures to conduct required (or any) rounds, and wholesale failures of supervisors to take any action in response to repeated obvious misconduct[.]” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 24). “According to Defendant Allen, the Jail regularly houses hundreds more detainees than its design capacity and operates with far fewer correctional officers than necessary[.]” (Id. ¶ 22). As further evidence of Sheriff Allen's subjective knowledge, Plaintiff points out that he could — but chooses not to — abate the overcrowded and dangerous conditions.

Defendant Allen freely admits that he has the authority to release detainees held on low-level charges. He has told the press that officers who arrest people for minor offenses such as driving with a suspended license could “waste the time and paperwork” if they wanted; as Sheriff, he could release them because “ultimately, we just do not have the space.” ․ Defendant Allen had actual knowledge that his decision to keep low-level detainees in Jail, despite its manifestly deplorable conditions, would lead to deaths.

(Id. ¶¶ 34 – 35).

A former CCDC employee also detailed pervasive violence and abysmal conditions, reporting “there was often water on the floor, the toilets were filled and clogged with feces, water in many of the sinks did not work, numerous detainees were infected with body lice, and he would often have to cleanup food scraps from the floor.” (Id. ¶ 43). Public reporting has similarly detailed “deplorable conditions inside the Jail, including detainees sleeping on floors, unsanitary cells, inadequate medical and mental-health care, and a pattern of serious assaults and deaths.” (Id. ¶ 23). “From 2020 to February 2023, at least 17 people died while in custody at the Jail,” including several homicides and suicides. “Eight more [inmates] died in 2024.” (Id. ¶¶ 24–33). Moreover, many of those who have died in custody at CCDC have suffered from severe and untreated mental illness. (Id. ¶ 26).

Plaintiff goes on to explicitly allege Sheriff Allen's supervisory liability, including his knowledge of and indifference to these abysmal conditions. Referring to Sheriff Allen and Clayton County, Plaintiff alleges that:

115. These defendants were subjectively aware of the inhumane and dangerous conditions of the Jail. They knew that the doors and locks did not function properly, that there were severe staffing shortages, that officers were not properly trained, that detainees could roam freely between cells, and that serious violence and deaths had occurred in the Jail under similar conditions.

116. These defendants were aware of pervasive staffing issues and logistical problems that made it impossible for Jail officers to address near-constant violence, tensions between different subsets of a prison population, and unique risks posed by individual prisoners or groups of prisoners due to characteristics like mental illness.

117. These defendants were aware of a pattern of violence, injuries, and death at the Jail in the years leading up to Charlie's death. These were known and obvious consequences of the status quo.

118. The nature of the Jail at the time of Charlie's death, of which these defendants were aware, was so violent and dangerous that it conferred subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm upon these defendants. Despite this knowledge, these defendants failed to act․ Defendant Allen failed to take action to repair the doors or other physical conditions, address staffing issues, or implement a better training program.

119. Clayton County and Defendant Allen instead blamed and continue to blame each other for the Jail.

(Id. ¶¶ 115–119). Sheriff Allen's subjective awareness of the widespread abuse systemic in his jail is also acutely obvious from his public statements to the Clayton County Commissioners. In one January 2024 press release, Sheriff Allen recognized that “[t]he jail is currently overcrowded and has over 300 inmates sleeping on the floor.” (Id. ¶ 25). He has also made clear the need for additional funding “to expand the jail's capacity and to properly classify inmates.” (Id. ¶ 45).

In short, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Sheriff Allen is aware of a “history of widespread abuse” at CCDC but has acted in a deliberately indifferent manner to these constitutional deprivations. See Conley v. Oliver, 2026 WL 880601, at *17–20, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2026) (Totenberg, J.) (finding plaintiff plausibly asserted supervisory liability claim against commissioner where plaintiff alleged “understaffing, inmate violence, contraband, deficient medical care, and crumbling facilities” and that commissioner received data reports regarding violent incidents); see also McCreary v. Parker, 456 F. App'x 790, 793 (11th Cir. 2012) (sustaining supervisory deliberate indifference claim against sheriff given “allegations that inmates had repeatedly complained to [him] about being quartered with dangerous inmates” and his “policy of double-celling inmates who were in disciplinary or administrative holding”).

