ANGELO BLACK v. CHASE WEBER (2026)

ORDER

Plaintiff Angelo Black brought this civil rights and state tort damages action in October 2023 against former Gwinnett County Police Officer, Chase Weber. (Compl., Doc. 1). Mr. Black was seriously injured during the course of a police foot chase that occurred in October 2021. The foot chase ultimately ended with Officer Weber deploying a taser to immobilize Mr. Black, resulting in Mr. Black sustaining a serious head injury and lasting health issues.

Plaintiff's federal civil rights claim is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and his battery and emotional distress claims are brought under state law. Mr. Black alleges that Officer Weber used excessive and harmful force in the course of his pursuit of Mr. Black, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and state law battery and emotional distress provisions. Plaintiff's case is now before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36], in which Officer Weber seeks immunity from the lawsuit. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert Natasha Powers [Doc. 37] is also before the Court. After due consideration of the briefs and evidence presented, the Court enters the following Order.

I. Factual Background 1

On Thursday, October 21, 2021, Plaintiff Angelo Black was the passenger in a car subject to a traffic stop for a broken brake light. (Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (“Def.'s SOMF”), Doc. 36-2 ¶ 1; Weber Body Camera at 1:10). After pulling the car over, Defendant Officer Chase Weber, an officer with the Gwinnett County Police Department at the time ² , approached the vehicle to obtain both the driver's and Mr. Black's identification. (Weber Body Camera at 1:13). Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Weber remarked that it smelled like marijuana. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 4; Weber Body Camera at 1:25). Officer Weber ran a search of the driver's information and discovered that he was driving with a revoked license and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶¶ 6, 8; Weber Body Camera at 3:00-4:09). The driver was then arrested and moved into a police vehicle. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 8; Weber Body Camera at 5:06).

Officer Weber then asked the front-seat passenger, Plaintiff Angelo Black, to step out of the vehicle. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 9). Mr. Black complied. (Weber Body Camera at 5:37). Officer Weber asked Mr. Black for consent to conduct a search of his person. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 12; Weber Body Camera at 5:46). Mr. Black consented to the search. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 13; Weber Body Camera at 5:47). Officer Weber directed Mr. Black to place his hands on his head and stand with his legs apart. (Weber Body Camera at 5:49). Mr. Black did so. (Weber Body Camera at 5:51). Mr. Black was unarmed ³ and was holding two cell phones, one in each hand, during the search. (Weber Body Camera at 5:47). While patting him down, Officer Weber reached inside Mr. Black's pant pocket, pulled out an object, and asked, “This money is yours?” (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 16; Weber Body Camera at 5:59). Mr. Black then suddenly began to flee on foot. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 17; Weber Body Camera at 6:00; Fuller Body Camera at 3:39). Officer Weber and Corporal Fuller, another Gwinnett County law enforcement officer who was also on the scene, began to chase after Mr. Black. (Fuller Body Camera at 3:39 ⁴ ). While chasing Mr. Black, Corporal Fuller shouted, “Stop right there, police, stop!” (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 22; Fuller Body Camera at 3:41). Less than one second after Mr. Black began to flee, before Corporal Fuller demanded that Mr. Black stop, body camera footage shows Officer Weber reaching for his taser. (Fuller Body Camera at 3:39).

The sequence of events that occurred during the next few seconds is both crucial and hotly disputed. While fleeing, Mr. Black jumped off a ledge that was approximately four feet in height above the adjacent parking lot of a Steak ‘n Shake. The retaining wall that he jumped from was three feet and five inches in height, and there was a concrete curb measuring approximately six and a half inches at the base of the wall. Thus, the total drop off was three feet and eleven and a half inches – approximately four feet. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶¶ 48-50; Fuller Body Camera at 3:40; see also Statement of Georgia Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Stephanie Graham, Doc. 36-9). The following photograph shows the wall from the perspective of the Steak ‘n Shake parking lot. Mr. Black jumped from the white ledge located on the right side of the photograph, onto the pavement:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

(Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 46; see also Doc. 36-8 at 2).

Officer Weber followed Mr. Black off the four-foot high ledge. (Fuller Body Camera at 3:42). At some point during this chase off the ledge, Officer Weber tased Mr. Black. The parties dispute when exactly the tasing occurred. Officer Weber asserts that he deployed the taser on Mr. Black after Mr. Black landed on the ground. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 33). Mr. Black, on the other hand, testifies that he felt the taser on his neck and back while he was mid-air, leaping off the ledge onto the pavement. (Dep. of Angelo Black, Doc. 35-1 at 119:19-24; 122:2-3; Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts (“Plf.'s SOMF”), Doc. 40-2 ¶ 3). The entirety of the chase lasted less than ten seconds.

The body camera footage in the record does not make clear what position Mr. Black was in when he was tased. Officer Weber's body camera became dislodged during the chase, so the footage from his body camera does not show at what point he deployed his taser. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 19; Weber Body Camera at 6:00). Corporal Fuller was running behind Officer Weber during the chase. (Fuller Body Camera at 3:39-3:42). Therefore, in Corporal Fuller's body camera footage, Officer Weber's body blocks the view of the taser and Mr. Black's position when the taser was initially deployed. (Id.). But Mr. Black affirmatively presents testimony and evidence to support his assertion that he was in an elevated position ⁵ when he was tased. In addition to his own sworn testimony, Plaintiff presents expert testimony from Ms. Natasha Powers, an expert in police practices and taser usage.⁶ Based on her experience and professional training, Ms. Powers proffers testimony concluding that Mr. Black was at an elevated position when Officer Weber tased him. (See Powers Report, Doc. 37-1).

Ms. Powers drew this conclusion by relying specifically on her expertise in the field of taser use and design. As she explains in her report, tasers are designed to send an electrical output for a five-second cycle. (Id. at 13). To stop the five-second cycle after the taser is deployed, the taser user must engage the safety of the taser. (Id.). The parties do not dispute that the taser was deployed on Mr. Black for the full five-second cycle. The parties agree that although the start of the five-second cycle cannot be clearly seen or heard in either Officer Weber's or Corporal Fuller's body camera footage, the point at which the taser stopped cycling can be clearly heard on Corporal Fuller's body camera footage. (Id. at 13; Fuller Body Camera at 3:47; Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶¶ 34-36; Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶¶ 21-22). Using the timestamp at which the cycling stops, Ms. Powers re-wound the footage by five seconds, at which point she asserts that Officer Weber deployed his taser. (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 13). At that timestamp, Ms. Powers states that the body camera footage shows Mr. Black at an elevated position. (Id.; Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶ 22). Thus, Ms. Powers concludes that Officer Weber tased Mr. Black while Mr. Black was at an elevated position. (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 13). Officer Weber has moved to exclude Ms. Powers's testimony on various grounds [Doc. 37], which the Court addresses in a later section. For the purposes of summary judgment, however, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Black and finds that a reasonable jury could find that he was at an elevated position when he was tased.

Having been tased, Mr. Black fell to the pavement and hit his head, resulting in a deep laceration on his forehead and other serious injuries. Officer Weber was also hurt by his own jump off the ledge, which aggravated a previous back injury. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 41; Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 51:15-17). Both Mr. Black and Officer Weber were then transported to the hospital. (Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶ 16; Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 51:13-14). Mr. Black was in a coma for an unspecified amount of time (Dep. of Angelo Black at 77:15-19, 119:19-24, 125:22-23) and sustained several other injuries, including a concussion, brain bleed, skull fractures, facial bone fractures, vision loss in his right eye, hearing loss in his left ear, and injury to his ankle. (Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶ 11). In addition to those injuries, Mr. Black has since been prescribed medication for anxiety and depression and is now receiving treatment for seizures he experienced as a result of the injuries sustained from the incident. (Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶¶ 17-18; Dep. of Angelo Black, Doc. 35-1 at 130:3-11).

