MELANIE FIGUEROA v. SANTA ROSA COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT (2026)

ORDER ON SHERIFF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case arises out of the purported mental health seizures of two autistic children at a school in Santa Rosa County. Plaintiffs include the minor children, C.B. and B.F., and their parents, who have sued Defendant Sheriff, in his official capacity, and the Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Department,¹ for various federal claims arising out of the purported mental health seizures of both children. The Sheriff and Sheriff's Office have moved for summary judgment as to all claims. ECF No. 184. This Court has considered, without hearing, the motion for summary judgment, id., Plaintiffs' response in opposition, ECF No. 205, and the Sheriff Defendants' reply, ECF No. 208. For the reasons set out below, the motion is due to be GRANTED.

This Court firsts addresses those claims that can be addressed in short order. First, Plaintiffs' Monell claims against the Sheriff based on the alleged wrongful seizures of and excessive force used on C.B. and B.F. The Sheriff, in his official capacity, “may be held liable for the actions of [his] law enforcement officers only when the officers' execution of official policy (or custom) is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Baker v. City of Madison, Ala., 67 F.4th 1268, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “Thus, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that (1) his constitutional rights were violated, (2) the municipality had a policy (or custom) that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right, and (3) the municipal policy (or custom) caused the violation.” Id. at 1282. But “[t]here can be no policy-based liability ․ when there is no underlying constitutional violation.” Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017).

By separate Order, this Court concludes that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Deputy Daniels had probable cause to arrest both children for criminal offenses, which immunizes Daniels from liability under section 1983. Likewise, inasmuch as probable cause supported both seizures, no constitutional violation occurred with respect to whether either child was wrongfully seized under the Fourth Amendment. This Court also previously dismissed C.B.'s claim for excessive force. ECF No. 94 at 27 (concluding that C.B. had not plausibly alleged a constitutional violation for excessive force). Nor does Plaintiff identify any authority demonstrating that the rough handcuffing of B.F. constituted a constitutional violation under these circumstances. And absent an underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiffs can demonstrate no Monell claim against the Sheriff for wrongful seizure or excessive force. See Andrews v. Marshall, 845 F. App'x 849, 855 (11th Cir. 2021) (“And because Deputy Marshall and Sergeant Kizzire are entitled to summary judgment on these claims, Sheriff Marceno cannot be liable in his official capacity either.” (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986))). Accordingly, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to the remaining section 1983 wrongful seizure and excessive force claims—namely, Counts III and IV.

Plaintiffs' remaining claims against the Sheriff, in his official capacity, include the parent Plaintiffs' section 1983 procedural due process claims based on a deprivation of parental rights to custody and control (Counts V and XXI), and the parent Plaintiffs' section 1983 procedural due process claims for deprivation of parental rights to control medical decisions (Counts VI and XXII). Likewise, B.F.'s and C.B.'s ADA claims under Title II (Counts VII and VIII), remain pending against the “Sheriff's Department.” This Court will address these in turn, starting with the remaining procedural due process claims.

Counts V and XXI are based on the alleged deprivation of the parent Plaintiffs' fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children without constitutionally sufficient process under the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 74 ¶¶ 243–47, 441–45. In essence, C.B.'s and B.F.'s parents allege that they were deprived of the right to care, custody, and control of C.B. and B.F. without due process when C.B. and B.F. were taken into custody under the purported mental health seizures and transported to a receiving facility without their parents' prior notice or consent. Counts VI and XXII are based on the same allegations insofar as the Plaintiffs contend the initiation of involuntary examination under the Baker Act without their notice or consent deprived them of their right to control their children's medical care without due process. Id. ¶¶ 254–58, 452–56. As explained below, Plaintiffs' claims are fundamentally flawed insofar as Plaintiffs identify no authority for their position that they were entitled to and deprived of any additional notice or input under these unique circumstances.

Without dispute, the Sheriff's deputy, Defendant Daniels, initiated the Baker Act seizures under the state statutory provision allowing law enforcement to initiate involuntary examinations. See § 394.463(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Although the Baker Act provisions do not require prior notice or consent from a parent before law enforcement makes a determination to conduct a mental health seizure of their child, Plaintiffs contend that due process requires as much. Even so, Plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of the Baker Act's provisions setting out the pre- and post-deprivation procedures for initiating an involuntary examination. These statutory requirements allow law enforcement to make a judgment call as to whether the circumstances warrant a mental health seizure for an involuntary examination of a minor without prior notice to a parent or the parent's consent. See § 394.463(1), Fla. Stat. (“Criteria” for involuntary examination). They set a limited deadline by which a minor must be examined by a healthcare professional and require parents who are present when the seizure occurs to be provided notice of the name, address, and contact information where the minor is being taken. §§ 394.463(2)(a)2. and 394.463(2)(g), Fla. Stat. Finally, the Baker Act designates what actions must be taken under the circumstances depending on individual needs of the minor who has been seized, including releasing the minor. § 394.463(2)(g)1., Fla. Stat.

