UNITED STATES v. ALLEN (2024)

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Grant Decatur Allen, Jr.’s amended motion [587] for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

I. Background

In 2010, Allen was arrested and charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The superseding indictment included the following counts: (1) count one, conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(i); (2) count two, aiding and abetting in the attempt to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; (3) count three, aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2; and (4) count five, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). On September 26, 2011, a jury found Allen guilty on each of these counts.

On January 19, 2012, Allen was sentenced to life imprisonment: life on counts one, two, and five to run concurrently, and sixty months’ imprisonment on count three, to run consecutively to the other counts.¹ Allen appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. See United States v. Dunn, 533 F. App'x 908 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1128, 134 S.Ct. 2324, 189 L.Ed.2d 199 (2014).

Allen has petitioned the Court for relief multiple times since his sentencing. On May 15, 2015, he filed a motion to vacate [439] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was deprived of a unanimous jury verdict. This motion was denied [506].

On January 26, 2021, following a raft of denied motions, Allen filed his first compassionate release motion [562] under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), asking for immediate release because of the COVID-19 pandemic and significant changes in sentencing law. The Court denied his motion [576].

On January 13, 2023, Allen filed a subsequent pro se motion [581] for compassionate release, seeking immediate release or a reduction in sentence to 235 months. This Court stayed the determination of this motion pending the publishing of the amendments to the sentencing guidelines. On September 5, Allen (through counsel) filed an amended motion for compassionate release [587], which is now before the Court.

II. Legal Standard

“The authority of a district court to modify an imprisonment sentence is narrowly limited by statute.” United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2010). The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, expressly permits district courts to reduce a previously imposed term of imprisonment. See United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020). Generally, a court is statutorily prohibited from modifying a term of imprisonment once imposed. But the compassionate release statute provides that a court may do so upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

If the director fails to bring a motion on a defendant's behalf, a defendant can bring a motion on his own behalf only after he has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal the BOP's failure to bring a motion on his behalf, or thirty days have elapsed from receipt of such request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier. Id.

If the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, a district court may reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But it is the “defendant's burden to show that his circumstances warrant a sentence reduction.” United States v. Alonge, No. 21-13566, 2022 WL 1135533, at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 18, 2022) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)); see also United States v. Mantack, 833 F. App'x 819, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2021)) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Green, 764 F.3d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 2014)).

Congress has not defined the circumstances that rise to the level of “extraordinary and compelling,” except to say that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone is insufficient.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 448 (S.D. Iowa 2019). Instead, it directed the Sentencing Commission to issue a policy statement describing “what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).

Section 1B1.13 of the sentencing guidelines manual provides the applicable policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021). Before the First Step Act of 2018, section 1B1.13 applied only to compassionate release motions filed by the BOP director. But now § 1B1.13(a) provides that “a defendant is now authorized to file a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), making the policy statement applicable to both defendant-filed and BOP-filed motions.” U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, Official Commentary and Statutory Index 7, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/official-text-amendments/202305_Amendments.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2024).

Following the recent amendments to the sentencing guidelines, which went into effect on November 1, 2023, there are now six extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying relief under § 1B1.13: (1) the defendant's medical circumstances, (2) advanced age, (3) family circumstances, (4) whether the defendant is a victim of abuse, (5) “other reasons,”² and (6) whether the defendant received an unusually long sentence.

III. Discussion

Allen points to his medical circumstances and his unusually long sentence as extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying relief. But before the Court can address the motion on the merits, it must determine whether Allen has exhausted his administrative remedies.

A. Administrative Remedies

On August 22, 2022, a few months before Allen filed his second compassionate release motion, he submitted an administrative request for compassionate release or a sentence reduction to the warden, citing his medical concerns and a change in the sentencing provisions as reasons for his release. This request was denied on September 7. On September 22, he offered a more detailed request to the warden, but the warden never responded.