After the tasing, Corporal Fuller ran a criminal history report on Mr. Black and learned that Mr. Black was a convicted felon. (Fuller Body Camera at 21:44 – 24:45). Officer Weber also alleges that after the tasing, two firearms were discovered in the vehicle and drugs were later identified on Mr. Black's person. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-1 ¶¶ 10-11). In December 2024, more than a year after the filing of this action, Mr. Black pled guilty to charges of misdemeanor obstruction and felony trafficking in illegal drugs, for which he is currently serving a ten-year sentence in prison.⁷ (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶¶ 51, 52; Doc. 36-11 at 2 ⁸ ).

In the instant suit, Mr. Black has brought three claims against Officer Weber: excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim I); battery pursuant to Georgia common law (Claim II), and intentional infliction of emotional distress, also pursuant to Georgia common law (Claim III). (Compl., Doc. 1). Mr. Black also seeks punitive damages and attorneys' fees. (Id. at 13). Officer Weber has moved for summary judgment on all claims, asserting qualified immunity as to the federal claim, and official immunity as to the state claims [Doc. 36]. Officer Weber has also moved to exclude the opinion of Mr. Black's expert witness, Natasha Powers [Doc. 37]. Both motions are presently before the Court.

II. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert Natasha Powers [Doc. 37]

The Court first addresses Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Opinion of Expert Natasha Powers [Doc. 37]. The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's consideration.

A. Legal Standard

“[A]nalysis regarding the admissibility of expert testimony begins with Federal Rule of Evidence 702.” Moore v. Intuitive Surgical., Inc., 995 F.3d 839, 850 (11th Cir. 2021). Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

In assessing admissibility, federal courts act as “ ‘gatekeepers’ tasked with screening out ‘speculative’ and ‘unreliable expert testimony.’ ” Moore, 995 F.3d at 850 (quoting Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010). The gatekeeping function “inherently require[s] the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of expert opinions to ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002)). Thus, for expert testimony to be admissible, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed district courts to conduct a rigorous inquiry into the following three factors, also known as Daubert requirements:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters she intends to address;

(2) the methodology by which the expert reaches her conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and

(3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). While there is overlap, these three requirements — qualifications, reliability, and helpfulness — remain “distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Id. at 851 (quoting Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260). “[E]ach of the three analytical prongs (including qualifications) is assessed in reference to the matter to which the expert seeks to testify—i.e., ‘to the task at hand.’ ” Id. at 854 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). As such, “expertise in one field does not qualify a witness to testify about others.” Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 772 F.3d 1352, 1368 (11th Cir. 2014).

The proponent of expert testimony always bears the burden of establishing these three factors. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260 (citing McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257). A 2023 amendment to the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 clarifies that the proponent of expert testimony must meet all the requirements for admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Comm.'s Note to 2023 Amend. “Nothing in the amendment imposes any new, specific procedures.” Id. Rather, the rule was amended to make clear that arguments about the sufficiency of an expert's basis do not always go to weight rather than admissibility. Id. The advisory committee's notes specify that “once the court has found it more likely than not that the admissibility requirement has been met, any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight of the evidence.” Id.

Importantly, however, while a district court must take on the role of gatekeeper, this role “is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.” Burch v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., No. 5:22-CV-316-CAR, 2024 WL 4351647 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2024) (quoting Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999)). Rather, “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).

B. Discussion

Officer Weber moves to exclude the opinions of Mr. Black's expert witness, Ms. Natasha Powers, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 [Doc. 37]. Ms. Powers is a former law enforcement officer who now owns a consulting firm that specializes in police practices. (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 2-3). Ms. Powers's Expert Report contains her opinions on three main questions:

(1) Did Officer Weber exercise good judgment?

(2) Were Officer Weber's actions in concert with established police practices, guidelines, and law enforcement standards?

(3) Given the same or similar circumstances presented in this case, would a reasonably trained and prudent police officer likely have performed in a similar manner as Officer Weber?

(Id. at 4-5). Ms. Powers answers all three questions in the negative. After reviewing body camera footage and other materials related to the case, Ms. Powers's opinion is that

Officer Weber's actions did not correspond with generally accepted police practices. There was no reasonable threat posed by Black[.] Black ran from a traffic stop where he was a passenger and not suspected of committing any crime. Black posed no reasonable perception of threat, and the force used against Black was unreasonable and excessive.

(Id. at 6). She also states in her Expert Report that it is her “professional opinion and conclusion that [Officer] Weber fired upon Black when he was at an elevated position.” (Id. at 13). Ms. Powers bases her opinions on her “education, training, experience, and review of the information and materials related to this case,” including Officer Weber's and Corporal Fuller's body camera footage. (Id. at 6).

Officer Weber challenges the admissibility of Ms. Powers's opinion on several grounds, including that, in his view, Ms. Powers is unqualified to render her expert opinion, that the methodology she used to reach her conclusions is unreliable, and that her opinion would be unhelpful to a jury's understanding of the issues in the case. The Court addresses each of Officer Weber's arguments below.

i. Ms. Powers's Qualifications

The Court begins with the first Daubert requirement that Officer Weber challenges: Ms. Powers's qualifications. (Doc. 37 at 12, 16). Expert testimony is admissible if an expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters they intend to address. City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 563. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an individual to qualify as an expert based upon their knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in their field of expertise. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260-61. In determining whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert, “the trial court [is required] to examine the credentials of the proposed expert in light of the subject matter of the proposed testimony.” Jack v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314-16 (N.D. Ga. 2002). This inquiry is “not stringent[.]” Sibley v. City of Lakeland, No. 8:24-cv-2853-VMC-AEP, 2026 WL 205662 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2026) (quoting Clena Inv., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 280 F.R.D. 653, 661 (S.D. Fla. 2009)). “[S]o long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert's expertise [go] to credibility and weight, not admissibility.” Id.

Ms. Powers far surpasses the “minimally qualified” standard; her extensive experience certainly qualifies her to render her opinions concerning police practices and the use of force and tasers in the instant case. She retired from fourteen years as a law enforcement officer in 2011, when she began consulting on matters related to policing. (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 2-3). Since her retirement in 2011, she has received certifications in taser instruction, police practices, force science, management of chaotic events and prevention of arrest-related-in-custody deaths, and defensive tactics. (Id. at 3). Ms. Powers has trained police academy recruits and in-service police officers in defensive tactics, use of non-lethal force, and the use of deadly force. (Id.). She has advised law enforcement agencies on the use of force and options relative to the use of force. She also has written policies on law enforcement's use of force. (Id.). Perhaps most importantly, she has been qualified by courts as a “police practices expert,” and has “evaluated thousands of police incidents over [her] career in policing.” (Id.). Her role as a “police practices expert is to assist in understanding what constitutes ‘established police practices and guidelines’ and how these practices and guidelines come into play during police-citizen encounters.” (Id. at 6). Since 2011, she has testified in over 250 court cases regarding police practices. (Id. at 2). The significant scope of Ms. Power's experience, training, and certification indicates that she is extensively qualified in evaluating police officers' use of force, and thus, is qualified to opine on the appropriateness of Officer Weber's use of force in the instant case.

