ROSETTA WYNN CONLEY RANDY WYNN v. TYRONE OLIVER AHMED HOLT JAMIE CLARK BRIAN ADAMS JENNIFER JARRIEL BRIANNA EDWARDS KAMORIE JACKSON CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BROWN CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT ANDREW DOUGLAS YANES GEORGIA DEPATMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2026)

ORDER

Randy Wynn, an inmate at Smith State Prison in Georgia, was 54 years old when he died after being beaten unconscious, repeatedly stabbed, shot, and possibly raped, by another inmate. He received delayed medical care after enduring this brutal assault. Mr. Wynn was decades into a life sentence handed down when he was in his late twenties.¹ That such a violent event was a possibility — let alone, a frequent occurrence at Georgia state prisons — is of profound concern.

In this tragic civil rights case, Wynn's mother, Rosetta Wynn Conley, seeks to hold accountable the officers and institution charged with incarcerating and guarding Wynn. She contends that the officers' alleged indifference to Wynn's safety constitutes a violation of his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants have moved for a more definite statement of Conley's claims or, in the alternative, to have several of her claims dismissed. [Doc. 12]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss [Doc. 12] is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND 2

A. Factual Background

In early February 2023, Randy Wynn, incarcerated in Smith State Prison, was assigned to share his cell with “a violent gang-affiliated inmate,” Brian Duffy. (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 65). Wynn was 54 at the time; Duffy was around 33. (Id. ¶ 68). Wynn was 5'7” and 151 pounds; Duffy was 6'2” and 254 pounds. (Id. ¶ 70). Wynn immediately protested this assignment, as Duffy had previously engaged in a violent altercation with Wynn. (Id. ¶ 72). Wynn expressed this concern to Defendant Jennifer Jarriel, the prison's Deputy Warden; Defendant Brianna Edwards, a Correctional Lieutenant; Defendant Kamorie Jackson, a Correctional Officer; and Defendant Brown,³ also a Correctional Officer. (Id. ¶¶ 73–74). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, “[o]n the day that Inmate Duffy was to be placed into Mr. Wynn's cell, Mr. Wynn pleaded with Defendant Brown and Defendant Jackson to not put Inmate Duffy in a cell with Mr. Wynn,” given their previous altercation and the threat Duffy posed to Wynn's safety. (Id. ¶ 75). Plaintiff alleges that, in retaliation for those protestations, Correction Officers Jackson and Brown beat him. (Id. ¶ 76).

Wynn's pleas for safety continued. Plaintiff alleges that, on Thursday, February 2, and again on Friday, February 3, Wynn told Edwards that Duffy's placement in his cell was a risk to his safety, that he feared for his life, and that he needed to be placed in protective custody — to no avail. (Id. ¶¶ 77–84). Plaintiff alleges that Edwards took no action; rather, on Friday, Edwards threatened Wynn, handcuffed him, and placed Duffy in his cell. Plaintiff further alleges that these actions were in retaliation for Wynn's voicing of his fears. (Id. ¶ 85).

“Over that weekend, February 4, 2023 to February 5, 2023, Mr. Wynn asked every prison employee who came by his room door to get him out of the room, and he repeatedly stated that he feared for his life.” (Id. ¶ 86). Wynn repeatedly pleaded with Deputy Warden Jarriel, who was on duty from Friday, February 3, through Sunday, February 5. “Mr. Wynn asked her to move him out every time she came around to sign door charts, stating that he feared for his life.” (Id. ¶¶ 87–93).

On the night of Sunday, February 5, 2023, Wynn suffered the horrifying assault at the core of this proceeding. Wynn was “brutally beaten unconscious, stabbed several times with a makeshift weapon, and possibly raped” by Duffy. (Id. ¶ 94). A subsequent autopsy also found two “irregular circular gaping holes,” believed to be bullet wounds.⁴ (Id. ¶ 146).

Around 5 A.M. on Monday, February 6, Defendants Christopher Wright, a Correctional Sergeant, and Andrew Yanes, a Correctional Officer, discovered Wynn on the floor in his cell. Around 7:15 A.M., he arrived at Evans Memorial Hospital, a roughly 20-minute drive from the prison.⁵ (Id. ¶¶ 33–37, 98–100). Hospital notes reflect that, as of 8:41 A.M., Wynn still had “not seen a healthcare provider for [his] acute chief complaint.” (Id. ¶ 102). At the hospital, Wynn was diagnosed with severe and life-threatening injuries, including a brain bleed (subdural hematoma); a collapsed lung (pneumothorax); and blood in his lung cavity (hemothorax), in addition to significant head trauma, lacerations, and fractures. (Id. ¶¶ 96–97). Because of Wynn's critical condition and the risks associated with it — “Decline in Condition, Disability or Death,” according to hospital notes — providers at Evans Memorial Hospital opted to transfer Wynn. At roughly 11:45 A.M., he was transferred by helicopter to Memorial Health University Medical Center. (Id. ¶¶ 106–109).

All the while, as Wynn had been assaulted and, in turn, transferred to two different hospitals, his family was left scrambling for information. On February 6, Wynn's family was notified by inmates at the prison that Wynn had been assaulted, stabbed, and possibly raped. (Id. ¶¶ 110–114). But when Wynn's sister attempted to contact prison officials that day, she was told that he was “fine” and that she should wait for a call from a deputy for more information. Wynn's family did eventually receive a call, in which they were told Wynn had been in an “incident,” was transported to the hospital, and was alive, but were given no further details. (Id. ¶¶ 115–19). On February 7, Wynn's sister again attempted to obtain more information but was told that further details (including where he was hospitalized) could not be disclosed. (Id. ¶¶ 120–123). More than a week later, on February 16, an investigator looking into Wynn's assault advised Wynn's mother (the Plaintiff here) that she (the investigator) could not disclose details about Wynn's whereabouts or the attack — only that he was in a stable condition. (Id. ¶¶ 124—127). On February 28, Plaintiff was told her son was in an intensive care lockup at the hospital. (Id. ¶ 130).

On the morning of March 1, 2023, Wynn passed away as a result of his injuries. His family was notified that morning. (Id. ¶¶ 132–135). On March 2, an autopsy of Wynn was conducted by the medical examiner's office, but the report was not made available to Plaintiff. On March 4, Plaintiff hired Dr. Jackson Gates to perform a second autopsy. (Id. ¶¶ 137, 141). Dr. Gates's report identified blunt force head trauma with associated brain hemorrhaging; a right-sided chest wall injury with a massive contusion; bruising and hemorrhaging of the right lung; and two “distant range, entrance gunshot wounds,” one on the lower neck and one on the left anterior abdomen. Dr. Gates did not identify exit wounds. (Id. ¶¶ 142–53). On March 6, Dr. Gates amended his report to identify the alleged bullet wounds as “irregular circular gaping holes,” after noting Wynn was incarcerated. (Id. ¶¶ 145–146).

B. Systemic Problems at Smith State Prison

Wynn's fatal assault is hardly an outlier in the deficient conditions at Smith State Prison. Specifically, Plaintiff describes how the conditions at the prison declined significantly during the tenure of Defendant Warden Brian Adams. (Id. ¶¶ 162–163). Adams assumed his role as Warden on October 1, 2019. On February 8, 2023, Adams was arrested on allegations that he took bribes as part of a sprawling, gang-affiliated contraband smuggling scheme operating out of the prison. He was terminated that day.⁶ Plaintiff alleges that Adams's involvement in this scheme — and his attendant inattention to both the deteriorating conditions at the prison and further corruption among prison officials — contributed to the prevalence of weapons at Smith, which exacerbated inmate-on-inmate violence. (Id. ¶¶ 179, 206, 210–220).