Defendants take issue with the purportedly general nature of Plaintiff's assertions. In particular, Defendants point out that “[a] generalized threat of inmate-on-inmate violence, such as where there are occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another, are insufficient to satisfy the substantial risk of serious harm prong of the deliberate indifference test.” (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 14–15 (citing Johnson v. Lang, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 19442, at *8–11 (11th Cir. July 14, 2022) (per curiam)). Plaintiff's allegations, however, far outpace the mere “occasional, isolated attacks” that Defendants contend. Rather, Plaintiff alleges rampant inmate violence fomented by severe overcrowding and inadequate classification — all factors that feed into the “history of abuse” that Plaintiff seeks to establish. Even Sheriff Allen has recognized these consistent risks, writing in a press release:

The jail is currently overcrowded and has over 300 inmates sleeping on the floor. This causes issues among the inmates. When one inmate uses the toilet and the other [ ] inmate's head is down by the toilet, you will have fights, and when you are in a room where everything in the room is steel, metal, or concrete, it becomes a deadly cage match.

(FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 25). Similarly, in Defendants' view, “Plaintiff [ ] alleges that several deaths [ ] have occurred at the Clayton County Jail, but makes no allegations as to what the cause of these deaths were, and whether these deaths had anything to do with inmate-on-inmate violence.” (Indiv. Defs. MTD, Doc. 33-1 at 16). Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n July 2022, detainee Jaylan Andrise Goodman was murdered by another detainee in his cell,” and that “[i]n January 2024, Johnathan Pettigrew was murdered in his two-man cell which was occupied by three men ․ the foreseeable and inevitable result of overcrowding[.]” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 24–25). In other words, Defendants' concern with the level of generality it attributes to the Plaintiff's allegations does not accurately reflect either the Amended Complaint or Eleventh Circuit requirements for pleading supervisory liability at this juncture.⁹

Having found plausible allegations of supervisory liability, the Court turns to the issue of Sheriff Allen's asserted qualified immunity. As this Court has previously found, “the Eleventh Circuit has indeed ‘clearly established’ the principle that a high-ranking correctional supervisor — including the official at the top of the food chain, such as the sheriff or statewide commissioner — can incur supervisory liability based on their knowledge of and inaction toward pervasive violence and dangerous conditions in correctional facilities.” Conley, 2026 WL 880601, at *20; see also McCreary, 456 F. App'x at 794 (“As far back as 1974, this court held that improper supervision of inmates, overcrowding, and frequent inmate-on-inmate attacks could rise to the level of posing a serious risk of harm to an inmate, thus implicating the Constitution.”).

Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995) is near directly on point. There, the Eleventh Circuit allowed a supervisory deliberate indifference claim against the county sheriff to proceed based on evidence “that inmate-on-inmate violence occurred regularly when the jail was overcrowded,” in part due to a “failure to classify or segregate violent from non-violent inmates, assign inmates to cells or beds, adequately train the jailers, and adequately supervise and monitor the inmates.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583. These allegations are nearly on all fours with Plaintiff's assertions that Sheriff Allen “knew that the doors and locks did not function properly, that there were severe staffing shortages, that officers were not properly trained, that detainees could roam freely between cells, and that serious violence and deaths had occurred.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 115); see also Dickinson v. Cochran, 833 F. App'x 268, 272–273 (11th Cir. 2020) (sustaining supervisory claims against sheriff and warden based on allegations they “failed to implement a ‘proper classification system,’ ‘adequately train correctional officers regarding classification issues,’ [or] ‘limit the introduction of contraband’ ”). Qualified immunity thus does not attach for Sheriff Allen at this initial juncture.

Custom or Policy. As an alternative path to supervisory liability, Plaintiff alleges that “Clayton County and Defendant Allen adopted and enforced a custom and practice designed to evade, in perpetuity, their legal obligations toward detainees at the Jail.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 120); see also Valdes, 450 F.3d at 1237. “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)). “A custom is an unwritten practice that is applied consistently enough to have the same effect as a policy with the force of law.” Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). “Demonstrating a policy or custom requires ‘show[ing] a persistent and wide-spread practice.’ ” Id. (quoting Depew v. City of St. Mary's, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).

