JAMES MANN v. BLESSINGS AT THE BEACH LLC (2026)

ORDER

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1), Plaintiffs move to depose the representative of Blessings at the Beach LLC for a total of ten hours. For the reasons set forth below, this court authorizes Plaintiffs to depose the representative for nine hours.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are six individuals whom Blessings at the Beach previously employed at the Pineglen Motorcoach and RV Park in Panama City Beach, Florida. Plaintiffs contend that Blessings at the Beach failed to pay them the minimum wages and overtime premium wages mandated by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and Article X, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution.

Plaintiffs seek to depose the designated representative of Blessings at the Beach pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). Plaintiffs argue that because the deposition will address a large number of subjects, and because Blessings at the Beach purports not to possess records regarding the Plaintiffs' work schedules and wages, the designated deponent likely will require ten hours to answer all of the relevant questions Plaintiffs will pose. Defendants respond that seven hours will be more than sufficient.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of discovery is the disclosure of relevant information so that the parties and the court may fully ascertain the facts and ensure that all disputes are resolved consistent with the law. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). Consistent with these goals, the deposition of a key individual can prove to be “a major event in the life of a case.” Evans v. Griffin, 932 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 2019). “Depositions are the factual battleground where the vast majority of litigation actually takes place.” Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

The Federal Rules, therefore, regulate depositions in an effort to maximize their effectiveness and efficiency. One such provision—subsection (d)(1) of Rule 30—states in relevant part that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a deposition is limited to one day of 7 hours.” This provision creates a default rule that an examiner can depose a deponent for a maximum of seven hours, and those seven hours must be on a single day. This default rule applies to all deponents, including deponents designated by organizations pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). Infernal Tech., LLC v. Epic Games, Inc., 339 F.R.D. 226, 230 (E.D.N.C. 2021). Of course, Rule 30(d)(1) also authorizes parties to agree to some other duration and schedule. UWorld LLC v. USMLE Galaxy LLC, 349 F.R.D. 258, 265 (N.D. Tex. 2025).

A party also can move for additional time to depose the deponent. See Vazquez-Rijos v. Anhang, 654 F.3d 122, 130 (1st Cir. 2011). Indeed, a court “must” afford the moving party such additional time, consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2), “if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1). By use of the term “must,” Rule 30(d)(1) requires district courts to grant motions for additional time whenever the moving party demonstrates good cause and meets the requirements of Rule 26(b)(1) and (2). George v. City of Buffalo, 789 F. Supp. 2d 417, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); Roberson v. Bair, 242 F.R.D. 130, 138 (D.D.C. 2007). The party seeking additional time to conduct a deposition bears the burden of demonstrating that there is “good cause” for such an enlargement. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) advisory committee notes to 2000 amendment; see also Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2003); Keplar v. Google, LLC, 346 F.R.D. 41, 52 (N.D. Tex. 2024); 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2104.1 (2010).

When assessing whether a party has demonstrated good cause for a lengthier deposition, a “court should begin with the presumption that the seven-hour limit was carefully chosen and that extensions of that limit should be the exception, not the rule.” Roberson, 242 F.R.D. at 138. Counsel's desire to cast a wide net does not itself constitute good cause for an extended deposition. Rule 30(d)(1) authorizes courts to afford counsel extra time “to fairly examine the deponent,” not to perform a perfect and exhaustive examination. Fuentes v. Classica Cruise Operator Ltd., Inc., 32 F.4th 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022); Prasad v. George Washington Univ., 323 F.R.D. 88, 98 (D.D.C. 2017). Counsel, therefore, must prioritize their questions and use their time efficiently to ensure that they cover the most salient topics.

As noted above, demonstrating good cause for additional time to examine a deponent is a necessary condition but is insufficient in itself for a court to order a lengthier deposition. A movant also must show that an augmented duration will not run afoul of Rule 26(b)(1) or (2). Specifically, the movant must show that the additional deposition time likely will yield evidence that is relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, that he is not seeking cumulative evidence, and that there is no more efficient or less expensive way to obtain the information. Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc., 903 F.3d 733, 742 (8th Cir. 2018); Kleppinger v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 283 F.R.D. 330, 335 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Roberson, 242 F.R.D. at 138.

Federal courts have taken two different approaches to motions for additional time to conduct a deposition. Some courts take a “wait and see” approach to ex ante motions to enlarge the time for a deposition. They believe that it is more efficient to see if the examining party truly needs additional time before determining whether to grant additional time. See, e.g., Malec v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 208 F.R.D. 23, 24 (D. Mass. 2002). There is something to be said for this approach. A moving party's assertion that more than seven hours will be required is largely speculative. It may be based on a sound estimate, but prior to the kickoff, nobody knows with certainty that overtime will be required.

Among other things, the “wait and see” approach encourages the deposing party to be efficient in its use of time. A hard deadline focuses the mind and incentivizes brevity and efficiency. Also, any inefficiency in the deposition likely will be apparent in the transcript, which might doom any chance that the district court will grant a motion for additional time to depose the deponent. Similarly, this approach incentivizes the deponent and the deponent's counsel to be reasonable lest a district court grant a motion for additional time based on their conduct. Paraphrasing Ambrose Bierce, a deponent's conscience is that little voice inside his head reminding him that a district court might read the deposition transcript. The “wait and see” approach, therefore, may itself obviate the need for a longer deposition. For this and other reasons, at least one commentator has opined that a “party generally should not seek additional time for a deposition before the deposition is taken.” 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 30.45 (3d ed. 2023).