Although some grounds for the present motion are the same, Allen adds arguments and therefore must satisfy the exhaustion requirement anew. See United States v. Rodriguez-Orejuela, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1286–87 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (finding that defendant's motion for compassionate release was not ripe for review because he never presented a request to the warden based on COVID-19 concerns); United States v. Robinson, No. 19-00193, 2021 WL 684576, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 22, 2021) (denying defendant's subsequent motion for compassionate release because she did not exhaust administrative remedies with respect to her hypertension or high BMI diagnoses).

On August 22, 2023, Allen (through counsel) submitted a new administrative request to the warden. As of the filing date of Allen's amended motion [587] (September 5), the warden had not responded. Given the required thirty days have passed, the Court deems the exhaustion requirement satisfied.³

B. Medical Condition

Allen, age 59, seeks relief based in part on his medical condition. He suffers from various comorbidities, including osteoarthritis in his right knee, ventral hernia and muscle diastasis, obesity, asthma, dermatitis and psoriasis, and chronic eye conditions. He does not contend that any of his conditions are life-threatening.

Although the Court is sympathetic to Allen's conditions, they do not support an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying his release. He is not “suffering from a terminal illness” as described by § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A), nor has he demonstrated that his conditions “substantially diminish[ ]” his ability to “provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B).

Further, although he may require specialized medical care, there is ample evidence that such care is being provided by the BOP.⁴ Regarding his osteoarthritis, “the prison has considered arthroscopy surgery ․ and for years has provided him with a knee sleeve and medication.” [587] at 21–22. The same can be said for his dermatitis and psoriasis—“the prison treats the condition with triamcinolone topical cream.” Id. at 23.

The Court concludes that Allen's medical conditions do not create an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. See United States v. Bellamy, No. 8:18-cr-151, 2023 WL 7132291, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2023) (holding that a defendant who suffered from sleep apnea, obesity, asthma, hypertension, COPD, and high cholesterol did not establish that “any of his medical conditions rise to the severe level required to provide an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release”).

C. Unusually Long Sentence

Allen presents a strong argument that a ground recently added in § 1B1.13—an unusually long sentence—supports his motion for compassionate release. This provision, effective November 1, 2023, and found in subsection (b)(6), “permits a judge to consider a non-retroactive change in sentencing law as an extraordinary and compelling reason in specified circumstances.” U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 3 (2023), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/202305_RF.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2024).

The amendment reads:

Unusually Long Sentence—If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant's individualized circumstances.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).

In promulgating the amendment, the Commission specified that subsection (b)(6) operates alongside subsection (c), which reads:

Limitation on Changes in Law—Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this policy statement. However, if a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction under this policy statement, a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered for purposes of determining the extent of any such reduction.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) (emphasis added).

Subsection (c) serves a key role. It is the Commission's response to the circuit split that has developed regarding whether nonretroactive changes in the law may be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A).⁵ See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, supra at 5–6. In the Commission's view, district courts should “consider non-retroactive changes in the law as extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” but “only in cases involving ‘unusually long sentences’ ” and “where it would produce a gross disparity between the length of the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.” Id. at 6.

The Government opposes Allen's motion, arguing that the Commission did not have authority to pass the amendment and that it is contrary to “Congress's deliberate choice” to make certain statutory changes nonretroactive. Because it lacked authority, the Government argues, the Court must find that the provision is invalid.

This case is not the first in which the Government has attacked the validity of the amendment. See United States v. Arnold, No. 3R 310-012, 2023 WL 8936347, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2023)); Order Reducing the Sentence, United States v. Padgett, No. 5:06-cr-13-RH (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2024), ECF No. 162; Memorandum and Order, United States v. Capps, No. 1:11-cr-108-AGF (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2024), ECF 165.