Officer Weber argues that Ms. Powers is unqualified to provide her opinion because she is not an “expert in forensic video analysis,” and therefore, her opinions that are based, in part, on a review of the body camera footage are inadmissible. (Doc. 37 at 12). Officer Weber is correct that Ms. Powers is not an expert in forensic video analysis. (Dep. of Natasha Powers, Doc. 35-3 at 40:3-5). But she does not have to be an expert in forensic video analysis in order to be qualified to opine on whether Officer Weber's use of force against Mr. Black was appropriate or excessive under the circumstances. Ms. Powers's opinions about Officer Weber's use of force are not based solely on a forensic analysis of the body camera footage. Rather, her opinions are based on her “education, training, experience, and review of the information and materials related to this case,” including the body camera footage of the incident. (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 6). Similarly, Ms. Powers's opinion that Officer Weber tased Mr. Black while he was at an elevated position is not based solely on a cursory review of the body camera footage. She combines her review of the body camera audio and video with her expertise on the length of taser cycles to determine the time stamp of the video at which the taser was likely deployed. (Id. at 13 (discussing the length and nature of a taser cycle and explaining why those characteristics led her to deduce the time stamp at which Mr. Black was tased and therefore, what position he was in)). Ms. Powers has established that she has the requisite training and experience to qualify her to offer such an opinion: she is a certified taser master instructor and has been trained in the use of tasers and use of force investigations. (Id. at 3).

Ms. Powers additionally testified that she has been trained in forensic video analysis and regularly reviews body camera footage in civil cases to draw conclusions regarding police use of force. (Dep. of Natasha Powers, Doc. 35-3 at 35:8-24, 36:12-25–37:1-5, 49:25–50:1-7). She was also able to testify to her expertise and familiarity with Switch, the application she used to slow down the body camera footage during her review. (Id. at 37:9-25–38:1-7, 65:7-12). Ms. Powers's training and experience related to reviewing body camera footage in conjunction with police conduct in the handling of suspects and the use of force further establishes her qualifications to offer an opinion on Officer Weber's particular use of force here. Compare Wallace v. Martinez, No. 1:19-cv-1199-AWI-SAB, 2022 WL 2872998 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2022) (finding an individual was qualified to opine on police use of force by relying in part on body camera footage where the expert was only “educated and experienced in videography and forensic video review and analysis” because of his “extensive training and experience as a law enforcement officer and course instructor on police performance, investigations, decision making, and action-reaction timing”); with Patel v. City of Madison, Ala., No. 5:15-cv-253-VEH, 2018 WL 1876356 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 19, 2018) (finding an individual was not qualified to use a compressed digital video image to calculate the speed at which an individual in the video hit the ground because he never received any formal training in forensic video analysis and “displayed an unfamiliarity” with the video application and encoding process used).

Ultimately, Officer Weber may challenge Ms. Powers's expertise in video analysis at trial, but because it is “more likely than not” that Ms. Powers is a qualified expert, that challenge will go to the credibility and weight of her testimony – not to its admissibility. Jolly v. Hoegh Autoliners Shipping AS, No. 3:20-CV-1150-JAR-MCR, 2024 WL 3859797, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2023 amends.) (“[O]nce the court has found it more likely than not that the admissibility requirement has been met, any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight of the evidence.”)).

ii. Reliability of Ms. Powers's Principles and Methods

The Court now turns to the second Daubert requirement that Officer Weber challenges: reliability. The reliability inquiry focuses “on the expert's principles and methodology, and not on the conclusions that they generate.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004). “Exactly how reliability is evaluated may vary from case to case, but what remains constant is the requirement that the trial judge evaluate the reliability of the testimony before allowing its admission at trial.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. In the context of scientific experts, case law provides four factors a district court may consider in its analysis: (1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested, (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error of the scientific technique, and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 813 F.3d 983, 988 (11th Cir. 2016). These factors apply more readily to cases involving scientific testimony, though, and may not be directly applicable to a district court's Daubert analysis involving a non-scientific expert, as is the case here. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-52 (1999). For a non-scientific expert, the relevant standard for reliability is that “the expert must be able to explain how [her] experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Shaffer v. Scarborough, No. 8:23-cv-680-WFJ-NHA, 2025 WL 368705, *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2025) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Ms. Powers does just that in her report. (See Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 5-6). She explains that in forming her opinions, she primarily reviewed five major pieces of information: (1) the Complaint in this case; (2) the Gwinnett County Police Department Incident Report related to this incident; (3) Officer Weber's deposition; (4) Corporal Fuller's body camera footage of the incident; and (5) Officer Weber's body camera footage of the incident. (Id. at 5). Ms. Powers states that she combined her review of these materials with her familiarity with four “model” rules and policies from various organizations: (1) the Model Police Policies, Procedures, and Rules of the International Association of Chiefs of Police; (2) the Model Polices, Procedures, and Rules of Lexipol, Inc.; (3) the National Consensus Policy on the Use of Force; and (4) the Guiding Principles in the Use of Force crafted by the Police Executive Research Forum. (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 5). Ms. Powers also explains that she applied her “familiarity with current policing news, practices, guidelines, and trends across the United States,” her “active, ongoing work as a police practices expert,” and her review of relevant case law in reaching her conclusions. (Id. at 5-6). Ms. Powers's overall scope of law enforcement experience, her review of this case's evidentiary record and relevant law, and her knowledge and expertise in the field of police practices, standards, and taser use provide a reliable foundation upon which she based her findings and conclusions. See, e.g., Shaffer, 2025 WL 368705, at *2 (citing Blessing v. Williams, No. 3:19-CV-731-TJC-MCR, 2022 WL 4182531, at *16 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2022) (noting that a police practices expert's reliance on similar materials – such as the case record, incident reports, deposition testimony, and model policies and procedures – is a methodology that is “routinely accepted” by courts to be reliable)).

Officer Weber argues that Ms. Powers's reliance on the body camera footage “does not comport with the well-recognized standards for reviewing officers' split-second decisions in hindsight,” and that her method “cannot be properly applied to the facts at issue.” (Doc. 37 at 7, 9). Citing to a Sixth Circuit case ⁹ , Officer Weber argues that opinions based on “frame-by-frame viewings of use of force incidents are in no way tailored to the needs of the excessive force analysis required in Graham [v. Connor].” (Id. at 10). However, as discussed in more detail below, Ms. Powers's opinion does address the relevant factors laid out in Graham that require the Court's consideration. Specifically, the Court here must consider in its excessive force analysis the severity of the crime at issue, whether Mr. Black posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and the fact that Mr. Black was attempting to evade arrest by flight at the time of the use of the officer's use of force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). That said, Officer Weber is correct that Ms. Powers's opinion addresses these factors through the lens of police training and policy. Her opinion does not address the mandate in Graham that courts must judge an officer's reasonableness in a way that allows “for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments,” rather than judging reasonableness “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396–97. But that omission in her analysis goes to the weight a jury would give to her opinion – not to admissibility. See, e.g., Shaffer, 2025 WL 368705, at *2 (challenge to a police practices expert's failure to discuss certain information – such as a “detailed analysis of the specific circumstances that led [the police officer] to use force on [the plaintiff]” – was relevant to the weight a jury would give to the testimony, not to admissibility). This alleged shortcoming in her testimony and report is therefore appropriately addressed through “vigorous cross-examination” and presentation of contrary evidence at trial. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