The Court notes that, having plausibly alleged Sheriff Allen's supervisory liability based on his awareness of and indifference to “a history of widespread abuse,” Plaintiff need not also allege his promulgation of an unconstitutional custom. Given the gravity of the alleged mismanagement, however, the Court finds it worthwhile to examine, without deciding the sufficiency of, this second theory of supervisory liability.

Plaintiff's alleged custom is rooted in the funding crisis between Clayton County and Sheriff Allen — one where both recognize the need for more resources, but neither is able to effectively allocate them. In this vein, Plaintiff lays out extensive allegations purporting to show that “the understaffing and defective quality of the Jail was the result of Defendant Allen's fiscal and other mismanagement.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 124). Plaintiff specifically alleges that

125. Defendant Allen, like his predecessor, insists that the Sheriff's Office must engage in general law enforcement throughout the County in addition to its core roles of running the jail, providing courtroom security, and serving papers. Clayton County has a dedicated police force to provide these services. [This] takes money away from the Sheriff's Office's core responsibilities and is duplicative of the work of the Clayton County Police Department.

126. As additional examples of the inexplicable diversion of resources, Defendant Allen has his personnel participate in television shows on a consistent basis. Beyond the “120 Hours Behind Bars” program, Defendant Allen has his personnel participate in “On Patrol Live,” another reality TV type show. Defendant Allen even permitted a Youtuber to stay in the jail, dressed as a detainee, for content purposes.

127. In addition, Defendant Allen has repeatedly made bizarre financial decisions like spending millions of dollars on new electric vehicles as “take home” cars to “incentivize” his personnel, when those cars are not used in the day-to-day operation of the Jail.

128. As additional examples of the inexplicable diversion of resources, Defendant Allen threw a lavish “ball” and produced a video about it to post on social media.

129. The County Board of Commissioners has also accused Defendant Allen of overtime fraud. The County Board of Commissioners has requested bank statements and policies about overtime, but the Sheriff has not complied with these requests.

(Id. ¶¶ 125–129).

The Court certainly does not see its role as micromanaging or addressing the financial decisions of the Clayton County Sheriff's Office. And, indeed, correctional officers are given a wide berth of discretion to implement “policies and practices that in [the] judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (cleaned up). But the Court would posit that Sheriff Allen's custom of financial management appears highly questionable, especially given his public assertions and petition for equitable relief seeking greater funding to maintain CCDC. (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 45–53). The notion that this pattern of financial mismanagement may constitute an unconstitutional custom of deliberate indifference in the context of the issues raised here merits real consideration, though the Court declines to decide on its viability given the sufficiency of Plaintiff's other allegations.

2. Clayton County 10

As described above, Sheriff Allen's alleged mismanagement of CCDC appears to have created an untenable situation for inmates at the jail. Nevertheless, Clayton County is not blameless in the back-and-forth fight over funding for the institution. Plaintiff's final claim alleges that Clayton County “adopted and enforced a custom and practice designed to evade, in perpetuity, [its] legal obligations toward detainees at the Jail.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 120). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that “Clayton County failed to properly fund repairs for the doors and other physical conditions of the Jail, or provide funding for increased staff[.]” (Id. ¶ 118). In Plaintiff's view, this “custom or practice of maintaining an unsafe, constitutionally inadequate Jail was the moving force that caused Charlie's death.” (Id. ¶ 133).

Municipalities may be sued for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such custom has not received formal approval through the [municipality's] official decisionmaking channels.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–691 (1978). Specifically, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A custom is “a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of the law.” Id. at 1290 (cleaned up); see also Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding “[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is [generally] not sufficient to impose liability” against a municipality under Monell). In sum, “the plaintiff must show that ‘through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.’ ” Smothers v. Childers, 159 F.4th 922, 931 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404)).