Although district courts that have considered the question have sided both ways, at least one district court in the Eleventh Circuit has granted relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6) over the Government's objection. Compare Padgett, No. 5:06-cer-13-RH, at 18 (holding that § 1B1.13(b)(6) is valid despite the government's assertion that it is invalid and is “inconsistent with the overall sentencing purposes set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”), with United States v. Carter, No. 07-374-1, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2024 WL 136777, at *4–6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2024) (holding that § 1B1.13(b)(6) cannot be valid because United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021) “remains binding law” in the Third Circuit; Andrews held that “the duration of [a defendant's] sentence and the nonretroactive changes to mandatory minimums could not be extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting sentence reduction” (quoting Andrews, 12 F.4th at 260 (alteration in original))).

Because the Eleventh Circuit has never held that nonretroactive changes cannot be extraordinary and compelling reasons, this Court can accept § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s validity and applicability. To hold that courts cannot consider nonretroactive changes to sentencing laws as extraordinary or compelling reasons would require courts to ignore the policy statement that Congress explicitly directed the Commission to create. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1255 (“There is no question that 1B1.13 is the policy statement the Commission adopted to comply with this statutory mandate.” (citations omitted)). The amendments revised the policy statement to unambiguously allow courts to consider nonretroactive changes in individual circumstances. And nothing in § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s text “prohibits the Commission from considering nonretroactive changes in the law as extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.” Capps, No. 1:11-cr-108, at 18. “Congress could have drafted ․ a blanket prohibition into § 3582(c)(1)(A),” but decided not to. Id. Therefore, the Commission's decision to expand upon the policy statement was within its statutory authority and presents no separation of powers issues.

Further, the Government's argument contradicts itself. The Department of Justice has previously argued that courts should refrain from addressing the retroactivity question because “it should be addressed first by the Commission.” Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, supra at 6; see also [598] at 5 n.11. The Commission has now addressed the issue. How can the Commission have the authority to address the question but exceed that authority by addressing the question? This argument lacks merit.

Because the Court concludes that the amendment was within the Commission's power, it now analyzes whether Allen's individualized circumstances qualify him for relief.

1. Change in the Law

Allen argues that the superseding change in law that results in a gross disparity in his sentencing is § 401 of the First Step Act. Some background information is helpful.

The First Step Act of 2018 brought a slew of sentencing reforms, including § 401. Before the 2018 Act was implemented, the mandatory minimum sentences for those convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A) ranged from twenty years for one “felony drug offense” to life for two or more drug offenses.⁶ Allen's three drug convictions fell under the broadly defined “felony drug offense” category in place at the time of his sentencing. Because he had more than two “felony drug offenses,” he was sentenced to life.

But § 401 of the Act replaced “felony drug offense” with “serious drug felony” and reduced the mandatory minimums to fifteen years for one serious drug felony and twenty-five years for two or more. Under the statute as now written, a “serious drug felony” is defined as an offense for which “(A) the offender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and (B) the offender's release from any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of the commencement of the instant offense.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(57).

It is undisputed that Allen's previous convictions do not qualify as serious drug felonies. Therefore, “if he were prosecuted and sentenced today, he would not have any qualifying serious drug felonies, would not face mandatory life sentences, and would simply face an advisory guideline range” of 322 to 387 months. United States v. Wiggins, No. 5:12-cr-274, 2022 WL 17472277, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 6, 2022).

When Allen was sentenced, the Government filed a § 851 notice based on his three previous convictions. But because none of the offenses qualifies today, the Government could not file a § 851 notice today, and a life sentence would not be an option.

2. Gross Disparity

Now the Court must determine whether this change in the law “produce[s] a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion [was] filed.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). What rises to the level of a “gross disparity” is not strictly defined.⁷

The Government argues that the difference between life imprisonment and 322 to 387 months imprisonment cannot be grossly disparate. The Court rejects this argument. As the Government points out, the dictionary definition of “gross” is “glaringly noticeable.” [596] at 22 (citation omitted). This Court finds that the difference between a life sentence and any sentence less than life is glaringly noticeable.