Finally, Officer Weber argues that Ms. Powers's testimony is unreliable because the record evidence simply “do[es] not support her opinion.” (Doc. 37 at 14). In other words, Officer Weber challenges the reliability of Ms. Powers's methodology because he disagrees with the conclusion she draws. This is not an appropriate reason for this Court to deem Ms. Powers's testimony inadmissible. The court's analysis as to reliability is limited to focusing “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Seamon, 813 F.3d at 988 (cleaned up). In short, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Powers's principles and methodology are reliable.

iii. Helpfulness of Ms. Powers's Opinions

The final Daubert element, helpfulness, requires that the evidence or testimony “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Supreme Court explained in Daubert that the helpfulness condition goes primarily to relevance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92. In other words, “expert testimony that does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant, and ergo, non-helpful.” Id. Expert testimony must also be “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case,” such that it will “aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.” Id. But ultimately, the helpfulness inquiry turns on whether the proffered testimony concerns “matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.” Edwards v. Shanley, 580 F. App'x 816, 823 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262-63 (“Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.”).

Ms. Powers's opinion is certainly relevant to the issue of the degree of force used in this case. Moreover, her expert testimony is based on information that the average lay person is not aware of, such as the length and nature of a taser cycle, model policies and procedures regarding use of force, and national policing standards. Notably, Officer Weber himself relies only on Ms. Powers's report and testimony to support the assertion that a taser cycle is five seconds long – a fact that Officer Weber states is material to this case. (See Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 34). Officer Weber also relies solely on that fact when offering his own estimate of the timestamp in the body camera footage at which he deployed his taser. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36). Ms. Powers's testimony is, at the very least, helpful to a jury's assessment and determination of when Officer Weber deployed his taser, which currently is a disputed material fact in this case.

Finally, Officer Weber argues that Ms. Powers's opinion that his use of force was “unreasonable and excessive” is unhelpful because it is an improper legal conclusion. (Doc. 37 at 17-18). Officer Weber is correct that expert witnesses, while permitted to testify as to their opinion on an ultimate issue of a case, may not offer purely legal conclusions. Fed. R. Evid. 704(a); see also Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., No. 4:05-cv-273-HLM, 2008 WL 11423983, at *23 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2008) (citing Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1527, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990)). The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that “the distinction between whether challenged testimony is either an admissible factual opinion or an inadmissible legal conclusion is not always easy to perceive.” Hanson v. Waller, 888 F.2d 806, 811 (11th Cir. 1989). But fundamentally, an expert may not “merely tell the jury what result to reach.” Montgomery, 898 F.2d at 1541 (11th Cir. 1990).

However, Ms. Powers's use of terminology such as “excessive,” “unreasonable,” and “disproportionate” in her Report does not necessarily make her opinion an impermissible legal conclusion. In using this language, she is not telling the jury what legal result to reach. Rather, she emphasizes that her use of such terminology is “intended to and should be read as references to the professional and generally accepted standards in policing [․] not ․ as references to or the application of legal standards within the scope and sole province of the factfinder or judge.” (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1 at 6). Courts routinely admit expert testimony opining on whether a police officer's use of force violated police practices and policies, as such opinions are not legal conclusions. See, e.g., Flint v. Scott, No. 4:16-cv-159-CDL, 2018 WL 327166, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2018) (finding that a use of force expert's testimony on “how a reasonable officer would have reacted” and “whether [the defendant's] conduct conformed to standard police practices” was not an impermissible legal conclusion). As Ms. Powers's use of such terminology is limited to the context of police practices and policies, her opinion is not an improper legal conclusion and is admissible at trial.¹⁰

For all the above reasons, Ms. Powers's testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.¹¹ Accordingly, Officer Weber's Motion to Exclude Ms. Powers's Opinion and Expert Testimony [Doc. 37] is DENIED.

III. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36]

Having found that Ms. Powers's expert testimony may properly be considered, the Court now turns to Officer Weber's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36]. The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's consideration.

A. Legal Standard

The Court may grant summary judgment only if the record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual issue is material if resolving the factual issue might change the suit's outcome under the governing law. Id. The motion should be granted only if no rational fact finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248–49. The essential question is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

When ruling on the motion, the Court must view all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). The moving party need not positively disprove the opponent's case; rather, the moving party must establish the lack of evidentiary support for the non-moving party's position. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the party moving for summary judgment meets this initial burden, the non-moving party must present “relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings” to show that there is a genuine issue for trial to be tried. Id. at 324–26. The party opposing a summary judgment motion does not satisfy its burden if the rebuttal evidence is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative” of a disputed fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Further, where a party fails to address another party's assertion of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Court may consider that fact undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). However, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ․ The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

B. Discussion

Mr. Black has brought three claims against Officer Weber: excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim I); battery pursuant to Georgia common law (Claim II), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Claim III). (Compl., Doc. 1). In moving for summary judgment on all three claims, Officer Weber principally argues that Mr. Black's federal and state law claims against him are barred by qualified immunity and official immunity, respectively. (See generally, Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36). The Court addresses Mr. Black's claims and Officer Weber's asserted defenses of immunity in turn below.

i. Claim I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

Mr. Black's constitutional claim asserts that Officer Weber used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment by tasing him while Mr. Black was in the process of jumping off a ledge at an elevated height as he fled from the traffic stop.¹² Officer Weber, on the other hand, maintains that he deployed his taser subsequent to Mr. Black's landing on the ground. As discussed at length earlier, Mr. Black presents evidence – his own deposition testimony, Ms. Powers's Expert Report, and Corporal Fuller's body camera footage – suggesting that Officer Weber fired his taser while Mr. Black was mid-air.

Although the court should review the record as a whole at summary judgment to assess the merits of the summary judgment motion, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–51. For the purposes of summary judgment, then, the Court will construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to Mr. Black as the non-moving party. On the other hand, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

a. Qualified Immunity

Officer Weber moves for summary judgment on Mr. Black's excessive force claim by asserting the defense of qualified immunity. (See generally, Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36). The judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). An officer asserting a qualified immunity defense bears the initial burden of establishing that he was acting within his discretionary authority. Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, the parties do not dispute that Officer Weber was acting within his discretionary authority during the events at issue. (See Defs.' Mtn for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 23). The burden therefore shifts to Mr. Black to show that (1) Officer Weber employed excessive force in his use of the of the taser and thereby violated Mr. Black's Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from the infliction of excessive force, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021). These two elements may be analyzed in any order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

If the evidence at the summary judgment stage, construed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, contains “facts inconsistent with granting qualified immunity, then the case and the qualified immunity defense proceed to trial.” Stryker v. City of Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the Court now turns to the underlying merits of Mr. Black's constitutional claim to determine if his clearly established rights were violated and whether Officer Weber is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

b. Violation of Constitutional Right

Beginning with the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry, the Court will assess whether the facts, construed in Mr. Black's favor, show that Officer Weber violated Mr. Black's Fourth Amendment rights by using unreasonable, excessive force to seize him. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Officer Weber used excessive force against Mr. Black.

An excessive force claim requires proof “that a law enforcement officer carried out an unreasonable seizure through a use of force that was not justified under the relevant circumstances.” Cnty of Los Angeles, Calif., v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428 (2017). The Fourth Amendment forbids the use of excessive force to apprehend a suspect. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 699 (11th Cir. 2021). Excessive force claims are therefore “governed by the Fourth Amendment's ‘reasonableness standard.’ ” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014). The amount of force used by an officer must be “reasonably proportionate” to the need for that force. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (cleaned up).

