MICHELLE SMITH v. SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (2026)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

The court dismissed Plaintiff Michelle Smith's original complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 15. At issue now is Smith's amended complaint. ECF No. 16. That complaint asserts two claims: a disparate-treatment claim based on race and a retaliatory hostile-work-environment claim based on opposition to race-based workplace discrimination. The Department again moved to dismiss. ECF No. 17. (The Defendant is the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs. For simplicity, I will refer to the Defendant as the Department.)

While Smith offers additional factual allegations concerning her time as Staff Psychologist and Chair of the Diversity Committee, she still has not plausibly alleged that the Department's actions (whether directed at her or the trainees she sought to defend) were based on race. The Department is thus entitled to dismissal.¹

I.

Smith's new allegations focus on the lead-up to and events following an April 2022 staff meeting. According to the amended complaint, in the days leading up to that meeting, the Director of Psychology Training asked Smith to attest to an altered performance evaluation for a Psychology trainee of East Indian descent. ECF No. 16 ¶ 11. The altered performance evaluation gave the trainee a failing score and stated the trainee had “problematic performance.” Id. But Smith “pushed back,” insisting the trainee had actually achieved a passing score. Id. A week later, during the April 2022 meeting, Smith advised the same Director that she (Smith) had “received complaints alleging discriminatory treatment” from various trainees, some Hispanic and one Korean. Id. ¶ 12. Smith also expressed her concern regarding the East Indian trainee who had now been “placed on probation without being afforded the due process that” Department “policies and procedures required.” Id. ¶ 13. (Policy requires the Department to consult a trainee's supervisor before placing a trainee on probation. Id. ¶ 14. The Department, Smith alleges, “never subjected the White trainees to probation without including their supervising psychologist in the process.” Id. ¶ 15.) Smith's non-black colleagues similarly shared concerns about the East Indian trainee's treatment. Id. ¶ 17.

Following the meeting, the Director of Psychology Training conveyed Smith's concerns to her supervisor, the Chief of Psychology. The Chief was displeased with Smith's comments. She initiated a fact-finding investigation against Smith in the weeks after the April meeting and would later meet with Smith in July 2022 to discuss Smith's comments and workplace diversity efforts. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. At the July meeting, the Chief of Psychology expressed “resentment and disagreement” with Smith's creation of a diversity and inclusion survey for trainees, speculating Smith was at fault for the trainees' discontentment. She also suggested Smith “was being influenced by a demon or, in fact, was a demon,” and then required Smith to meet regularly with her and the Director of Psychology Training. None of Smith's non-black colleagues, she alleges, faced similar ridicule or restrictions. Id. ¶¶ 22-24.

At the end of the Department's fact-finding investigation, the Chief imposed additional restrictions: Smith could no longer meet with trainees one-on-one or participate in supervising interns. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. Smith alleges none of her non-black colleagues faced similar restrictions.

II.

A.

The thrust of Smith's disparate-treatment claim concerns the events surrounding the April 2022 meeting—namely, the fact-finding investigation and the subsequent restrictions on Smith's authority. As with the original complaint, Smith also points to the Chief of Psychology's comments and delay surrounding Smith's step raise and board certification. The issue for Smith is that even assuming each of the Department's actions constitute adverse actions under Title VII, she has not plausibly alleged a connection between her race and those actions.

“Factual allegations that are ‘merely consistent with a defendant's liability' fall short of being facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). To state a disparate-treatment claim, Smith had to plausibly allege she suffered an adverse employment action because of intentional discrimination. Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015).² Intentional discrimination means “the protected trait actually motivated the employer's decision.” EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1026 (11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). When the allegations reveal “obvious alternative explanations” to discriminatory intent, liability cannot attach. Doe v. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675, 688-89 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)) (concluding plaintiff failed to plausibly allege discrimination where “ineptitude, inexperience, and pro-complainant bias” were “just as much—if not more—in line” with suggestion of unlawful motive).

In practice, that means unpleasant work environments—even targeted ones—do not establish Title VII liability, absent facts making an employer's discriminatory motive plausible. See, e.g., Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The facts that [plaintiff] is Caucasian and that the co-workers who were threatening and shunning him were Hispanic or Latino, by themselves, do not state a plausible claim of race discrimination.”); Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017) (concluding plaintiff “did not provide enough factual matter to plausibly suggest” sex discrimination where, among other facts, plaintiff alleged supervisor sought to target plaintiff “because she had substantial evidence of wrongdoing against him”), abrogated on other grounds by Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 590 U.S. 644 (2020).