The parties somewhat dispute what, exactly, is the alleged custom at issue in Plaintiff's Monell claim. The County identifies four categories of Plaintiff's allegations and, for each, indicates that the Plaintiff has not sufficiently plead the County's responsibility or negligence: (1) inadequate maintenance, staffing, and jail conditions; (2) underfunding and understaffing; (3) failure to repair locks at CCDC; and (4) inadequate mental health treatment. (Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 27-1 at 6–18). Plaintiff, meanwhile, contends that “the Court should consider the combined effect of the conditions alleged in the Complaint, rather than evaluating each in isolation” and that “[t]aken together, the First Amended Complaint states a viable claim that a combination of dangerous conditions and operational failures left detainees exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm.” (Pls. Opp. to Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 39 at 14).¹¹

In the Court's view, neither party correctly articulates the concrete and viably alleged custom that could give rise to Plaintiff's Monell claim against Clayton County. As the Court sees it, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the County's systemic underfunding of CCDC — despite its awareness of the persistently malfunctioning locks at the facility — constitutes a custom out of which the constitutional deprivation at issue ultimately flowed.

The leading Eleventh Circuit case regarding Monell claims premised on underfunding is McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004). There, the plaintiff argued that “Dekalb County's custom of understaffing the Sheriff's Office (and the Jail) delayed the treatment of his condition,” which caused partial paralysis. Id. at 1289. Ultimately, the plaintiff “trace[d] the County's liability to its failure to properly fund the resources necessary to staff the Jail,” which he alleged constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 1291. In rejecting this claim, the Eleventh Circuit wrote:

McDowell is asking this Court to extend liability to inadequate budgeting practices, but does not identify any “pattern of injuries” linked to the County's budgetary decisions, nor does he insist that its accounting practices are “defective.” ․ McDowell cannot establish that a reasonable member of the Board would conclude that the County's budget decisions would lead to events that occurred here.

Id. at 1291–1292. Given the holding in McDowell, the Court is cognizant that Plaintiff faces an uphill battle pleading a Monell claim that arises out of the alleged underfunding of CCDC and its effect on the safety and security of the jail.

Still, the persistent malfunctioning of doors and locks at CCDC was, according to Plaintiff's allegations, well-established and well-known. “Many of the cell doors could not securely close, allowing dangerous detainees to roam freely from cell to cell.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 58). Indeed, “Sheriff Allen has testified that he personally reported ‘failing locks,’ dangerous overcrowding, and severe staffing shortages to the County on multiple occasions.” (Pls. Opp. to Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 39 at 7). In August 2021, one corrections officer described the abysmal state of security in an email passed through the chain of command, up to the Board of Commissioners. The email detailed how “detainees [could] ‘go in and out as they please [at] any given moment ․ and attack someone’ ” as well as “ ‘low security awareness’ on the part of officers, understaffing issues, weapons ‘constantly being found on [i]nmates,’ multiple stabbing incidents, and [the officer's] general belief that the jail was ‘not a safe place.’ ” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶¶ 62–64).

Yet, as Plaintiff alleges, the jail's funding needs went unmet. Perhaps most troubling, Plaintiff recounts that

in September 2022, during a publicly broadcasted meeting, the Clayton County Board of Commissioners voted to remove an agenda item to appropriate more than $2 million towards repairing the Jail's locks. The agenda item was removed at the request of Defendant Allen's office for reasons that did not make sense. One of the commissioners who opposed removing that item from the agenda explicitly referenced the emails and stated that the locks issue was an “emergency.” She also noted that the persons responsible for running the Jail said the locks needed to be fixed “immediately.”

(Id. ¶ 65). “The Board voted to remove the funding by a vote of 3-2, with the same Commissioner stating that she voted ‘nay’ because a person who did not have security training was recommending removal of the agenda item on behalf of the County.” (Pls. Opp. to Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 39 at 7). “The Commissioner further stated concerns that: we're putting our County in this position [ ] where the Board is making the decision about the safety of those that are inmates, and them being safe. But those who are responsible for it have advised that this needs to be done immediately. And we have that in writing.” (Id.).