Other courts, however, see value in addressing a motion to exceed the default duration prior to a deposition. This “don't put off until tomorrow what you can do today” approach entails substantial advantages for the parties and the courts. Providing additional time upfront creates at least some incentive for the the deponent not to tarry. When a deponent—not to mention his counsel—knows that the court has put extra time on the clock, he should have less incentive to obstruct the deposition through evasiveness and irrelevant loquacity. Such tactics likely will prove insufficient to run out the clock. Rather, obstruction will simply extend the duration of the deposition.

Furthermore, the “don't put off until tomorrow ․” approach obviates the cost and inefficiency inherent in the “wait and see” approach. The relevant actors already are present and prepared for one deposition; it makes sense just to see the endeavor through to the end rather than trying to reschedule round two, if and when the district court permits it. Round two will entail additional expenditures of both time and money—e.g., for travel to and from the deposition site, additional preparation by the examiner and the deponent—that could be avoided simply by the district court affording the examiner extra time at the outset. Litigation already is expensive. Courts should strive to minimize unnecessary litigation expenses whenever possible. Furthermore, although an encore performance by a deponent is permitted by the Federal Rules, the practice generally is “disfavored,” because of the inherent inefficiency and waste of resources that it entails. PlayUp, Inc. v. Mintas, 344 F.R.D. 429, 433 (D. Nev. 2023). Of course, advance authorization to exceed seven hours itself creates a perverse incentive for an unethical examining attorney to prolong the examination in an attempt to harass the deponent and opposing counsel. Depositions already can be unpleasant “because the examining lawyer is not inhibited by the presence of a judge or jury who might resent hectoring tactics.” DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1988). Thus, lengthy depositions can become “the modern form of trial by ordeal.” In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 230 F.R.D. 527, 532 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

Extending the duration of a deposition ex ante also attenuates some of the incentive for the examining counsel to prepare thoroughly and craft precise questions in advance of the deposition. A strict deadline at the expiration of the seventh hour undoubtedly creates an incentive for brevity and efficiency that will be lost if a court employs a “don't put off until tomorrow ․” approach.

Regardless of the timing of its decision, when addressing a motion for an extended deposition, a district court must consider the specific facts of each case. Depending on the particular facts of a case, courts may consider:

• the number of claims and defenses asserted;

• whether the deponent is a “central figure” in the case and likely to have extensive relevant information;

• whether the deponent is an expert witness, a fact witness, or both;

• whether an expert has provided detailed and lengthy opinions;

• whether the facts of the case are relatively complex;

• whether the case involves multiple acts or omissions, or the facts occurred over a substantial period;

• whether the deponent must examine and testify about a large number of exhibits, particularly lengthy documents, and whether the deponent could familiarize himself with these exhibits in advance of the deposition;

• whether the deponent—or affiliated entities—failed to produce properly requested documents or failed to respond timely to interrogatories, thereby increasing the need to address relevant matters in the deposition;

• whether the deponent is a non-party and not closely affiliated with a party such that he warrants additional protection from inconvenience or harassment;

• whether the case involves multiple parties and, if so, whether multiple parties must examine the deponent or have divergent interests;

• whether the parties recently have added new claims or counterclaims such that there has been little discovery regarding those subjects;

• whether English is the primary language in which the deponent is fluent;

• whether a linguist is needed to communicate with the deponent;

• whether the deponent suffers from a condition that likely would affect the pace of the deposition or, on the other hand, would preclude increasing the duration of the deposition beyond seven hours per day;

• whether it appears that the movant is seeking additional time merely to harass and inconvenience the deponent; and

• the probability that the deponent or his counsel will seek to obstruct the deposition.

FED. R. CIV. P. 30, advisory committee notes to 2000 amendment; Republic of Turkey v. Christie's Inc., 326 F.R.D. 402, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Avago Techs. U.S., Inc. v. IPtronics, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 294, 297 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Kleppinger, 283 F.R.D. at 333; George, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 436; Roberson, 242 F.R.D. at 138–39; Miller v. Waseca Med. Ctr., 205 F.R.D. 537, 541–42 (D. Minn. 2002). Of course, this is a non-exhaustive list.

Here, it is appropriate to address Plaintiffs' motion prior to the deposition of the Rule 30(b)(6) deponent. Among other things, the deposition will involve a large number of topics about six separate Plaintiffs, about events that spanned—for some Plaintiffs—more than two years.

The Plaintiffs assert only three claims—two claims under the FLSA and one similar claim under the Florida Constitution—and they are not complex claims. To support their claims, Plaintiffs will need to establish the number of hours they worked per week and the amount Defendants paid them. Defendants purportedly do not have any records of these facts, however. The designated deponent, therefore, will need to relate this information from memory, which likely will prove a time-consuming process—assuming the deponent has the relevant information. The deponent also likely will be a central figure in this litigation.

For their part, Defendants assert twenty affirmative defenses, and Plaintiffs' counsel will need to delve into the elements and bases of these defenses. Counsel for the parties repeatedly have been unable to achieve consensus on rudimentary discovery disputes, and this court would not be surprised if the deposition takes a contentious turn. In light of these and other factors, Plaintiffs have shown good cause to extend the default duration of the relevant deposition, but only by two hours.

CONCLUSION

“[D]epositions play an extremely important role in the American system of justice.” GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 185 (E.D. Pa. 2008). In the scheduled Rule 30(b)(6) deposition Plaintiffs seek to obtain evidence essential to their case. Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated that more than seven hours—but less than ten hours—likely is necessary to procure the necessary testimony, Plaintiffs' motion to depose Blessings at the Beach's designated deponent for more than seven hours is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' deposition of the designated deponent shall not exceed nine hours. Also, “only the time taken for the actual deposition, not breaks, counts toward the” nine hours. Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of September 2026.

Michael J. Frank United States Magistrate Judge