Smith's core contentions concerning intentional discrimination are that she “was the only African American” in the April 2022 meeting and “was singled out” following the meeting, even though non-black colleagues raised similar trainee-treatment concerns. ECF No. 19 at 9-11. As an initial matter, the lone allegation concerning Smith's race does not, by itself, support an inference that race motivated the Chief of Psychology's decisionmaking. And the amended complaint reveals non-discriminatory motives just as much—if not more—in line with any racial motive. Unlike her colleagues, Smith “served as Chair of the Psychology Service Diversity Committee” where she interfaced with trainees “who wanted support for diversity-related concerns.” ECF No. 16 ¶ 8; see also id. ¶ 12 (noting Smith fielded complaints from various trainees). So while it is true the Chief of Psychology berated Smith but not her non-black colleagues for comments at the April 2022 meeting, she also expressed sentiments in line with opposing Smith's role, not race. For example, the Chief “stated her resentment and disagreement that the trainees” completed a diversity and inclusion survey Smith created, suspected Smith was at fault for the trainees' discontentment, and was generally “furious with Smith for opposing” the allegedly unequal treatment of minority trainees. ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 21-22. None of that connects plausibly with Smith's race.

As before, Smith also points to the Chief's slow walking her raise following Smith's board certification and the Chief's comment that “[a]nyone could create” a board certification. But Smith offers even fewer reasons why race would motivate those actions. Smith's general allegation that the Chief “never delayed” Smith's non-black colleagues' step-increases offers no facts in support. And even if Smith could demonstrate non-black colleagues readily received their step-increases, she also concedes she “was the only psychologist who achieved board certification,” ECF No. 16 ¶ 32, allowing the alternative explanation that the novelty of the board certification animated the Chief's reaction, not Smith's race.

Because Smith has not plausibly alleged her race “actually motivated [her superior's] decision[s],” Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1026, the Department is entitled to dismissal on Smith's disparate-treatment claim.

B.

Smith next asserts a retaliatory hostile-work-environment claim. The gist of that claim is that the Chief of Psychology retaliated against her for opposing racially discriminatory treatment of minority trainees. But as with her disparate-treatment claim, Smith does not plausibly allege the Chief or others discriminated against the minority trainees based on race. Nor does she plausibly allege she had any good-faith, reasonable belief that they did.

Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful employment discrimination. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016). To state a claim for retaliatory hostile work environment, though, a plaintiff must plausibly allege she “had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.” Id. (cleaned up). The practice opposed need not be “actually unlawful,” but the employee's belief must still be “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and controlling substantive law. Id.

Smith's problem is that she is short on details. She asserts simply that trainees of various minority backgrounds complained about discriminatory treatment, ECF No. 16 ¶ 12, but she offers no facts concerning what treatment they experienced or how it was based on their races. While she does allege a trainee of East Indian descent had been placed on probation despite Department policies and procedures, Smith does not offer any allegations suggesting race had anything to do with that. Indeed, as to the same trainee, Smith alleges her supervisor “claimed that she had misplaced the original [evaluation] scores, and ․ was trying to reconstruct them from her memory.” ECF No. 16 ¶ 11; see Doe, 29 F.4th at 688-89 (noting “ineptitude” may be “just as much” in line with unlawful motive). Nor does Smith offer facts in support of the allegation that the Department “never subjected the White trainees to probation without including their supervising psychologist in the process.” ECF No. 16 ¶ 15; cf. also Doe, 29 F.4th at 689 (“Allegations of a procedurally or otherwise flawed proceeding ․ combined with a conclusory allegation of sex discrimination are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” (quoting in parenthetical Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994) (alterations adopted)) (addressing Title IX).

Separate and apart from her failure to plausibly allege an objectively reasonable belief in discriminatorily motivated actions, Smith also fails to allege any facts suggesting the trainees experienced “a serious and material change” in the terms and conditions of their employment. Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A discrimination claim under Title VII requires an adverse employment action.”).

Because Smith has not shown an objectively reasonable belief that the Department was engaged in unlawful discrimination, the Department is entitled to dismissal on Smith's retaliatory hostile-work-environment claim. I therefore need not address the Department's separate argument about causation.

CONCLUSION

The Department's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED. The clerk will enter a judgment that says, “Plaintiff's claims are dismissed on the merits for failure to state a claim.” The clerk will then close the file.

SO ORDERED on June 24, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because the Secretary is entitled to dismissal on the merits, I will not separately address exhaustion. Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that with non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirements, courts “may skip over the exhaustion issue” if it denies relief); Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 549-51 (2019) (noting Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional).

2.   Smith is correct that she “need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.” ECF No. 19 at 7; see also Tynes v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Justice, 88 F.4th 939, 941, (11th Cir. 2023) (McDonnell Douglas “is an evidentiary framework” and “not a set of elements that the employee must prove”). Still, Smith must offer enough allegations of fact to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of Title VII's ultimate questions: An adverse employment action causally connected to intentional discrimination. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Allen Winsor Chief United States District Judge