SHONNICA ANDERSON ESTATE OF MARCUS HAYES v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2025)

ORDER

This case arises from the 2019 suicide of Mr. Marcus Hayes while incarcerated in the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, and Defendants' alleged mishandling of Mr. Hayes's associated medical emergency, culminating in his death at the prison. This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. The first Motion is brought by the three Individual Defendants remaining in this case, warden Benjamin Ford and correctional officers Shallumar Smith and Davy Crockett ¹ (together, the “Individual Defendants”) [Doc. 65].² The second Motion is brought by Defendant Georgia Department of Corrections [Doc. 73]. The Court GRANTS the Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 65] and DENIES the Georgia Department of Corrections' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 73].

Plaintiff Shonnica Anderson's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of James Claude Upshaw Downs, M.D. [Doc. 57] is also before the Court. That Motion is granted in part and denied in part. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude [Doc. 57] as it relates to Dr. Downs's sixth conclusion, which found that any rescue of Mr. Hayes would have been unlikely, and part of his seventh conclusion, to the degree it also assesses the likelihood of successful intervention rescue measures. The Court DENIES the Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude as it relates to Dr. Down's other findings and conclusions.

I. Background 3

Plaintiff Shonnica Anderson is the mother and representative of the estate of Marcus Hayes. Her claims in this case arise from Mr. Hayes's death by suicide on July 16, 2019, while he was incarcerated at the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison (“GDCP”). Her claims against the Individual Defendants are for violations of Mr. Hayes's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 82–106, 118–135).⁴ In addition, she brings a claim against the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”) for negligence under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 70–81). She also seeks punitive damages and attorney's fees. (Id. ¶¶ 151–153).⁵

A. Events on July 16, 2019

Mr. Marcus Hayes arrived at GDCP on June 20, 2019. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 5). GDCP is a close-security diagnostic facility, where all new male GDC inmates are housed before being assigned long-term housing. (Id. ¶ 6).

On July 16, 2019, Mr. Hayes was moved into E House, a general population unit where he was housed in Cell 26 with a cellmate named Anthony Palos. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 25). Officer Smith had been on duty at E House that afternoon and Officer Crockett arrived in the early evening to relieve Officer Smith and begin his shift. (Id. ¶ 22). But the exact time of Officer Crockett's arrival is somewhat disputed. Officer Crockett's written statement says that he came in “at approximately 1815 [6:15 P.M.].” (Crockett Written Statement, Ex. 2 to Deposition of Davy Crockett (“Crockett Dep.”), Doc. 103-1). During his deposition, Mr. Crockett indicated that he was “pretty confident” he arrived “somewhere between [6]:15 and no later than [6:30].” (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 pp. 58:25–59:1).⁶

Around the time of the shift change, any E House inmates who were at appointments or work assignments around GDCP were returning to E House, and the unit was being locked down for a headcount prior to Officer Smith ending his shift and Officer Crockett taking control of the unit. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 23). Officer Crockett and Officer Smith were working together to get inmates back into their cells, but some of the cell doors' electronic locks were not functioning. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. GDC's SMF, Doc. 84 ¶ 17). This required the officers to open the cells and lock the inmates in by hand. (Id.).

According to Officer Smith, there was “mass movement” of people in the cell house around the time of the incident, meaning about 20 to 25 people were out of their cells. (Deposition of Shallumar Smith (“Smith Dep.”), Doc. 103-9 pp. 19:21– 21:17). Officer Crockett stated that, upon his arrival, the cell house was “pretty erratic” and “on the edge of being out of control,” and Officer Smith was doing everything he could to get it under control and move inmates back in their cells before the shift change. (Crockett Audio Interview, Doc. 85-8 at 1:46–2:03). Officer Crockett described it as “quite busy” in the cell house at the time, but not so loud that he couldn't “communicate and yell back and forth or talk back and forth with somebody with no problem.” (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. GDC's SMF, Doc. 84 ¶ 18–19; Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 39:16–18). Mr. Palos testified that the environment in E House at the time was “crazy,” “loud,” and “chaotic,” with “people ․ screaming and hollering and cussing and singing and rapping.” (Deposition of Anthony Palos (“Palos Dep.”), Doc. 103-6 p. 11:12–20).

It is undisputed that the door to Cell 26, where Mr. Hayes and Mr. Palos were located, was functioning properly and was locked at the time of the incident. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 26). Around this time — although the exact timing is the subject of significant dispute between the parties — Mr. Palos and Mr. Hayes were in their cell when Mr. Palos heard ripping fabric, then gagging noises. Then, he saw Mr. Hayes jump down from his bunk with a ligature tied around his neck. (Id. ¶ 17).

After Mr. Hayes jumped from his bunk, he pointed and grabbed at the ligature, and “moved around the cell in a ‘spastic dance.’ ” (Id. ¶ 18). Mr. Palos tried to remove the ligature from Mr. Hayes's neck but could not get the knots untied. (Def. GDC's Resp. to Pl.'s SMF, Doc. 94 ¶ 11; Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 19; Pl.'s Resp. to Def. GDC's SMF, Doc. 84 ¶ 4). Mr. Palos started banging on the cell door and yelling for help. (Def. GDC's Resp. to Pl.'s SMF, Doc. 94 ¶ 11). Mr. Palos believed that the “crazy,” “loud,” “chaotic” environment was why he “couldn't get any help ․ because everybody's yelling something.” (Palos Dep., Doc. 103-6 p. 11:12–20).

The parties dispute how long it took for help to arrive, but Mr. Palos estimated that 10 to 25 minutes passed between when he began calling for help and when an officer came to assist. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. GDC's SMF, Doc. 84 ¶ 7; Palos Dep., Doc. 103-6 p. 13:6 (“[a]bout 10, maybe 15 minutes”), p. 24:25 (“maybe 20 minutes, 25 minutes”), p. 29:15 (“about 20 minutes”)).⁷

At some point while Mr. Palos was yelling for help, Mr. Hayes fell to the floor. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 18; Palos Dep., Doc. 103-6 p. 24:23). Finally, one of the inmates who was outside of his cell went to get an officer. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 18; Palos Dep., Doc. 103-6 p. 25:1–5). Mr. Palos testified that Mr. Hayes “wasn't ․ responsive after that.” (Palos Dep., Doc. 103-6 p. 25:7). According to Mr. Palos, one of the officers came — it's unclear which one — and unsuccessfully tried to remove the ligature, then left “to go get somebody else.” (Id. p. 25:8–11). While the officer was gone, another inmate tried to help Mr. Palos remove the ligature. (Id. p. 25:9–11). Mr. Palos also noted that at some time “a second officer ․ came around.” (Id. p. 39:20).