Rather than challenge the constitutionality of these statutory procedures, Plaintiffs add a gloss to Florida law, suggesting, without citation to authority, that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the Sheriff to implement policies requiring a parent's prior notice and consent before an officer may make a Baker Act determination under Florida law. See ECF No. 202 at 28 (“In the context of involuntary examination of a child under the Baker Act, parental consent is required in the absence of a ‘true emergency.’ ”). Ultimately, Plaintiffs' proposed rule—notice and consent to seize in the absence of a “true emergency”—would require the Sheriff to have his deputies first contact parents and receive their consent to seize their children in the event the deputies do not have probable cause for such seizure.² But this proposed rule is founded on the assumption that Deputy Daniels lacked probable cause to seize C.B. and B.F. However, as explained at length elsewhere, neither seizure violated C.B.'s or B.F.'s Fourth Amendment rights insofar as Daniels had probable cause to arrest both boys for felonies. See Marbut, 176 F.4th at 1266 (holding that mental health seizure did not violate Fourth Amendment “[e]ven if the emergency-aid doctrine did not justify [the] seizure,” because “officers could seize [Appellant] because they had probable cause to believe she committed a criminal offense”); see also J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo Cnty., 806 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that power to arrest based on probable cause “did not depend on classification of the arrestee (adult versus juvenile) or the crime (felony versus misdemeanor); law enforcement can arrest minors, as well as adults, even when the crime involves only a misdemeanor.”). And Plaintiffs certainly do not suggest or cite any authority supporting the position that an officer must first notify a parent and receive their consent before arresting a minor based on probable cause that the minor has committed a felony. In other words, insofar as Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims against the Sheriff are founded on the presumption that their children were wrongfully seized—“in the absence of a true emergency”—and thus, the seizure required their prior notice and consent to satisfy their procedural due process rights, this theory fails as a matter of law given the probable cause that supported both seizures.³ Ultimately, Plaintiffs identify no binding Circuit or Supreme Court authority holding that a Sheriff violates the constitution when his or her deputies conduct mental health seizures of minors that are otherwise supported by probable cause to arrest without providing prior notice to or receiving consent from the minors' parents. Accordingly, Defendant Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment as to these counts in the absence of any authority supporting Plaintiffs' position that the facts in this record would permit a reasonable jury to find that they were deprived of their parental rights without due process. Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to the section 1983 procedural due process claims—namely, Counts V, VI, XXI, and XXII.

Finally, B.F. and C.B. also allege in Counts VII and VIII that the Sheriff Defendants violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act based on the use of handcuffs during both child's seizure. ECF No. 74 ¶¶ 264–81, 284–300. They claim the Sheriff's Department failed to accommodate B.F.'s and C.B.'s disabilities by not providing a modification to handcuffing during the purported mental health seizures, denying both children the opportunity to participate in education services, and intentionally discriminating against both children because of their disabilities. As explained below, Plaintiffs fail to identify any record evidence creating a dispute of material fact to defeat the Sheriff Defendants' motion for summary judgment.⁴

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “[C]ourts have read Title II to impose a duty on public entities to provide ‘reasonable’ accommodations to qualifying individuals with a disability as to their services.” Laubscher v. Gwinette Cnty., 2026 WL 1897046, at *6 (11th Cir. July 1, 2026) (listing cases). To state a Title II claim, Plaintiffs generally must prove that they are qualified individuals with a disability, that they were either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the Sheriff's Office's services, programs, or activities, or were otherwise discriminated against by the Sheriff's Office, and that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of their disability. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007). “In the ordinary course, proof of a Title II ․ violation entitles a plaintiff only to injunctive relief.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiffs seek damages, which requires them to also prove that the Sheriff's Office “engaged in intentional discrimination, which requires a showing of ‘deliberate indifference.’ ” Id. (quoting Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 348 (11th Cir. 2012)). And deliberate indifference requires proof that “an ‘official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the entity's behalf’ had ‘actual knowledge of discrimination in the entity's programs and failed adequately to respond.” Id. (quoting Liese, 701 F.3d at 349).

