UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SARA MARI HOEHN (2026)

ORDER GRANTING RENEWED MOTION FORCOMPASSIONATE RELEASE

This Court has considered, without hearing, Defendant's renewed, counseled motion for compassionate release. ECF No. 226. Defendant was originally sentenced to a total of 331 months imprisonment for drug conspiracy, trafficking, and firearms offenses. Her sentence was ultimately reduced to a total sentence of 255 months imprisonment. See ECF No. 198. She has served approximately fourteen years of her prison sentence and is set to be released on January 10, 2030. See Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.

While serving her sentence of imprisonment in this case, Defendant was housed at FCC Coleman (“Coleman”), where she asserts, under penalty of perjury, that she was sexually harassed by two corrections officers employed there. See ECF No. 226-6. According to Defendant, this harassment included unrelenting verbal harassment, groping, an attempted rape, and forceful digital penetration by one officer, Christopher Palomares. Id. Neither of the officers who Defendant names as her abusers have been convicted of any crime or found liable in any civil or administrative proceeding with respect to their conduct towards Defendant. As the Government points out, Palomares was apparently permitted to retire with full pension benefits. See ECF No. 228 at 2.

Defendant explains that while BOP was investigating sexual abuse complaints at Coleman in 2018, Officer Palomares threatened Defendant and other female inmates with retaliation in the event they reported his conduct to investigators. ECF No. 226-6 at 11. Later, Defendant joined a group of inmates in a lawsuit against the Bureau of Prisons in 2019, and Defendant settled her claim in December 2020. Id. at 12. A few months later, PREA auditors were scheduled to speak with Defendant and other female inmates about Officer Palomares and other guards at Coleman, but the Bureau of Prisons ended up transferring all female inmates out of Coleman only a few days before the interviews were set to begin. Id.

The widespread culture of sexual abuse by prison guards at Coleman, including Christopher Palomares, is documented in a Staff Report from the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, released on December 13, 2022. See ECF No. 226-2 at 13, 15–19. The Report mentions that during the lawsuit Defendant joined in 2019, the Government admitted in court filings that six of the corrections officers involved admitted to engaging in sexual conduct with at least ten of the plaintiffs. Id. at 16. Each of these officers admitted to sexually abusing female prisoners under their supervision during compelled interviews with the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs, but none of these officers was ever prosecuted. Id.

The Senate Report noted the failing of rushing to conduct compelled interviews of prison staff that may have later tainted any attempt at criminal prosecution for conduct admitted to during such interviews. See id. at 17 (“The practical effect is that if the BOP employee can be compelled, it's a get out of jail free card under certain circumstances, OIG told the Subcommittee ․ BOP OIA compelled each of these officers to sit for interviews. In those interviews, the officers made sweeping admissions to misconduct, making subsequent criminal prosecution difficult.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the Senate Report included excerpts from Christopher Palomares's compelled interview, in which he admitted to having “had a large number of sexual encounters with inmates when [he] was an officer at FCC Coleman. I would say there is over a 70% chance I received oral sex from ․ [redacted] in the visiting room. I have received oral sex from a number of inmates and number of times.” Id. at 18. Finally, the Senate Report also indicated that PREA audits failed to detect the culture of sexual abuse at Coleman, particularly when BOP transferred all female inmates, including Defendant, out of the prison two days before the auditor arrived to interview inmates. Id. at 25.

Almost a year after the release of the Senate Report detailing the sexual abuse committed at Defendant's facility while she was incarcerated there and almost three years after Defendant settled her claim against the Government with respect to her allegations concerning Palomares, the Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines added a “victim of abuse” category as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. See ECF No. 226-3 at 4. Now, a defendant is eligible for compassionate release if she can demonstrate that, while in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to be reduced, she was a victim of sexual abuse involving a “sexual act” as defined by federal law that was committed by a correctional officer. The sexual abuse must be established by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding, unless such proceedings are unduly delayed or the defendant is in imminent danger. Id. A “sexual act” constituting sexual abuse for purposes of this provision includes digital penetration with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. See 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(C).