The rest of this episode is recounted in the officers' written recollections and interviews. Both of the Defendant officers provided contemporaneous handwritten statements after Mr. Hayes's suicide, and both were interviewed by GDC Investigator Michael Riley later that night. Both also gave later deposition testimony, several years after Mr. Hayes's death.

i. Officer Crockett's Statement and Testimony

Officer Crockett stated in his interview that he arrived at E House between 6:15 and 6:20 P.M. (Crockett Audio Interview, Doc. 85-8 at 1:30–1:40). Some of the automatic cell doors were malfunctioning, so Officer Smith had to put inmates in their cells manually, one at a time, slowing down the process. (Id. at 2:05–2:20).

Officer Crockett testified that he was working with Officer Smith to “move ․ inmates into those cells that they belonged to. Just trying to speed the process up so we could get the shift started.” (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 pp. 20:23– 21:1). He heard an inmate “holler[ ] out” that a man was having a seizure in Cell 26. (Crockett Audio Interview, Doc. 85-8 at 2:20–2:27; Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 22:9–11; Crockett Written Statement, Ex. 2 to Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1).⁸ Officer Crockett then “told Officer Smith to open Cell 26 because there was an offender having a seizure there.” (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 22:13–14). He told Officer Smith he was going to Cell 26 to investigate and asked him to open the cell door. (Crockett Audio Interview, Doc. 85-8 at 2:35–2:44). When he arrived at Cell 26, the door had been unlocked. (Id. at 2:44–2:48; Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 22:15).

As Officer Crockett arrived at Cell 26, he saw Mr. Hayes on the floor with bed linens “that had been stripped down and ․ tied together” around his neck, and Mr. Hayes had “basically strangled himself.” (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 22:17–20). Once he saw that Mr. Hayes was on the floor and not seizing, he testified that he could see Officer Smith at the control panel for the cell doors. Officer Crockett told Officer Smith “that he needed to call [the officer in charge] and medical and have them on the way.” (Id. p. 24:8–12).

Officer Crockett knew through EMT training and his experience working as a medic that he could not perform CPR until the ligature was removed. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 34). He testified that he “tried to untie the bed linen from [Mr. Hayes's neck]” and “was trying to break it lose [sic], but the way he had it wound together, it was impossible to break by hand.” (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 23:5–16). Crockett left the cell and went to the officers' supplies stand, “hoping to find something that [he] would possibly be able to cut this linen off with.” (Id. p. 23:19–22). At that point, Officer Smith was on the phone, calling for help. (Crockett Audio Interview, Doc. 85-8 at 4:09–4:29). Officer Crockett did not find a useful tool, so he returned to Mr. Hayes's cell and unsuccessfully tried to remove the ligature by hand a second time. (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 pp. 23:20–24:7).

After that, Officer Crockett ran back and “met [the] medical [team] coming into the cell house.” (Id. p. 24:17). He took a pair of medical shears from a nurse and ran back to Mr. Hayes to cut the ligature loose. (Id. p. 24:18–22). It is undisputed that the nurses from the medical unit arrived at Mr. Hayes's cell at 6:52 P.M. (Def. GDC's Resp. to Pl.'s SMF, Doc. 94 ¶ 3). As he arrived at the cell, nurse Raymond Johnson III saw Officer Crockett cutting the ligature off with the shears that Officer Crockett had grabbed from him — meaning the ligature was likely cut from Mr. Hayes's neck at approximately 6:52 P.M. as well. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5). Medical staff then took over providing emergency aid to Mr. Hayes. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 39).

Butts County Emergency Medical Services was called at 6:53 P.M. (Indiv. Defs. Resp. to Pl.'s SMF, Doc. 98 ¶ 2). At 6:55 P.M., an Alternative External Defibrillator (“AED”) was placed on Mr. Hayes, which indicated “no shock.” (Id. ¶ 1). Mr. Hayes was then taken to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 44).

ii. Officer Smith's Interview and Testimony

Like Officer Crockett, Officer Smith gave a contemporaneous interview on the night of Mr. Hayes's suicide. Officer Smith indicated that, at the time of the incident, Officer Crockett had arrived, but his own shift had not ended because he was still putting inmates into their cells. (Smith Audio Interview, Doc. 85-3 at 1:57–2:33). While Officer Smith was doing so, “one of [the] orderlies” told him that someone in Cell 26 was “choking themself out.” (Id. at 2:36–2:50).

Officer Smith went to check Cell 26 and saw Mr. Hayes “laid out” on the floor, not moving. (Id. at 2:52–3:00). He went to the door control panel to open the cell, and then returned to Cell 26. (Id. at 3:00–3:25). He saw that the linens around Mr. Hayes's neck were “triple knotted” and tried to pull the knots loose but could not because they were tied too tightly. (Id. at 3:25–3:43). While he was trying to pull the knots out, he thought “it looked like [Mr. Hayes] was still breathing a little bit.” (Id. at 5:00–5:33). He then ran to the phone and called for the facility's medical staff, who told him to call the officer in charge. Officer Smith had to call multiple times to get through. (Id. at 3:43–4:00). By the time he got through to the officer in charge, he saw the facility's medical staff and Lieutenant Walker running into the cell house, to Mr. Hayes's cell. (Id. at 4:00–4:13).

Officer Smith was later deposed about the incident in 2022, although he did not recall many details and at times contradicted his previous interview. In the first instance, he did not remember Officer Crockett or Mr. Palos being present.⁹ (Smith Dep., Doc. 103-9 pp. 35:25–36:16, 37:21–40:4). He acknowledged that it was possible he did not hear Mr. Palos's yells due to the noise level in the cell house. (Id. p. 40:5–20). He could not recall if, when he arrived at Mr. Hayes's cell and tried to remove the ligature, Mr. Hayes was still breathing. (Id. pp. 29:21–30:16).

B. GDCP Policies

GDCP's training and policies on suicide intervention also provide key information in connection with Mr. Hayes's death. In 2019, new GDCP correctional officers attended a 40-hour pre-service orientation program and then a six-week, 240-hour training program. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 49). All correctional officers were also required to complete 40 additional hours of annual in-service training each subsequent year. (Id.¶ 50). The curriculum of each program was regularly reviewed by members of GDCP's training committee and updated with input from members of GDC's central office and facility-level staff. (Id. ¶ 52). New officers at GDCP were additionally placed with more experienced Field Training Officers for hands-on training. (Id. ¶ 53). GDCP's emergency response procedures, including suicide intervention, are a combination of statewide and facility-specific guidelines. (Id. ¶ 55).