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of these conditions and other failures by Warden Adams and Deputy Warden Jarriel, inmate-on-inmate violence was common at Smith. (Id. ¶ 188). Inmates commonly fashioned shanks and other weapons from the prison's crumbling infrastructure, and stabbings with these shanks “were a feature of life at Smith State Prison,” according to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 182, 190). Between 2020 and 2023, at least 17 homicides occurred at the prison, with stabbings and blunt force trauma as the primary causes of death. (Id. ¶¶ 191–192). And in the weeks preceding and following Wynn's death, fifteen individual sets of contraband items were found at Smith and on the surrounding property, including a 9mm handgun, a cell phone, marijuana, and shanks. (Id. ¶ 220). Plaintiff also alleges that Warden Adams and Deputy Warden Jarriel failed to properly classify and separate inmates to lower the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence, (id. ¶ 183), and failed to adequately address the violence at Smith by, for example, adjusting the “mix” of gang members assigned to given housing zones, investigating sources of contraband, and seeking to improve both staffing and security rounds, (id. ¶¶ 225–227).

Because of low staffing levels and deficient security practices, Plaintiff alleges, correctional officers at Smith were “rarely present in the housing units” and did not adequately supervise inmates or conduct regular security checks. (Id. ¶¶ 194–99). Because officers did not conduct checks frequently enough, in Plaintiff's view, they were routinely unable to provide adequate attention to inmates' medical needs following violent incidents. Plaintiff alleges that, with adequate staffing and proper security check procedures, officers likely would have found Wynn sooner and rendered more timely medical aid. (Id. ¶¶ 195, 203).

More broadly, Plaintiff alleges that the conditions at Smith State Prison were emblematic of prisons statewide, as documented in multiple Department of Justice reports on the state's prison system. (Id. ¶¶ 264–304). These wide-ranging allegations are the basis of Plaintiff's claims against Tyrone Oliver, Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”); Ahmed Holt, Assistant Commissioner for Facilities Division; and Jamie Clark, GDOC Director of Engineering and Construction Services. Collectively, Plaintiff alleges, these three Defendants are responsible for “chronic understaffing, and easily accessible contraband,” (id. ¶ 537); “ineffective classification and housing systems,” (id. ¶¶ 489–501); and the physical deterioration of the facilities, (id. ¶¶ 467–477), all of which contribute to the immense risk of violence inside state correctional facilities.

C. Procedural History

On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel sent a Notice of Claim/Ante-Litem Notice regarding Wynn's death and the surrounding circumstances. Subsequently, on February 5, 2025, Plaintiff brought suit against prison officials and correctional officers at Smith State Prison; the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”); and top GDOC leaders. Plaintiff filed suit in the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; asserting state law claims for negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death; and seeking, among other recovery, estate claims and punitive damages. (See Doc. 1-1). Defendants removed the case to this Court on March 12, 2025, and subsequently filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss (Docs. 1; 3). With the consent of the Defendants and the Court, Plaintiff amended her Complaint on March 31. (Doc. 5). Defendants then re-filed their Motion [Doc. 12], which is now fully briefed and ripe for the Court's consideration. (Docs. 12, 16, 19).⁷

II. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Defendants first moved for a more definite statement of Plaintiff's claims, on the premise that the operative complaint is a “shotgun pleading.” Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 10(b) also commands that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”

A plaintiff runs afoul of Rule 8 and Rule 10 when they present the court with a “shotgun pleading,” one that fails “to identify [plaintiff's] claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant to frame a responsible pleading.” Holtz v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 2010 WL 2595075, *4 (N.D. Ga. June 25, 2010) (quoting Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1018 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001)). Based on a shotgun pleading, “it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit has “roundly, repeatedly, and consistently condemn[ed]” shotgun pleadings, Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 979 (11th Cir. 2008), because such pleadings “wreak havoc on the judicial system,” Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1130 (11th Cir. 2001). Based on that principle, the Circuit has identified four rough categories of shotgun pleadings:

(1) a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint; ․

(2) a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; ․

(3) [a complaint that does] not separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief; [and]

(4) [a complaint] asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, “[t]he unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.

The Court does not find the Plaintiff's complaint to be either so conclusory or so intentionally overwhelming as to constitute a shotgun pleading. It is true, of course, that Plaintiff's pleading is voluminous. But “[t]he prohibition against shotgun pleadings is not ‘an indictment against all long complaints.’ ” Okposio v. Barry Univ., Inc., 2023 WL 7484223, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2023) (quoting Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 n.2 (11th Cir. 2018)). Plaintiff accomplishes much in 236 pages, including not only explaining the facts of Wynn's assault (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 64–155), but also cataloging specific deficiencies and violent incidents both at Smith State Prison (id. ¶¶ 156–240) and across GDOC (id. ¶¶ 240–569). These factual allegations are crucial for Plaintiff to plausibly plead not only her claims arising out of Wynn's particular attack, but also the supervisory liability that could accrue for leaders at Smith State Prison and GDOC, given the alleged patterns of violence and dangerous prison management at issue in this case. See infra at 26–48.

Most importantly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have properly identified in each claim the asserted conduct, the defendants involved, and the underlying factual bases. In the case of a shotgun pleading, “it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366. That is not the case here, where Plaintiff, in many cases, has identified the most relevant sections of the Amended Complaint in each particular claim. In this way, Plaintiff has adequately put the Defendants (and the Court) on notice as to what factual bases plausibly support each asserted cause of action. Defendants' initial resistance to the lengthy framing of the Complaint is understandable. But as the Eleventh Circuit noted in Weiland, “[Plaintiff's] re-alleging of paragraphs [ ] at the beginning of each count looks, at first glance, like the most common type of shotgun pleading․ What we have here is different. The allegations of each count are not rolled into every successive count on down the line.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324 (emphasis added). For these reasons, the Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement is denied.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

In the alternative, Defendants move to dismiss several of Plaintiff's claims. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must include “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In assessing such a motion, a court accepts the complaint's factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions, as true. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

A. Ante Litem Notice (Count IX)

Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for negligence and gross negligence against the Georgia Department of Corrections (Count IX) on the premise that Plaintiff's ante litem notice is deficient and, thus, the claim is barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently set forth the relevant Defendants' “alleged acts and omissions,” as is required in an ante litem notice, because the notice did not specifically describe the officers' allegedly problematic conduct.

Under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), “no person may bring a tort claim against the State of Georgia without first giving notice of such claim ‘in writing within 12 months of the date the loss was discovered or should have been discovered[.]’ ” Hammond v. Georgia, 2012 WL 181647, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2012) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50–21–26(a)(1)) (Story, J.). “A copy of this notice is to be attached to the complaint.” Id. The ante litem notice is a requirement for the state's waiver of sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff's ante litem notice reads, in relevant part:

On the night of February 5, 2023, Mr. Wynn was brutally beaten unconscious. He was later found on the floor around 5:00 am on February 6, 2023.

Mr. Wynn was subsequently transferred from the Prison by EMS to Evans Memorial Hospital. There, providers noted diagnoses and medical problems, including but not limited to subdural hematoma, pneumothorax, hemothorax, significant head trauma, lacerations, and fractures. Providers at Evans Memorial Hospital further noted that Mr. Wynn suffered from an assault at some point on the night of February 5 and that Mr. Wynn suffered from significant head trauma with hematomas noted on the face and scalp.

(FAC, Ex. 1, Doc. 5-1 at 4). In her subsequent Complaint, Plaintiff articulated her negligence claims by alleging that the officers breached their duty “to treat [Wynn] humanely, provide him with necessary medical care, and ensure his safety and health.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 674–686). Plaintiff further alleged that the officers' conduct “caused Mr. Wynn to suffer from worse medical injuries due to delayed medical treatment, suffer from prolonged physical and mental pain and suffering, and suffer from wrongful death, among other things.” (Id. ¶¶ 681–682).