The reasonableness of the use of force is an “objective inquiry that pays careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case” and considers the events from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Mendez, 581 U.S. at 428 (cleaned up). This “requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances” surrounding the use of force, Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 774, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). As determining reasonableness entails an objective test, an officer's intent or motivation should not be considered as part of the analysis. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Instead, the inquiry “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. at 396. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit has distilled the evaluation of an officer's use of force into six factors: (1) the severity of the suspect's crime; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat of harm to others; (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or trying to flee; (4) the need for the use of force; (5) the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used; and (6) how much injury was inflicted. Wade v. Daniels, 36 F.4th 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sherriff Dep't, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015)).

In order to analyze whether the force Officer Weber used was excessive, the Court must first identify the level of force Officer Weber applied during the incident in question. The record shows, and Eleventh Circuit precedent indicates, that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Weber applied deadly force when he tased Mr. Black at an elevated height. Deadly force is “force that an officer knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.” Bradley v. Benton, 10 F.4th 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court has found that an officer may not apply deadly force to a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). Although the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that a taser is not generally a deadly weapon, it has also noted that like many other weapons, a taser may be used to apply deadly force. See United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[W]hether an object constitutes a ‘dangerous weapon’ turns not on the object's latent capability alone, but also on the manner in which the object was used,” especially “when used in a manner likely to endanger life or inflict great bodily harm.”). Most relevant here, the Eleventh Circuit found, in a case with facts remarkably similar to those at hand, that “tasing a person who is at an elevated height may come with a substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death.” Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1241.

In Bradley, a police officer tased a passenger of a stopped vehicle who “inexplicably fled the scene on foot” and scaled an eight-foot concrete wall during his escape. Id. at 1235. As a result of being tased, the passenger fell from the wall, broke his neck, and died. Id. at 1236. Just as is the case here, the passenger in Bradley did not threaten any of the officers, was not suspected of having committed any crime at the time he was seized, and was not armed with a firearm or weapon. Id. at 1241-42. The deceased passenger's family sued the officer for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the officer unreasonably applied deadly force when he tased the passenger while he was atop the eight-foot wall. Id. at 1237. The officer, on the other hand, claimed he tased the passenger while he was on the ground, before he began to climb the wall. Id. at 1240. Construing the facts in the plaintiff's favor, the Eleventh Circuit “[had] little trouble in concluding that this use of force was excessive.” Id. The court found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because tasing a person while they are in a “precarious position” at an elevated height constitutes deadly force, due to the substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death that comes with falling from a height after being incapacitated by a taser. Id. Because the tased passenger had not committed any crimes and did not pose a threat to the officers or anyone else, the court found that the officer's decision to use such deadly force was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 1242. Put simply, Bradley established that tasing a fleeing suspect at an elevated height constitutes deadly force, which is disproportionate and unconstitutional when the fleeing suspect is not armed or dangerous. Id.

Here, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Officer Weber tased Mr. Black at an elevated height and that firing a taser under these circumstances constituted deadly force under Bradley. Similar to Bradley, the parties here also disagree over the material fact of Mr. Black's position at the time of the tasing. Officer Weber asserts that he tased Mr. Black once Black had landed on the ground, after jumping off the ledge. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 33). Mr. Black disputes this assertion and contends he was tased as he was jumping off the ledge and suspended in mid-air – in other words, while he was at an elevated height. (Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶ 3).

The first piece of evidence Mr. Black points to in support of his assertion is his own sworn testimony in which he testified that he heard the “pop” of the taser “when [he] jumped in the air[.]” (Dep. of Angelo Black, Doc. 35-1 at 126:5-10). He also testified that he “felt the feeling” of the taser while he was in the air, “prior to hitting the pavement.” (Id. at 147:10-25). Mr. Black also presents the Expert Report of police practices expert, Ms. Natasha Powers – discussed extensively above – to support his assertion that he was tased mid-air. (See Powers Report, Doc. 37-1). Applying her knowledge that a taser cycle lasts for five seconds, Ms. Powers rewound Corporal Fuller's body camera footage from the point at which the taser cycle can be heard concluding. (Id. at 13). Five seconds before the taser cycle concludes on the body camera footage, Ms. Powers states that Mr. Black can be seen mid-air. (Id.). Therefore, Ms. Powers concludes that Mr. Black was at an elevated position in the air when he was tased. (Id.).

Officer Weber, on the other hand, presents his own sworn testimony that he tased Mr. Black after he landed from the jump, while he was on the pavement. (Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 48:4-7). He testified that he did not fire his taser until after Mr. Black “hit the ground.” (Id. at 46:12-22). Officer Weber does not present any expert evidence that counters Ms. Powers's conclusion that Mr. Black was tased at an elevated height. Rather, using Ms. Powers's testimony that a taser cycle lasts for five seconds, Officer Weber presents his own timeline using Corporal Fuller's body camera footage. Officer Weber asserts that when the body camera footage is rewound by five seconds from the point at which the taser cycle can be heard concluding, Mr. Black can be seen with his feet on the ground. (Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 16-17). Thus, Officer Weber asserts that “the record evidence conclusively establishes that [Mr. Black] was not at the top of the ledge when he was tased, and instead was either on the ground or very close to it.” (Id. at 16 (emphasis in original)).

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Black, the Court finds that Mr. Black has presented sufficient evidence such that a jury could reasonably find that he was at an elevated position when he was tased. There is no evidence in the record that indisputably shows where Mr. Black was at the exact moment he was tased. Neither party has presented eyewitness testimony, and the footage of the chase captured on Corporal Fuller's body camera does not definitively show Mr. Black's positioning one way or the other. But a reasonable jury could review the evidence in this case and agree with Mr. Black, the non-movant, and find that he was tased while mid-air. Alternatively, a jury after reviewing the evidence could also ultimately find that Officer Weber's assertion is correct – that Officer Weber tased Mr. Black after Mr. Black had landed on the ground. It will be the jury's role as the fact-finder to resolve this dispute based on a full review of all of the evidence in the record. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, the Court must find that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Mr. Black was tased while at an elevated position, which constitutes deadly force under Bradley, or for the jury to reach an alternative finding.¹³

Having found that Officer Weber employed deadly force on Mr. Black, the Court next addresses whether the record shows that Officer Weber knew that his actions would create a substantial risk of causing death or bodily harm. Officer Weber asserts in his Motion that at the time of the tasing, he was not aware that there was a ledge or drop-off in the area. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶¶ 38-40). To support this assertion, Officer Weber points to the fact that there was no signage or barricade in the area indicating there was a drop-off, and he had not surveyed the area after pulling the car over. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶¶ 38-40). Officer Weber also points out that he was injured by the jump himself because it aggravated a previous back injury, implying that had he known there was a drop-off, he would have landed in such a way that he would not have been injured. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 41; Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 6 (“Because he did not know about the ledge, [Officer] Weber sustained injuries upon hitting the ground.”)). Officer Weber contends that as he was not aware of the ledge, there was no way he could have known that his actions would create a substantial risk of injury for Mr. Black.