GDCP contends that it has a policy that addresses how officers should respond to deaths by hanging, including ligature strangulation. (Id. ¶ 57). Plaintiff acknowledges the existence of such a policy but contends that the policy was not used or implemented at the facility and that the responding officers were not aware of it. (Id.). The policy instructed officers to immediately call for assistance via radio using emergency code 10-44, after which Central Control would notify on-site medical staff. (Id. ¶ 58). Responding officers are directed to assess the situation for danger while maintaining visual observation of the inmate. (Id. ¶ 59). Officers are instructed not to enter the cell alone if they sense danger and to enter a cell only after backup has arrived to begin preservation-of-life procedures. (Id. ¶ 60). Officers should put on protective gear before providing assistance, then lift the inmate to relieve pressure until the strangulation device is removed.¹⁰ (Id. ¶ 61).

Under the policy, the strangulation device should be cut from the inmate's neck using an appropriate “cutdown” tool. Thereafter, the officer is to assess the inmate's condition, place him on a hard, flat surface, and then begin CPR. (Id. ¶ 62). When medical staff arrives, they are charged with taking control of the situation. (Id. ¶ 63). GDC's statewide policy leaves the details of where to keep cutdown tools to the discretion of facility wardens, as each facility has different needs based on their physical layout, offender population, and security level. (Id. ¶ 65). When Ford began working as GDCP warden in October 2018, officers in designated high-risk units were issued medical shears as cutdown tools because of the heightened risk of suicide in those units. (Id. ¶ 68). Defendants contend that general population dorms did not have medical shears for safety reasons, a contention that Plaintiff asserts is inaccurate. (Id. ¶ 69).

II. Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. 65; 73]

Having now described the complicated and disputed series of events, the Court turns to the pending Motions for Summary Judgment. All Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to their respective claims. The Individual Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims and have also asserted qualified immunity defenses. [Doc. 65]. Defendant GDC has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim of negligence under the Georgia Tort Claims Act.¹¹ [Doc. 73]. These Motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for consideration.

A. Legal Standard

The Court shall grant summary judgment if the record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual issue is material if resolving the factual issue might change the suit's outcome under the governing law. Id. The motion should be granted only if no rational fact finder could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 248–49.

When ruling on the Motion, the Court must view all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes in the non-moving party's favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The moving party need not positively disprove the opponent's case; rather, the moving party must establish the lack of evidentiary support for the non-moving party's position. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets this initial burden, to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must then present competent evidence beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324–26. The essential question is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

B. Individual Defendants' Motion [Doc. 65]

The Individual Defendants — Officer Smith, Officer Crockett, and Warden Ford — assert that Plaintiff cannot establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Because Warden Ford's relevant conduct is distinct from that of Officer Smith and Officer Crockett, his response is analyzed separately. Ultimately, however, the Individual Defendants are correct that Plaintiff cannot establish a deliberate indifference claim as to any of them. The Individual Defendants also contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to their conduct that did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. See, e.g., Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016). As the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a legally viable Eighth Amendment claim here, the Court need not reach or rule upon the issue of qualified immunity.

i. Legal Standard of Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff does not contend that the Individual Defendants “should have prevented [Mr. Hayes] from tying a ligature around his throat.” (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 15–16). Instead, she argues that Defendants were deliberately indifferent in “delaying emergency first aid for [Mr. Hayes] after they learned that [he] had a ligature around his throat.” (Id. at 16).¹² In other words, Plaintiff's allegations center on the officers' response in the minutes after Mr. Hayes's suicide attempt.

The Eighth Amendment forbids the “inflict[ion]” of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Because the amendment prohibits “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” it also bars “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (internal quotations omitted); Hoffer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). “An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, the state has “a constitutional obligation to provide minimally adequate medical care” to those it has incarcerated. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991). “[D]elay in access to medical care that is ‘tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ may constitute deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). But not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

A deliberate indifference claim entails both an objective and a subjective component. Keohane v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. Sec'y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). Specifically, here, Plaintiff must establish both that there was an objective risk to Mr. Hayes and that each Individual Defendant had a subjective level of knowing fault. As an en banc Eleventh Circuit opinion recently stated,

[f]irst, of course, the plaintiff must demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’ ”

Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” and to do so he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.”

Wade v. McDade (Wade I), 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted).¹³ ,  ¹⁴ “In addition, section 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986).

ii. Officer Smith and Officer Crockett's Conduct

Plaintiff's serious medical circumstances and needs are not in actual dispute. The question here, instead, is whether the conduct of Officer Smith and Officer Crockett in addressing these circumstances reflected a criminal-level subjective recklessness, as required by the Eleventh Circuit.

a. Plaintiff's Serious Medical Need

As noted above, Plaintiff argues that the Individual Defendants were deliberately indifferent in “delaying emergency first aid for [Mr. Hayes] after they learned that [he] had a ligature around his throat.” (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 16). Although the Individual Defendants do not directly address this point, the Court finds that the officers' learning that Mr. Hayes had a ligature tied around his neck would have put them on notice of an objectively serious medical need requiring rapid attention. When the officers were able to take action to address this medical emergency is fuzzier. The obstacles they faced within the prison also are relevant.

b. Defendants' Subjective Awareness

Plaintiff must demonstrate that Officer Smith and Officer Crockett each acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” specifically by showing that each was “actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to [Mr. Hayes].” Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1262. “A person acts recklessly, in the most common formulation, when he ‘consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk' attached to his conduct, in ‘gross deviation’ from accepted standards.” Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 427 (2021) (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)). To meet the subjective element of the deliberate indifference requirement, “the prison ‘official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’ ” Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence ” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. A reasonable response to the risk also precludes liability under the Eighth Amendment. Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1262.

Here, factual disputes exist regarding when the officers became aware of the emergency, whether they responded reasonably, and whether serious institutional deficits caused or contributed to Mr. Hayes's death. Under Plaintiff's view of the facts, an officer arrived at Mr. Hayes's cell sometime between 6:37 P.M. and 6:42 P.M., roughly 10 to 25 minutes after Mr. Palos began calling for help. (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 10–11). Officer Crockett and Officer Smith both appear to have believed, before arriving at the cell, that Mr. Hayes was having a seizure. (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 22:9–14). Upon arriving there, Officer Crockett saw Mr. Hayes on the floor with a ligature tied around his neck. (Id. p. 22:17–20). Based on his EMT training and medic experience, Officer Crockett knew that he could not perform CPR until he removed the ligature. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 34). Officer Crockett told Officer Smith to call for medical assistance, unsuccessfully tried to remove the ligature, then left to search for a tool with which to cut the ligature.¹⁵ Failing to do so, he returned to the cell and attempted to untie the ligature again until medical assistance arrived, at which time he used a pair of medical shears from a nurse to cut the ligature loose. (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 23:20–24:22). At this point, medical staff took over the care of Mr. Hayes. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 39).