Defendants assert that the Plaintiff's ante litem notice “fails to set forth ‘[t]he acts or omissions” out of which her negligence claims arise. Defendant asserts that “Conley bases her negligence and gross negligence claims on Officer Yanes['] and Officer Wright's alleged failure to call an ambulance for her son for two hours and alleged failure to follow the Department of Corrections' ‘policies and procedures on the provision of medical care.’ ” (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 10). But, in Defendants' view, Plaintiff's ante litem notice “does not contain any mention of these acts and omissions” and thus has “failed to strictly comply with the Georgia Tort Claims Act's ante litem notice provision.” (Id. at 13).

Defendants' argument purports to seek strict compliance with the GTCA, but in actuality asks Plaintiff to forecast unknown details or, otherwise, waive her claims. It is true that “a claimant must strictly comply with the notice provisions as a prerequisite to filing suit under the GTCA” Brown v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 844 S.E.2d 544, 545 (Ga. App. Ct. 2020). But “the rule of strict compliance does not demand a hyper-technical construction that would not measurably advance the purpose of the GTCA's notice provisions as reflected by the plain meaning of the relevant statutory text.” Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5) (requiring notice of claim with information “to the extent of the claimant's knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances”). Put otherwise, “the GTCA's ante litem notice provisions clearly contemplate the possibility that a claimant may have imperfect information regarding various facets of her claim at the time her notice is submitted.” Cummings v. Ga. Dep't of Juv. Just., 653 S.E.2d 729, 732 (Ga. 2007) (holding ante litem notice that named incorrect responsible agency was valid).

And, indeed, Plaintiff's ante litem notice predicted and pre-empted Defendants' contention:

Mr. Wynn was serving a sentence in Smith State Prison. Due to the nature of the on-going investigations at Smith State Prison—and the ongoing investigation into the murder of Mr. Wynn—limited information was provided to Plaintiffs as to the circumstances surrounding the attack. Plaintiffs received an incident report via an open records request, but it was almost entirely redacted. Therefore, plaintiffs rely on other forms of information and research in providing this notice of claim.

(FAC, Ex. 1, Doc. 5-1 at 3). Plaintiff elsewhere describes how she and her family were stonewalled for weeks when seeking information from the Smith State Prison. Plaintiff's Complaint reflects how, on the day after Wynn's attack, “when Mr. Wynn's sister contacted the Georgia Department of Corrections to get in touch with the prison, she was directed to a deputy's secretary who told her that Mr. Wynn was fine.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 115). Deputies repeatedly told Wynn's sister that they could not disclose where Wynn was hospitalized. (Id. ¶¶ 121–131). And, on the day Wynn passed away, “[t]he deputy warden stated that she could not tell Mr. Wynn's family too many details because of HIPAA laws.” (Id. ¶¶ 135).

Given Plaintiff's representations in both her ante litem notice and her Complaint about the limitations of her information, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's notice lays forth her understanding to the “practicable ․ extent of the claimant's knowledge and belief.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5). Defendants' position would, apparently, require Plaintiff to have specifically identified the officers' alleged failure to call an ambulance for roughly two hours after discovering Wynn in his injured state. In other words, in Defendants' assessment, the only acts relevant to the Plaintiff's negligence claims were the officers' alleged failure to call an ambulance and/or follow department policies — and, thus, the omission of those particular details from the ante litem notice is a fatal defect. (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 10). But Plaintiff's Complaint more broadly alleges that the officers “caused Mr. Wynn to suffer from worse medical injuries due to delayed medical treatment.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 681–82) (emphasis added). And she did, indeed, identify a source of some of the delay in Wynn's medical treatment when she wrote in her ante litem notice that Wynn was “brutally beaten unconscious ․ [o]n the night of February 5, 2023” but was not discovered until “around 5:00 am.” (FAC, Ex. 1, Doc. 5-1 at 4).

Defendants point to Williams v. Wilcox State Prison, 799 S.E.2d 811 (Ga. App. Ct. 2017), as instructive. There, a Georgia appeals court found a slip-and-fall plaintiff's ante litem notice insufficient when it “assert[ed] that [her] negligence claims [were] based on the [defendant's] failure to properly warn her of the water hazard” but the eventual complaint “alleged that she was injured at the prison when she tripped and fell over uneven flooring in the visitor's bathroom, not that she slipped as a result of a water hazard.” Id. at 814. Wilcox does not control for two reasons. First, any absent details in Plaintiff's ante litem notice are, by her own admission, a result of insufficient information provided to her. (FAC, Ex. 1, Doc. 5-1 at 3). That paucity of details, which is indeed contemplated by the Act,⁸ is far different from changing one's entire theory of the case between the pre-suit notice and the suit itself. Second, Plaintiff does, indeed, allude to the problematic delay in Wynn's treatment in her ante litem notice, when she points to the period of time that elapsed between his assault and his discovery by the Defendant officers. Wilcox is thus inapposite, and Plaintiff's ante litem notice is deemed sufficient to overcome the state's assertion of sovereign immunity.

B. Due Process Claims (Counts I–VIII, X, XI)

The Defendants next seek to dismiss portions of the Plaintiff's causes of action to the degree they set forth duplicative constitutional claims. Specifically, the majority of Plaintiff's claims (Counts I–VIII, X, XI) seek constitutional relief on the dual bases of (1) the Eighth Amendment's protections against cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment's protections of substantive due process. (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 570–785). The Defendants move to dismiss the substantive due process portions of these claims on the grounds that “when the Constitution provides ‘an explicit textual source of constitutional protection,’ plaintiffs must bring their claim under that particular amendment rather than ‘the more generalized notion of substantive due process.’ ” (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 12 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); see also Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff does not appear to oppose this portion of the Motion in her response brief. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, in the case of prisoners, “the Due Process Clause affords respondent no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). As such, Counts I–VIII, X, XI of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are dismissed only as to the Due Process Clause claims. Plaintiff's claims arising under the Eighth Amendment in Counts I–VIII, X, XI will remain, subject to the Court's rulings below.

C. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs (Counts VI, VII)

Defendants next move to dismiss two of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims, Counts VI and VII, which allege that Defendants Wright and Yanes were deliberately indifferent to Wynn's serious medical needs when they delayed his transportation to the hospital by roughly two hours. (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 647–664). Defendants contend that “Conley fails to assert sufficient facts to raise her allegation of medical deliberate indifference above the speculative level” because “there are no allegations about what happened during that two-hour period, including how the officers responded when they found her son, whether they took her son to the prison's medical unit, whether medical professionals at the prison examined her son (and, if so, what actions they took), etc.” (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 14). These factual omissions, in Defendants' view, preclude claims of deliberate indifference. (Id.). The Court thus turns to these two claims.

1. Legal Standard for Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment forbids the “inflict[ion]” of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Because the amendment prohibits “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” it also bars “deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (cleaned up); Hoffer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). “An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, the state has “a constitutional obligation to provide minimally adequate medical care” to those it has incarcerated. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991). “[D]elay in access to medical care that is ‘tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ may constitute deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). But not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

A deliberate indifference claim entails both an objective and a subjective component. Keohane v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. Sec'y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). As an en banc Eleventh Circuit opinion recently stated,

[f]irst, of course, the plaintiff must demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’ ”

Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” and to do so he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.”

Wade v. McDade (“Wade I”), 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).⁹

2. Relevant Factual Context

As described in detail supra at 2–6, Wynn suffered a vicious and ultimately fatal assault on the night of February 5, 2023, during which he was ““brutally beaten unconscious, stabbed several times with a makeshift weapon, [shot] and possibly raped” by Duffy. (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 94–95). Defendant Wright, a Correctional Sergeant, and Defendant Yanes, a Correctional Officer, discovered Wynn in his cell at around 5 A.M. the next morning. Wynn did not arrive at the hospital until 7:15 A.M. (Id. ¶¶ 33–37, 98–100). Indeed, the hospital's own records reflect that Wynn “present[ed] to Evans ER via ambulance transport from Smith State Prison after being found at 5 am[,] 3 hours prior to [his arrival at the ER] [and] after being assaulted [the] prior evening at an unknown time.” (Id. ¶ 101).