Still, other facts in the record suggest differently – specifically, indicating that Officer Weber knew that he was applying deadly force when he tased Mr. Black. For example, Officer Weber testified that when he pointed his taser at Mr. Black (before deploying the taser), he “could see that [Mr. Black] had just gotten off of an elevated surface.” (Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 46:14-17). When asked if he could “see [that] there was a hard surface that, at minimum, [Mr. Black] was jumping to,” Officer Weber said “yes.” (Id. at 47:24-25, 48:1-3). Officer Weber's statements in his deposition contradict his assertion that he was unaware that a ledge was located next to the parking lot. While it is quite possible that Officer Weber was not sure of the exact height of the ledge, his sworn testimony could lead a jury to find that he was, at the very least, aware at the time of the tasing that the ledge existed. Additionally, Officer Weber testified that he was aware that when an individual is tased, “the muscles lock up,” and that there is a possibility that the tased individual “can fall down.” (Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 57:15-25, 58:1). Officer Weber also testified that based on his training, he was aware that tasing a person who is jumping on a hard surface is likely to cause death or injury. (Id. at 47:2-10). Officer Weber's knowledge and training that tasing an individual who is jumping onto a hard surface can lead to death or injury, combined with his testimony indicating that he was aware of the ledge, suggests that Officer Weber applied force that he knew created a substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death when he tased Mr. Black as they jumped off the elevated ledge. Thus, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Black, a reasonable jury could find that Officer Weber knew that he was using deadly force.

Having found that both the record and binding Eleventh Circuit precedent could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Officer Weber applied deadly force to effect the seizure of Mr. Black, the Court now turns to the factors that the Eleventh Circuit has deemed to be relevant in determining whether Officer Weber's use of deadly force was excessive under the circumstances. These factors include: (1) the severity of the suspect's crime; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat of harm to others; (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or trying to flee; (4) the need for the use of force; (5) the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used; and (6) how much injury was inflicted. Edwards v. Grubbs, No. 24-12787, 2026 WL 706637, *5 (11th Cir. Mar. 13, 2026); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). When an officer uses deadly force, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to also consider whether the officer (1) has probable cause to believe that the suspect posed a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, or that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm; (2) reasonably believes that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some warning about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12; Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2003). The Court finds that these factors suggest that Officer Weber was not entitled to apply deadly force under the circumstances.

First, Mr. Black did not commit – and was not suspected of committing – a crime “involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2003)). At the time of the tasing, the only crime Mr. Black was suspected of committing was the crime of misdemeanor obstruction: fleeing Officer Weber's search of his person after a traffic stop aimed at his friend who was the driver of the car. (Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶ 2, 13). The Eleventh Circuit has described misdemeanor obstruction as “of minor severity” for purposes of analyzing an excessive force claim. See, e.g., Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The crime of misdemeanor obstruction is a crime of minor severity for which less force is generally appropriate.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1242 (finding that an individual's flight from a traffic stop, while “suspicious,” “would not [alone] give a reasonable officer probable cause to believe that [he] had committed crimes involving the infliction of serious physical harm.”). Officer Weber did not have “probable cause to believe that [Mr. Black] committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.

Second, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Mr. Black posed an immediate threat of harm to the officers or others. There is no evidence in the record that suggests Mr. Black was armed with a weapon, and he was fully compliant with Officer Weber's request that he step out of the vehicle and submit to a pat-down search. (Weber Body Camera at 5:20-5:59). Mr. Black's hands were placed on his head while Officer Weber searched him, and he did not make any movements indicating that he was about to draw a weapon. (Id.). In fact, Mr. Black was holding two cell phones – one in each hand – during the pat-down search and the chase. (Weber Body Camera at 5:47-5:59). Mr. Black could not have held a weapon while both his hands were holding cell phones. Officer Weber also testified that Mr. Black did not threaten him or any other officers on the scene. (Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 110:24-25, 111:1-2).

Officer Weber asserts that it is a material fact that both before and after the incident, Corporal Fuller's body camera footage shows civilian vehicles in the area. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶¶ 20, 43). Officer Weber is wrong; this fact is immaterial to the Court's assessment of whether Mr. Black posed a threat of serious physical harm. During the chase and at the time of the tasing, Officer Weber testified that there were no civilians or civilian vehicles in the area. (Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 110:24-25, 111:1-12 (In response to the question of whether Mr. Black threatened any civilians, Officer Weber responded, “There were none, no.” Officer Weber also testified that “it appeared no one was around” at the time of the incident)). Officer Weber's and Corporal Fuller's body camera footage confirms that fact. Most importantly, however, there were no circumstances present that could have suggested Mr. Black posed a threat to the civilian vehicles in the area after the incident, because not only was he unarmed and non-threatening to begin with, but also, he was incapacitated after the incident. At bottom, Officer Weber has not pointed to any objective evidence in the record suggesting that there was any reason to believe that Mr. Black was or could have been dangerous at the time of the tasing.

Third, the record shows that Mr. Black fled from Officer Weber during Officer Weber's search. Although Mr. Black fled, he was never given the opportunity to comply before force was used. Officer Weber fired his taser at Mr. Black without warning. “When considering whether it was feasible for a police officer to warn a suspect that [ ]he plans to use deadly force, we consider both time and opportunity.” Cantu v. City of Dothan, Alabama, 974 F.3d 1217, 1231 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1331). Here, Officer Weber had both: he and Corporal Fuller were never more than a few seconds behind Mr. Black, and they had eyes on him throughout the entirety of the less-than-ten-second chase. Corporal Fuller did yell, “Stop, police, stop!” when the chase began. But at no point did Officer Weber warn Mr. Black that he intended to fire his taser if Mr. Black did not stop fleeing. Instead, he chose to deploy his taser without warning while he and Mr. Black appeared to be jumping off an elevated ledge. Under these circumstances, Officer Weber's use of deadly force was unreasonable. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243 (officer's failure to warn before tasing an individual atop an eight-foot wall was an unreasonable use of deadly force because the officer had the opportunity and time to warn the individual, as he was never far behind the individual during the chase and had eyes on him throughout the chase).

Fourth, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that “some use of force” may be “minimally necessary to prevent [a fleeing suspect's] escape” when the suspect “show[s] no signs of ending the chase.” Edwards, 2026 WL 706637, at *6. Officer Weber states in his deposition that the only real need he identified in the moment to tase Mr. Black was that it was within Gwinnett County Police Department's policy to tase a fleeing suspect.¹⁴ (Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 71:21-25; 72:1-12 (When asked why he tased Mr. Black, Officer Weber replied, “That's within Gwinnett County's policy,” and “Because he was fleeing.”)). Officer Weber testified that Mr. Black was not threatening, and he did not have any reason to believe that Mr. Black might be armed or dangerous. (Id. at 110:11-25; 111:1-12). Officer Weber agreed that “the only thing [he] had at the time when [he] deployed [his] taser on Mr. Black [was] that he was “a misdemeanor for obstruction; nothing more.” (Id. at 110:13-16). Thus, to the extent that any force was necessary to stop Mr. Black from fleeing, it was minimal. The amount of force Officer Black ultimately deployed far exceeded what was “minimally necessary” under the circumstances. Edwards, 2026 WL 706637, at *6.

Fifth, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used weighs in favor of Mr. Black. Put simply, the amount of force used by an officer “must be reasonably proportionate to the need for that force.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. It is well-settled law that when a non-dangerous and unarmed individual flees detainment, deadly force is excessive and disproportionate. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243 (using “this level of force to stop an unarmed man who was not suspected of committing a violent crime from fleeing on foot ․ is excessive”); Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1332-33 (deadly force may not be used when the only danger presented by the suspect's continued flight was the risk of an accident during pursuit).