The parties dispute when Officer Smith and Officer Crockett became aware of Mr. Hayes's suicide attempt. Logically, the officers could not have known that their own actions (or inaction) created a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Hayes until they learned about the emergency. The Individual Defendants contend that “[w]hile Smith and Crockett were returning inmates to their cells, they were notified of a medical emergency in Cell 26.” (Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 65-1 ¶ 25). Plaintiff disputes this characterization and asserts that “[o]ne or both of Officers Smith and Crockett were informed that Marcus was experiencing a medical emergency ‘essentially immediately’ upon Officer Crockett's arrival to the E Building.” (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 25).

Regardless of that dispute, the facts of this case reflect a tragic situation and, potentially, substandard responses by Officer Crockett and Officer Smith. But “at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not ․ to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[,] but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether the officers' responses were appropriate or sufficient. But, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is not “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict” that either Officer Smith or Officer Crocket demonstrated subjective, criminal recklessness given the emergency, time-sensitive circumstances they faced when attempting to intervene.

The undisputed facts are that both officers acted once notified of the emergency. Under Plaintiff's assessment of the facts, the first officer — though it is disputed which one — arrived at Mr. Hayes's cell between 6:37 P.M. and 6:42 P.M. (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 10). At least one (and possibly both) of the officers attempted to remove the ligature by hand but were unsuccessful. (See Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 p. 23:5–16; Smith Audio Interview, Doc. 85-3 at 3:25– 3:43). Officer Crockett then (also unsuccessfully) went to search for a tool with which to cut the ligature while Officer Smith called for medical assistance, sometime between 6:45 P.M. and 6:50 P.M. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶¶ 35–36; Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 9–10). As soon as medical personnel arrived at 6:52 P.M., Officer Crockett used the medical team's shears to remove the ligature. (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 9). These rescue efforts do not reflect a “conscious[ ] disregard[ ] [of] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” or a “gross deviation' from accepted standards.” Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1261. “[M]edical treatment violates the Constitution only when it is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ ” Dang ex rel Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)). That is not the case under these facts.

Put otherwise, Officer Crockett's and Officer Smith's responses were dissimilar from conduct that courts have found to be deliberately indifferent. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jackson, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1274–75 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (deliberate indifference claim survived motion to dismiss where officer “failed to provide any care whatsoever” for eight minutes, including checking decedent's breathing or pulse, administering CPR, or calling for medical assistance (emphasis in original)); Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1232 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (deliberate indifference claim survived summary judgment motion where officers “[f]ail[ed] to resuscitate or immediately call medical personnel in response to a[n] unconscious, non-breathing prisoner” after using force against him), aff'd 422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005); Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1117–18 (11th Cir. 2015) (after shooting plaintiff, officer did not call ambulance for three and a half minutes and “falsely reported [plaintiff's] gunshot wound as a laceration,” which further delayed ambulance). And, notably, those cases pre-dated Wade I, which made the deliberate indifference standard still more rigorous. See, e.g., Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1255 (clarifying Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference as criminal recklessness, rather than “more than” negligence).

Another suicide-related case, out of an Indiana federal district court, reflects the same conclusion. Jones v. Forestal, 2020 WL 1469832 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2020). The court in Jones granted summary judgment for officers who responded to a suicide attempt in a similar manner, finding that “[n]o reasonable jury could find such a response objectively unreasonable.”

[W]hen the deputies responded to the medical emergency in [the] cell, they were unaware that they were responding to an attempted suicide. Accordingly, it was not objectively unreasonable for them to have failed to procure the cutting tool before responding to the scene. [They] immediately began working together in an effort to untie the ligature. Given that there was no cutting tool within close proximity, their decision to immediately attempt to free [the decedent] as opposed to leaving [the cell] in order to retrieve the cutting tool was not objectively unreasonable. Their failure to radio for someone else to retrieve the tool while continuing their efforts to free [the decedent] would at best be negligence, but it in no way demonstrates knowing or reckless indifference to the situation they confronted.

Id. at *21.

It is reasonable to ask whether Officer Smith and Officer Crockett made the best decisions in response to this medical emergency. Similarly, it is reasonable to consider the threat posed by chaotic management of the prison's shift change simultaneous to staff's return of inmates to cells with non-functional electric locks. But as the Eleventh Circuit clarified in Wade I, a defendant “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause if he ‘responded reasonably to th[at] risk.’ ” Wade I, 106 F.4th at 1253; see also Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2024) (“A reasonable decision does not have to be a perfect decision, and it does not require that any potential harm was actually averted.”).

iii. Warden Ford's Supervisory Liability

Warden Ford had left GDCP for the evening when Mr. Hayes's suicide occurred, but he returned to the facility after being notified of the circumstances and GDCP staff's response thus far. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 45). Thus, Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim against the warden is distinct because he — unlike Officer Smith and Officer Crockett — was not present at GDCP at the time of Mr. Hayes's death. (Ford Decl., Doc. 65-3 ¶ 15). Instead, the claim against Warden Ford is rooted in his role as a supervisor. The Eleventh Circuit imposes an “extremely rigorous standard for supervisory liability.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013). “[T]o hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff must show that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor's actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb County, 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014). “[T]he causal connection may be established when a supervisor's custom or policy ․ result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)).

a. Challenged Policies

Plaintiff first alleges Warden Ford's supervisory liability based on his decisions regarding (1) where, within the prison, to keep cutdown tools and (2) which prison staff were permitted to call 911. (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 19–21). According to Plaintiff, these two policies demonstrate a deliberate indifference to Mr. Hayes's constitutional rights. “But proving that a policy ․ caused a constitutional harm would require [a plaintiff] to point to multiple incidents.” Myrick v. Fulton County, 69 F.4th 1277, 1299 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019)). Plaintiff does not do so for either policy. “In the absences of a series of constitutional violations from which deliberate indifference can be inferred, the plaintiff must show that the policy itself is unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011)).