3. Wynn's Serious Medical Need

Given the severe and eventually fatal nature of Wynn's extensive injuries, no one disputes that he suffered objectively serious medical need requiring timely attention. Wynn suffered a brain bleed (subdural hematoma); a collapsed lung (pneumothorax); and blood in his lung cavity (hemothorax), in addition to significant head trauma, lacerations, and fractures. (Id. ¶¶ 96–97). His critical condition also required rapid emergency transport to another nearby hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 106–109). The Court thus easily finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the first element of a deliberate indifference claim by more-than-plausibly alleging Wynn's objective, serious medical deprivation.

4. Defendants' Subjective Awareness

The more complicated question is whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants Wright and Yanes “acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,’ ” such that they were “subjectively aware that [their] own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1262. “A person acts recklessly, in the most common formulation, when he ‘consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk’ attached to his conduct, in ‘gross deviation’ from accepted standards.” Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 427 (2021) (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)). To meet the subjective element of the deliberate indifference requirement, “the prison ‘official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’ ” Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact ․” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. A reasonable response to the risk, meanwhile, precludes liability under the Eighth Amendment. Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1262.

Construing the facts in Plaintiff's favor, the Court finds Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants Yanes and Wright “acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law’ ” in their delay of Wynn's care. Plaintiff's allegations regarding those officers' deliberate indifference are as follows:

• Mr. Wynn was [ ] found on the floor at around 5:00 AM on February 6, 2023 by Defendant Christopher Wright and Defendant Andrew Yanes. However, Mr. Wynn was not transferred to the hospital for his life-threatening injuries until 7:15 AM on February 6, 2023. (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 98–99).

• Required action by [Defendants Wright and Yanes] upon finding Mr. Wynn at around 5:00 AM on February 6, 2023, would be to administer CPR on Mr. Wynn, call for medical attention on the radio, and very quickly call for an ambulance to take Mr. Wynn to the hospital.” (Id. ¶¶ 651, 660).

Defendants' rejoinder is that Plaintiff includes “no allegations about what happened during that two-hour period, including how the officers responded when they found her son, whether they took her son to the prison's medical unit, whether medical professionals at the prison examined her son (and, if so, what actions they took), etc.” (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 14).

In this instance, judicial logic falls in the Plaintiff's favor. Again, at this juncture, Plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, and Plaintiff need only raise “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's allegations of a two-hour delay between the officers' discovery of Wynn and Wynn's arrival at the hospital plausibly allege recklessly negligent behavior, particularly because the two-hour delay implies a “ ‘gross deviation’ from accepted standards” of care. Borden, 593 U.S. at 427. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added). And, indeed, based on the allegation that Wynn arrived at the hospital two hours after he was discovered by the officers, the Court finds it reasonable to infer some level of inaction on their part during that period. Further, construing the factual pleadings in favor of Plaintiff, the Court similarly finds it would be unreasonable to infer, for example, that the officers immediately called for emergency medical assistance or an ambulance, which took more than two hours to deliver Plaintiff to the hospital.

This is especially true given the hospital's own records, which documented at 7:15 A.M. that Wynn “present[ed] to Evans ER via ambulance transport from Smith State Prison after being found at 5 am 3 hrs prior” and again, at 8:41 A.M., that Wynn still had “not seen a healthcare provider for [his] acute chief complaint.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 101–102). These records raise a reasonable inference that Wynn had not received any emergency medical assistance at the time of his arrival at the hospital, two hours after the officers found him in his brutalized state.¹⁰

“Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs may be shown by failure to provide prompt attention to those needs by delaying necessary medical treatment for nonmedical reasons or by proving a policy of deficiencies in staffing or procedures such that the pretrial detainee is effectively denied medical care.” Mladek v. Day, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1305–1306 (M.D. Ga. 2003); see also Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven where medical care is ultimately provided, a prison official may nonetheless act with deliberate indifference by delaying the treatment of serious medical needs, even for a period of hours, though the reason for the delay and the nature of the medical need is relevant in determining what type of delay is constitutionally intolerable.” (cleaned up)); Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 938 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The requisite deliberate indifference may be established by a showing that prison doctors or prison guards intentionally denied or delayed access to medical care requested by a prisoner.”).

Indeed, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held that the actions alleged of Defendants Yanes and Wright — that is, the failure to initiate any effective interventions, for roughly two hours after discovering Wynn — can support a deliberate indifference claim, especially at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Alsobrook v. Alvarado, 477 F. App'x 710 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding plaintiff's allegations that defendant “knew about [serious injuries] but delayed for almost two hours in taking him for medical treatment” plausibly supported deliberate indifference claim); Patel v. Lanier County, 969 F.3d 1173, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding viable deliberate indifference claim “worse ‘than gross negligence’ ” where officer “utterly refused to respond” to detainee's unconsciousness, sweating, hyperventilating, and shaking); McCarley v. Dunn, 722 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1264 (N.D. Ala. 2024) (finding gross negligence where officer “did not render first aid, [ ] did not transport [plaintiff] to the infirmary, and, despite allegedly having access to radios [ ], did not call for help”) (“Two inmates eventually carried McCarley to the prison infirmary.”).

In fact, even a delay of a few minutes wherein officers fail to render aid or call for emergency medical assistance can support a deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jackson, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1274–75 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (deliberate indifference claim survived motion to dismiss where officer “failed to provide any care whatsoever” for eight minutes, including checking decedent's breathing or pulse, administering CPR, or calling for medical assistance (emphasis in original)); Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1232 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (deliberate indifference claim survived summary judgment motion where officers “[f]ail[ed] to resuscitate or immediately call medical personnel in response to a[n] unconscious, non-breathing prisoner” after using force against him), aff'd 422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005).

Discovery may potentially vindicate the Defendants' contention that, during this two-hour delay, the officers acted reasonably in reacting to Wynn's injuries. (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 14). But the Court's role at this stage is not to project the most likely version of the facts, construed in favor of the Defendants. Rather, it is to evaluate the Plaintiff's allegations for legal sufficiency to support a claim. The Court finds that given the factual allegations at this juncture, Plaintiff has asserted colorable claims that Defendants Wright and Yanes were deliberately indifferent to Wynn's serious medical needs.

D. Supervisory Liability (Counts VIII, X, XI)

The final segment of Defendants' Motion seeks dismissal of three of Plaintiff's claims related to supervisory liability, on the basis that they are not plausibly alleged or, alternatively, are precluded by qualified immunity. (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 15–21). Plaintiff's supervisory liability claims arise out of the officers' failure to ensure Wynn's protection while in their custody. “ ‘[P]rison officials have a duty’ under the Constitution to take reasonable action ‘to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’ ” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied 45 S. Ct. 178 (2024) (quoting Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016)).

The Eleventh Circuit imposes an “extremely rigorous standard for supervisory liability.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013). “[T]o hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff must show that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor's actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb County, 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit has outlined three paths to establishing such a causal connection:

A causal connection may be established when: 1) a ‘history of widespread abuse’ puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he or she fails to do so; 2) a supervisor's custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or 3) facts support an inference that the supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.

Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)) Plaintiff brings three claims of supervisory liability, each with a slightly different allegation. The Court examines each in turn and also assesses the applicability of the qualified immunity defense to the degree relevant in each claim.

1. Wright (Count VIII)

In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wright, a Correctional Sergeant, “is liable to Mr. Wynn for his failures to adequately supervise prison staff, including Defendant Yanes, regarding the provision of medical treatment[.]” Plaintiff alleges this in particular because Wright was “directly involved in finding Mr. Wynn with Defendant Yanes[,] and Defendant Wright was the reporting official when Mr. Wynn was found.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 666–67).