Here, Plaintiffs' ADA claims fail for several reasons. A Title II violation occurs only when the qualified individual with a disability is excluded, denied the benefits of a service or program, or otherwise discriminated against by the public entity. Laubscher, 2026 WL 1897046, at *9. Likewise, the Sheriff's Office's duty to accommodate B.F. and C.B. with respect to its services “is only triggered once the person with a disability makes clear to the public entity his need for an accommodation to enjoy the benefits of the public entity's services.” Id. (citing Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999)). In this case, the alleged Title II violations could only have occurred when C.B. and B.F. were handcuffed during their mental health seizures, not at some earlier time when the challenged policies were enacted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' conclusory assertion that the “Sheriff Defendants' practice of handcuffing disabled students, regardless of age or disability, violates the ADA,” because “[t]he ADA requires the Sheriff Defendants to modify their policies, practices, and procedures to avoid discriminating against persons based on disability,” is a nonstarter insofar as Plaintiffs contend some earlier policy choice, in the abstract, constitutes intentional disability discrimination against C.B. and B.F. See ECF No. 205 at 32; see also Laubscher, 2026 WL 1897046, at *9 (“Gwinnett's alleged policy decisions that were made prior to the April 30, 2022 shooting, and without any knowledge of Dani or Dani's needs, could not in themselves have constituted intentional discrimination against Dani under Title II.”).

Moreover, Plaintiffs point to no record evidence demonstrating that either Plaintiff or their parents requested any accommodation to handcuffing in the event of a mental health seizure. Nor do Plaintiffs point to any evidence that either Deputy Daniels or the Sheriff's Office were aware of C.B.'s or B.F.'s asserted disabilities. At most, Plaintiffs point to evidence that state and county stakeholders in the juvenile justice system were meeting to address needs for services that worked with children on the autism spectrum as early as 2018. See ECF No. 204-1 at 1. But this task force addressed “children that are in front of the Court system,” ECF No. 179-7 at 20, not adjustments or any need for improvement with respect to Baker Act policies involving children on the autism spectrum. And beyond pointing to evidence that the Sheriff's Office was aware that children were being “Baker Acted,” generally, Plaintiffs identify no other evidence suggesting that anyone in a supervisory or policy-making role was aware of or indifferent to a pattern of similar Baker Act seizures involving other children on the autism spectrum to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the Sheriff's Office was deliberately indifferent to the alleged discrimination. See Laubscher, 2026 WL 1897046, at *8 (“To show actual knowledge and hold a public entity liable for compensatory damages under the ADA and RA, plaintiffs asserting claims like the Laubschers' based on a public entity's upstream policies must show a pattern of incidents and ADA violations similar to the underlying alleged discrimination.”). Ultimately, Plaintiffs do not point to even a scintilla of evidence to demonstrate actual knowledge of any disability, actual knowledge of any request for accommodation, or any intentional discrimination. Accordingly, inasmuch as there is no dispute of material fact, Defendant Sheriff's Office is entitled to summary judgment on the Title II claims—Counts VII and VIII.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant Johnson's and the Sheriff's Office's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 184, is GRANTED.

2. This Court does not direct entry of judgment on the issues decided in this Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

SO ORDERED on September 3, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiffs named the wrong Defendant in their Second Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 108. The proper Defendant is the “Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Office,” not the “Sheriff's Department.”

2.   Of course, this Court recognizes that the Eleventh Circuit has recently articulated a more flexible standard than probable cause, which now applies when evaluating the constitutionality of a mental health seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Marbut v. Phillips, 176 F.4th 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2026) (mental health seizures do not violate the Fourth Amendment when officers “have an ‘objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that intervention is needed to ‘prevent serious harm.’ ”).

3.   Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims against the Sheriff also ignore the fact that Florida law requires schools to make reasonable attempts at notifying parents of Baker Act determinations that happen at school. Here, there is no genuine dispute that the school in this case did, in fact, either contact the child's parents to notify them of the Baker Act determination or at least attempted to contact them prior to their child being transported to the hospital. See ECF No. 179-5 at 2 (school staff member's testimony confirming she contacted C.B.'s father); ECF No. 179-9 at 1–2 (contact log documenting attempts to contact C.B.'s parents regarding Baker Act); ECF No. 179-11 (school staff member's testimony confirming she contacted B.F.'s mother); ECF No. 179-12 (contact log documenting attempt to contact B.F.'s mother regarding Baker Act).

4.   In addition, summary judgment is arguably due for the Sheriff's Office insofar as Plaintiffs have named the wrong Defendant—the “Sheriff's Department.” This Court previously gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend to correct the error, but they failed to ever amend to name the proper Defendant. See ECF No. 108 at 2–3 (providing Plaintiffs until May 22, 2024 to file an amended complaint naming the proper party and noting that “errors should be corrected now to prevent confusion at later stages of litigation.”).

Mark E. Walker United States District Judge