Under GDC policy, officers must respond to medical emergencies within four minutes, according to Robert Toole, who served as the Director of Facility Operations for GDC from 2018 to 2023. (Deposition of Robert Toole (“Toole Dep.”), Doc. 103-10 p. 18:2–13). Mr. Toole further testified that it takes approximately two minutes to get from the E House unit of GDCP, where Mr. Hayes was incarcerated, to the main control station of the prison, where the shears were kept. (Id. pp. 30:23–31:3). Once there, officers would have to check out the shears from the main control unit and return to E House. (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 20). Thus, Plaintiff alleges, by keeping the prison's cutdown tool in the main control station, “Defendant Ford implemented a policy which made it physically impossible for officers to respond to an emergency within the life-saving four minutes required by GDC policy and industry standards.” (Id.). According to Warden Ford, shears were not typically issued to officers or stored in general population housing units because of the risk that an inmate might access them. (Ford Decl., Doc. 65-3 ¶ 33). The Individual Defendants also contend that “during an emergency, medical staff or supervisory officers would bring shears to the officers.” (Indiv. Defs. Reply in Supp. of MSJ, Doc. 96 at 13).

Again, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff at the summary judgment stage. Even assuming that, under GDCP's policy, Officer Smith and Officer Crockett would have had to provide medical care within four minutes and, in turn, also retrieve the prison's cutdown tool from the main control station within that time, it is unclear given the current record how their failure to conform with this policy in the four-minute timeframe would rise to the level of criminal recklessness required to establish deliberate indifference. That is the case even though corrections experts may deem this policy seriously flawed, as Plaintiff asserts, or alternatively, difficult to rapidly implement under the chaotic circumstances present here, with the simultaneous shift change and mass movement of inmates. (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 20–21; see also Palos Dep. p. 11:11–20).

Furthermore, it is undisputed that Warden Ford's decision regarding where to keep the cutdown tool was permissible under GDC's state-level policy of discretion. Plaintiff notes that “[t]he department leaves it up to each prison's warden to determine how to implement policies to enable its officers to follow the [standard suicide and first responder] protocol and respond to emergencies,” including “the determination of where to keep the appropriate cutdown tools in the prison.” (Id. at 19 (citing Toole Dep., Doc. 103-10 p. 17:2–8) (internal quotations omitted)). This directive — along with the expansive discretion allowed to correctional officers generally — further undermines the notion that Warden Ford's policy as to cutdown tools was itself per se unconstitutional. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (counseling deferral to “policies and practices that in th[e] judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline” (internal quotations omitted)).

It is true that, the day after Mr. Hayes's death, Warden Ford ordered shears to be placed in each of the prison's housing units. (Indiv. Def.'s Reply in Supp. of SMF, Doc. 97 ¶ 66). But the fact the Warden's risk calculus — and his prior decision to place shears only in the main control station and medical unit — shifted in the wake of Mr. Hayes's death does not render the initial policy per se criminally reckless.¹⁶ At least on the current record, GDCP's policy as to location of the cutdown tool cannot by itself support a claim of supervisory liability against Warden Ford.

Second, Plaintiff alleges that, in violation of a statewide GDC policy, Warden Ford “allowed only GDCP medical staff, not corrections officers, to call 911 in the event of emergencies.” (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 21). Warden Ford, in his own words, explained that “[t]he decision of when and if to call 911 is left to GDCP's medical staff [because] they are trained to determine whether the inmate can be treated on-site and can arrive at the scene of an emergency much faster than outside EMS.” (Ford Decl., Doc. 65-3 ¶ 29). Again, reasonable minds may disagree as to what policy would most effectively protect inmates incarcerated at GDCP. But Warden Ford's policy decisions as to the storage of shears and the handling of 911 calls fall within the discretion allotted to correctional management and correctional officers. And no evidence has been proffered that the Warden's policies were linked to other comparable incidents — at least as reflected in the current record. (See Indiv. Defs. Reply in Supp. of MSJ, Doc. 96 at 12–13 (noting absence of multiple incidents)). Accordingly, it is not facially unconstitutional. Based on this record, a reasonable jury could not find the Warden's policy decisions and conduct criminally reckless, as required to support Plaintiff's claim of supervisory liability.

In short, Plaintiff does not establish either the original shears placement policy or the 911 call decisionmaking policy to be unconstitutional under the current evidentiary record. As a result, neither policy alone or in conjunction can establish a viable supervisory liability claim against Warden Ford.

b. Failure to Train

Plaintiff next asserts supervisory liability based on the contention that Warden Ford failed to ensure proper training of Officer Smith and Officer Crockett. “[A] supervisor's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). More specifically,

[f]ailure to train can amount to deliberate indifference when the need for more or different training is obvious, such as when there exists a history of abuse by subordinates that has put the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective measures and when the failure to train is likely to result in the violation of a constitutional right.

Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1397–98 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). As discussed above, supervisors can only be held liable for a failure to train when they “personally participate[ ] in the alleged constitutional violation” (which is not the case here) or “when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 820 (11th Cir. 2017).

To demonstrate the shortcomings in the officers' training, Plaintiff specifically points to their purported ignorance of the suicide response policy and the procedure for obtaining a cutdown tool. (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 22–23). “But [Plaintiff] offered no evidence that [Warden Ford] had notice of a need to improve the officers' training or supervision” and “never highlighted specific deficiencies in [GDCP's] training program.” Knight, 856 F.3d at 820. Plaintiff indicates only that Warden Ford “kn[ew] suicides are a problem in Georgia prisons.” (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 22 (citing Deposition of Benjamin Ford (“Ford Dep.”), Doc. 103-3 p. 16:3–8). This fact and sad reality does not appear to be in dispute. But merely establishing Warden Ford's knowledge of the issue does not explain why the officers' training was deficient or whether the warden knew of those deficiencies. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she establishes the officers' ignorance as to the appropriate suicide response protocol. However, Plaintiff's evidence does not show how Warden Ford's decisionmaking or leadership in connection with training caused, or allowed, for the officers' ignorance and deficient training. As such, Plaintiff's evidence as to failure to train does not viably support Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim under applicable legal standards.

All that said, the Court takes notice of the sad reality that suicide is a leading cause of death in jails and prisons nationally. See, e.g., Bureau of Just. Stat., NCJ 300731, Suicide in Local Jails and State and Federal Prisons, 2000–2019 – Statistical Tables (2021), https://perma.cc/WQ2M-5EX9; Vera Inst. of Just., Preventing Suicide and Self-Harm in Jail (2019), https://perma.cc/997B-E8BL. This is a serious and tragic issue that should be tackled as a matter of national and local policy, but is difficult to address in litigation within the confines of current legal authority.

C. GDC's Motion [Doc. 73]

Plaintiff also brings a negligence claim against GDC under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. This claim is against the GDC entity alone — not the individual officers. Specifically, Plaintiff contends GDC breached its duty of ordinary care by failing to maintain GDCP's facilities properly (such that the electronic doors malfunctioned); failing to provide emergency medical personnel prompt access to the facility; and failing to staff GDCP adequately to maintain order and appropriately monitor inmates' safety. (Compl., Doc. 1-1 ¶ 80). As evidence of negligent conduct, Plaintiff also points to the officers' delayed response; lack of a cutdown tool; and failure to administer CPR or call 911 upon discovering Mr. Hayes prostrate on the cell floor. (Id.). GDC has moved for summary judgment on this claim.