Importantly, this Court has already found supra at 18–26 that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Wright acted with deliberate indifference in the delay of Wynn's medical care. The question, then, is whether Plaintiff has alleged additional facets of Wright's conduct — distinct from his actions in tandem with Yanes — that could establish an additional element or basis of supervisory liability. See, e.g., Martinez v. City of New York, 564 F. Supp. 3d 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“A plaintiff may not assert a second set of identical claims premised on the same conduct under the label supervisory liability.” (cleaned up)). In sum, the Court found previously that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a deliberate indifference claim against Wright based on his failure to timely respond to Wynn's serious medical emergency. Plaintiff cannot, however, allege a second Eighth Amendment claim against Wright for supervisory liability based on precisely the same conduct.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged additional or distinct conduct by Wright that would give rise to supervisory liability. Plaintiff's contentions regarding Wright's allegedly problematic conduct as a supervisor are that he “fail[ed] to adequately supervise prison staff, including Defendant Yanes, regarding the provision of medical treatment”; that he was “directly involved in finding Mr. Wynn [and] was the reporting official when Mr. Wynn was found”; and that he “ratified the actions and omissions of Defendant Yanes.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 665–73). However, these factual allegations are either (1) duplicative of the factual conduct alleged in Count VII against Defendant Wright or (2) conclusory statements regarding Wright's supervisory authority.

For example, in Count VII, which alleges Defendant Wright's direct liability for deliberate indifference, Plaintiff points to “Defendant Wright's refusal and failure to provide medical attention or call for medical attention.” (Id. ¶ 661). In Count VIII, which alleges Defendant Wright's supervisory liability, she alleges that “Defendant Wright refused to take action to supervise his staff and Defendant Yanes, to reasonably respond to Mr. Wynn's serious medical needs.” (Id. ¶ 669). These allegations are, substantively, the same. The sole difference is that, in Count VIII, Plaintiff perfunctorily ties Wright's conduct (and his failings) to his role as a supervisor. Plaintiff does not, however, allege “facts [that could] support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048. Nor does she allege specific facts regarding how Wright's failure to call for medical attention was distinct from Yanes's failure to call for medical attention, precluding a finding that Wright incurred additional liability as a supervisor. Because Count VIII as currently drafted seeks to confer liability for the same conduct as Count VII and because it is not supported by specific allegations arising out of Wright's supervisory conduct, the Court finds that Count VIII does not state a plausible claim for relief.

2. Adams and Jarriel (Count X)

In Count X, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Adams, then the Warden at Smith State Prison, and Defendant Jarriel, then the Deputy Warden, are liable for their “failures to adequately supervise prison staff” and for their “policy making,” specifically related to “the prevention of the attacks onto Mr. Wynn, the free flow of contraband and smuggling which provided the weapons used to harm and kill Mr. Wynn, and the constitutionally deficient medical care.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 691–699). The Plaintiff alleges at least three ways in which Adams and Jarriel's conduct is linked to Wynn's attack and subsequent death:

• first, Adams's documented involvement in a contraband smuggling scheme facilitated the flow of contraband into the prison, including the shank and gun with which Wynn was assaulted, (id. ¶¶ 166, 212–214);

• second, officers in the prison were “rarely present in the housing units and did not perform adequate security rounds or otherwise monitor people to prevent harm,” (id. ¶ 195), allowing for Wynn's attack; and

• third, the paucity of security rounds also delayed the discovery of Wynn's injuries and his eventual transport to the hospital (id.).

In the Court's view, both the excessive flow of contraband and the absence of regular security rounds support Plaintiff's claim that the conditions inside Smith State Prison “were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to [Wynn's] future health or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019); see, e.g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding unconstitutionally unsafe conditions where “excessive quantities of contraband flowed freely into and within the prison,” such that “[i]nmates carried knives and openly used drugs,” and officers “did not ․ patrol the interiors of the dorms regularly”).

“[T]he causal connection” necessary to substantiate supervisory liability” may be established when a supervisor's custom or policy ․ result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Keith 749 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360). The crucial question, then, is whether Plaintiff plausibly alleges (1) that Defendants Adams's and Jarriel's customs generated a level of culpability amounting to deliberate indifference and (2) that this conduct was the proximate cause of the assault on Wynn, such that supervisory liability would attach.

“A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)). “A custom is an unwritten practice that is applied consistently enough to have the same effect as a policy with the force of law.” Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). “Demonstrating a policy or custom requires ‘show[ing] a persistent and wide-spread practice.’ ” Id. (quoting Depew v. City of St. Mary's, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).

a. Warden Adams

As to Adams, the Court finds both the culpability and the causal connection to be fairly clear cut. “Defendant Adams was charged with participating in a smuggling ring operating inside the prison which led to increases in prison violence and contraband.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 212). That striking fact makes less surprising the fact that “[m]ultiple staff members have been arrested for trafficking contraband into Smith State Prison.” (Id. ¶ 214) (emphasis added). Contraband found in Smith State Prison in the weeks surrounding the attack included a cell phone, marijuana, multiple shanks and homemade weapons, and a handgun (found in a car in the area outside the prison). (Id. ¶ 220).

As a reminder, the attack on Wynn allegedly included two separate pieces of contraband: a makeshift weapon and a firearm. (Id. ¶ 95). Given Plaintiff's factual allegations regarding Adams's role in actively facilitating the flow of contraband into Smith State Prison, it is reasonable to infer that Adams “did not take appropriate measures to prevent the movement of contraband” (id. ¶ 211), including turning a blind eye to other corruption within the facility. These alleged facts demonstrate the consistent and widespread practice required to establish a “custom” and substantiate supervisory liability. Moreover, Adams was actually criminally charged with facilitating the flow of contraband into Smith State Prison, plausibly establishing that he acted with a level of “ ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,’ ” and was “subjectively aware that [his] own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm” to prisoners. Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1262.

Having found that the Plaintiff has plausibly pled a claim for supervisory liability against former Warden Adams, the Court turns to the issue of qualified immunity for this claim.¹¹ “[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andre v. Clayton County, 148 F.4th 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010)).

“First, a government official raising a defense of qualified immunity must ‘prove that [s]he acted within the scope of h[er] discretionary authority’ ” or, in other words, “(1) in accordance with her job-related duties, and (2) within the scope of her authority.” Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1278 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021)). “It is the burden of the governmental official to make this showing.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). “Put another way, to pass the first step of the discretionary function test for qualified immunity, the defendant must have been performing a function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen within his legitimate job description.” Id. at 1266. Finally, “[i]f the defendant makes her discretionary-authority showing, the burden shifts” to the plaintiff to establish a violation of his clearly established rights. Huggins, 151 F.4th at 1278

In the case of Warden Adams, however, the qualified immunity analysis need not go very far. To refresh, Adams's complicity in a widespread gang-affiliated contraband scheme allowed for the flow of contraband weapons into the prison — like the ones used in the brutal assault on Wynn. Adams was arrested in February 2023 “on charges that he received cash payments as part of a widespread contraband operation at Smith State Prison” that was “associated with the Yves Saint Laurent Squad, a smuggling ring operating inside the prison.”¹² (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 164–166). It is difficult to conceptualize how Adams's participation in contraband smuggling (which caused his termination as Warden and resulted in his being subject to a criminal charge) could possibly fit within his “job-related duties” or “the scope of [his discretionary] authority.” Huggins, 151 F.4th at 1278. “Employment by a local, county, state, or federal government is not a carte blanche invitation to push the envelope and tackle matters far beyond one's job description or achieve one's official goals through unauthorized means.” Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1267. Certainly, Adams's role in a sprawling contraband ring operating out of the prison he managed would constitute a matter “far beyond [his] job description.” Thus, qualified immunity does not attach.

b. Deputy Warden Jarriel

Deputy Warden Jarriel's supervisory liability is less straightforward. Plaintiff has brought both a direct liability claim (Count II) and a supervisory liability claim (Count X) against Jarriel, arising out of the Deputy Warden's alleged conduct related to the attack. Unlike the claims against Defendant Wright, discussed supra at 27–29, Plaintiff identifies distinct conduct underlying each count against Defendant Jarriel.

