JADEN RASHADA v. HUGH HATHCOCK (2025)

ORDER

Before the Court is the parties' Joint Motion for Trial Continuance, seeking a seven-month extension of the trial date and the corresponding discovery, expert, mediation, and dispositive motion deadlines. Doc. 96; see also, Doc. 98.¹ The matter was referred to the undersigned for disposition, and the undersigned held a case management conference and hearing on December 8, 2025. Doc. 99. At the outset of the hearing, the parties orally amended their motion to request a two-month extension of discovery and the corresponding deadlines and to withdraw their request for an extension of the July 20, 2026 trial date. Because the parties have not been diligent in their discovery efforts and have not shown that with such diligence they cannot meet the existing deadlines, the motion, as amended, is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jaden Rashada filed this action in May 2024 against the Defendants, alleging they fraudulently induced him with a promise of over $13 million in NIL funds to decommit from the University of Miami in favor of the University of Florida. After addressing the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court conducted a Rule 16 conference with the parties and, on April 25, 2025, entered a scheduling order containing the following pertinent deadlines:

Document Discovery Deadline Deposition of Named Parties Plaintiff's Expert Disclosures Defendant's Expert Disclosures Fact Discovery Deadline Expert Discovery Deadline Daubert and Dispositive Motions August 1, 2025 October 1, 2025 August 15, 2025 September 15, 2025 December 1, 2025 January 15, 2026 February 17, 2026

Doc. 78.

The parties moved for an extension of time and, on September 10, 2025, the Court entered an order with the following extensions:

Document Discovery Deadline Deposition of Named Parties Plaintiff's Expert Disclosures Defendant's Expert Disclosures Expert Discovery Deadline October 1, 2025 October 1, 2025 November 14, 2025 December 12, 2025 January 30, 2026

Doc. 88.

The parties requested two additional extensions on September 12, 2025 (Doc 89) and October 24, 2025 (Doc. 91). Those extensions resulted in the following changes to the scheduling order:

Deposition of Named Parties Plaintiff's Expert Disclosures Defendant's Expert Disclosures Daubert and Dispositive Motions January 30, 2026 November 21, 2025 December 19, 2025 February 17, 2026

Docs. 90 & 92.

Despite these three extensions, the parties contend they need more time to complete discovery – namely to take depositions and, at the hearing, asked for the Court to extend the fact and expert discovery deadline, as well as all corresponding deadlines (except the trial date) for 60 days. Because the parties are no longer seeking an extension of the trial date, the requested extension would push the Daubert and dispositive motion deadline to April 18, 2026, giving the Court a little over a month before trial to address any such motions after they are fully briefed.

II. DISCUSSION

A district court's scheduling order shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.”). To establish “good cause,” the parties must show they cannot meet the existing deadlines despite their diligence. Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note). “A finding of lack of diligence on the part of the party seeking modification ends the good cause inquiry.” Laird v. Fairway Elec. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1277 (M.D. Fla. 2002). None of the parties in this case have shown good cause for an extension and the parties' representation to the contrary rings hollow.

Since April 2025, when the scheduling order was entered, the parties have exchanged written discovery, issued subpoenas to numerous third parties, and met and conferred about privilege issues related to Rashada's document production and those of third parties, also represented by Rashada's counsel. The parties argue their written and document discovery efforts show they “have been diligent in trying to complete discovery as quickly as possible in accordance with the current deadlines.” Doc. 98 at 2. The undersigned disagrees.

First, the deadline for completing document discovery expired more than two months ago on October 1, 2025. The parties, however, did not complete document discovery by that date. Instead, a host of supplementations, “reproductions,” and meet and confers about document issues occurred after that deadline. Doc. 98-1. In fact, as late as November 25, 2025, a “select reproduction” of documents was made by Rashada, his father, and his agents (all of whom are represented by Rashada's counsel). While these “reproductions” may have been the result of agreements subsequently reached regarding confidentiality issues, those issues should have been addressed and resolved prior to October 1, 2025.