In weighing claims against the state, “sovereign immunity is a threshold issue that the trial court [is] required to address before reaching the merits of any other argument.” State Dep't of Corr. v. Devs. Sur. & Indem. Co., 750 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), aff'd 763 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 2014). Under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (the “Act”), “[t]he state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances.” O.G.C.A. § 50-21-23(a). However, “[t]he state shall have no liability for losses resulting from ․ [t]he exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.” Id. § 50-21-24(2). A discretionary decision is one that “requir[es] a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of action based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors.” Id. § 50-21-22(2). “The Supreme Court of Georgia has cautioned that broadly extending the discretionary function exception to include any decision affected by ‘social, political, or economic factors’ could allow the exception to ‘swallow the waiver.’ ” Sivak v. Ga. Dep't of Nat. Res., 899 S.E.2d 743, 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Brown, 471 S.E.2d 849, 851 (Ga. 1996)).

Plaintiff's negligence claim against GDC is not barred by sovereign immunity. GDC falls explicitly within the purview of the Act, which identifies departments as “state government entities” and law enforcement officers as “state officers or employees.” Id. § 50-21-22(6), (7). Furthermore, the officers' emergency response to Mr. Hayes's suicide attempt was not discretionary, as it evinced no “exercise [of] policy judgement.” See Edwards v. Dep't of Child. & Youth Servs., 525 S.E.2d 83, 86 (Ga. 2000) (“The decision of state employees on the type of emergency medical care to provide incarcerated juveniles does not fall within the discretionary function exception to the Georgia Tort Claims Act.”).

Having addressed the issue of immunity, the Court now moves to the substance of Plaintiff's negligence claim. Negligence has four axiomatic requirements: “duty, a breach of that duty, causation and damages.” City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 S.E.2d 573, 576 (Ga. 2017) (quoting Johnson v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 578 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Ga. 2003)). “[Q]uestions of negligence ․ and proximate cause are peculiarly matters for the jury, and a court should not take the place of the jury in solving them, except in plain and undisputable cases.” Bussey v. Dawson, 160 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. 1968); see also David Hrick & Charles R. Adams III, Georgia Law of Torts § 2:15 (2022).

Again, the issue here is not whether the officers' alleged negligence caused Mr. Hayes's suicide, but rather whether their response to his suicide attempt was negligent. As described above, Plaintiff alleges that both the time taken for the officers to respond and the inefficacy of their response breached the ordinary standard of care. (Compl., Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 73–81; Pl.'s Opp. to GDC MSJ, Doc. 83 at 13–24). In response, Defendant GDC asserts that Plaintiff's negligence claim fails because “there is insufficient evidence to establish that GDC's alleged negligence proximately caused the death of Marcus Hayes,” given how quickly he would have lost consciousness. (GDC Reply in Supp. of MSJ, Doc. 95 at 2). In other words, whether the officers breached their duty of care is not relevant, under Defendant's theory of the case, because Mr. Hayes lost consciousness so quickly that any negligence on GDC's part would not be the proximate cause of his death.

In this way, Plaintiff's claim rises and falls on causation: without a proximate causal link, any breach of duty is non-actionable.¹⁷ “Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by other causes, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred.” Johnson v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, 858 S.E.2d 23, 29 (Ga. 2021) (quoting Zwiren v. Thompson, 578 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga. 2003)). “Georgia law generally deems suicide an unforeseeable intervening cause that breaks any causal connection between alleged negligent conduct and the resulting death ․” Maia, 800 S.E.2d at 576 (granting summary judgment for officer where teen died by suicide after officer released graphic photos of her). But “Georgia courts have also deviated from the general rule that suicide absolves an alleged tortfeasor of liability in cases involving a special relationship between the tortfeasor and decedent,” such as “between a police officer or jailer and his detainee or prisoner, because a duty to protect arises under such circumstances.” Id. at 578. Thus, Mr. Hayes's suicide does not constitute an intervening event that would necessarily break the chain of causation.

The parties' causation dispute centers on the minutes preceding Mr. Hayes's death. Defendant seeks summary judgment because “Plaintiff has failed to provide reasonable evidence that the correctional officers on duty at the time of Mr. Hayes' apparent suicide attempt were made aware of the attempt until it was too late to save Mr. Hayes' life.” (GDC Reply in Supp. of MSJ, Doc. 95 at 2). Specifically, GDC contends that there was a mere six-minute window to save Mr. Hayes, but “no correctional officer became aware of Mr. Hayes' condition until a minimum of 10 minutes” after he attempted suicide. (GDC Rev. Br. in Supp. of MSJ, Doc. 77 at 7). In Plaintiff's view, this framework oversimplifies the situation, because the testimony of Dr. Kris Sperry, Plaintiff's expert witness, indicates that “irreversible injury will occur after approximately six minutes, if the jugular veins and carotid arteries are compressed continuously and uninterrupted for that time.” (Pl.'s Opp. to GDC MSJ, Doc. 83 at 25 (citing Deposition of Kris Sperry, M.D. (“Sperry Dep.”), Doc. 107-1 pp. 21:23–22:4, 23:20–25) (emphasis in original)). According to Plaintiff, that “continuous[ ] and uninterrupted” pressure has not yet been established, especially given the ambiguity around when Mr. Hayes lost consciousness. (Id.). GDC has contended that Mr. Hayes “lost consciousness” immediately after tying the ligature and falling to the floor. (GDC Rev. Br. in Supp. of MSJ, Doc. 77 at 4). But, as Plaintiff points out, “[a]ccording to Mr. Palos's testimony, ․ Marcus did not lose consciousness until mere moments before Officer Crockett was alerted of the emergency at the earliest, and perhaps after he was alerted,” many minutes after Mr. Hayes tied the ligature. (Pl.'s Opp. to GDC MSJ, Doc. 83 at 26).

The parties agree, then, that the issue of causation turns on when Mr. Hayes lost consciousness — and, as a result, when irreversible injury would have occurred — and at what point the officers knew of his situation. Whether the officers' subsequent response was negligent is only relevant if a causational link can be established based on this timing. And, as captured above and further discussed below, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to both when Mr. Hayes lost consciousness and when the officers learned of the emergency.

First, GDC asserts that Mr. Hayes “lost consciousness” quickly after tying the ligature and jumping from the top bunk. (GDC's SMF, Doc. 73-4 ¶¶ 2–3). Plaintiff, conversely, alleges that Mr. Hayes “did not lose consciousness until mere moments, at the earliest, before Officer Crockett was alerted of the emergency” — a span of minutes that, as described below, is itself in dispute. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. GDC's SMF, Doc. 84 ¶¶ 3, 7–8). In other words, the parties dispute when the six-minute clock started ticking.

Second, and crucially, the parties dispute at what point the officers became aware of Mr. Hayes's emergent situation. Plaintiff contends that both officers learned of the emergency “ ‘essentially immediately’ upon Officer Crockett's arrival to the E Building.” (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 25). Officer Crockett, however, indicated that someone yelled to him about Mr. Hayes's emergency while he was helping return inmates to their cells. (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 pp. 20:23– 22:11). Again, the existence of a causational link — and thus the question of whether the officers' allegedly negligent response is actionable — depends on when the officers learned of Mr. Hayes's emergency. The parties have provided sufficient testimony to create a genuine dispute of material fact on that issue.

As established above, serious factual questions remain as to the causational link between the GDC officers' conduct and Mr. Hayes's death. If Defendant GDC were able to establish the absence of proximate cause, the question of whether Plaintiff could establish a breach of duty would be moot. Without causation, Plaintiff cannot establish her negligence claim. But given the open question of whether the officers' actions (or inaction) were the proximate cause of Mr. Hayes's death, the question of whether Defendant GDC breached its duty of ordinary care — i.e., whether the officers were reasonably prompt and prepared in their response — is a material dispute. And, as with causation, potential breach is a factual issue best left to a jury. Bussey, 160 S.E.2d at 836.

Given conflicting testimony on these two issues and the presumption that proximate cause is a “matter[ ] for the jury ․ except in plain and undisputable cases,” id., summary judgment is not appropriate as to Plaintiff's negligence claim against GDC. Viewing the facts in the light most favorably to the non-movant, Plaintiff, “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

III. Motion to Exclude Dr. Downs [Doc. 57]

Finally — and crucially, given the surviving negligence claim — the Court addresses Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of James Claude Upshaw Downs, M.D. [Doc. 57]. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Downs, only as to his sixth conclusion and those portions of his seventh conclusion that evaluate the likelihood of Mr. Hayes's rescue. The remainder of Dr. Downs's testimony may be admitted.

A. Legal Standard

“[A]nalysis regarding the admissibility of expert testimony begins with Federal Rule of Evidence 702.” Moore v. Intuitive Surgical., Inc., 995 F.3d 839, 850 (11th Cir. 2021). Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise ․ [if]:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. In assessing admissibility, federal courts act as “ ‘gatekeepers' tasked with screening out ‘speculative’ and ‘unreliable expert testimony.’ ” Moore, 995 F.3d at 850 (quoting Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010). Yet, “courts must remain chary not to improperly use the admissibility criteria to supplant a plaintiff's right to a jury trial.” Id. Indeed, “the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.

The Eleventh Circuit has “distilled the expert admissibility inquiry into the following three factors”:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address;

(2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and

(3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Moore, 995 F.3d at 850–51. While there is overlap, these three requirements — qualification, reliability, and helpfulness — remain “distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Id. at 851 (quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). “[E]ach of the three analytical prongs (including qualifications) is assessed in reference to the matter to which the expert seeks to testify—i.e., ‘to the task at hand.’ ” Id. at 854 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). As such, “expertise in one field does not qualify a witness to testify about others.” Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 772 F.3d 1352, 1368 (11th Cir. 2014).

B. Discussion

Dr. Downs's testimony comprises seven conclusions that “fall essentially into three categories.” (Pls. Mot. to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Downs, Doc. 57 at 3). First, Dr. Downs affirmed that Mr. Hayes died of ligature self-strangulation. (Expert Report of J.C. Upshaw Downs, M.D. (“Downs Report”), Doc. 57-2 at 3–6). Second, Dr. Downs discussed how quickly Mr. Hayes would have lost consciousness. (Id. at 6–8). Finally — and substantively at issue in this Motion — Dr. Downs concluded that Mr. Hayes “really had little hope of survival” due to “multiple temporal barriers” and that, as a result, “[t]he chance of successful ‘rescue’ here [was] highly unlikely.” (Id. §§ 6 & 7 at pp. 8–10). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this last category of statements is inadmissible because its inherent evaluation of proper prison operations falls in part outside of the scope of Dr. Downs's expertise. Dr. Downs is not “qualified to testify competently regarding” the likelihood of a successful rescue in these circumstances, given his self-professed absence of “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” on prison management. (Deposition of James Claude Upshaw Downs, M.D. (“Downs Dep.”), Doc. 103-2 pp. 50:21–52:18); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702; Moore, 995 F.3d at 850–51.

Because Plaintiff's negligence claim essentially turns on whether the officers would have been able to properly respond to the emergency in time, evidence regarding the likelihood of saving Mr. Hayes's life is crucial. In his sixth conclusion, Dr. Downs indicated that a rescue “would be unlikely at best” given the “significant” obstacles, including the time needed for officers to be notified, secure other inmates, respond to the scene, recognize the emergency, locate a cutdown tool, and return to the scene to cut the ligature. Based on that analysis, Dr. Downs concluded in his seventh finding that there was a slim chance of a “successful ‘rescue.’ ” (Downs Report, Doc. 57-2 at 8–9).

But Plaintiff is correct that, as Dr. Downs candidly discussed in his deposition, he is not qualified to opine on “the operation of prisons, suicide intervention in prisons, or the standards applicable to prison correctional officers.” (Pls. Mot. to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Downs, Doc. 57 at 5–6 (citing Downs Dep., Doc. 103-2 at 50:21–52:18)). Ultimately, the possibility and likelihood of a rescue here depends on how quickly the officers should have been on notice of the emergency and how long it should have taken to retrieve a cutdown tool. Those questions require an assessment of how prisons ordinarily, if functioning properly, operate. Dr. Downs has no relevant expertise on these operational issues.

Conversely, for example, Plaintiff's correctional expert, Mr. Tim Gravette, based his opinion as to Defendants' emergency response on his years of experience as a correctional officer and Associate Warden with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. (See generally Expert Report of Tim Gravette (“Gravette Report”), Doc. 57-4). Based on two decades of experience working and managing correctional facilities, Mr. Gravette opined that “[h]ad the proper equipment been available to CO Crockett who was a trained Medic ․ and had the response for medical staff and supervisory staff been properly initiated by CO Smith there would have been a quicker response to remove the ligature from the neck of Hayes.” (Id. at 9). Mr. Gravette thus concluded that “the GDCP failed to provide timely help” to Mr. Hayes, “which caused his death.” (Id. at 10). In this way, Mr. Gravette was able to come to a conclusion about the likelihood of rescue based on his experience and understanding of proper prison management.