As to the direct liability claim, which is not substantively at issue in this Motion, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Jarriel was on duty as the deputy warden on Friday, February 3, 2023, as well as during the weekend of February 4, 2023 to February 5, 2023, and Mr. Wynn asked her to move him out every time she came around to sign door charts, stating that he feared for his life.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 87).

As to the supervisory liability claim, which is at issue in this Motion, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Warden Jarriel was “responsible for overseeing the daily operations, managing staff, and ensuring the safety and security of both inmates and staff.” (Id. ¶ 159). Her duties “included conducting head counts, making rounds, checking security devices, and accompanying inmates within the prison.” (Id. ¶ 160). Plaintiff alleges that “due to the supervision of Defendant Adams and Defendant Jarriel, Smith State Prison Correctional Officers were rarely present in the housing units and did not perform adequate security rounds or otherwise monitor people to prevent harm.” (Id. ¶ 195). Strikingly, she further alleges that

[o]n the night of Mr. Wynn's homicide, as a result of the supervision, staffing, customs, and practices of Defendant Adams and Defendant Jarriel, security rounds were not conducted, and such rounds could have prevented Mr. Wynn's attack and could have led to quicker medical attention to Mr. Wynn's injuries.

(Id. ¶ 203) (emphasis added).

The failure to conduct regular security rounds, or to ensure such rounds were standard practice, demonstrates a level of recklessness far and beyond mere negligence, especially because Jarriel and other officers tasked with supervising Wynn knew of his specific and well-founded fears for his life. Garner ex rel. R.C. v. Jamerson, 2023 WL 4927250, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023) (finding cadet was “deliberately indifferent toward [decedent's] safety” because he “did not perform even cursory supervision on the night” of inmate's suicide despite knowing of significant risk to his safety); LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1530–31 (finding evidence could support supervisory claim of deliberate indifference against prison superintendent where, among other things, officers “did not ․ patrol the interiors of the dorms regularly”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that, in the days leading up to his murder, Wynn “asked [Jarriel] to move him out every time she came around to sign door charts, stating that he feared for his life.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 87). In other words, construing Plaintiff's allegations as true, it is unquestionable that Jarriel was on notice of the specific threat to Wynn's safety. Nevertheless, as the official “responsible for overseeing the daily operations, managing staff, and ensuring the safety and security of both inmates and staff,” in addition to specifically “making rounds,” Jarriel took no steps to ensure Wynn's safety. (Id. ¶¶ 159–60).

Again, it is worth noting that, according to Plaintiff's allegations, “security rounds were not conducted” at all on the night of Wynn's murder. (Id. ¶ 203). It is, the Court notes, unclear whether a policy existed within the prison requiring regular security rounds — and, thus, whether the shortcoming was in the absence of a policy or in the failure to enforce it. Either way, Jarriel's inaction in the face of Wynn's pleas (both her alleged direct liability in failing to intervene herself, and her alleged supervisory liability in failing to direct any supervision or security measures by her subordinates) is striking. In this way, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Jarriel's failure to implement any security rounds or other precautions — in the face of Wynn's repeated, specific pleas for his life and requests to be separated from Duffy — amounts to deliberate indifference in her supervisory role.

Turning briefly to causation, Plaintiff has also sufficiently established the requisite link between the absence of security rounds in proximity to Wynn's cell, and the fatal assault on Wynn on the evening of February 5, 2023:

[D]ue to the supervision of Defendant Adams and Defendant Jarriel, Smith State Prison Correctional Officers were rarely present in the housing units and did not perform adequate security rounds or otherwise monitor people to prevent harm. These failures led to the attack onto Mr. Wynn as leaving him alone with Inmate Duffy gave Inmate Duffy the opportunity and time to torture and kill Mr. Wynn. These failures also caused Mr. Wynn to not be discovered until 5:00 AM the next morning,13 delaying Mr. Wynn's medical care, as additional officers performing adequate security rounds would have discovered Mr. Wynn in his critical condition.

(Id. ¶ 195). In short, Jarriel's failure to ensure that the cells of Wynn and other inmates were monitored at any point overnight allowed ample time for Wynn's assailant to attack in their shared cell — hardly an unexpected outcome given both Wynn's pleas for his life and the startling record of inmate-on-inmate violence in Smith State Prison. “Violent acts by incarcerated people against other incarcerated people at Smith State Prison were common and included homicides, stabbings, and sexual abuse.” (Id. ¶ 188). Indeed, “[t]here were at least 17 homicides at Smith State Prison between 2020 and 2023[.]” (Id. ¶ 191; see also ¶ 192). In sum, Jarriel's alleged failure to ensure adequate (or, according to Plaintiff, any) security supervision facilitated Wynn's attack by creating the ideal environment for inmate-on-inmate violence.

Finally, the Court addresses the issue of Jarriel's qualified immunity as it relates to Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim against her. As a reminder, “a government official raising a defense of qualified immunity must ‘prove that [s]he acted within the scope of h[er] discretionary authority.” Huggins 151 F.4th at 1278. “Second, if the defendant makes her discretionary-authority showing, the burden shifts. The plaintiff must then show (1) that the defendant ‘violated [his] statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.’ ” Id.

The parties do not appear to dispute that Jarriel was acting within the discretionary authority of her role as Deputy Warden when implementing policy about the prison's security (or, as Plaintiff asserts, failing to do so). The question, then, is whether Jarriel's alleged failure to ensure adequate supervision of the prison she was responsible for managing is a “clearly established” constitutional violation. Given multiple Eleventh Circuit cases on this issue, the Court finds that it is a clearly established violation. See, e.g., Garner, 2023 WL 4927250, at *2 (finding correctional officer, lieutenants, warden, and other supervisors liable for deliberate indifference and denying qualified immunity where defendants were aware of high suicide risks and “lack of supervision” in the prison) (“[S]upervisors knew that officers routinely failed to conduct safety checks on high-risk inmates[.] ․ [The district court] ruled that it was clearly established that failing to act despite having knowledge of a serious risk of harm to an inmate amounted to deliberate indifference, so the supervisors were not entitled to qualified immunity.”); see also LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1530–31.

3. Oliver, Holt, and Clark (Count XI)

In Count XI, Plaintiff alleges, in sum, that:

• Defendant Oliver, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, is liable for his supervisory conduct related to “the operation and management of Georgia prisons” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 743);

• Holt, the Assistant Commissioner of Facilities Division, is liable for his supervisory conduct related to “inmate classification systems and practices at Georgia prisons,” (id. ¶ 744); and

• Clark, the Director of Engineering & Construction Services, is liable for his supervisory conduct related to the “maintenance and repair practices at Georgia prisons,” (id. ¶ 745).

Arising out of the extensive factual allegations made in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts supervisory liability claims against Oliver, Holt, and Clark on the basis of the widespread, rampant abuses in the Georgia state prison system; their knowledge of such; and their failure to respond to these disturbing conditions.¹⁴

a. Commissioner Oliver

First, Plaintiff alleges that Commissioner Oliver's knowledge of and inaction toward the “history of widespread abuse” related to understaffing, inmate violence, contraband, deficient medical care, and crumbling facilities supports a causal connection between the Commissioner's conduct and Wynn's fatal attack. The Eleventh Circuit's case law as to when supervisory liability attaches based on a “history of widespread abuse” is, to put it kindly, less than clear. See, e.g., Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1256 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding sheriff's failure to investigate multiple incidents of officers' excessive force allowed for supervisory liability related to plaintiff's excessive force claim because of “causal connection between [sheriff's] failure to investigate any allegations of serious misconduct and [officer's] belief that he could act with impunity”); Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding plausible claim of supervisory liability against warden where he was specifically “warned ․ about certain guards” who were “believed [to be] abusive toward inmates”). But see Myrick v. Fulton County, 69 F.4th 1277, 1298 (11th Cir. 2023) (dismissing supervisory liability claim where plaintiff alleged that sheriff was aware of “numerous settlements and judgments based on the unconstitutional actions of the Fulton Sheriff and Sheriff deputies” and “permitted a custom of excessive force by permitting unwarranted use of tasers on inmates”).