Given the allegations identified above, Court finds that Plaintiff has marshaled the facts to sufficiently state a plausible Monell claim at this early juncture. (McDowell, as a reminder, was decided on a motion for summary judgment — a far more demanding factual posture.) Key to the reasoning in McDowell was the plaintiff's inability to link the County's budgetary decisions to the asserted harm. In the instant case, however, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the County Commission's budgetary decision-making affected the malfunctioning doors and locks in CCDC, a safety weakness that was a necessary condition precedent for Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's murder.

In McDowell, the appeals court held that plaintiff could not “establish that a reasonable member of the Board would conclude that the County's budget decisions would lead to events that occurred here.” McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1292. Here, the Plaintiff alleges, at least one County Commissioner foresaw such a possibility. (See FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 65 (“One of the commissioners who opposed removing that item from the agenda explicitly referenced the emails and stated that the locks issue was an ‘emergency.’ ”)).¹² The fact pattern — and the pass-the-buck relationship between the Sheriff and the County — is more akin to that in Smothers v. Childers, 159 F.4th 922 (11th Cir. 2025), where the appeals court found sufficient evidence to support a Monell claim.

[I]n the sheriff's election before [the inmate's] death, the Jail's poor medical care was at issue. After all, by that point, several inmates had died on [the private medical contractor's] watch. So once the sheriff won election, he asked the county to fire [the contractor]. But the county wouldn't let him. Instead, Walker County continued to employ [the contractor]. Then it doubled down and renewed [its] contract.

Smothers, 159 F.4th at 924. As in Smothers, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged here that the County was aware of the substandard jail conditions caused by its policy decision, that the Sheriff brought the seriousness of the issue to the County's attention, and that the County continued down the same path regardless.

Also analogous is Kendall v. Fulton County, 2024 WL 1242463, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2024) (Boulee, J.). In that matter, also evaluated at a motion to dismiss posture, the plaintiff (1) indicated that the sheriff “made continued pleas to Fulton County for additional funding for the Jail, communicating his ‘profound safety concerns for inmates in the Jail’ ” and (2) “identified a pattern of injuries—jail deaths between 2019 and 2022—that he allege[d] [were] linked to the [county's] decision not to increase funding for the Jail because that decision led to the continued provision of inadequate medical care.” Kendall, 2024 WL 1242463, at *10. Based on those pleadings, the court found that plaintiff “sufficiently alleged that Fulton County had a persistent and widespread practice of underfunding the Jail and that a reasonable member of the Board would conclude that its decision to continue underfunding would lead to a violation of inmates' [ ] rights to receive medical care.” Id.; see also Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing Monell claim to move forward where plaintiff alleged county's underfunding contributed to jail's deliberate indifference to inmate medical needs) (“Lack of funds for facilities cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical care and treatment for inmates.”). These decisions mirror the custom of underfunding alleged herein, and the unsafe conditions it created in the jail, which contributed to Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo's untimely death.

Defendants argue that “plaintiff fails to allege facts to show that the County was on notice of any deficiencies with the locks that were directly causing violations of anyone's rights [or] that any final policy maker made a conscious choice to disregard the cause of these violations in any decision making capacity.” (Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 27-1 at 14). In the Court's view, the 2022 episode cited by Plaintiff negates this contention. Indeed, the Commissioner's expression that the state of security at CCDC was an emergency going unaddressed seems to make clear that “the County was on notice of any deficiencies with the locks that were directly causing [constitutional] violation[s].” Defendant makes much of the fact that “defendant Allen's office requested the removal of this agenda item,” thus apparently absolving the Commission of responsibility for its funding discussions and decisions. Though the Court is not in the business of adjudicating factual disputes at the Motion to Dismiss stage, it takes note of Plaintiff's rebuttal, which appears to counter this narrative:

The [objecting] Commissioner then asked a spokesman for the Sheriff if his office agreed that the Board should wait until the next meeting. The spokesman responded that “the original plan was to move forward as quick as we could.” The plan changed, he explained, because the Clayton County Staff Attorney (Chuck Reed) and Chief Operating Officer had advised that “being that it's a County building, this is something that the actual County will have to move through Central Services to procure.”

(Pls. Opp. to Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 39 at 6–7) (citations omitted).

Defendants further contend that the Plaintiff's argument about a pattern of underfunding is supported only by a cited 2022 episode in front of the Clayton County Board of Commissioners and, indeed, does not paint the full picture. As Defendants argue, “[o]n October 4, 2022—a month after the meeting plaintiffs reference—the Board approved an award to repair lock and hinge replacements to the [jail]. In February 2023, the Board also unanimously approved an emergency budget amendment to provide the Sheriff's Office with $3,063,951 to provide repairs to the [jail].” (Reply ISO Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 46 at 6–7).

Again, the Court is hesitant to dive deep into factual adjudications at this juncture. And the Defendants are correct that, once past the pleading standard, Plaintiff will have to substantiate her allegations of systemic underfunding, taking into account the full decision-making record of Clayton County. See Stuppard-Wilson v. Fulton County, 2025 WL 2484199 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2025) (Thrash, J.) (“A single denied funding request and a general allegation that other funding requests were denied are insufficient under Eleventh Circuit law to establish a ‘persistent and wide-spread practice’ of underfunding the jail.”). That said, Defendants' implication that the 2022 meeting cited by Plaintiff was a mere one-off appears to be questionable given the allegations of the Amended Complaint, which recount how Sheriff Allen's 2025 suit for equitable relief was rooted in continued underfunding, leading to unsafe and inhumane conditions at the jail.

Defendants' final contention is that Plaintiff's Monell claim must fail “because plaintiff does not allege an underlying constitutional violation by anyone employed by the County.” Rather, “all of the defendants whose actions are at issue in this case are employees of the Sheriff, not the County itself.” (Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 27-1 at 5). The Eleventh Circuit has reached somewhat diverging opinions on this issue, which this Court attempts to harmonize. As a general rule, “[a] Monell claim is derivative of—and so requires—an actual constitutional violation by an officer.” Cunningham v. Cobb County, 141 F.4th 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Land v. Sheriff of Jackson Cnty., 85 F.4th 1121, 1129 (11th Cir. 2023)). That is to say: municipalities act through their officers and employees. So, naturally, it makes sense that a municipality's liability is potentially contingent on the problematic actions of an individual.

But the Eleventh Circuit has, in particular circumstances, held to the contrary, finding that “Monell ․ and its progeny do not require that a jury must first find an individual defendant liable before imposing liability on local government.” Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686 (11th Cir. 1985)). This may be the case, for example, where “the combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy or custom may violate an individual's constitutional rights” Id. at 1301–1302 (quoting Garcia v. Salt Lake City, 768 F.2d 303, 310 (10th Cir. 1985)). As the Eleventh Circuit wrote in Anderson — and as would be applicable here — “if the [court] were to find [ ] that the deprivation of [ ] constitutional rights was a result of understaffing, then it would logically find no fault on the part of the individual arresting officers.” Anderson, 778 F.2d at 686. In sum, “[w]e must ask whether a judgment in favor of individual officers ‘can be harmonized with a concomitant ․ decision imposing liability on the municipal entity.’ ” Andre v. Clayton County, 148 F.4th 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1302). Under the specific factual circumstances presented here, the Court finds that such a finding is tenable, at least at this early stage of the proceedings in this case.

At its core, Plaintiff alleges that Clayton County's systemic underfunding leads to unsafe and insecure conditions within the jail. It would be incongruous to attempt to attribute this allegedly unconstitutional systematic decision to the actions of any one officer. The Court finds that Plaintiff's Monell claim therefore survives at this initial juncture.

IV. CONCLUSION

Early on in her legal pleading, Plaintiff notes that “Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo will generally be referred to as ‘Charlie,’ the name his family and loved ones knew him by.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 1 n.1). It is an important reminder that, at the center of this lawsuit, is a young man's life. Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo needlessly died in custody two years after being accused of a minor felony theft.

This proceeding raises important and wide-ranging allegations of gross negligence at every level within the Clayton County Detention Center, including alleged fundamental mismanagement and underfunding. Plaintiff has, at this initial juncture of the litigation, successfully alleged the majority of her claims. For the reasons above, the Court orders as follows. Clayton County's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 27] is GRANTED IN PART, as to the claim for punitive damages, but is otherwise DENIED; the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Sheriff Allen, Officer Fullerton, Officer Claiborne, Officer Curry, and Officer Broussard [Doc. 33] is DENIED; Officer Walker's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 44] is DENIED; Officer Blake's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 51] is DENIED. For clarity's sake, the current state of Plaintiff's claims is set forth below:

Count I Count II Count III Count IV Count V MAINTAINED in full MAINTAINED in full MAINTAINED in full MAINTAINED in full DISMISSED as to Clayton County MAINTAINED as to all other Defendants

Given the serious constitutional and statutory issues at stake in this case as well as the depth of human concerns at issue, the Court finds it appropriate at this early stage to REFER this case to mediation with the next available magistrate judge on the rotation wheel. The mediation shall be IN PERSON. The parties are DIRECTED to file a status report within 14 days of the conclusion of the mediation indicating whether this matter is resolved.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of June, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “[T]he Clayton County Jail is primarily a pretrial detention facility. Although it houses a limited number of individuals serving short local sentences, none are serving life sentences or anything approaching that length. Accordingly, none of the deaths that have occurred at the Jail can be attributed to detainees being sentenced to die in custody or serving sentences so long that an in-custody death would be expected.” (FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 38).

2.   The Court takes judicial notice of the context in which this case has arisen. See, e.g., Clayton County Inmate Charged With Murder in Jail Beating Death, FOX 5 ATLANTA (Apr. 3, 2026), www.fox5atlanta.com/news/clayton-county-inmate-charged-murder-jail-beating-death; Rob DiRienzo, Clayton County Jail Faces Growing Concerns Over Violence and Unsafe Conditions, FOX 5 ATLANTA (Nov. 21, 2025), www.fox5atlanta.com /news/clayton-county-jail-faces-growing-concerns-over-violence-unsafe-conditions; Tom Jones, ‘I Wanted to Cry’: Mother Describes Son's Injuries From Beating in Jail By Dozen Inmates, WSB-TV (Sept. 17, 2025), www.wsbtv.com/news/local/clayton-county/i-wanted-cry-mother-describes-sons-injuries-beating-jail/PUM27R4GJFAI5AB ND47OQJXIYU/.

3.   The Court takes judicial notice that, according to the Clayton County Sheriff's Office, Jackson's attack on Mr. Zegarra-Arroyo was racially motivated. “During the investigation Inmate Jaquez Jackson stated several times to investigators that he does not like Mexican/Hispanics and wanted to kill them.” See Press Release, Sheriff Levon Allen, A Racially Motivated Murder Investigation is Underway at the Clayton County Jail. (Nov. 20, 2023), https://perma.cc/L7EF-DEQX. However, these asserted facts and evidence are not reflected in the record and thus do not bear on the Court's analysis herein.

4.   Pursuant to Defendants' Motion, the Court also stayed discovery in this matter, pending a decision on the Motions to Dismiss, with the exception of limited discovery to confirm Defendant Ladonna Blake's identity, which has since been completed. (Docs. 49; 50).

5.   Courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

6.   Prior Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases “should continue to be cited as binding precedent” if they are not inconsistent with Wade v. McDade (“Wade I”), 106 F.4th 1251, 1265 (11th Cir. 2024) (Jordan, J., concurring).

7.   But see Oliver v. Warden, Wilcox State Prison, 2025 WL 1178369, at *5–6 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025) (finding no deliberate indifference at summary judgment where plaintiff did not tell officers that neighboring inmate had made sexual threats) (“[Plaintiff] only told [the officer] that [the neighboring inmate] would do ‘something’ and that he didn't feel ‘comfortable’ in the cell. He never told [the officer] that he ‘feared [the inmate] or that [the inmate] clearly threatened [him].’ ”); Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim where plaintiff “was attacked by an inmate in the next cell when all of the cell doors opened and a riot began”) (“[E]ven though the plaintiff alleged that the attacker had threatened him previously and that an attack was possible, he had not alleged any information showing a strong likelihood that he and his attacker would be released at the same time in a chaotic environment.”); Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding officer was not subjectively aware of risk of harm to inmate where attacker “was a ‘problem inmate’ with a well-documented history of prison disobedience and [ ] violence ․ [who] acted crazy, roaming his cell like a ‘caged animal’ ” and “plan[ing] on faking a hanging”).