Right now, Allen has no hope of being released from prison. Even if the Court imposed the highest end of the guideline range, he would have hope of eventual release. Any sentence less than life would also allow him to take advantage of good-time credits.⁸

Courts that have faced similar situations agree. Even before the most recent amendments, “[m]any courts [ ] concluded that the severity of a § 924(c) sentence, [(which Allen received under Count three)], combined with the enormous disparity between that sentence and the sentence a defendant would receive today, can constitute an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” United States v. Rahim, 535 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1319 & n.11 (N.D. Ga. 2021) (finding that an eighteen-year difference in sentencing is a gross disparity).

A similar case was decided after the amendment went into effect. See United States v. Vanholten, No. 3:12-cr-96, 2023 WL 8357739 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2023). The similarities between Vanholten and Allen are striking: both received life sentences for drug-related activity; the Government filed 21 U.S.C. § 851 sentencing enhancements based on prior drug felonies; both went to trial; both have “entirely nonviolent” criminal histories; and both “would not face a mandatory minimum life term under current law.” Id. at *1, *3.

In granting the joint motion for compassionate release, the court noted that Vanholten's sentence of “at least twenty years longer than the fifteen-year minimum Congress now deems warranted for offenders like him ․ no doubt makes for a gross disparity.” Id. at *3 (citations omitted).

3. Unusually Long Sentence and Time Served

It is undisputed that Allen has served more than the ten years required to qualify for relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6).

The Court is not persuaded by the Government's conclusory statement that Allen “could not establish that the sentence he received is unusually long.” [596] at 8. Courts facing similar circumstances have noted that similar sentences are “outlier[s] about drug trafficking offenders [when defendants] receive[ ] a § 851-enhanced mandatory minimum sentence.” Vanholten, 2023 WL 8357739, at *2. Data from the Commission also supports the unusual nature of a life sentence. Of the 86,194 individuals sentenced in 2012, only 206 individuals, or 0.24%, were given a life sentence. U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Life Sentences in the Federal System 5 fig.1 (2022), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2022/20220726_Life.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2024).

In light of the rarity of life sentences, the Court finds that Allen's sentence was unusually long.

D. 3553(a) Factors

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the district court

may reduce the term of imprisonment ․ after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if it finds that ․ extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ․ and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

The Court is “not required to expressly discuss all ․ mitigating evidence or every § 3553(a) factor.” United States v. Villa, No. 22-10359, 2022 WL 3018238, at *1 (11th Cir. July 29, 2022) (citation omitted). Instead, “an acknowledgement by the [C]ourt that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is ordinarily sufficient.” Id. (citing United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021)).

Allen argues that his lack of involvement in violent acts, the sentencing disparity among his co-conspirators, his age and comorbidities, and his history and characteristics warrant a reduced sentence. The Government devotes only one sentence in its response: “[T]he Section 3553(a) factors independently preclude relief.” [596] at 8. The Government does not provide any explanation nor specifics as to what factors support Allen's continued imprisonment.

Allen's crimes were serious and endangered the public. Although he never used a firearm nor committed violent acts during his involvement in the enterprise, he carried firearms throughout and, according to the presentencing report, was held accountable for a total of thirteen firearms. Further, he was held accountable for at least 170 kilograms of cocaine.⁹

Although Allen did not accept responsibility for his involvement in the form of a plea deal,¹⁰ the Court is impressed by Allen's behavior while in BOP custody. He has not committed any disciplinary violations, has completed dozens of educational and drug treatment programs, and has a PATTERN ¹¹ risk-assessment score of “minimum.” Given his life sentence, he has done so without hope of early release for good behavior.

Considering all the factors, including the nature of Allen's offense and his positive conduct while imprisoned, the Court determines that a sentence reduction rather than an immediate release best serves the goals of § 3553(a).