Defendant previously filed a pro se motion for compassionate release, citing the sexual abuse she experienced at Coleman while serving her sentence in this case. ECF No. 199. Defendant did not argue undue delay as an exception to the requirement that her abuse be established by civil liability, a criminal conviction, or an administrative finding. This Court denied Defendant's motion after concluding that Defendant had not established the alleged misconduct by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding, and therefore she had not demonstrated eligibility for compassionate release based on the abuse she experienced. ECF No. 208. Now, with the benefit of counsel, Defendant has renewed her motion and attached compelling evidence demonstrating that she is eligible for compassionate release as a victim of sexual abuse. Inasmuch as Defendant does not claim that she is presently in imminent danger, nor is there any apparent dispute that Defendant's alleged sexual abuse—digital penetration at the hands of Officer Palomares—qualifies as a sexual act under federal law, the only disputed issue as to Defendant's eligibility for compassionate release is whether she has established the sexual abuse or is excepted from the establishment requirement based on an undue delay in proceedings.

In response, the Government again asserts that nothing has changed since this Court previously denied Defendant's pro se motion insofar as Defendant's alleged sexual abuse has not been established by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding. The Government points to the fact that Defendant's settlement in her 2019 lawsuit did not include an admission or finding of liability, Palomares never admitted to sexually abusing Defendant, and he was apparently allowed to retire with full pension benefits.

This Court agrees, as it did before, that Defendant's asserted sexual abuse has not been established by civil liability, a criminal conviction, or a finding in an administrative proceeding. But Defendant has now, with the benefit of counsel, persuasively argued and provided new evidence demonstrating that any criminal proceeding against Palomares for his misconduct has been unduly delayed given the investigative failures detailed in the Senate Report and the Government's decision not to prosecute any of the corrections officers, including Palomares, who admitted to sexually abusing female inmates at Coleman. The Government's suggestion that the fact that Palomares was permitted to retire with full pension benefits notwithstanding his admission to engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with several inmates at Coleman somehow demonstrates his innocence is, at best, tone deaf and offensive.¹

What's more, the Government completely fails to respond to Defendant's arguments concerning administrative failures and the undue delay in either a criminal prosecution given the concerns around Palomares's compelled interview or an administrative finding given the suspicious timing of BOP's transfer of all female inmates out of Coleman only two days before their PREA auditor arrived. Rather than address these arguments head on, the Government minimizes Defendant's experiences at Coleman by suggesting her settlement in the amount of $25,000.00 is a nominal amount and that she would be complaining either way had she not been transferred before the PREA auditor arrived.

It should be noted that Defendant's settlement, which disclaimed any admission of civil liability, was finalized years before the Sentencing Commission updated the Amendments to include the “victim of abuse” ground for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting compassionate release. At the time she agreed to such language, Defendant would have no way of knowing she would be cutting off a possible avenue for compassionate release by agreeing to this boilerplate language. Nonetheless, the language is unavoidable with respect to whether Defendant can establish her sexual abuse by a finding or admission of civil liability—it appears she simply cannot at this juncture given the language of her settlement agreement. But this is not the end of the inquiry.

Defendant may still be eligible for relief as a victim of abuse if she can demonstrate that criminal or administrative proceedings are unduly delayed. See United States v. Russell, 757 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1140 (D. Idaho 2024) (concluding “it is difficult not to find there has been a significant delay in the administrative proceeding,” inasmuch as FCI Dublin closed after inmate submitted grievance and before it could be resolved); United States v. Lambert, 2025 WL 2735856, at *1, *5 (D. Mont. Sep. 24, 2025) (noting that facts suggested undue delay inasmuch as “Lambert's claims prove difficult to substantiate in large part because the prison lacked sufficient camera coverage and footage”).

Cases interpreting and applying the “undue delay” exception to establishing the sexual abuse by conviction, civil liability, or administrative finding are few and far between. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Left Hand, 2024 WL 579206, at *5 (D. N.D. Feb. 13, 2024) (finding no undue delay in criminal proceeding where correctional officer had been indicted in federal court for sexually assaulting inmate, but trial date had not yet been set); United States v. Boyce, 2024 WL 3460947, at *5 (E.D. Wisc. July 18, 2024) (noting that “undue delay” is not defined in the Policy Statement and finding no undue delay where entire administrative proceeding was commenced and concluded in approximately 18 months). However, courts that have addressed similar circumstances have found undue delay in such proceedings as an exception to the establishment requirement when administrative review has been thwarted. See Russell, 757 F. Supp. 3d at 1140 (administrative review thwarted by closing of prison after inmate filed grievance). Here, Defendant points to the undisputed fact that she, along with every other female inmate at Coleman, was transferred to a different facility only days before a PREA auditor was scheduled to interview inmates, suggesting an administrative finding with respect to rampant sexual abuse at that facility was unduly delayed.