In the wake of the muddied and fact-intensive precedent, the Court returns to first principles. At the Motion to Dismiss stage, the Court takes the Plaintiff's allegations as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And, here, Plaintiff makes extensive allegations that Oliver, who has served as the GDOC Commissioner since January 2023, was on notice of the abysmal conditions throughout the system. Plaintiff describes extensive and long-running violence, as well as chronic corruption and understaffing:

• In a 2024 report, the U.S. Department of Justice found that “the Georgia prison system ․ [f]ails to protect incarcerated people from violence and harm by other incarcerated people [and] harm caused by sexual violence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (Id. ¶¶ 278–279).

• “Over the six-year period from 2018 through 2023, the GDC reported a total of 142 homicides in its prisons, which includes Smith State Prison, with 48 in the first three years and a 95.8% increase in the latter three years, with 94 homicides.” (Id. ¶ 261).

• “Staffing levels vary across the prisons ․ with correctional officer (CO) vacancy rates around 50% systemwide and over 70% at ten of the largest facilities.” (Id. ¶ 254).

• “In the past six years, hundreds of Georgia prison officers have been arrested on criminal charges arising out of acts committed in or in relation to the prisons, including acts with victims outside of the prisons. The vast majority were contraband-related arrests, while other charges involved violence, extortion, or sexual assault; gangs with members inside and outside the prisons often played a role.” (Id. ¶¶ 298–299).

Plaintiff also specifically alleges Oliver's awareness of these pervasive problems. Plaintiff asserts that “GDC leadership officials ․ are sent a selected portion of the data that facilities collect in incident reports and other documentation. [ ] For each facility, a monthly report containing statistics, including those related to violent incidents, is generated for review by the warden and regional manager,” along with statewide supervisory officials. (Id. ¶¶ 550–552). According to Plaintiff, Oliver also receives “reports of emergencies and serious incidents across the system,” and, “from 2022 through April 2023, these reports available to GDC leadership ․ included 1,045 incidents of violence, including assaults, fights, and homicides.” (Id. ¶¶ 554–555). Plaintiff concludes that “[i]t is plainly evident, from not only the staffing levels and crime in the prisons but also by the prevalence of harm, that Georgia prisons expose the people [they] incarcerate[ ] to a substantial risk of serious harm, and that [the] policies and practices [of GDOC supervisors] have failed to address the pervasive problems.” (Id. ¶ 566–567).

In short, Plaintiff alleges, Oliver is definitively on notice of a “history of widespread abuse” throughout the GDOC system and has failed to adequately address it. That is sufficient to allege a plausible supervisory liability claim at this juncture, based on Oliver's alleged deliberate indifference to the constitutional deprivations happening within GDOC facilities. See Garner, 2023 WL 4927250, at *3 (finding plaintiff plausibly alleged supervisory liability claim related to prisoner's suicide and denying qualified immunity where state's inmate suicide rate was “double the national average due to severe understaffing, high turnover, poor training, lack of supervision, abuse of solitary confinement, and failure to discipline officers” and “supervisors allegedly knew about but failed to correct these widespread abuses”).

Having found that Plaintiff has stated a viable claim of supervisory liability against Oliver, the Court turns to the qualified immunity analysis. As a reminder, “a government official raising a defense of qualified immunity must ‘prove that [s]he acted within the scope of h[er] discretionary authority,’ ” or in other words, “(1) in accordance with her job-related duties, and (2) within the scope of her authority.” Huggins 151 F.4th at 1278. “Second, if the defendant makes her discretionary-authority showing, the burden shifts. The plaintiff must then show (1) that the defendant ‘violated [his] statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.’ ” Id.

The parties do not dispute that Oliver acts within his discretionary authority in his “operation and management of Georgia prisons.” (MTD, Doc. 12-1 at 19; FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 743). The question, then, is whether Oliver's management decisions — which, Plaintiff alleges, facilitate conditions of violence and corruption within GDOC facilities — violate “clearly established” law. Again, the precedent is variable and fact-intensive. But numerous Eleventh Circuit cases stand for the principle that supervisory liability can flow from a higher-level official's knowledge of (and inadequate response to) pervasive violence, chronic understaffing, and other objectively dangerous conditions.

In LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1530–31 (11th Cir. 1993), ten present and former inmates of a Florida prison brought a deliberate indifference claim against the prison's superintendent, challenging the violent and dangerous conditions at the prison. The district court found the superintendent liable for deliberate indifference, based on findings of pervasive contraband, rampant physical and sexual violence, staff corruption, and physical decrepitude.¹⁵ The circuit agreed that the evidence could support a deliberate indifference claim against the superintendent, but remanded after taking issue with the district court's standards for causation and knowledge. Id. at 1539, 1541.

Similarly, in Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit revived a supervisory deliberate indifference claim against the county sheriff, based on evidence “that inmate-on-inmate violence occurred regularly when the jail was overcrowded, as it was during [that year] and the two preceding years”; that the sheriff subjectively knew about that widespread violence; and that he took no sufficient, responsive action. Id. at 1583 (holding Plaintiff's “evidence [was] sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the excessive risk of violence flowed from an atmosphere of deliberate indifference reflected in [the sheriff's] failure to classify or segregate violent from non-violent inmates, assign inmates to cells or beds, adequately train the jailers, and adequately supervise and monitor the inmates”).

More recently, in Garner ex rel. R.C. v. Jamerson, 2023 WL 4927250 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023), the Eleventh Circuit sustained claims against six GDOC supervisory officials — including the GDOC Commissioner — on the basis that the supervisors knew about a widespread dangerous condition across Georgia prisons but did not adequately respond.

[Plaintiff] alleges that the inmate suicide rate in Georgia prisons—involving at least 125 suicides since 2017—was double the national average due to severe understaffing, high turnover, poor training, lack of supervision, abuse of solitary confinement, and failure to discipline officers. The supervisors allegedly knew about but failed to correct these widespread abuses. They allegedly adopted a custom of allowing officers to disregard required suicide safety protocol without consequence, to the point that it was “widely known” that officers routinely falsified door charts and observation logs.

2023 WL 4927250 at *3. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit also easily found that “[b]ecause the complaint adequately alleges a causal connection between the supervisors' conduct and a clearly-established constitutional violation ․ the district court did not err by denying them qualified immunity at this stage.” Id.

In other words, the Eleventh Circuit has indeed “clearly established” the principle that a high-ranking correctional supervisor — including the official at the top of the food chain, such as the sheriff or statewide commissioner — can incur supervisory liability based on their knowledge of and inaction toward pervasive violence and dangerous conditions in correctional facilities. As such, and based on the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint, the Court does not find that Commissioner Oliver can properly invoke qualified immunity at this preliminary juncture.

b. Assistant Commissioner Holt

Next, Plaintiff asserts a claim for supervisory deliberate indifference related to GDOC's subpar systems for classifying and segregating inmates by security level. As a reminder, Assistant Commissioner Holt was responsible for “the policies and procedures related to inmate classifications at Georgia prisons.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 764). Plaintiff alleges that GDOC has “classification and housing systems that do not function properly,” specifically because “Georgia prisons do not conduct timely and accurate classification and segregation reviews due to staffing shortages and the incomplete data in GDC's automated system.” (Id. ¶ 490; see also ¶¶ 491–501).

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, supervisors can incur liability based on a failure to properly segregate inmates. See, e.g., Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583. However, Plaintiff's claim fails to allege a causal nexus between the shortcomings in GDOC's inmate segregation system — the failings of which would likely be attributable to Holt — and the problematic inmate assignment that led to Wynn's fatal attack. Plaintiff alleges that “[s]ometime before February 5, 2023, Mr. Wynn was forced to share a room with a violent gang-affiliated inmate, named Brian Deshone Duffy, over Mr. Wynn's desperate protest.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 65). What Plaintiff fails to allege — and what is unclear to the Court — is whether Duffy's placement in Wynn's cell was indeed a result of the allegedly flawed classification and segregation system managed by Holt. In other words, Plaintiff has failed to plead and assert a causal connection between Holt's alleged shortcomings and Wynn's assault.