Finally, the injuries that Mr. Black experienced as a result of the tasing were severe and life-altering. Mr. Black was in a coma after the incident. (Dep. of Angelo Black at 77:15-19, 119:19-24, 125:22-23). He also experienced a concussion, brain bleeding, skull fractures, facial bone fractures, vision loss in his right eye, hearing loss in his left ear, and an injury to his ankle. (Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶ 11). Mr. Black now suffers from anxiety and depression, and he has received treatment for seizures he experienced as a result of the injuries sustained from the incident. (Plf.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-2 ¶¶ 17-18; Dep. of Angelo Black, Doc. 35-1 at 130:3-11).

A thorough analysis of the facts and the relevant factors specified by the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court leads this Court to conclude that a reasonable jury could readily find that Officer Weber violated Mr. Black's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, thus satisfying the first qualified immunity prong.

c. Constitutional Right was Clearly Established

Having concluded that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to potentially determine that Officer Weber violated Mr. Black's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force, the Court now turns to the question of whether Officer Weber could nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant contends that the law as it existed when this incident occurred on October 21, 2021 was not sufficiently clear to give a reasonable law enforcement officer “fair notice” that his conduct was unconstitutional under these circumstances. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in several ways: (1) materially similar case law that has already been decided; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law. Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2019); Gilmore v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025).

This inquiry is easily resolved here. As discussed at length in the previous section, there is materially similar precedent. The Eleventh Circuit, in a case with facts closely analogous to those here, found that tasing an individual while they are at an elevated position is equivalent to deadly force. Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1241. Bradley, decided several months before the events of this case transpired, applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Tennessee v. Garner that an officer cannot use deadly force to stop an unarmed person who is not suspected of committing a violent crime from fleeing on foot. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Applying Tennessee v. Garner, the Eleventh Circuit found that the deceased passenger, who was unarmed and not suspected of committing any violent crimes, was subjected to excessive force when he was tased during his flight atop an eight-foot-high concrete wall, because of the serious risk of injury that comes with an uncontrolled fall from an elevated height. Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1240-42. Based on Bradley and Garner, the Court finds it was clearly established at the time of Officer Weber's seizure of Mr. Black that (1) the use of a taser to seize a fleeing suspect who is at an elevated height constitutes deadly force; and (2) the use of deadly force to seize a fleeing suspect is unconstitutionally excessive if the suspect is unarmed and not suspected of committing a violent crime. Therefore, Officer Weber is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officer Weber's primary argument as to why the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bradley should not apply to the facts at hand is that in Bradley, the deceased passenger was atop an eight-foot wall when he was tased, whereas here, the ledge from which Mr. Black jumped was approximately four feet high. (Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 13). Officer Weber argues that since the Eleventh Circuit never specified what exactly constitutes an “elevated height,” the Bradley decision does not apply here because the height from which Mr. Black fell is not as high as the wall in Bradley. Id. Officer Weber is correct that the Eleventh Circuit did not provide a specific height at which it becomes dangerous for an officer to tase a fleeing individual. And, to Officer Weber's credit, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that, in determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, “clearly established law” should not be defined “at a high level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79-80 (2017). However, to parse the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bradley to mean that it is clearly established that it constitutes deadly force to tase an unarmed fleeing suspect specifically at an eight-foot elevation—but not an inch or feet less—would take this directive from the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit in Bradley too far. Bradley is directly on point as to the constitutional question in this case despite the four-foot difference in elevation between the wall there and the wall here.

The reasoning behind the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bradley that tasing a suspect who is at an elevated height constitutes deadly force is not based on the precise degree of height. Rather, it is based on the fact that tasing a person functionally incapacitates them, which is substantially more dangerous when it happens in a location at which the individual may fall to the ground from any elevation versus when they fall to the ground when on a non-elevated surface. Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1236. While a fall from a higher elevation is likely to result in more severe injuries, it does not change the fact that a fall from even a four-foot ledge onto a hard surface – after use of a taser to incapacitate the individual in flight – can (and did, in Mr. Black's case) result in serious injuries.

Moreover, even if the specific facts of Bradley were not materially similar to the facts at hand, the Eleventh Circuit specified that applying deadly force on a fleeing, non-dangerous and unarmed suspect is “obviously unconstitutional even absent a case directly on point.” Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1244. The Eleventh Circuit recently reiterated this principle and conclusion: “Bradley was an obvious clarity case and held that the conduct — tasing a non-dangerous and unarmed suspect on an elevated surface merely to prevent flight — was obviously unconstitutional to any reasonable officer even in the absence of caselaw directly on point.” Edwards, 2026 WL 706637, *7. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that Bradley was not directly on point to the facts here, the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning would nonetheless apply because tasing Mr. Black (who was not armed) at an elevated position and under the overall circumstances presented was patently inconsistent with governing Eleventh Circuit precedent.

After careful review of the record and arguments presented, the Court DENIES Officer Weber's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36] as to Mr. Black's federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim I) and finds that Officer Weber is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.

ii. State Law Claims: Battery (Claim II) and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Claim III)

Officer Weber maintains that he is entitled to official immunity as to Mr. Black's state law claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.¹⁵ This is Officer Weber's only argument for why summary judgment should be granted in his favor on Mr. Black's state law claims.

Similar to qualified immunity, the doctrine of official immunity “offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.” Cameron v. Long, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Ga. 2001). Individual government employees are shielded by official immunity from damages suits unless the plaintiff can establish that the official negligently performed a ministerial act or performed a discretionary act with malice or an intent to injure. See Grammens v. Dollar, 697 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Ga. 2010); Glass v. Gates, 716 S.E.2d 611, 621 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011), cert. granted (Jan. 23, 2012), aff'd, 729 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. 2012). Here, the parties do not dispute that Officer Weber's tasing of Mr. Black was a discretionary act. (Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 23). Thus, here, the Court must determine whether Mr. Black established actual malice or intent to injure, such that Officer Weber cannot be protected by official immunity.

“Actual malice, in the context of official immunity, means a deliberate intention to commit a wrongful or illegal act.” Kinlocke v. Benton, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (quoting Tittle v. Corso, 569 S.E.2d 873, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)). It does not include a “reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others.” Kinlocke, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1381 (quoting Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54, 60 (2007)). Nor does it encompass simply “unreasonable conduct.” Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016). Likewise, the phrase “actual intent to cause injury” means “an actual intent to cause harm to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to do the act purportedly resulting in the claimed injury.” West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1073 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kidd v. Coates, 518 S.E.2d 124, 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)). “This definition of intent contains aspects of malice, perhaps a wicked or evil motive.” Marshall v. Browning, 712 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). Ultimately, “[a] showing of improper motive requires strong record evidence” if it is to overcome official immunity. See Croland v. City of Atlanta, 782 F. App'x 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2019).

Officer Weber argues that he acted in a manner consistent with his understanding of the situation at the time. He asserts that his efforts were intended to end the “dangerous situation,” not to “do wrong.” (Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 23-24). Thus, he argues, his actions do not show actual malice. (Id.). Mr. Black does not make any argument that Officer Weber showed actual malice. He simply argues that “if a reasonable jury could find that the force used by an officer was excessive under the Fourth Amendment, then a jury could also find that the force was unlawful under the Georgia Constitution and constituted negligence or a battery.” (Plf's. Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 40 at 20 (citing Walker v. City of Sandersville, No. 5:20-cv-438-MTT, 2021 WL 5410896, at *1 (M.D.Ga. Nov. 18, 2021))).