IV. Conclusion

The Court has discretion to reduce Allen's sentence and is “not bound by statutory minimums when granting [§] 3582(c)(1)(A) motions.” Vanholten, 2023 WL 8357739, at *5 (quoting Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1257). Allen has served just over twelve years of his current life sentence. Factoring in good-time credits, his time in custody totals just over fourteen years.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part Allen's motion [587], and will reduce his sentence on counts one, two, and five. The Court will impose a modified sentence at a resentencing hearing that will be scheduled shortly. The Court is particularly interested in hearing from counsel regarding the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of February, 2024.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The life sentences were imposed pursuant to the 21 U.S.C. § 851 sentencing enhancement on the drug counts and the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count based on Allen's three prior convictions. In 1990, Allen was convicted in DeKalb County for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. In 1995, he was convicted in Fulton County for the same. In 2007, he was convicted in Fulton County for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

2.   The Eleventh Circuit has clarified that district courts lack discretion to develop “other reasons” that might justify a reduction in a defendant's sentence. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248. Only the director of the BOP can determine which other extraordinary and compelling circumstances fall within this catch-all provision. Id. at 1263–65.

3.   The Government does not contest this.

4.   The Court notes that Allen's original § 3582 motion [581] included COVID-19 concerns. His amended motion does not include this ground. Because the amended motion moots Allen's original motion, the Court will not address COVID-19's impact.

5.   The First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that non-retroactive changes in sentencing law may be considered, while the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eight, and the D.C. Circuits have held that non-retroactive changes cannot be considered. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, supra at 5 (collecting cases from circuit courts on both sides of the split). The Eleventh Circuit has referenced the circuit split but has not articulated its stance on the issue. See United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1257 (11th Cir. 2021). It has made clear that it defers to the Sentencing Commission in “defining the universe of ‘extraordinary and compelling circumstances’ that can justify a reduction.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1255.

6.   “Felony drug offense” was defined as an “offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign county that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.” 28 U.S.C. § 802(44) (2015).

7.   Although a few circuit courts have mentioned § 1B1.13(b)(6), as of the date of this Order, none has determined what kind of disparity rises to the level of “gross disparity.” United States v. Iverson, No. 22-1612, 2023 WL 8825136 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2023); United States v. Stewart, 86 F.4th 532 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Elam, No. 22-40373, 2023 WL 6518115 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2023); United States v. Holder, No. 23-5445, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 31772 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2023); United States v. Harper, No. 22-1291, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 33030 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2023); United States v. Williams, No. 23-5418, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 31565 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 2023); United States v. Williams, No. 23-1929, 2023 WL 8868502 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 2023); United States v. Sawyer, No. 23-1934, 2024 WL 261316 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 2024); In re Thomas, No. 21-1154, 2024 WL 389246 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2024); United States v. Luster, No. 22-12062, 2024 WL 95469 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2024).

8.   Good-time credits would “instantly materialize” if Allen's sentence was reduced, which would allow him to earn fifty-four days per year for the time spent in custody, totaling more than 648 days of credit. [587] at 3.

9.   Allen objected to the portion of the presentencing report which outlined the total kilograms of drugs. The PSR indicates that Allen was accountable for over 400 kilograms of cocaine, over 2,000 kilograms of marijuana, thirty grams of crack cocaine, and two kilograms of heroin.

10.   Of his co-conspirators, only one other defendant, George Washington Dunn, opted to go to trial. He received a sentence of 205 months.

11.   The Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (“PATTERN”) is a new risk tool that “accurately measures an inmate's change during incarceration, and provides opportunities for inmates to reduce their risk scores during periodic reassessments.” PATTERN Risk Assessment, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/pattern.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2024). “Minimum” is the lowest category. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Cut Points Used for PATTERN v. 1.3, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/fsa_cut_points.pdf?v=1.3 (last visited Feb. 12, 2024).

Timothy C. Batten, Sr., Chief United States District Judge