This contrast underscores the inadmissibility of certain portions of Dr. Downs's testimony. Dr. Downs's lack of qualifications as to prison operational issues renders inadmissible his sixth conclusion and part of his seventh conclusion — specifically his assessment that “[t]he chance of successful ‘rescue’ here [was] highly unlikely.” (Downs Report, Doc. 57-2 at 9). To the extent Dr. Downs's testimony speaks to the likelihood of a successful rescue based on the proper management of a prison, Defendant would need to establish a proper foundation for his relevant expertise, which thus far does not exist in the record.

However, Dr. Downs's lack of qualifications as to some of his opinions does not require the wholesale exclusion of his testimony. Again, “the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment. It is undisputed that Dr. Downs is a well-qualified forensic pathologist competent to speak on both Mr. Hayes's medical cause of death and how quickly Mr. Hayes would have lost consciousness — the latter of which is another key issue in determining the reasonableness of Defendants' response.

IV. Conclusion

Mr. Hayes's death on the very day of his transfer to this unit was tragic. In more ways than one, dysfunction within the facility allowed for this tragedy to occur. Plaintiff raises serious and legitimate concerns about management of the chaotic climate in the prison cellblock, as well as the lack of speed and efficacy in Defendants' response to Mr. Palos's cries for help. The facts alleged are sufficient to sustain Plaintiff's state law negligence claim against Defendant GDC at this juncture, given the genuine dispute of material fact as to whether GDC breached its duty of care and whether that potential negligence proximately caused Mr. Hayes's death. However, Plaintiff's allegations cannot sustain a deliberate indifference claim, especially given the Eleventh Circuit's rigorous standard.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 65] and DENIES GDC's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 73]. The Court furthermore GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude [Doc. 57], as to Dr. Downs's sixth conclusion and those parts of his seventh conclusion on the likelihood of a successful rescue.

The Court also WILL REFER this case to mediation with the next available magistrate judge on the rotation wheel. The mediation shall be IN PERSON. The parties are DIRECTED to file a status report at the conclusion of the mediation indicating whether this matter is resolved. If this case is not settled in mediation, the parties are DIRECTED to submit their proposed pretrial order within twenty (20) days of the conclusion of the failed mediation.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of February, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendants Gerard Walker and Timothy Ward were previously dismissed from this case by stipulation. (Doc. 54).

2.   [Text missing]

4.   At all relevant times, Defendant Benjamin Ford was the warden of GDCP, a position he held from October 2018 through February 2022. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 1). Defendants Shallumar Smith and Davy Crockett were both employed as correctional officers at GDCP during the relevant time. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3).

5.   Although not directedly addressed by the parties in their briefing, the Court notes that punitive damages may not be recovered for claims brought under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-30.

6.   At various points, Plaintiff suggests that the Court weigh conflicting pieces of evidence. See, e.g., Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 22 (“[T]he greater weight of evidence shows that [Officer Crockett arrived] between 6:15 p.m. and 6:20 p.m.”). As discussed later, the Court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage. But the Court may consider the parties' presentation of conflicting facts in assessing whether summary judgment is warranted or not based on such factual disputes.

7.   Mr. Palos also testified, however, that “[t]ime is kinda messed up when you're in there. There are no clocks the only thing you have to set time by is meals. And even meals are erratic. So time has a way of being funny when you're in a place like that.” (Palos Dep., Doc. 103-6 p. 29:10–14).

8.   Plaintiff cites Officer Crockett's handwritten statement as support for the fact that, “[i]mmediately upon Officer Crockett's arrival to the E Building, he was told that an inmate was having a medical emergency.” (Pl.'s Opp. to Indiv. Defs. MSJ, Doc. 85 at 9 (citing Crockett Written Statement, Ex. 2 to Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1)).

9.   The notion that Officer Crockett and Mr. Palos were not present in Mr. Hayes's cell with Officer Smith is contradicted by the bulk of the evidence. Mr. Palos's deposition indicates he himself was the one who first attempted to remove the ligature from Mr. Hayes before calling for help. (Palos Dep., Doc. 103-6 pp. 23:10–25:7). Officer Crocket, meanwhile, testified that he arrived first to Mr. Hayes's cell, instructed Officer Smith to call for medical assistance, unsuccessfully attempted to untie the ligature, went to search for a tool with which to cut it, and then eventually met the medical team and used its shears to cut the ligature loose. (Crockett Dep., Doc. 103-1 pp. 22:15–24:22).

10.   The Court notes that it is undisputed that Mr. Hayes did not hang himself — rather, he tied a ligature around his neck — so the specific portion of the policy regarding “lift[ing] the inmate” to relieve pressure in the case of hanging is not applicable here.

11.   O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23 provides that Georgia only waives its sovereign immunity for actions against state officers and employees in state courts, not federal courts. However, a state defendant's removal of an action to federal court waives its immunity from suit in a federal forum. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002).

12.   See Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1358 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Acting with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is a separate claim from acting with deliberate indifference to a known risk of suicide.”).

13.   Judge Jordan's concurrence suggests that prior Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases “should continue to be cited as binding precedent” if they are not inconsistent with Wade I. 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

14.   The instant proceeding was stayed on February 23, 2024, pending the Eleventh Circuit's en banc rehearing of Wade, which clarified the circuit standard for deliberate indifference claims. The Circuit issued its en banc decision on July 10, 2024. No party in the instant proceeding submitted supplemental briefing after that decision. On remand, the Wade panel affirmed that the plaintiff had not established deliberate indifference under the Eleventh Circuit's clarified standard. Wade v. McDade (Wade II), No. 21-14275 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024) (unpublished).

15.   As Plaintiff points out, this order of events is disputed. Officer Smith, at one point, contended that he was the first to arrive and was the only officer in the unit. (Pl.'s Resp. to Indiv. Defs. SMF, Doc. 86 ¶ 33 (citing Smith Dep., Doc. 103-9 at 13:6–17:24)).

16.   The Court notes that it might have taken a different view of this fact if evidence had been presented of other attempted prior suicide incidents involving delayed access to shears and/or other medical devices to address suicide attempts or other injuries.

17.   Plaintiff contends that, “[a]s a practical matter, GDC's motion boils down simply to a causation argument.” (Pl.'s Opp. to GDC MSJ, Doc. 83 at 25). “GDC agrees that its Motion for Summary Judgment was just that.” (GDC Reply in Supp. of MSJ, Doc. 95 at 2).

Honorable Amy Totenberg United States District Judge