Indeed, it is not clear that “but for” the deficiencies in GDOC's classification system, Wynn would not have been attacked. For example, as the Court understands it, Duffy's placement in Wynn's cell was especially problematic because “Mr. Wynn had been involved in an altercation with Inmate Duffy a week prior to Inmate Duffy's placement in Mr. Wynn's cell.” (Id. ¶ 72). And, indeed, Plaintiff does allege that “Georgia prisons do not conduct timely and accurate classification and segregation reviews due to staffing shortages and the incomplete data in GDC's automated systems.” (Id. ¶ 490). But this short span between Duffy's first altercation with Wynn and the subsequent fatal assault calls into question whether, even functioning properly, GDOC's classification system would have appropriately separated the two men. As Plaintiff does not connect the dots between the allegedly subpar classification and segregation system used by GDOC, and Wynn's death at the hands of a dangerous cellmate, the supervisory liability claim against Holt must fail.

c. Director Clark

Most tenuously, Plaintiff asserts a causal connection between Clark's allegedly reckless management of GDOC's physical infrastructure and the attack on Wynn. As a reminder, Clark, at the time, managed the GDOC division “responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of the Georgia prison's physical infrastructure.” (Id. ¶ 252). Plaintiff alleges:

Mr. Wynn was put at constant risk of danger, serious personal injury, and death due to the Smith State Prison's crumbling infrastructure, caused by Defendant Clark's maintenance practices, which inmates use to craft makeshift knives, called “shanks,” for use as weapons. Such shanks were used in the Incident to harm, maim, and kill Mr. Wynn.

(Id. ¶ 308). This allegation does not plausibly state a causal connection between Clark's responsibilities and Wynn's attack. Even accepting Plaintiff's contention that “damage to facility hardware and infrastructure poses risks to incarcerated persons' physical safety” because “furniture and fixtures can be dismantled to make weapons,” it is not clear that this was the situation in the case of Wynn's attack.¹⁶ (Id. ¶ 469). More broadly, Plaintiff does not sufficiently assert what “widespread abuse” Clark is allegedly responsible for related to Wynn's attack. Plaintiff points to findings that “Georgia prisons fail to perform required checks of windows and doors” and “maintain accurate key and tool inventories and to document key counts and checks,” but these shortcomings have no apparent causal connection to the conditions that allowed for Wynn's assault. (Id. ¶¶ 467–488). In sum, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently state a claim for supervisory liability against Defendant Clark, given the absence of any substantive allegations from which the Court could infer a causal connection between Clark's supervision of aging infrastructure and Wynn's assault.¹⁷

IV. CONCLUSION

Randy Wynn's death in Defendants' custody was, at its core, a needless tragedy. Legal recovery may not ultimately remedy Plaintiff's terrible loss. Nevertheless, in large part, Plaintiff's factual allegations arising out of that tragedy plausibly support her continued pursuit of her claims in this case.

For the reasons above, Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss [Doc. 12] is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, as follows. Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement is DENIED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to:

• Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XI, only to the degree they allege violations of the Due Process Clause;18

• Count VIII, in full;

• Count XI, as it relates to Defendant Holt and Defendant Clark.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to:

• Count VI;

• Count VII;

• Count IX;

• Count X;

• Count XI, as it relates to Defendant Oliver.

For clarity's sake, the current state of Plaintiff's claims is set forth below:

Count I Count II Count III Count IV Count V Count VI Count VII Count VIII Count IX Count X Count XI Count XII Count XIII Count XIV DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED in full MAINTAINED in full DISMISSED as to Due Process claims; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claims DISMISSED as to Due Process claims and as to Defendants Holt and Clark; MAINTAINED as to Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Oliver MAINTAINED in full MAINTAINED in full MAINTAINED in full

Additionally, given the stunning gravity of Plaintiff's allegations, the Court also finds it appropriate at this early stage to REFER this case to mediation with the next available magistrate judge on the rotation wheel. The mediation shall be IN PERSON. The parties are DIRECTED to file a status report with 14 days of the conclusion of the mediation indicating whether this matter is resolved.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Wynn v. State, 491 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. App. Ct. 1997).

3.   Brown's first name does not appear in the record. (See, e.g., FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 30).

4.   Plaintiff points out that “homicides with firearms have occurred from inside Smith State Prison.” (Id. ¶ 95).

5.   The hospital's records reflect that Wynn “present[ed] to Evans ER via ambulance transport from Smith State Prison after being found at 5 am 3 hrs prior to [emergency department] arrival [and] after being assaulted [the] prior evening at an unknown time[.]” (Id. ¶ 101).

6.   Carrie Teegardin & Danny Robbins, Georgia Prisons: A Look Back at the AJC's Investigation of Corruption, Dysfunction, Criminal Rings and Violence, Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Dec. 12, 2024), https://www.ajc.com/news/investigations/georgia-prisons-the-ajcs-investigation-into-corruption-dysfunction-and-violence/P3GTS77W4RGHLN 5GLJSS6WCV2Y/.

7.   The Defendants also, at this time, moved to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the instant Motion (Doc. 13), which the Court granted.

8.   O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5) (requiring notice of claim with information “to the extent of the claimant's knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances”).

9.   Judge Jordan's concurrence suggests that prior Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases “should continue to be cited as binding precedent” if they are not inconsistent with Wade I. 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

10.   The Court notes that Plaintiff “does not necessarily need to show that the delay in medical care exacerbated his condition because the delay in care is, itself, a wanton infliction of pain and a constitutional violation.” Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1116 (11th Cir. 2015).

11.   “When an official asserts qualified immunity, the district court must consider the issue on a claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant basis.” Miller v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 129 F.4th 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018)). Thus, this analysis applies only to Count X and only as to Warden Adams.

12.   It appears that, as of February 2026, Adams's criminal charges were still pending.

13.   As a reminder, Plaintiff alleges that Wynn was discovered around 5 A.M. but did not arrive at the hospital until roughly 7:15 A.M. (Id. ¶¶ 98–100).

14.   Plaintiff also appears to ground the supervisory liability claims in Count XI in the policies and customs promulgated and/or enforced by Oliver, Holt, and Clark. (See FAC, Doc. 5 ¶¶ 758–779). But the “policies” and “customs” described therein — related to statewide problems of inadequate staffing, dilapidated facilities, free-flowing contraband, extensive inmate-on-inmate violence, and deficient medical care — appear to be essentially another way of framing the “obvious, flagrant, [and] rampant ․ history of widespread abuse.” The Court thus construes both theories of supervisory liability as one.

15.   Among other things, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted that officers “did not ․ patrol the interiors of the dorms regularly”; that special detention cells “lacked adequate ventilation, had poor lighting, and were infested with roaches and vermin”; that “excessive quantities of contraband flowed freely into and within the prison,” such that “[i]nmates carried knives and openly used drugs”; and that officers allowed “unsupervised showings of hard-core pornographic movies,” which exacerbated sexual violence. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1532–33 (11th Cir. 1993)

16.   Plaintiff alleges only in conclusory fashion that “[u]nmaintained parts of Georgia prisons ․ provided the makeshift weapons for the attacks onto Mr. Wynn during Incident 2.” (FAC, Doc. 5 ¶ 475).

17.   Because the Court does not find that Count XI pleads a plausible claim for supervisory liability against either Holt or Clark, it does not proceed to a qualified immunity analysis for those claims.

18.   In other words, to the degree these claims allege Eighth Amendment liability — which they all do — the Eighth Amendment claims are maintained subject to the exceptions listed herein.

Honorable Amy Totenberg United States District Judge