8.   See Garner ex rel. R.C. v. Jamerson, 2023 WL 4927250, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023) (sustaining deliberate indifference claims against supervisory officials, including commissioner, based on alleged knowledge of and indifference to “severe understaffing, high turnover, poor training, lack of supervision, abuse of solitary confinement, and failure to discipline officers”); Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1256 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding sheriff's failure to investigate multiple incidents of officers' excessive force allowed for supervisory liability related to plaintiff's excessive force claim); Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding plausible claim of supervisory liability against warden where he was specifically “warned ․ about certain guards” who were “believed [to be] abusive toward inmates”); Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1584–1585 (11th Cir. 1995) (sustaining deliberate indifference claim against sheriff based on evidence “that inmate-on-inmate violence occurred regularly when the jail was overcrowded,” in part due to a “failure to classify or segregate violent from non-violent inmates, assign inmates to cells or beds, adequately train the jailers, and adequately supervise and monitor the inmates”); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1530–1531 (11th Cir. 1993) (sustaining deliberate indifference claim against superintendent based on unconstitutionally dangerous conditions where officers “did not ․ patrol the interiors of the dorms regularly”; detention cells “lacked adequate ventilation, had poor lighting, and were infested with roaches and vermin”; “excessive quantities of contraband flowed freely into and within the prison,” such that “[i]nmates carried knives and openly used drugs”; and officers allowed “unsupervised showings of hard-core pornographic movies,” which exacerbated sexual violence); Conley v. Oliver, 2026 WL 880601, at *17–20, ---F.Supp.3d ---- (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2026) (Totenberg, J.) (finding plaintiff plausibly asserted supervisory liability claim against commissioner where plaintiff alleged “understaffing, inmate violence, contraband, deficient medical care, and crumbling facilities” and that commissioner received data reports regarding violent incidents). But see Myrick v. Fulton County, 69 F.4th 1277, 1298 (11th Cir. 2023) (dismissing supervisory liability claim where plaintiff alleged that sheriff was aware of “numerous settlements and judgments based on the unconstitutional actions of the Fulton Sheriff and Sheriff deputies” and “permitted a custom of excessive force by permitting unwarranted use of tasers on inmates”).

9.   Defendants rely on Myrick v. Fulton County, 69 F.4th 1277 (11th Cir. 2023), to support their contention that Plaintiff's allegations are overly general. But the Court finds that the allegations in Myrick are factually much more generalized than the allegations at issue in the instant case, i.e. (1) that “Fulton County, GA has paid numerous settlements and judgments based on the unconstitutional actions of the Fulton Sheriff and Sheriff deputies”; (2) that “Sheriff Jackson permitted a custom of excessive force by permitting unwarranted use of tasers on inmates”; and (3) that the sheriff failed to train officers.

11.   Defendants point out that “Plaintiff cannot rely on the Sheriff's operations and/or functions to establish liability as to the County.” (Clayton Cnty. MTD, Doc. 27-1 at 6–7). And, indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “the Clayton County Sheriff is not a county policymaker under § 1983 for his law enforcement conduct and policies.” Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1348 (11th Cir. 2003). But this notion is inapposite here, as Plaintiff's Monell claim relies on the County's funding decisions, not the actions of Sheriff Allen.

12.   Compare FAC, Doc. 22 ¶ 65 (“[T]he Clayton County Board of Commissioners voted to remove an agenda item to appropriate more than $2 million towards repairing the Jail's locks.”), with England v. Clayton County, 2025 WL 4058244, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 2025) (“[N]othing in the Amended Complaint alleges a ‘deliberate’ or a ‘conscious choice’ by Clayton County that would indicate that its budgeting decisions required the Jail to make the decisions that it made with its budget.”).

Honorable Amy Totenberg United States District Judge