In addition, this Court is persuaded that this rationale reasonably extends to criminal proceedings that have been thwarted by the BOP's own actions in conducting compelled interviews that allowed corrections officers to make sweeping admissions with little fear of prosecution, as documented in the Senate Report. See n. 1 supra. Notwithstanding the fact that Palomares and several other officers admitted to sexually abusing inmates under their supervision at Coleman, and the Government admitted to similar allegations in response to Defendant's 2019 lawsuit,² these officers have not been prosecuted to this day for such conduct. All of this suggests that BOP's missteps in handling allegations of sexual abuse when female inmates were still housed at Coleman made it virtually impossible to pursue a prosecution of any of the officers involved.

Ultimately, this Court is persuaded that Defendant has amply demonstrated undue delay. Defendant asserts that any criminal prosecution or administrative proceeding has been unduly delayed given BOP's documented failures to address sexual abuse complaints of female inmates at Coleman, including the routine referral to internal affairs and compelled interviews that cannot later be used against offending officers, the decision not to prosecute Officer Palomares, and the undisputed fact that Defendant was transferred along with all other female inmates before their scheduled interviews with PREA auditors in 2021. Given the failings outlined in detail in the Senate Report that led to compelled interviews, inadmissible evidence, and the removal of all female inmates in an apparent attempt to avoid an administrative finding during the 2021 PREA audit, this Court concludes that Defendant has demonstrated an undue delay in any criminal proceeding or administrative finding against her abusers.

Further, Defendant suffered sexual abuse inasmuch as she has submitted a declaration, under penalty of perjury, detailing the sexual act that Officer Palomares committed on her while she was serving her sentence in this case at Coleman. Accordingly, Defendant has demonstrated an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release as a victim of sexual abuse under § 1B1.13(b)(4)(A) of the Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines.

This Court also finds Defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2). This Court is confident that—given her condition, her lack of any discipline in the past twelve years, the length of time she has already served, and her support system awaiting her upon release—appropriate oversight by the United States Probation Office upon conditions stated in the judgment, ECF No. 91, will prevent Defendant from posing any danger to the community. Upon review of all the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), this Court is persuaded that the pertinent factors support Defendant's request for compassionate release.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant Sara Mari Hoehn's renewed motion for compassionate release, ECF No. 226, is GRANTED.

2. Defendant's sentence of imprisonment is reduced to time served.

3. The United States Probation Office shall forward a copy of this order to the pertinent personnel within the Federal Bureau of Prisons and shall file a notice with this Court that it has done so.

4. The Federal Bureau of Prisons shall effectuate Defendant's release within fourteen days of the date of this Order.

5. The Clerk is directed to close the file.

SO ORDERED on March 23, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This Court is mindful of the Government's routine use of admissions as evidence against Defendants charged with sex offenses in this district. Still, this Court finds it a curious choice not to address Defendant's argument concerning evidence of Palomares's admissions and instead focus on his retirement and lack of any discipline as evidence of his innocence, particularly when BOP's Office of Inspector General even recognized that the fact that officers like Palomares “knew they ha[d] been compelled and could retire and resign and spill to BOP OIA and basically have immunity in some cases for engaging in sexual activity with multiple inmates ․ is a terrible outcome.” ECF No. 226-2 at 19.

2.   See, e.g., Answer to Amended Complaint, ECF No. 48 ¶ 22, Case No. 5:19-cv-0615-Oc-32PRL (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2020) (“Admit that in interviews conducted in September 2018 and June 2019, Palomares stated that he had previously engaged in sexual conduct with Plaintiffs Aloe, Beaubrun, Berman, Flowers, Leon, More, Watson, but aver that both he and Plaintiffs had previously denied said conduct. Admit he was not prosecuted.”)

Mark E. Walker United States District Judge