Mr. Black's argument is insufficient to overcome the protections afforded to Officer Weber by official immunity. While he is correct that a jury could find that an officer's force was unlawful under both the Fourth Amendment and state law, that potential finding is not the only relevant consideration to overcome official immunity. See, e.g., Roberts v. Kahl, No. 1:19-cv-1846-TWT, 2020 EL 4577714, at *8 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2020), aff'd, 844 F. App'x 160 (11th Cir. 2021) (“But unreasonable conduct, even if it is enough to sustain a § 1983 claim for Fourth Amendment violation, does not necessarily support an inference of actual malice.”). Mr. Black does not cite any specific evidence of Officer Weber's subjective intent, which the Court must consider in order to make a finding that official immunity does not protect Officer Weber from liability for his actions. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007). While the record here supports the conclusion that Officer Weber violated Mr. Black's Fourth Amendment rights, Mr. Black has not carried his burden of demonstrating a genuine factual issue as to whether Officer Weber possessed the “deliberate intention to do wrong” needed to satisfy the actual malice standard. See Hart v. Logan, 664 F. App'x 857, 864 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his Court has noted that Georgia's actual malice standard is higher than what is required to make out a Fourth Amendment violation.”). Thus, the Court GRANTS Officer Weber's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Mr. Black's state-law claims (Claims II and III), based on official immunity under the Georgia constitution.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Exclude Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert Natasha Powers [Doc. 37]. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36] is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. The Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36] on Claim I (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment), but GRANTS Defendant's summary judgment on Claims II (Battery) and III (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).

Considering the nature of this matter and the parties' respective positions, the Court believes the parties would benefit from mediating this case at this juncture. The Court therefore ORDERS AND REFERS this case to the Chief Magistrate Judge for assignment to the next magistrate judge available on the wheel for mediation.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Officer Weber left the Gwinnett County Police Department in 2022. (Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 21:5-7).

3.   Defendant alleges that Mr. Black “had a gun with him in the car that day,” but Defendant does not allege that Mr. Black had a gun on his person, nor is there any evidence in the record suggesting Mr. Black was armed. (Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 36-2 ¶ 10).

4.   Corporal Fuller arrived on the scene a few minutes after Officer Weber pulled the car over, resulting in the difference in time stamps in their body camera footage.

5.   The Court uses the terms “elevated position” and “elevated height” to mean any position above the ground. This could mean a position where Mr. Black was on the ledge about to jump or a position where Mr. Black was suspended in mid-air just after jumping off the ledge.

6.   Ms. Powers served as a law enforcement officer for fourteen years, and since retiring in 2011, has owned and managed her own police practices consulting firm. (Powers Report, Doc. 37-1). She has extensive training in tasers, which is outlined in detail in her Expert Report. (Id.). Ms. Powers's qualifications are further discussed in a later section of this Order.

7.   Mr. Black does not concede that the facts about the firearm, drugs, his subsequent guilty plea, and his prison sentence are material, arguing that these facts are “unlikely to be admissible evidence” and “ha[ve] no bearing on Defendant's use of excess force by tasing Plaintiff while he was suspended in the air.” (Plf.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOMF, Doc. 40-1 ¶¶ 10, 11, 51, 52). The Court agrees that these facts are not material to the claims at issue here because they are ultimately irrelevant to the excessive force inquiry, as explained below. The Court includes the facts nonetheless because Officer Weber's Motion for Summary Judgment relies on these facts to some extent.

8.   Page numbers in citations to the record refer to ECF pagination, unless otherwise noted.

9.   Cunningham v. Shelby County, 994 F.3d 761, 766-67 (6th Cir. April 19, 2021).

10.   If this case ultimately proceeds to trial, Officer Weber may raise anew objections to Ms. Powers's trial testimony if she ventures impermissibly into the territory of instructing the jury as to what result to reach, providing legal conclusions, or explaining the law. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Corellium, LLC, No. 19-81160-CV, 2020 WL 5417197, *4 (S. D. Fla. July 30, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-81160-CIV, 2020 WL 7385752 (S. D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2020) (finding that an expert could testify as to industry standards and accepted practices, but if, at trial, the expert's testimony “stray[ed] too far afield” and provided impermissible legal determinations, the opposing party could “lodge contemporaneous objections or motions to strike, for determination by the trial judge.”).

11.   The Court notes that even if Ms. Powers's Report and opinions were excluded, it would not change the outcome of the Court's decision on Officer Weber's Motion for Summary Judgment. With or without Ms. Powers's Expert Report, a genuine dispute still exists as to the material fact of whether Officer Weber tased Mr. Black while Mr. Black was at an elevated position. The Court discusses this finding below.

12.   Mr. Black's excessive force claim requires a threshold finding that he was in fact “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. See Watkins v. Davis, 696 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2023), aff'd, 156 F.4th 1084 (11th Cir. 2025). Here, Mr. Black does not challenge the constitutionality of the initial traffic stop or Officer Weber's search of his person. Thus, the only “seizure” here is Officer Weber's tasing of Mr. Black, which the parties do not dispute constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has also construed tasing as a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Helm v. Rainbow City, Ala., 989 F.3d 1265, 1280 (11th Cir. 2021). Therefore, for the purposes of analyzing whether Officer Weber used excessive force against Mr. Black, the Court will do so only as to the tasing.

13.   Alternatively, even if there was no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Black was tased while at an elevated position, the Court notes that the other undisputed facts of record could still give rise to a finding that Officer Weber used deadly force. If Officer Weber is correct that he tased Mr. Black after he landed on the asphalt pavement or was “very close” to landing, a jury could nonetheless conclude that he applied deadly force because he tased Mr. Black while he was on a hard surface. (Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 16; Dep. of Chase Weber, Doc. 35-2 at 48:24-25, 49:1-2 (Officer Weber testified that he, “at minimum,” tased Mr. Black on a hard surface)). An individual who is tased while on a hard surface is “more likely to suffer injury from an uncontrolled fall.” Walker v. City of Sandersville, No. 5:20-cv-438-MTT, 2021 WL 5410896, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2021). “The difference between tasing a suspect who could fall from an elevated location and tasing a suspect running on a hard surface is only one of degree. In both situations, an uncontrolled fall can cause injury.” Id. Accordingly, the Court notes that even if a reasonable jury finds that Mr. Black was not tased at an elevated height, there is still sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to potentially conclude that Officer Weber's tasing of Mr. Black in these circumstances constituted deadly force. Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1241.

14.   The Court notes that Gwinnett County Police Department is not a defendant in this action, and Gwinnett County Police Department's policy is not in the record, so Officer Weber's testimony that it is the department's policy to tase a fleeing suspect is unverified.

15.   Mr. Black's Complaint asserts a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 40-45). Officer Weber's Answer also addresses the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Doc. 6). But curiously, Officer Weber's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's subsequent Response both refer to this claim as negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 36 at 21-24; Plf.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 40 at 21). Given that Mr. Black's original claim was for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court will construe Officer Weber's argument and Mr. Black's response as addressing the original intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court notes that doing so does not alter the analysis of the parties' arguments in any way, as Officer Weber's only argument for summary judgment on this claim is that he is shielded from liability by official immunity, which is an argument that is not specific to either an intentional or a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

Honorable Amy Totenberg United States District Judge