Second, the parties have not been diligent in seeking assistance from the Court. On the morning of the hearing, Hathcock filed a motion for leave to file a motion to compel the production of documents under seal (Doc. 103) and Napier's counsel represented, at the hearing, that he intends to file a motion to compel the production of documents. While the parties suggest that these motions were not filed sooner because the parties were engaging in meet and confers to try to narrow or resolve the issues before bringing them to the Court, such efforts cannot be taken in ignorance of impending deadlines. “A Scheduling Order ‘is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.’ ” Moyer v. Walt Disney World Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, some of the document productions at issue in the motion to compel were made months ago in June or July. It should not take until December for motions to compel to be filed, particularly when it comes to documents that Defendants contend they need before taking the deposition of the Plaintiff, his father, and his agents – depositions which Defendants contend are at the core of this suit.²

Third, the parties have identified seventeen (17) parties and fact witnesses whose depositions they want to take. Yet, since April 2025, not a single party deposition has been taken. And the only two (2) fact witness depositions that have been taken did not occur until last week. Taking two depositions in eight (8) months is the opposite of due diligence. Even accepting that unresolved document issues prevented the parties from taking what they have referred to as the core depositions, those issues did not prevent the parties from proceeding with the other depositions.

Fourth, the parties have not made any efforts to discuss among themselves a proposed deposition schedule. Indeed, other than asking for dates for the depositions of Rashada, his dad, and his agents, the parties have not requested deposition dates from other parties or non-parties. Instead, the parties submitted a chart that simply identified the months of January, February, or March as the proposed date for taking the remaining depositions. Because the parties have not reached out to many of the third parties they seek to depose to discuss deposition dates and admitted that at least one third-party has advised he has “limited” availability, the Court is not convinced that the parties will not be back asking for additional extensions even if the Court were to grant one now.

Finally, the Court notes that some of the delay in scheduling the depositions of Rashada, his dad, and his agents has fallen at Plaintiff's feet. Rashada's counsel piecemealed the document production for Rashada and these third parties. They did not produce a complete privilege log until October. And they insisted that lead counsel Rusty Hardin, who has been in trial since September, defend these depositions. As the Court stated at the hearing, these depositions will proceed regardless of whether Hardin can defend them. The Court is certain that one of the other nine (9) attorneys who have appeared on Rashada's behalf in this case is more than capable of defending these depositions.

On that point, the Court notes that this case is not lacking in legal representation. Seven (7) attorneys have appeared for Hathcock, four (4) attorneys for Napier, one for Castro-Walker, and two (2) for Velocity. Surely, 23 lawyers is sufficient bandwidth to cover the remaining fifteen (15) fact witness depositions and potentially four (4) expert witnesses ³ in the roughly eight (8) weeks that remain before the January 30 discovery deadline.

A district court has “broad discretion” in managing its cases. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001). “Given the caseload of most district courts and the fact that cases can sometimes stretch out over years, district courts must have discretion and authority to ensure that their cases move to a reasonably timely and orderly conclusion.” Chrysler Int'l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002). Whether to grant any extension is vested in the discretion of the Court. See Compass iTech, LLC v. eVestment All., LLC, 14-81241-CIV, 2017 WL 1290849, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2017) (“A district court is not obligated to extend the discovery deadline, and may ‘hold litigants to the clear terms of the scheduling order.’ ”) (quoting John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (USA) v. Andrews, No. 1:15-CV-3715-WSD, 2015 WL 9255554, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2015)) (quoting Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011)). Exercising that discretion here, the Court does not find good cause to grant yet another extension in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

The Joint Motion for Trial Continuance (Doc. 96) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of December, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the Court's direction, the parties submitted a supplement to support their motion. Doc. 98.

2.   Velocity's counsel suggested that the Court close all discovery on January 30, but allow the parties to have until February 28, to take the depositions of Rashada, his father, Harlen Rashada, his two agents, Thomas Thomsen and Jackson Zager, and their agency JTM Sports. As discussed at the hearing; to do that, the Court would have to also extend the expert discovery deadline, which would then push the dispositive and Daubert motion deadlines. The Court requires parties to meet and confer before filing a motion to compel and appreciates efforts to narrow issues the Court must address. However, the fact that Defendants allowed Rashada's counsel to lull them into non-action by promises of additional production and cooperation is a problem of their own creation.

3.   Plaintiff has disclosed one expert. Defendants state that they expect to disclose up to 3 experts. Defendants' expert disclosure deadline is December 19.

HOPE THAI CANNON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE